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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
PART 1: ASSESSMENT OF THE EVALUATIONS OF THE 
ASYLUM POLICY 
 
The issue is a key one since The Hague Programme requested in 2004 the Common 
European Asylum to be build upon a thorough and complete evaluation of the legal 
instruments that have been adopted in the first phase. This evaluation should be 
systematic, efficient, impartial and objective and have not only a legal purpose by dealing 
with the implementation of the asylum instruments, but also a political one by covering the 
effectiveness and impact of the asylum policy. 
 
The Commission adopted to follow up this request a Communication on the evaluation of 
EU policies on Freedom, Security and Justice on 28 June 2006.  The mechanism conceived 
in three steps (information gathering, reporting and evaluating strategically) was based on 
factsheets containing indicators to be completed by Member States and would have been 
implemented twice every five years. The Council adopted on 19 June 2007 conclusions 
restraining the proposal of the Commission. Due to the lack of support of Member States 
considering it too burdensome, this mechanism has never been implemented. In practice, 
the evaluation of the asylum policy consequently took place on the basis of the existing 
methodology and means. They are based on the “Scoreboard +” (see below) and the 
standard reporting provisions included in the final provisions of the legal instruments 
adopted by the EU that are insufficient.  
 
The evaluations conducted suffer from several weaknesses - firstly, not on a political, but 
rather from a more or less purely legal perspective. This has been the case for the 
evaluation of the directives on reception conditions for asylum seekers and on the definition 
and status of protected persons and in particular for the Dublin Regulation and the Frontex 
Agency, with nevertheless some improvement for the directive on asylum procedures. 
Secondly, no horizontal approach evaluating the instruments in the broader context of the 
asylum policy and including cross-cutting issues, but a merely vertical approach focusing on 
each of the instruments separately. The fact that impact assessments that are normally ex-
ante evaluating tools about the possible impact of an instrument in the future, have been 
used to replace (in the case of the qualification and asylum procedures directives) or 
complete ex-post evaluations reveals the difficulties of the Commission to conduct proper 
evaluations. The results show that the evaluations have not been systematic, neither 
efficient but fairly objective, even if the report about the Dublin regulation is not impartial 
as it has been driven in function to the single minded preference for the status quo.  
 
Several reasons explain this situation. Aside from the fact that evaluations are sometimes 
requested too early due to the political agenda before there is enough insight concerning 
the implementation of instruments by Member States, the main reason is a lack of 
appropriate evaluating tools and data. 
 
The Scoreboard qualified “plus” because it covers not only the European but also national 
level, is a purely quantitative tool measuring the progress of the policy regarding the 
adoption of the expected instruments towards the agenda contained in the five years policy 
programmes and action plans. The standard provision1 contained in the final provisions of 
                                                 
1  Reading like following: “Not later than/ by (date) the Commission shall report to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the application of this Directive/ Regulation/ Decision in the Member 
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legal instruments adopted by the EU and included in the asylum directives or regulations, 
has no political purpose. It limits the scope of the evaluation to the application and not the 
impact or effectiveness of the instruments without specifying the information to be 
provided by the Member States to the Commission. Despite the fact this is not limited to 
Asylum, it is still a general problem after fifty years of European Law and it is striking that 
even the legal information that the Member States are requested to transmit to the 
Commission does not include at least a table of concordance between the provisions of 
European directives and national provisions of transposition2. Only the decisions related to 
the European Refugee Fund contain more adequate provisions on evaluation due to the fact 
that they concern a financial instrument whose efficiency is more scrutinised. There is also 
a problem due the lack of statistical data in the field of asylum.  
 
The absence of a mechanism for monitoring Human Rights is particularly problematic due 
to the fact that asylum has been included under article 18 in the EU Charter that is legally 
binding since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. If the Commission checks the 
conformity of its legislative proposals with the Charter, the Fundamental Rights Agency 
does not have a mandate to control the respect of human rights by the EU and its Member 
States, but only to provide them with assistance and expertise. Finally, the costs of 
gathering the information necessary to adequately evaluate the effectiveness of European 
and national instruments might be considered to high by Member States as it was the case 
during the discussions of the Council conclusions of 19 June 2007 on the Evaluation of EU 
policies on Freedom, Security and Justice. 
 
There are fortunately several elements that should or could lead to an improvement of the 
evaluation in the field of asylum. 
 
Firstly, the regulation 862/2007 of 11 July 2007 on community statistics on migration and 
international protection is applicable in practice since 2008 and will provide lacking data in 
the field of asylum, even if it does not cover adequately all the fields of asylum where some 
gaps not filed by specific provisions of the concerned instruments will remain. Secondly, the 
Quality Initiatives promoted by the UNHCR in the United Kingdom since 2003, in eight 
Central and Easter countries since 2008 and envisaged for five more Southern Member 
States contribute to the evaluation of the quality of the concrete functioning of the national 
asylum systems and incite the participating States to set up internal quality review 
mechanisms. Thirdly, the European Asylum Support Office created by Regulation 439/2010 
of 19 may 2010, will contribute notably to improve the availability of data and information 
about the implementation of European and national rules regarding asylum and their 
comparability. This new office will also have a reporting mission on the situation of asylum 
in the Union that could nevertheless be limited to its own activities due to the fact the 
legislator has not tasked it with a function of evaluation that could nevertheless be added 
to its missions in the future.  
 
Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon paves the way for an improvement of the evaluation of the 
asylum policy in the European Union. Article 70 TFEU provides a special legal basis for the 
creation of a new evaluating mechanism. The fact that it is based on peer review of States 
by States will have the advantage to encourage them to provide the necessary information 
while the collaboration with the Commission will guarantee the required objectivity and 
impartiality of the process. On the contrary, the exclusion of the European Parliament of a 
                                                                                                                                                            
States and shall propose any amendments that are necessary. The Member States shall send the 
Commission all the information that is appropriate for drawing up this report.” 
2  This leads often the Commission to externalise lengthy studies to legal experts obliged to loose time 
by looking for information that Member States have or should have. 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 30 
mechanism aiming at evaluating European policies where the Assembly has a co-decision 
power is incomprehensible. The Stockholm programme devotes a lot of attention to 
evaluation and even quotes asylum procedures as a priority field to this end. There seems 
to be the necessary political will to improve evaluation in the field of asylum. The future will 
tell us if this will translate into reality.  
 
PART 2: ASSESSMENT OF THE ASYLUM ACQUIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE SHORT 
TERM 
CHAPTER 1: DISTRIBUTION OF APPLICANTS FOR 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROTECTED PERSONS 
1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
This Chapter addresses CEAS instruments on the distribution of applicants for protection 
and of protected persons. The key instrument in this area, indeed the sole significant 
“distributive” instrument adopted to date, is the Dublin system. Current proposals for the 
second phase of the CEAS do not prefigure a profound restructuring of its “distributional” 
components but essentially focus on the Commission proposal to recast the Dublin 
Regulation. The Proposal does not purport to alter the general scheme of the Dublin 
system. Instead, the Commission has taken the approach of “confirm[ing] the principles 
underlying [the Dublin Regulation], while making the necessary improvements”. The first 
and welcome such improvement consists in fully extending the scope of the Dublin system 
to all applicants for international protection and not only to asylum seekers. The other 
suggestions for improvement put forward by the Commission aim to tackle a number of 
deficiencies observed in the operation of the Dublin system, in pursuance of two 
overarching goals: to increase the system’s efficiency and to ensure higher standards of 
protection for persons falling under the Dublin procedure.  
 
This Chapter examines these proposals in detail, against the background of current Dublin 
practice, and in light of protection principles relevant to the operation of the Dublin system. 
The analysis is organised in five thematic sections, each discussing key problem areas in 
relation to the Dublin system: guarantees against refoulement; protection of family unity 
and integration-related concerns; protection of vulnerable persons, including children; 
distributive fairness and the burden-concentrating effects of the system on “border” States; 
and finally, concerns relating to the effectiveness of the Dublin system and to the adverse 
impacts it has on the CEAS as a whole. In each area, possible solutions are considered in 
the context and within the constraints of the current recasting procedure. The Recast 
Proposal includes a number of welcome suggestions to correct the shortcomings of the 
Dublin system, but leaves a number of problems standing. Some of these will need to be 
tackled in the long term, through a reconsideration of the Dublin system as a whole. 
Setting up a Common European Asylum System:  
Report on the application of existing instruments and proposals for the new system 
 31 
2. MAIN PROBLEM AREAS IDENTIFIED IN RELATION TO 
THE DUBLIN SYSTEM 
 
Our first finding is that the Dublin Regulation falls short of ensuring compliance with the 
principle of non-refoulement, generating instead risks of refoulement. This is the result of 
two concomitant problems. The first such problem is that sufficient guarantees against 
refoulement and ill-treatment are not available always in the responsible State. On the one 
hand, and specifically, the interplay of the Dublin system with procedural rules (e.g. 
interruption in case of withdrawal) has demonstrably prevented asylum seekers from 
accessing a meaningful asylum procedure in the responsible State. On the other hand, in 
the context of widely diverging protection and reception standards, there are persistent 
concerns that the practices of some Member States fall short of ensuring fair asylum 
procedures (due to e.g. insufficient procedural guarantees, the application of unduly 
restrictive qualification criteria or reliance on flawed risk assessments) and dignified 
standards of living. The “sending” Member States could of course obviate to this, and 
prevent any risk of refoulement, through a principled application of the sovereignty clause. 
However – and this is the second problem – this second line of protection is also performing 
well below the standard of a full and inclusive application of the non-refoulement principle. 
Thus, first instance Dublin procedures fall short of basic standards of fairness and effective 
remedies against transfers are not always available in the “sending” State. Furthermore, in 
several member States, national administrations and courts are not in the position, or not 
willing, to meaningfully scrutinise the risks incurred by the asylum seeker in the responsible 
State, leading to an over-reliance on safety presumptions and an underestimation of the 
risks incurred by the asylum seeker. 
 
The second problem area is that of protection of family-unity and integration-related 
concerns. The Dublin criteria on family unity are shown to be restrictively framed and 
applied, falling well short of ensuring respect for the fundamental right to family life. The 
sovereignty and humanitarian clauses, which could in principle correct this shortcoming, 
are not consistently applied to this end. Moreover, the Dublin regulation disregards “close 
links”, other than family ties, between asylum seekers and a particular Member State, 
which has a negative impact on the integration and well-being of asylum seekers, as well 
as on the efficiency of the Dublin system. 
 
In a third section, the Chapter discusses problems concerning the protection of vulnerable 
persons -including children- in the Dublin system. While the Dublin Regulation explicitly 
refers to international obligations and humanitarian standards as an integral part of the 
Dublin scheme, it does not make provision for specific safeguards in regard to applicants 
with special needs, a lacuna which has given rise to unsatisfactory practice. More 
specifically, reception conditions of vulnerable persons in the State carrying out the Dublin 
procedure are of concern, both due to gaps in the legal framework (e.g. absence of firm 
obligations to institute a “screening procedure” to identify special needs), and to its 
misapplication (e.g., instances where the Reception Conditions Directive is not applied to 
persons subject to the Dublin procedure). Furthermore, the Dublin Regulation does not 
make provision for “fit for transfer” screening, nor does it include sufficient guarantees 
ensuring the continuity of treatment of vulnerable persons in the “receiving” State, after 
the transfer. Such shortcomings have not been made good by Member State practice, and 
have resulted in serious -on occasion even fatal- harm. 
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In regard to unaccompanied minors, the Dublin Regulation does not adequately reflect the 
principle that in all actions relating to children, the child’s best interest must be a primary 
consideration. Insufficient consideration for other child-specific guarantees, such as 
adequate representation, is also highlighted, and it is shown that these lacunae in the legal 
framework have paved the way for unsatisfactory practice in the Member States. More 
particularly, Member State practice shows that Dublin transfers are carried out even when 
in conflict with the best interest of the child, and that Member States rely excessively on 
uncertain age-assessment techniques or even treat age-disputed applicants as adults. 
The fourth problem area taken up is that of distributive fairness and the burden-
concentrating effects of the system on “border” States. It is shown that the Dublin system 
in some cases aggravates the imbalances in the distribution of asylum seekers, with 
detrimental effects in terms of effectiveness and protection. Though not meant to realise a 
“fair sharing of responsibilities”, the Dublin system is however intended to contribute to a 
fair sharing, but due to its distributive concept, linking together responsibility and irregular 
entry into the EU, the system does entail additional burdens on some Member States that 
are under particular migratory pressure because of their geographical location, and that 
have limited reception and absorption capacity.  
 
Lastly, this Chapter mentions the problem of the inefficiency of the Dublin system as a 
whole. Available information indicates that the number of effected transfers is much lower 
than the number of accepted transfers, and that the overwhelming majority of asylum 
applications are examined where they are first lodged. These structural problems indicate, 
first, that many of the resources invested in the operation of the system are ultimately 
wasted and, second, that the Dublin criteria have a minimal impact in practice – or more 
pointedly, are unworkable in practice. We also note that the Dublin system considerably 
delays access to asylum procedures. While these deficits may in part be due to technical 
problems, such as inappropriate deadlines or un-clarity of rules, it is argued that they are 
more likely due to key structural features of the system – and more particularly, to the fact 
that the system insufficiently takes into consideration the interests of asylum seekers, 
inciting them to evade its application, e.g. by absconding or by disposing of travel 
documents. The impacts of such uncooperative behaviour go beyond the mere inefficiency 
of the Dublin system. By inducing asylum seekers to engage in uncooperative behaviour, 
the Dublin system adversely affects the ability of Member States to carry out efficient 
asylum and return procedures, and it undermines efforts for an orderly management of 
migration. Furthermore, to the extent that it induces bona fide refugees to abscond or to 
engage in behaviour otherwise undermining their protection chances, the system arguably 
contradicts the Treaty goal of “offering appropriate status to any third-country national 
requiring international protection” (art. 78 TFEU). 
3. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
With regard to insufficient guarantees against refoulement and ill-treatment in the 
responsible State, and more specifically the issue of impaired access to the asylum 
procedure, it is suggested that Dublin returnees be given a clear right to have their case re-
opened, or to lodge an appeal, on return to the responsible State. Art. 18(2) of the Recast 
Proposal lays down an explicit guarantee that the responsible State must examine the 
application including by re-opening the case, if the examination of the claim has been 
discontinued due to “withdrawal”. This proposal would partially solve the problem. 
However, in view of providing for more complete protection, it is recommended to take the 
Presidency Compromise text as a basis and to further amend it in order to eliminate its 
current ambiguities. In regard to the problem of failing protection and reception standards 
in the responsible State, the study emphasises that there are no solutions to be expected 
Setting up a Common European Asylum System:  
Report on the application of existing instruments and proposals for the new system 
 33 
from a reform of the Dublin system. Indeed, the goal of ensuring that adequate and 
equivalent standards of reception and protection are applied throughout the Dublin area is 
a long-term goal, which can only be achieved through decisive advances in harmonisation 
and, arguably, strengthened supervision, capacity building, and burden-sharing. 
 
Concerning the problem of insufficient procedural guarantees against refoulement in the 
sending State, the Commission proposes the introduction of strengthened guarantees in the 
Dublin procedure: a comprehensive right to information, the right to a hearing and, 
importantly, a truly effective remedy against Dublin transfer. These proposals are fully 
supported in their original form, subject to a helpful amendment introduced by the 
Parliament, regarding a minimum 10 days deadline to file an appeal against Dublin 
transfers. With regard to the problem of over-reliance on safety presumptions, the Recast 
Proposal includes an innovative mechanism for the general suspension of transfers to 
Member States where “systemic” risks of refoulement or ill-treatment exist. This collective 
suspension mechanism should be maintained, although the substantive and procedural 
rules relating to its functioning should be improved in order to ensure that it is indeed 
applied in a protection-minded perspective. Another important measure would be to clarify 
Member States’ responsibilities in preventing refoulement through suitable amendments 
(fully set out in the Chapter) to the preamble of the Dublin Regulation. This would prevent 
the establishment of the collective suspension mechanism from sending wrong and 
dangerous signals to national administrations, e.g. that the Commission is solely 
responsible to avoid refoulement in Dublin context. 
 
As regards the problem of the overly restrictive criteria on family-unity and the ensuing 
human rights concerns, the proposed reforms of the family definition and family criteria go 
some way towards solving the issues arising under the right to family life. There is 
nonetheless scope for improvement. Thus, art. 11 of the Recast Proposal should refer to “a 
family member or relative” and not only “a relative”; the enumeration of dependency 
situations should be made non-exhaustive and a new procedure should be introduced 
ensuring the identification of a responsible State in every case. It is also advised that the 
European Parliament reopen a discussion with the Commission and Council on whether, and 
how far, some stark “status” limitations, which are left untouched by the Recast Proposal, 
are indeed justified by public interest considerations. Concerning special provisions on 
minors, the Recast Proposal includes a number of welcome proposals, such as making it 
clear that the “best interest” principle applies throughout the procedures; clearly requiring 
Member States to trace the family of unaccompanied minors; and extending the definition 
of “family members”. In this last respect, a reformulation of art. 2(i)(v) of the Recast 
Proposal is suggested so as to ensure that adult siblings of a minor applicant are included 
in the definition. A possible rewording for the “time rule” in art. 7(3) of the Recast Proposal 
is also put forward, in recognition of the fact that although the original provision suggested 
by the Commission is flawed, its underlying concept is worth maintaining. 
 
In this context, we would recommend that the European Parliament reconsider some of the 
amendments it has adopted at first reading – particularly, that it revert to the original 
Commission proposals to consider married minors as family members of their parents and 
siblings, provided that it is in line with the “best interest” principle, and to ensure family 
reunification for unaccompanied minors to the extent possible in the framework of art. 8 of 
the Recast Proposal. It is important to stress that even if all our recommendations were 
followed, gaps in the protection of family unity would remain, and the discretionary clauses 
would retain their importance. The Proposal introduces welcome amendments to the 
clauses themselves and to the Preamble of the Regulation. It is further recommended, as a 
short-term measure, to broaden the scope of the humanitarian clause in order to 
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encompass “close ties” beyond family ties. This would be a small step towards addressing 
the broader issue of integration, though real solutions to this problem would require 
rethinking the whole distributive concept underpinning the Dublin Regulation. 
 
With regard to problems relating to the protection of vulnerable persons, and their 
reception during Dublin procedures more specifically, recital 9 of the Recast Proposal seeks 
to ensure the full application of the Reception Conditions Directive. This initiative is 
welcome, as well as the suggestion to set up an identification procedure (art. 21 of the 
Reception Conditions Recast Proposal). The strengthened information rights and procedural 
guarantees, provided in articles 4-5 and 26 of the Recast Proposal, are also supported in 
the perspective of improving the protection of vulnerable persons. Taken together, these 
proposals would help ensuring appropriate identification and treatment of vulnerable 
applicants at all stages of the asylum process. Concerning fitness to travel and continuity of 
care, the Recast Proposal assists in ensuring that the Dublin system is applied with due 
regard to the physical and mental integrity of vulnerable applicants, laying down the 
principle that applicants may be transferred only if “fit for transfer”, and that relevant 
information must be exchanged between the Member States concerned. It is recommended 
that these useful proposals be strengthened by the inclusion of a mandatory “fit to travel” 
screening in the Regulation.  
 
Regarding unaccompanied minors, it is suggested that the “horizontal” guarantees for 
minors (a clear affirmation of the “best interest” principle, the obligation to ensure 
adequate representation in all Dublin procedures and a requirement of age-sensitive 
communication) be strengthened in all Dublin procedures, along the lines of the Recast 
Proposal. In addition, the requirements of independence and qualification for the minor’s 
representative should be better clarified. A properly conducted “best interest” 
determination, along the lines of art. 6 of the Proposal, would have the potential of solving 
the problem of transfers that are carried out even when in conflict with the “best interest” 
principle. However, practice suggests that Member States have not been unaware of 
relevant principles in the past, but have rather sidelined them in favour of the effective 
implementation of transfers. Owing to the special vulnerability of unaccompanied minors, 
the Commission’s proposal to introduce a “hard and fast” rule exempting them in part from 
“take back” transfers merits further consideration. Finally, the Commission Proposal does 
not address the issue of age assessment. The European Parliament has adopted welcome 
amendments in this regard, although they would be usefully complemented by a principle 
whereby applicants must be given the benefit of the doubt in case of uncertainty. 
 
Concerning the lacking distributive fairness of the Dublin system, the Recast Proposal 
foresees the establishment of a mechanism for the suspension of transfers to overburdened 
States. This proposal is considered positive, though it is recommended it be further 
improved by enlarging the conditions for triggering the mechanism. The solution is not 
considered as complete however, and the distributive imbalances currently observed in the 
CEAS are seen to require more decisive steps forward in the establishment of permanent 
burden-sharing mechanisms, as also demanded by the European Parliament at first 
reading. 
 
Regarding the final problem area, the inefficiency of the Dublin system, it is highlighted 
that the Recast Proposal includes a number of technical amendments designed to ensure a 
smoother operation of the Dublin system, such as new or revised deadlines, clarifications 
on contested points and the generalisation of conciliation procedures. Though it is 
acknowledged that these amendments may in part mitigate the observed problems, it is 
argued that they fail to tackle the key factor behind the considerable efficiency deficit of the 
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Dublin system: the fundamental unfairness of the Dublin system to asylum seekers. In the 
view of the authors, true solutions to this problem can only come from a reconsideration of 
the Dublin system as such, i.e. from its replacement with a more integration-friendly 
system, capable of attracting widespread compliance from asylum seekers.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE QUALIFICATION DIRECTIVE 
1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
This part of the Assessment analyses problematic aspects of the current text of the 
Qualification Directive (qualification part of this instrument, while status part is only 
referred to on several connected aspects) and proposes short-term solutions. The problems 
were identified taking into account first of all the objectives of the Directive, namely:  
 
– To ensure a minimum level of protection in all MSs for those in need of protection; 
– To reduce disparities between MS legislation and practice;  
– To limit secondary movements. 
 
The need to align Member State obligations with the Geneva Convention and international 
human rights law was taken into account, as required by Art. 78(1) TEU. Proposals were 
developed with solution orientation in mind and considering the effectiveness, efficiency 
and coherence, as well as social impacts and impacts on fundamental rights as suggested 
in the 2009 Commission Impact Assessment. Since the Commission presented its’ Recast 
Proposal for Qualification Directive on 21 October 2009, some of the problems identified 
and proposals to deal with them are already included in Commission’s suggestions. Also, 
due to recast legislative technique possibility of amendments to the Directive is limited to 
what the Commission suggests. However the authors have kept also suggestions that go 
beyond the Recast Proposal. It is believed that the Commission unnecessary overlooked 
some of the key issues, which will not be addressed right now, but will remain relevant in 
view of implementing the Stockholm Programme. The analysis of problems and proposed 
solutions is presented in the order of sequence of articles in the directive. 
2. MAIN PROBLEMS  
 
Several issues have been identified in the problem analysis part and they relate to the 
following provisions of the Directive: refugee status inclusion provisions (sur place claims, 
non-state actors of protection, internal relocation alternative, prosecution for conscientious 
objection, possible nexus between lack of protection and persecution grounds, cumulative 
test of social group and gender related aspects), grounds of subsidiary protection and 
exclusion and cessation provisions for refugee status and subsidiary protection. 
 
In terms of international protection inclusion provisions, the following provisions are of 
concern:  
 
1. Refusal of protection when a person creates the circumstances leading to 
protection needs: art. 5(2) comes close to requiring the “continuation of 
convictions“ as a condition for a well-founded fear or real risk, while it is not 
necessary under the Refugee Convention. Art. 5(3) provision may raise concern 
with regard to compliance with the Refugee Convention, as the latter does not 
provide for any limitations of protection in cases when a person himself/herself 
creates the circumstances leading to protection needs. 
 
2. Non-state protection and the notion of protection without the mandatory 
requirement of effectiveness: while the Refugee Convention requires state 
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protection, Art. 7(1)(b) of the Directive allows the possibility of non-state 
protection. According to Art. 7(2), it is enough that state or non-state actors take 
“reasonable steps to prevent the persecution”, regardless of whether those steps 
lead to the effective protection of individuals or not.  
 
3. Internal protection alternative test in Art. 8 („the applicant can reasonably be 
expected to stay there“) is considered to be too general and not ensuring that 
alternative is accessible: it gives a complete discretion to the MSs and results in 
divergent interpretations of the concept across national jurisdictions. Article 8(3) 
allowing refuse protection despite technical obstacles to return might be 
evaluated as contrary to the Refugee Convention. 
 
4. Prosecution for conscientious objection is not covered by persecution as a basis 
for refugee status (Art. 9(2)(e)): as the recognition of conscientious objection is 
not specifically mentioned in the directive, the practice of MSs regarding 
persecution by prosecution of draft evaders varies a lot. Mentioning only 
excludable acts, the directive does not seem to cover other situations (i.e. 
conscientious objection in the absence of alternative to a military service). 
 
5. Possible nexus between lack of protection and persecution grounds is not included 
(Art. 9(3)): the rules of the Directive on the nexus with the Refugee Convention 
grounds are overly restrictive, because Art. 9(3) excludes possible link between 
the Convention grounds and the lack of protection. It often results in state 
practice that is not in conformity with existing case law on the Refugee 
Convention. 
 
6. Cumulative test of social group and weak reference to gender related aspects: 
art.10(1)(d) raises the issues related to cumulative application of “social 
perception“ and “protected characteristics“ requirements in social group test and 
to non-presumption of social group from gender related aspects alone. These 
provisions are weak, they give a broad discretion to the MSs and involve the risk 
that persecution on the basis of social group (in particular on the basis of gender) 
will not be sufficiently considered. 
 
One of the major concerns is that current scope of subsidiary protection in the directive is 
limited as does not cover all protection needs (Art. 15). As a result, a number of persons in 
need of international protection remain outside the scope of harmonisation among the MSs 
under the notion of subsidiary protection. This goes against the objective of the directive, 
which is to ensure minimum level of protection to all those in need. Secondly, there are 
significant disparities in MS practices while applying subsidiary protection, thus 
undermining the harmonisation objective and encouraging onward movements within the 
Union. Among the persons not currently covered by subsidiary protection in the Directive, 
but in need of protection are: 
 
– Persons who cannot be expelled because of the absolute obligation of MSs under 
non-refoulement (e.g. art. 3 ECHR). This may include persons who were denied 
status under the directive but cannot be returned; as well as persons who should 
be exceptionally protected as there is no adequate treatment in their home 
country. 
– Persons whose family life cannot be guaranteed in the home country based on 
Art. 8 ECHR or when interests of the child cannot be guaranteed in the country of 
origin. 
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– Victims of generalised violence and human rights violations to whom most MSs 
grant protection. On EU level, protection to these persons is provided under the 
Temporary Protection Directive, but only when they arrive in a mass influx 
situation, albeit not individually. This causes horizontal inconsistency between 
asylum instruments and disparities in MS practice as concerns the issuance of 
residence permits.  
– Persons left out because MSs interpret various notions in Art. 15(c) differently: 
for instance “internal armed conflict” is understood unevenly, as a result some 
MSs do grant protection and some not to individuals coming from the same 
countries of origin.  
 
The need to expand the scope of subsidiary protection should be clearly distinguished from 
purely compassionate situations (e.g. old age, integration in a host society or technical 
obstacles to return) which should continue to be part of MSs discretionary decisions (in the 
absence of internationally or regionally defined standards how to deal with these 
individuals).  
 
With regard to denial of protection (exclusion, cessation and revocation clauses), they are 
beyond permitted limits of MS’s obligations (Art. 14 (4-5), 17 (1), 19). Confusion of 
exclusion/cessation clauses with exceptions to non-refoulement, as well as obligatory 
exclusion from subsidiary protection disregarding the absolute prohibition of refoulement, 
poses a risk to compliance of MS practices with the Convention and the TEU, thereby 
undermining the objective of the Union to provide protection to those in need. There is an 
apparent confusion in the Directive itself, even more in MS practice, as concerns the correct 
application of mentioned notions. Two concrete practical and legal problems are identified: 
 
1. Art. 14(4) and 14(5) dealing with exceptions to non-refoulement include what 
constitutes de facto provisions on exclusion, going beyond what is permissible under 
the Refugee Convention. National security reasons and convictions for a “particularly 
serious crime” maintained as quasi-exclusion grounds under the revocation 
provisions may be potentially in breach of MS obligations under the Refugee 
Convention. Some MS merge provisions on exclusion with provisions that stem from 
exceptions to the principle of non-refoulement. However, there is a difference 
between denial (exclusion) and termination of refugee status. Hence, if using Art. 
14(4-5), refugee status is withdrawn, the person will no longer be considered as 
refugee and thus will not be able to enjoy the benefits mentioned in art. 14(6). 
 
2. Mandatory exclusion from subsidiary protection may run counter with prevailing 
international obligations of MS and “minimum standards” required by the TEU. In a 
number of MS exclusion is not required in all cases covered by Art. 17(1), since the 
MS refer to absolute obligations under non-refoulement (e.g. Art. 2 and 3 ECHR). In 
practice also, many MS grant to persons excluded from international protection 
other statuses, and this renders the obligatory exclusion rather symbolical. If the 
obligations under international human rights law are considered minimum standards 
as required, then requirement of the directive to mandatory exclude persons from 
subsidiary protection is below these standards. In MS practice, it has been noted 
that provisions on revocation, ending of or refusal to renew refugee status (Art. 14) 
or subsidiary protection status (Art. 19) have led to cases of deterioration due to 
this obligation to terminate the status.  
 
With regard to cessation provisions for refugee status and subsidiary protection (Art. 11, 
14(2), 16 and 19(4)), the practice shows that there is insufficient harmonisation of 
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requirements for application of cessation of protection across the MS. As a result, some 
Member States tend to examine the existence of current risk of persecution/harm rather 
than assessing the durability of eliminated risk along with availability of effective 
protection. This results in incorrect practical application of cessation thereby prematurely 
denying protection to persons who continue to be in need of it. Evidence collected by 
UNHCR, Odysseus network and ECRE suggests that:  
 
a. in some MS domestic law states additional grounds or overly wide grounds for 
cessation or exclusion or these grounds were interpreted in a liberal way resulting in 
revocation of status of many refugees;  
 
b. many MS have failed the rule on the burden of proof, which requires the authorities 
to “demonstrate on an individual basis” that the person has ceased to be a refugee 
or a person eligible for subsidiary protection. Refugee status cessation provisions 
became an issue before the Court of Justice which delivered a decision on 2 March 
2010 concluding that a person loses the status when, following a change of 
circumstances of a significant and non-temporary nature in the third country 
concerned, the circumstances which had justified the person’s fear of persecution no 
longer exist and he has no other reason to fear being persecuted. This Court 
decision clarified the application of cessation to a certain extent, however it would 
still be beneficial to clarify the provisions of the Directive in order to ensure better 
harmonisation of practices. If these issues are not addressed, the impact of the 
directive on secondary movements within the EU will continue to be insignificant and 
legal limbo situations for persons to whom protection was legally ended but who 
cannot de facto as yet enjoy national protection might become more frequent.  
3. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Solutions for problems identified suggest revision of QD provisions, where it is considered 
that the issue cannot be sufficiently resolved by the practice, Court jurisprudence or in 
other ways. With regard to international protection inclusion provisions of the Directive, the 
authors suggest to: 
 
– Delete the second part of Art. 5(2) (starting from the words “in particular”) and Art. 
5(3); Art. 7(1)(b) or limit it only to de facto state authority; the words “generally” 
and “inter alia“ in Art. 7(2); Art. 8(3); 
– Specify internal protection criteria in Art. 8(1) by making a reference to Art. 7 
criteria and the criteria of Salah Sheekh vs. Netherlands judgment of ECtHR, adding 
the word “access“ and deleting the word “stay“;  
– Amend Art. 9(2)(e) to include refusal to perform military service (and not only in a 
conflict) due to conscientious objection as a possible case of persecution; 
– Amend Art. 9(3) by adding a link between lack of protection and persecution 
grounds as a possible nexus in the refugee definition;  
– Amend Art. 10(1)(d) by stating that the requirements of “social perception“ and 
“protected characteristics“ are alternative and that gender related aspects are in 
particular relevant for both social group tests. 
 
Expansion of subsidiary protection to include all those really in need of protection would 
align the practice with the objective of the directive and ensure consistency with other 
asylum instruments. Explicit coverage of certain individuals will limit the disparities that 
exist in MS legislation and practice and reduce the onward movements within the Union. 
From a practical and financial point of view, expansion of subsidiary protection should not 
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bear significant implications, as a number of MS already protect those persons under 
national law and many grant them certain rights. Proposal includes: 
 
a. Supplement Art. 15 with paragraph 2 requesting MS to grant subsidiary protection 
also in cases when international obligations prevent expulsion; 
 
b. Recital 26 should be deleted, as well as the terms “individual threat” and “internal or 
international armed conflict” in Art. 15(c); amend Art. 17(1) and 19 to state that 
exclusion from subsidiary protection should only be considered when there is no 
issue of absolute prohibition of refoulement based on the circumstances of the case. 
 
With regard to denial of protection, the authors suggest that: 
 
1. To prevent misinterpretation by MS of Art. 14(4) and (5) as exclusion or cessation 
clauses (which already happens in practice), these provisions should be moved to 
Status Rights’ part of the Directive. This would ensure that MS apply this article 
strictly as termination of “residence status” (“asylum” in the meaning of the EU 
Charter on Fundamental Rights), rather than refugee status or subsidiary 
protection as such, which would also ensure the elimination of risks pertaining to 
compliance with the Refugee Convention. 
 
2. Art. 2 would benefit from defining the concept of exclusion and revocation. Such a 
clarification would reduce disparities in MS exclusion practices and ensure 
compliance with the Refugee Convention.  
 
3. Observance of MS obligations under human rights law may only be ensured if a 
requirement is introduced to apply exclusion/revocation and  when there is no 
issue of absolute prohibition of refoulement based on the circumstances of the 
case. Alternatively, provisions on exclusion should be stated in non-obligatory 
terms in these Articles. As a result, only those persons falling under art. 17 and 
with regard to whom no international obligations apply would be excluded and 
effectively removed from the territory of the EU. 
 
As the practice of several MS shows that they do not apply the cessation provisions 
correctly, clarification on what cessation means through defining it among the main notions 
in art. 2 of the Directive would ensure better harmonisation of MS cessation practices, 
reduce the number of cases of preliminary rulings to the Court of Justice and secondary 
movements. This as a result would minimise occurrence of legal limbo situations for 
persons for whom protection was legally ended in a premature way, but who cannot de 
facto as yet enjoy national protection. It would also save resources that would be spent as 
a result of premature cessation and the need to examine the applications once again. The 
notion of cessation to be inserted in Art. 2 needs to include inter alia the requirement to 
assess the previous risk, the durability of its elimination, the absence of new risks and the 
availability of effective protection, as well as reinforce the difference between the right to 
protection and corresponding residence permit. 
 
The Commission in its Recast Proposal for Qualification Directive addresses a number of 
issues identified as concerns above. In regard to inclusion clauses, the Recast Proposal 
solves completely the problem in Art. 9(3), partly solves the problems in Art. 7, 8 and 
10(1)(d), but does not respond to problems in Art. 5 and 9(2)(e). The Proposal does not 
touch upon the scope of subsidiary protection, despite the evidence that not all persons in 
need of protection are currently eligible for protection under QD. The Recast Proposal does 
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not also address any of the legal and practical problems related to exclusion and revocation 
of status, presumably because of the sensitivity that exists around these issues among the 
MS. It is believed that cessation provisions will be resolved by the jurisprudence of the 
Court of Justice and practice of MS, but these issues are also not addressed. Given that a 
number of issues (exclusion, cessation, revocation and scope of subsidiary protection) fall 
beyond the negotiable limits of the Recast Proposal, these issues remain to be addressed in 
the future. 
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CHAPTER 3: STATUS OF PROTECTED PERSONS 
1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Two essential issues are dealt with in Chapter III related to the Status of Protected 
Persons: the detention of asylum seeker and the taking into account of the situation of 
vulnerable asylum seekers and vulnerable refugees having special needs. These two issues 
are analyzed in a horizontal way through the various relevant legal instruments of the EC 
(the reception conditions directive, the asylum procedure directive, the Dublin regulation 
and in addition the qualification directive regarding the second issue). The analysis focuses 
mainly on the content of the second generation of instruments that is the texts proposed by 
the Commission. The valuation of the Commission proposals can nevertheless imply an 
examination of the first generation instruments (texts currently into force). In addition, 
mentioning the texts proposed by the Parliament and/or the Council proves sometimes 
useful when these authorities have already come to a conclusion about the texts of the 
Commission.  
 
On the border between the above mentioned issues, a third one is tackled: the detention of 
vulnerable asylum seekers with special needs. This question is dealt with in the reception 
conditions directive proposal through the analysis of the texts of the Commission, the 
Parliament and the Council.  
1.1. The detention of asylum seekers: Main problems and 
Recommendations 
 
If one can underline, the fact that the loss of freedom has become commonplace for 
foreigners - including many asylum applicants - as an instrument used to control migratory 
flux, one must agree that from a legal point of view, taking into consideration international 
standards, asylum seekers can be subjected to detention. The main relevant international 
standards are found in article 31 of the Geneva Convention, article 9 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), article 5, § 1 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) and article 6 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. The 
case of law relating to them and the Court of Justice of the European Union case of law 
must also be taken into account. 
 
Thus the legal debate relating to the detention of asylum seekers does not question the 
principle of the detention itself but the basic conditions of the detention (including the 
reasons for detention), procedural guarantees and the framing of the conditions of 
detention.  The reception conditions directive Commission proposal is overall positive 
regarding these three elements. In addition, without any doubt, the introduction of the new 
articles 8 to 11 contributes to a better harmonization in the EC objective sought within the 
framework of the first phase of the CEAS. 
 
First of all, concerning the reasons for detention, the text restricts the loss of freedom to 
four cases only exhaustively listed (article 8 § 2, a) with d)). By doing so, from the point of 
view of the rights of asylum seekers the Commission proposal constitutes a progress in 
comparison with the reception conditions directive in force. This latter one leaves an 
important margin of appreciation to the Member States.  The reasons for detention 
suggested by the Commission do not cause any problem taking into consideration the 
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international law.  Nevertheless three of these reasons give way to interpretation and/or 
miss clearness. Thus details and/or modifications must imperatively be given to the 
wording.  
 
Beside the four reasons enumerated in the reception conditions directive proposal, the 
Commission has provided for a very specific reason in the Dublin regulation proposal. 
Article 27 § 2 of this text makes it possible to hold an asylum seeker subject to a decision 
of transfer to the State responsible for the determination of his application, if there is a risk 
of absconding. Detention due to a risk that the asylum seeker may abscond is thus limited 
to the case of a person under the Dublin procedure and subject to a decision of transfer.  
 
However, in the reception conditions directive proposal, the Council has added a fifth 
reason for detention being precisely the risk of absconding. Unlike the Dublin regulation 
Commission proposal, the risk of absconding mentioned by the Council is stated in a 
general and non-restrictive way: it applies to any asylum seeker regardless of the 
procedure and at any time.  
 
This raises the issue of a proper balance to be found between the right for the states to 
fight illegal immigration and the asylum seekers' right to freedom. The Council proposal 
does not ensure it. At the same time, the four reasons suggested by the Commission in the 
reception conditions directive proposal and the specific reason provided for in the Dublin 
regulation proposal do not apply to some situations and this create a legal gap. An 
arrangement was proposed to meet these problems.  
 
Concerning the asylum seekers’ guarantees, they are generally in conformity with the 
international law with the exception of a few points, (for example the applicant's right to be 
given information about the reasons for his/her placement in detention in a language 
he/she understands). 
 
The Council proposal deserves a special attention regarding the detention conditions, since 
in matter of lodging it sets an exemption likely to enter into conflict with the decisions of 
the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
Two important questions of principle must finally hold the attention of the Community 
legislator: the possible fixation of an optimal duration of detention and the application of 
principle of the reception conditions directive proposal to asylum seekers. This last issue 
should not be underestimated, considering the current position of a certain number of MS 
that consider that the reception conditions directive in force does not apply to asylum 
seekers. Even if the drafting of the reception conditions directive Commission proposal has 
reduced the risk of divergent interpretations, it has not managed to make it disappear 
totally. It is essential to add an explicit provision stipulating the application of principle of 
the directive to applicants hold in detention.  
1.2. Taking into account of the situation of vulnerable asylum 
seekers with special needs: main problems and 
Recommendations 
 
The reception conditions directive in force is the only Community instrument of first 
generation to give attention in a specific way to the situation of vulnerable asylum seekers 
with special needs. Indeed the Dublin regulation in force does not mention it and the 
directive procedure only touches the subject of the possible vulnerability of asylum seekers 
in an extremely marginal way. The situation of the identified refugees or the beneficiaries 
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of subsidiary protection is quite different, since provisions partly identical to the reception 
conditions directive in force can be found in the qualification directive. The asylum 
procedure directive Commission proposal and the Dublin regulation proposal clear up this 
problem. In the draft, specific provisions devoted to vulnerable asylums seekers are now 
envisaged.  
 
The European Council was asking for such a change: the Stockholm Program puts at the 
centre of the priorities of the Union a better protection of the vulnerable people. It is 
essential if one keeps in mind, among other cases, the children situation or the people who 
are victims of torture. The reception conditions directive in force provides itself several 
provisions relating to the situation of vulnerable asylum seekers - mainly articles 17 to 20-. 
Several reports however, have outlined the fact that many MS have failed to transpose 
and/or implement the aforementioned provisions. This is partly explained by the wording of 
the provision stating the general principle that the situation of vulnerable asylum seekers 
should be paid specific attention to (article 17). It does not expressly oblige the MS to set 
up a procedure of identification for these applicants, even if one can consider that this 
procedure is logically required by article 17 as the European Commission has underlined it 
in its report on November 26th 2007.  
 
In any event, the reception conditions directive Commission proposal gives an adequate 
answer to the problems. Indeed, with the new article 21, the MS are very clearly compelled 
to bring in procedures of identification in order to assess the individual situation of any 
asylum seeker aiming at identifying whether or not he/she has special needs. However the 
timing for the different stages must still be better defined in order to allow the identification 
of the vulnerable people throughout the procedure. Moreover, the reception conditions 
directive Commission proposal raises a problem of concept that is the determination of the 
people and the special needs one intends to meet. Written as it is, the interpretation and 
implementation of article 21 is unclear. These two elements must be thought over again. 
Insofar, the Council drafting of article 21 cannot in any case be accepted, as it mentions 
two distinct concepts without establishing any links between them making its interpretation 
and its implementation more than ambiguous. Under these conditions, a detailed proposal 
for an amendment of article 21 has been proposed.  
 
New protective provisions in favour of vulnerable asylum seekers with special needs are to 
be found in the asylum procedure directive Commission proposal (article 2, d and article 
20) and in the Dublin regulation Commission proposal (article 30). For this reason they 
should be fully approved. However two major drawbacks must be underlined in these two 
texts. First of all, the lack (or the insufficiency) of coordination between the various 
instruments of second generation regarding the issue of vulnerable applicants. If the set of 
problems can partly be seen in a different perspective according to the specific framework 
of instrument you are looking at, some links and/or similarity must be considered. Some 
clues are given to guide the EC legislator when tackling this first problem. Concerning the 
second drawback, the new provisions of the asylum procedure directive Commission 
proposal and the Dublin regulation Commission proposal can be compared with article 17 of 
the reception conditions directive in force. Indeed, even if these provisions protect asylum 
seekers having special needs, the States are not however, compelled to bring in specific 
procedures of identification in order to identify asylum seekers with special needs - as does 
article 17 of the reception conditions directive in force. 
 
Of course one can always argue, as the Commission pertinently did it for article 17, that it 
is logically required by these protective provisions, since the procedure of identification is 
“… a core element without which the provisions of the directive aimed at special treatment 
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of these persons will lose any meaning”. It does not in anyway mean that the lack of 
specific provision give way, with regard to the application of article 17, to many 
deficiencies. This absence of explicit provision creates also a legal insecurity. The problem 
is particularly acute concerning the people with mental health disability or concerning 
victims of torture or violence. Indeed, these are vulnerabilities uneasy to detect. At the 
same time, their identification is essential in order to be able to take these vulnerabilities 
into account within the framework of the asylum procedure itself (by adapting the 
modalities of the procedure) and also to acknowledge the possible link between these 
states of vulnerability and evidence, which can become grounds for international protection. 
It is consequently recommended to expressly set the obligation for the States to bring in a 
mechanism ensuring the identification of vulnerable asylum seekers with special needs.  
 
Finally concerning the qualification directive Commission proposal, the wording of the 
protective provision for vulnerable asylum seekers (article 20 §§ 3 and 4) cannot be 
implemented. Its drafting is identical to article 17 of the reception conditions directive in 
force. Consequently, the problem of express obligation for the States to bring in a 
procedure of identification remains. It is recommended to copy the drafting of the 
amendment related to article 21 of the reception conditions directive proposal even if some 
changes have to be made, as the people concerned are not asylum seekers but recognized 
refugees, or beneficiaries of subsidiary protection.  
1.3. Taking into account of the situation of vulnerable asylum 
seekers with special needs placed in detention: main 
problems and Recommendations 
 
The detention of vulnerable asylum seekers set as a principle is neither at variance with the 
EC legislation nor with the international law. The absence of banning of the principle itself 
of detention of vulnerable people does not mean their detention will be considered to be 
legal and non arbitrary in all circumstances. Probably, more often than for other people, the 
judge will be attentive to the fact that the detention is neither illegal nor arbitrary and that 
its conditions do not breach the international standards. With regard to the detention 
conditions, asylum seekers in detention should in theory profit from the implementation of 
the minimal standards of the reception conditions directive among which protective 
standards are in favour of vulnerable applicants. However this is not the case in many MS. 
There are two reasons for it: on the one hand, as it was underlined (Title 2), some MS 
consider that the reception conditions directive in force does not apply to asylum seekers in 
detention, on the other hand many MS have not set up yet the procedure of identification 
of vulnerable asylum seekers (Title 3).  
 
The reception conditions directive Commission proposal improves very efficiently the taking 
into account of these problems. Beside the answers that were already explained in titles 2 
and 3, a specific provision was added by the Commission in the reception conditions 
directive (article 11 § 5). The purpose of this provision is to avoid the loss of freedom of 
people whose physical or mental health condition could significantly deteriorate, as a result 
of the detention. Article 11 § 5 lays down the setting up of an individual examination, 
making it possible to assess the health condition of the applicant to appreciate how 
significantly it could be affected by detention. The Commission proposal should be fully 
accepted. One aspect of the individual examination must nevertheless be reformulated. The 
text of the Council is a retrograde step since it removed the reference to the individual 
examination envisaged by the Commission. This modification is likely to compromise the 
effective implementation of the stated principle. The text of the Council cannot 
consequently be accepted.  
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1.4. Common observation to titles 3 and 4 relating to vulnerable 
asylum seekers with special needs 
 
The instruments of second generation proposed by the Commission contain new protective 
provisions in favour of vulnerable asylum seekers. This is with no doubt positive. However, 
the Commission has not often provided the means to make it possible to ensure the 
implementation of these protective measures. This definitely implies to bring in procedures. 
Then another issue appears with respect to a multitude of examinations, procedures and 
mechanisms of assessment. The various actors on the ground should be solicited in order 
to think of relevant ways to establish links between these various procedures, or some of 
them. Such a reflection seems essential to ensure the viability of the CEAS.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE ASYLUM PROCEDURES DIRECTIVE (APD) 
1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
This part of the report analyses, on the basis of a diagram of the procedures (see annex to 
the chapter), the main weaknesses of the APD (vacuity and insufficiently of the current 
minimum common standards; wide margin of discretion given to Member States; 
multiplicity of provisional provisions; numerous possibilities to derogate to the basic 
principles and guarantees of Chapter II of the Directive) and the variety of the different 
facultative procedures (with several standstill clauses) actually foreseen by the Directive, to 
conclude that the APD provides more for a “variety of procedural standards” than for a 
“standard procedure” and lacks the potential to ensure, regardless the Member State 
concerned, fair and efficient examination of an application for international protection and, 
in addition to back up adequately the “Qualification Directive”.  
 
The principal aims pursued by the recast proposal of Directive of the Commission (single 
procedure for both forms of international protection; reinforcement of the procedural 
guarantees; simplification of the different procedures; modification of a number of notions 
and devices; enhancing gender equality and providing for additional safeguards for 
vulnerable applicants) are afterwards described, and the necessity is underlined to examine 
the recast programme of the second phase of the EU asylum instruments as a whole. 
 
It is referred to in the international legal framework which has to be taken into 
consideration, inter alia, to ensure the respect of the principle of non-refoulement (Geneva 
Convention; European Convention of Human Rights; International Convention on the Rights 
of the Child; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU). Attention is also paid to the 
necessity to control the compatibility of the recast proposal with fundamental rights and 
general principles of EU law, even as with the case law of the CJEU and the ECtHR. It is 
indeed essential to determine, when examining the different provisions of the recast 
proposal, what is legally required and what is more relied upon in a political debate 
between the different stakeholders. 
2. MAIN PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE 
BASIC PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES 
CONCERNING THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 
AT FIRST INSTANCE 
 
The recast proposal contains the establishment of a single asylum procedure for both forms 
of protection. The advantages of this option must be underlined. 
 
The report analyses the APD and the recast proposal to determine if the access to the 
procedure and the procedural guarantees offered are satisfactory. The general conclusion is 
that the recast proposal answers to a large part of the critics expressed about the APD, 
while some concerns remain: 
 
The right to remain during the procedure, even in case of extradition, has to be guaranteed 
taking into consideration the principle of non-refoulement and the absolute protection 
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against removal guaranteed by article 3 ECHR. The recast proposal answers this critic of 
the current text. 
 
Right to be informed and capacities of the determining authorities 
In order to avoid refoulement of asylum seekers in situation of mixed arrivals, border 
guards and immigration officials would benefit from training and clear instructions on how 
to answer asylum application and how to handle the needs of vulnerable groups. The recast 
proposal improves the capacities of the authorities, while an unjustified exception remains 
for the Dublin cases. In the same time, the identification of the authorities has to be 
clarified since the recast proposal continues to refer as well to “determining” as to 
“competent” authorities. The recast proposal contains also a new provision dedicated to the 
right to information of the applicant, namely in critical zones like transit zones. The 
effective access to the procedure depends indeed on this right to receive available and 
complete information.  
 
Personal interview 
The APD lists many exceptions to the right to the personal interview, while an oral hearing 
is important for an asylum seeker, even if its application seems inadmissible or grounded 
on undue reasons, or to rebut a presumption of safety in case of application of the concepts 
of “first country of asylum” (FCA), “(European) safe third countries” ((E)STC), and “safe 
countries of origin” (SCO). Even when a personal interview is provided by the APD, its 
requirements are too vaguely formulated. However, the right to be heard is guaranteed by 
CJ case law and required by the UNHCR. With this regard, the new procedural safeguards 
provided by the recast proposal contribute to the effectiveness of a fair and efficient 
procedure and by this way could reduce the percentage of appeal.  
 
Legal assistance 
The right to legal assistance is guaranteed by the APD but is limited. On the one side, its 
scope is problematic since the legal adviser could not have access to all the information 
contained in the applicant’s file. On the other side, this right is guaranteed at the own 
expenses of the asylum seeker because the right to free legal assistance is limited to the 
second (judicial) stage of the procedure. The recast proposal enlarges the access to the 
information of the applicant’s file and the right to free legal assistance. On the one side, 
this right is not yet limited to the procedures on appeal. On the other side, the proposition 
removes the possibility to refuse to grant the free legal assistance to other procedures than 
judicial procedures and to limit it only if the appeal or review is likely to succeed. The right 
to legal assistance is not subjected to discussion under EU law and in the ECHR that imply 
that the effectiveness of a judicial remedy is conditioned by the right to legal assistance. 
Even if this right is as such not absolute, the same principles apply to the right to free legal 
assistance at the second stage (judicial review) of the procedure. At the first stage of the 
procedure (administrative procedure), even if the texts and the case law are not so explicit, 
one can deduce from the CJ case law and from the necessity of the practice that a right to 
free legal assistance at the first stage has also to be recommended, taking into account the 
specificity of the asylum matter. 
 
Applicants with special needs 
One of the criticisms addressed to the APD is the lack of protection of the applicants with 
special needs. Only minors did benefit of a specific protection, while considered insufficient. 
Procedural rules have to be adapted to allow weaker applicants to be heard in right 
conditions. Moreover, to apply the same rules to situations significantly different, violates 
the principle of non-discrimination. Even if the recast proposal contains a new provision 
specifically dedicated to applicants with special needs, to guarantee an effective protection, 
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the recast proposal should also: 1°) define more precisely the protected groups; 2°) oblige 
the Member States to make a systematic monitoring to identify those groups, since an 
application is introduced; 3°) and clarify the guarantees provided to each subgroups of the 
applicants with special needs. 
 
Standards of examination 
In addition to the mere procedural provisions, the APD does also contain some rules on the 
examination of asylum applications (“standards of examination”). The question is if there is 
a need to better define those standards and if it would or not be possible to make concrete 
proposals in the amended Directive. Other ideas could be:  
 
1. to charge EASO to deal with issues of “recommended standards of examination” by 
issuing guidelines, from which Member States may deviate, but may be obliged in 
that case to register their differences;  
2. to realize, with the cooperation of EASO, experimental procedures concerning, inter 
alia, “joint processing” of examinations;  
3. to incorporate Article 4 of the “Qualification” Directive in the APD. 
3. MAIN PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CON-
CERNING GUARANTEES FOR A FULL EXAMINATION 
OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CLAIM 
 
The concrete application by each Member State of some concepts of the APD, like “FCA”, 
“(E)STC”, or “SCO”, could lead to deprive an asylum seeker to an access to an effective 
protection because he will not benefit of a full examination of the substance of his/her 
application. All the specific uses of the different forms of the “safe countries” concept raise 
similar concerns: the question of the illegal entry and/or of the individual examination of 
the claim; the criteria for the determination of countries as “safe”; the determination of the 
authorities that should be responsible in such cases; the meaning of “effective protection” 
in the country considered as safe; the question of the “necessary link” between the 
applicant and the third country concerned; the specific treatment of minors or vulnerable 
persons when applying those concepts. Even if some improvements are inserted in the 
recast proposal, they are not sufficient. In each case, the right to rebut the presumption of 
safety has to be explicitly recognized by the directive, as well on the procedural level as on 
the substantial level. The concept of CEAS is also not consistent with the option to refer 
only to “national” lists rather than to adopt “common EU” lists, with the possibility to 
involve the EASO. Moreover, about: 
 
– the FCA, the terms “sufficient protection” are too weak and could be replaced by 
“effective [and available] protection”.  
– the STC: a removal to such a country could only occur on the basis of an agreement 
which clearly outlines the respective responsibility of the Member State and of this 
country;  
– the SCO: providing that the use of those lists of SCO does not increase the burden 
of proof for the asylum-seeker, that each individual case will be examined fully on 
its merits, and that procedural guarantees are offered, the establishment of those 
lists could be acceptable. However, since the procedural guarantees required are the 
same than in the regular procedure, one may wonder if the complexity involved by 
this concept is really necessary for the Member States; 
– the ESTC: if we consider that the same procedural guarantees would apply as for 
the STC, this concept would better be abandoned. 
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4. MAIN PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE 
ORGANISATION OF THE DIFFERENT ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PROCEDURES AT FIRST INSTANCE 
 
At the hand of a comparative diagram (see annex to the chapter), the accent has first been 
put on the complexity of the procedures provided by the APD and o n the effort of 
simplification that has been pursued in the recast proposal. At the end of this examination, 
we can conclude that the new framework of procedures proposed could be considered as 
much more accessible and comprehensive than the one actually provided by the APD. It 
would be theoretically possible, but unreasonable in practice, to plaid for the abolition of 
any kind of specific or accelerated procedure and for the use of only one procedure. Taking 
this into account, we can consider that the different procedures provided by the recast 
proposal are acceptable and in line with the international obligations of the Member States 
and with the case law of the CJ and of the ECtHR, in so far as: 
 
1. the number of those procedures is reduced (inter alia with the abolition of the 
stand still clauses);  
2. the power to decide on the merits of the claim is, as such as possible, given to the 
determining authority; 
3. and the minimal guarantees lay down in the regular (ordinary) procedure, which 
are also reinforced by the recast proposal, would also apply to the accelerated or 
specific procedures, unless it appears absolutely incompatible with the specificity of 
those procedures, but at the condition that the exceptions provided are conform 
with the case law of the CJ and of the ECtHR.  
 
Some comments or recommendations can however be made concerning some aspects of 
the new organization of the asylum procedures at first instance: 
 
– the recast proposal should be completed in order to determine the consequences 
of failure to adopt a decision a first instance within the determined time-limits; 
 
– concerning the “accelerated” procedures, which are now clearly distinguished 
from the “prioritized” procedures, the main problems posed by the APD are 
resolved by the recast proposal (limited list of cases; reinforcement of the 
procedural guarantees: personal interview; possibility to ask, at least, for a 
temporary suspensive effect of a judicial appeal), provided that time-limits to 
conduct such procedures should not be too short and that the applicant has to be 
given a realistic opportunity to prove his/her claim; 
 
– concerning the “inadmissible applications” procedure, it is suggested, in addition 
to what has already been said concerning the “FCA” and “(E)STC” concepts, to 
examine some risks confusions resulting from some provisions of the recast 
proposal: confusion between some cases of “inadmissible applications” procedure 
and some cases of “preliminary examination” procedure of subsequent 
applications; what are the requirements for the “admissibility (personal) 
interview” provided by Article 30 (1) recast proposal?; who will take the decision: 
the determining authority or another “competent” authority?); 
 
– the provisions of the recast proposal with regard the “border” procedure may be 
approved, but one concern remains: the fact that very short time frames that 
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would be applied by Member States, among other to introduce an appeal, could 
render very difficult the exercise of rights and obligations by the applicant; 
 
– the “preliminary examination “procedure of subsequent applications is, as a 
principle, acceptable. Concerning the APD, there are however some critics about 
the fact that this specific procedure can also be applied in circumstances where 
the first application has not been examined on its substance. It is indeed 
proposed in the recast proposal to modify the scope of this procedure that would 
only be applicable when a person makes a subsequent application after a final 
decision has been taken on the previous application or where the previous 
application has been explicitly withdrawn. It is also explicitly provided that, where 
a person with regard to whom a transfer decision has to be enforced pursuant to 
the “Dublin” Regulation, makes further representations or a subsequent 
application in the transferring State, those representations or subsequent 
application shall be examined by the responsible Member State in accordance 
with the “Asylum Procedures” Directive. It may be considered as a consequence, 
that most of the concerns expressed with regard to the scope of this procedure 
are met by the recast proposal. Concerning the foreseen exception to the right to 
stay in the territory during the administrative examination of a (second or 
multiple) subsequent claim after that a first subsequent claim has already been 
considered as “inadmissible” or as “(manifestly) unfounded”, further explanations 
would however be given on the following points:  
 
1. which right to an effective remedy against the expulsion or removal order: 
application of the “Return” Directive or of Article 41 recast proposal? 
2. what about the relations between the “competent” authority and the “determining” 
authority before such an order should be decided? 
 
– in cases of withdrawing of the recognized international protection status, the right 
to free legal assistance is only recognized once the “competent authority” has 
taken this decision; we do however not see how this difference of treatment can 
reasonably be justified with regard to the recognition of such right at all stages of 
the procedures in first instance. We also consider that the person concerned 
would have the right to a personal interview, in the place of a written statement 
of the reasons why it is not justified to withdraw the status, at least when he/she 
expressly request for such interview; 
 
– is it intentionally or not that the recast proposal does not more contain any 
provisions concerning “national security problems”? 
 
To conclude on this point, we recommend the Parliament to support the recast proposal 
and to examine if any proposed amendment to this proposal is at least in conformity with 
the case law of the CJ and of the ECtHR; we also suggest taking into consideration the 
problems mentioned above. 
5. MAIN PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE JUDICIAL PROTECTION PRO-
VIDED BY THE APPEAL BODIES AT FIRST INSTANCE 
 
The accent has first been put on the fact that the APD, which gives Member States a wide 
margin of discretion for the organization of the judicial remedy is far from given assurance, 
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such as demonstrated by the recent case law of the ECtHR (among other the possibility of a 
suspensive effect of a judicial appeal or the power recognized to the court or tribunal), that 
the national law or regulation of the Member States will effectively be in accordance with 
their “international obligations”. Therefore, this is not surprising that multiples differences 
appear between Member States with regard to the level of protection standards and 
procedural guarantees provided by each national judicial system. This statement does not 
conform with the aim pursued by the construction of the CEAS, among others, of a 
common asylum procedure with mutual recognition as the long term goal.  
 
Furthermore, taking into account the consequences of the entry into force of Article 47 CFR 
(and Article 19 (1) TEU) and the interaction with the recent case law of the CJ and of the 
ECtHR, we can consider that the aim of the Commission to introduce in the recast proposal 
the minimal requirements for an effective remedy is a good step forwards and that the 
minimal requirements provided in the recast proposal (among others: the access to 
information in the applicant’s file by the court or tribunal and/or by the applicant and/or 
his/her counsellor and/or representative; the right to (free) legal assistance and 
representation; the automatic suspensive effect of the appeal or, at least, the possibility to 
ask for this suspensive effect until a first decision of the court or tribunal on the arguability 
of the claim; the scope of examination by the court or tribunal [full examination of both 
facts and law/examination “ex nunc”/examination “proprio motu”]) in general, conform 
with the minimal requirements provided by the case law of the CJ and the ECtHR.  
 
Some specific recommendations have however been made in the report: 
 
– the introduction in the Directive of a common minimum time-limit to introduce an 
appeal, time-limit which could vary regarding the procedure, which has been 
applied to the specific case; 
 
– the recast proposal would also be amended to prevent that an expulsion order 
should be enforced during the time-limit open to lodge an appeal, or at least to 
ask for an interim measure of suspension which has expired; 
 
– the recast proposal would also be completed to determine the consequences of 
the overstepping of the time-limits imposed for the court or tribunal to examine 
an appeal.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF ASYLUM 
1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
The area of freedom, security and justice that the Union shall ‘offer to its citizens’, pursuant 
to article 3(2) TEU, is supposed to remain penetrable to ‘those whose circumstances lead 
them justifiably to seek access to our territory’. The Tampere Conclusions indeed 
established that “the aim is an open and secure European Union, fully committed to the 
obligations of the Geneva Refugee Convention and other relevant human rights instruments 
[…]” (§4). The Stockholm Programme has set out precisely that “people in need of 
protection must be ensured access to legally safe and efficient asylum procedures” (§1.1). 
At the same time, as the Tampere Conclusions recall (§3), “the need for a consistent 
control of external borders to stop illegal immigration and to combat those who organise it 
and commit related international crimes” is to be taken into account. According to the 
European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, a proper balance is thus to be struck so that 
“the necessary strengthening of European border controls [does] not prevent access to 
protection systems by those people entitled to benefit under them”. 
 
In an environment of extraterritorial border surveillance and migration control, several 
solutions have been posted to offer guarantees to those who seek protection in or access to 
the European Union with varying degrees of success. Some of these mechanisms focus on 
the regions of origin and transit of refugee flows, as vectors of the international system of 
protection, with the objective of enhancing their protection capacity to manage protracted 
situations. Other initiatives engage directly with the individual refugee and his physical 
access to the territory of the EU Member States in a safe and orderly way. Still other 
measures, particularly those concerned with border surveillance and migration control in 
general, appear to largely neglect their impact on asylum seekers’ and refugees’ rights. 
 
This chapter constitutes the contribution on the external dimension of asylum to the debate 
regarding the future development of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Our 
purpose is to identify the main legal questions regarding the administration of access to 
international protection in the EU Member States and to advance possible solutions. The 
chapter looks into the state of the art of the EU acquis on entry management with an 
impact on access to international protection, evaluating current shortcomings and putting 
forward short-term solutions. Future perspectives are assessed in Part III of the study. 
After a preliminary review of the obligations of the EU Member States with an effect on 
access to international protection, the measures adopted to administer migration in general 
are dealt with first. The Schengen Borders Code, visa policy, carrier sanctions, immigration 
liaison officers, and joint patrolling conducted under the auspices of the FRONTEX agency 
are all concerned. 
 
Subsequently, the policy instruments implemented to manage refugee inflows in particular, 
are examined. Both the EU Joint Resettlement Programme and Regional Protection 
Programmes are assessed in Chapter 5. Offshore processing schemes, protected-entry 
procedures as well as, our recommendation for a comprehensive approach to access in the 
form of an overall protection-sensitive entry-management system are evaluated in Part III.  
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2. MAIN PROBLEM AREAS IDENTIFIED WITH REGARD 
TO ACCESS TO PROTECTION 
 
EU Member States’ approach to the extraterritorial applicability of human rights obligations 
has been fragmentary thus far. There is no uniform understanding of the territorial scope of 
application of protection-related obligations, which risks seriously encroaching upon 
refugees’ and asylum seekers’ rights to protection against refoulement and to (leave to 
seek) asylum. There is a pressing need for a consistent approach to the issue of access to 
international protection in the EU, which requires the prior acknowledgment by the EU 
Member States of the mixed character of the migratory flows to which they are confronted 
and the recognition of extraterritorial protection-related obligations that may be engaged 
by the actions or omissions of their agents when they operate abroad. The rights of 
refugees and asylum seekers travelling in mixed flows should not be compromised by the 
extraterritorial intervention of the EU Member States. Those rights should be taken into 
account at all the stages in which the management of migration and asylum flows is carried 
out. If a priori there is no obligation to provide for international protection extraterritorially, 
where the EU and/or its Member States exert ‘effective control’ over an area in foreign 
territory or over persons abroad, for instance through the extra-territorialisation of their 
migration and asylum policies, their human rights obligations, as ensuing from international 
and EU law, may be engaged. In addition, international cooperation, be it with international 
organisations or with third countries, does not exonerate the Union or its Member States 
from their respective obligations. In these situations the persons concerned are brought 
under the jurisdiction of the Union and/or its Member States in such a way that EU law, 
including its fundamental rights’ acquis, becomes applicable and must be duly observed.  
 
In the absence of adequate monitoring and evaluation tools, the real impact of entry and 
pre-entry control measures on the rights of asylum seekers and refugees remains 
unknown. No such instruments exist with regard to the Schengen Borders Code, nor 
regarding visa policy or carrier sanctions. The information available with regard to the 
activities of Immigration Liaison Officers (ILOs) posted abroad is very limited, as is access 
to data concerning FRONTEX-led operations. Full disclosure is prevented by existing rules 
on the classification of risk analysis, evaluations and periodic reports in this domain. 
 
The integration of protection-related considerations in the design and implementation of 
existing instruments of entry and pre-entry control is presently unsatisfactory. Clear entry 
requirements for refugees and asylum seekers are lacking. Although article 13(1) SBC 
indicates that ‘special provisions concerning the right of asylum and to international 
protection’ may apply when dealing with entry refusals, it remains silent as for what these 
‘special provisions’ should concretely provide. All refugee-producing countries feature in the 
black list of Regulation 539/2001, putting a heavy burden to access international protection 
in the EU through the submission of refugees and asylum seekers to visa requirements. In 
addition, there are no uniform conditions for recognised refugees to obtain visas and the 
provisions on limited territorial validity visas (LTVs) seem insufficient to fully accommodate 
the obligations that might be owed to refugees yet-to-be-recognised in exceptional 
circumstances. Ultimately, actual access to visas is not guaranteed in practice, as the 
diplomatic presence of the EU Member States in the third countries concerned is not 
compulsory. Against this background, the articulation of carrier sanctions with the respect 
of refugees’ and asylum seekers’ rights in relation to access to international protection is 
highly problematic. Considering that visas are not always available, carriers should be 
enabled to carry out full entry checks on the basis of the SBC provisions and the exceptions 
thereof. Similarly, ILOs’ activities accommodation to the asylum dimension related to their 
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action is not obvious. Their main task is precisely to prevent irregular immigration, without 
particular regard being had to the special position of those who need international 
protection. No specification of the procedures to be used in cases in which ILOs encounter 
refugees or asylum seekers or of any remedies available against their actions can be found 
in the ILOs Regulation. FRONTEX operations also pay insufficient attention to the rights of 
refugees and asylum seekers in transit. The lack of a uniform understanding of search and 
rescue obligations and of interdiction powers at sea among the Member States renders 
compliance with protection obligations further intricate. Cooperation with third countries in 
joint-surveillance missions has fostered further confusion in this regard. 
 
The entire system of entry/pre-entry control has to be subject to the democratic oversight 
of the European Parliament and the judicial control of both national and European courts. 
However, entry refusals are not endowed with suspensive effect under article 13 SBC. In 
light of articles 19 and 25 of the Community Code on Visas, appeal rights against LTV visa 
denials are unclear. As far as private carriers’ decisions are concerned, no remedies 
presently exist against exclusion from boarding in Directive 2001/51. Finally, remedies are 
also missing with regard to ILOs’ and FRONTEX agents’ actions or omissions in the relevant 
legislation. 
 
In a context of prevailing extraterritorial entry controls, to ensure that the right to (leave to 
seek) asylum and to non-refoulement remain accessible in law and in practice, common 
measures should be codified to provide a safe and legal access to international protection in 
the EU. Article 78(2)(g) TFEU provides the EU legislator with the legal basis to adopt 
legislation ‘for the purpose of managing inflows of people applying for asylum or subsidiary 
or temporary protection’. It would further appear that such measures shall be adopted as 
an integral part of the CEAS that the Union has to develop. Implemented and proposed 
initiatives in this realm comprise the EU Resettlement Programme, Regional Protection 
Programmes, which give rise to common concerns: they pursue high ambitions with limited 
financial and material means; doubts arise as for the voluntary nature of the participation 
in these measures, as their proponents maintain; so long as the real needs and capacities 
of the countries of first asylum these measure target are ignored, their impact will be 
limited; a requirement of consistency has been introduced with regard to the Global 
Approach of Migration, which constitutes a cause of concern, whereas coherence with the 
internal asylum acquis has been obliterated; the complementary nature of these measures 
with pre-existing legal obligations has not been clearly stated. 
3. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The content of the main obligations binding upon the EU Member States vis-à-vis refugees 
and asylum seekers in transit, as enshrined in the international instruments to which the 
EU Member States have adhered and in EU law itself, is to be properly identified. The 
principle of non-refoulement, the right to (leave to seek) asylum, in their substantive and 
procedural components, should be well delineated and incorporated into each of the 
extraterritorial initiatives undertaken by the EU and its Member States with an impact on 
access to international protection. On the ascertainment that human rights obligations may 
be engaged extraterritorially, it should be clearly acknowledged that entry and pre-entry 
controls shall be designed and implemented in a way that does not deprive refugees and 
asylum seekers of the protection that the prohibition of refoulement and the right to (leave 
to seek) asylum afford them in both their facets, substantive and procedural. In order to 
preserve the effect utile, entry and pre-entry controls, in the form of Schengen visas, 
carrier sanctions, the intervention of immigration liaison officers (ILOs), and the interdiction 
carried out in the course of FRONTEX-led operations, must be aligned with the fundamental 
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rights’ acquis of the EU. Activities pertaining to the ‘external dimension of asylum’ stricto 
sensu, such as the EU Resettlement Programme, Regional Protection Programmes, and 
proposals for Protected-Entry Procedures shall also be made compatible with these 
entitlements. 
 
The real influence of pre-entry and entry management instruments on asylum seekers’ and 
refugees’ rights should be properly identified. Therefore, it is highly advisable that reporting 
obligations on the actors concerned, independent monitoring, evaluation mechanisms and 
the duty to collect specific statistical data relevant to the situation of refugees and asylum 
seekers in transit be introduced for the purpose. The existing information in relation to the 
activities of ILOs and FRONTEX-led missions should be declassified. Once the real 
dimensions of the legal concerns posed by general border and migration legislation with 
regard to refugees’ and asylum seekers’ rights become known, the streamlining of the 
existing legislation will be facilitated.  
 
The rights of refugees and asylum seekers shall be duly incorporated in migration control 
and border surveillance strategies. Specific procedures and adequate legal safeguards must 
be introduced to ensure compliance with protection-related obligations. Ultimately, the 
instruments for which the alignment with the fundamental rights’ acquis of asylum seekers 
and refugees under EU law reveals impossible will have to be abolished. Accordingly, clear 
procedures for the identification and referral of asylum seekers at entry and pre-entry shall 
be introduced in the Schengen Borders Code. In light of the Munaf and WM jurisprudence, 
visa lists should be configured and reviewed considering not only security and illegal 
immigration concerns, but also their possible human rights implications, to facilitate the 
fulfilment by the EU Member States of their extraterritorial protection obligations as 
appropriate. In order to achieve the Treaty objective of a ‘common policy on visas’, the 
current discretion accorded to the EU Member State in relation to visa requirements for 
recognised refugees should be eliminated. The conditions and the procedure to issue LTV 
visas to refugees and asylum seekers shall be clarified, to ensure that the Member States 
at issue are able to fulfil their extraterritorial international obligations, as appropriate. Yet, 
if the availability of visas cannot be guaranteed in practice, the institution of carrier 
sanctions must be entirely re-thought, if not abandoned. With regard to ILOs, better 
specification of their tasks and powers and the introduction of appropriate legal safeguards 
is essential. The same applies to FRONTEX missions, vis-à-vis both the action of the 
agency’s personnel and that of the agents of the Member States participating in joint 
operations. Specific procedures and remedies shall be introduced to provide adequate legal 
safeguards to those seeking international protection recovered at sea. 
 
Effective remedies, which are accessible both in law and in practice, must be introduced for 
each individual case in which the person concerned presents an “arguable claim” that his 
rights have been or risk being violated. Therefore, the wording of article 13(3) SBC shall be 
clarified, so that the position of refugees and asylum seekers with regard to appeals against 
entry refusals is brought in line with the requirements of an ‘effective remedy’ ex article 13 
ECHR and article 47 EUCFR. The linguistic inconsistencies between articles 19 and 25 CCV 
shall be eliminated, so that refugee visa applicants do not see their applications truncated 
at the admissibility stage. Effective rights of defence and appeal should be introduced for 
those affected by carriers’ decisions. Yet, in practice, even if carriers would be de jure 
empowered to make full decisions on entry, it remains unclear how the exercise of effective 
remedies against their decisions and the right to judicial protection could be upheld in a 
meaningful manner. The impossibility to introduce the necessary legal safeguards in the 
carrier sanctions’ scheme should hence lead to the abandonment of the policy. With regard 
to ILOs’ actions, it is also uncertain that the legal safeguards and remedies that may be 
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introduced in the ILOs Regulation could be effective in practice. Thus, as with carrier 
sanctions, the impossibility to introduce the necessary legal safeguards in their scheme 
should lead to their abolishment. With regard to the actions and omissions that may be 
undertaken in the course of a FRONTEX-led operation, the inconvenience of implementing 
offshore procedures is referred to above. It ensues that in the maritime context for 
remedies to be effective disembarkation in ‘a place of safety’ located within European 
jurisdiction may actually be required. 
 
With regard to the limitations identified in relation to the EU Resettlement Programme and 
RPPs, several suggestions are provided: Given the fact that the financial and material 
means on which they rely are limited, to realize their humanitarian aspirations their 
coordination with other external humanitarian activities of the EU should be assured in 
practice; concerning the nature of the participation in these measures, there is ground to 
consider that, in view of the wording of article 78(2)(g) TFEU, participation in their 
implementation should be deemed compulsory; to maximise their humanitarian impact, 
RPPs and the EU Resettlement Programme shall translate a multilateral partnership with 
the countries of first asylum; in light of the duty to ensure consistency across the policies of 
the Union, enshrined in articles 7 TFEU and 21(3) TEU, flagrantly contradictory results 
between or within the external and the internal asylum acquis shall be considered in breach 
of this legal obligation. Therefore, the design and implementation of RPPs and the EU 
Resettlement Programme should take into account the relevant rules of the CEAS already in 
place; on the other hand, linking protection-related measures to migration management 
concerns, as those belonging to the Global Approach to Migration, risks detracting those 
measures from their primary humanitarian objectives; the existence of such measures 
cannot be used as a pretext not to grant admission, or not to provide protection in 
accordance with international and EU law as appropriate; the complementary nature of 
these measures must be made straightforward. 
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PART 3: LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVES FOR THE COMMON 
EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM 
 
It does not seem reasonable to expect changes of the European Treaties and therefore to 
come up with revolutionary proposals. Moreover, much can be done in the current treaty 
framework with the renewal of the policy due to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
as well as the Charter of fundamental rights and the creation of the European Asylum 
Support Office. Four perspectives should be considered for the development of the 
Common European Asylum System in the future.  
 
SECTION 1: THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 
Three parameters must be taken into consideration. 
 
1. THE IMPACT OF ARTICLE 18 OF THE CHARTER OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 
This provision states that “The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the 
rules of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967, 
relating to the status of refugees and in accordance with the Treaty on European Union and 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ».  
 
This provision reflects the complexity of the texts guaranteeing asylum in the European 
Union. Based on a mixing of the notions of asylum and refugee, the question of its precise 
meaning from the minimum procedural right to seek asylum to the maximum substantive 
right to territorial asylum, as well as of its effect (direct or not?), are open to interpretation 
and will need an interpretative ruling by the Court of Justice. It is nevertheless clear when 
it is read in conjunction with article 78, §§1 and 2 TFEU, that it creates for the European 
Union the positive obligations to guarantee the right to asylum by applying the principle of 
non-refoulement and adopting an appropriate status for protected persons encompassing 
refugees, subsidiary protection and even temporary protection. 
2. THE ACCESSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO THE 
GENEVA CONVENTION 
 
The idea for the EU to accede to the Geneva Convention is expressed for the very first time 
in the Stockholm Programme. It is in line with article 78, §1 TFEU, following which the 
common asylum policy “must be in accordance with the Geneva Convention”.  
 
Firstly, one may wonder if it is legally feasible. This seems to be the case from the point of 
view of the European Union. Its firmly established internal competence regarding asylum 
allows the Union to exercise it externally by acceding to the Geneva Convention, even if it 
must be clear that the Union would in this way not succeed to the Member States, as it 
does not grant asylum to refugees. However, the Geneva Convention covers several 
questions concerning refugees’ rights that belong to the Member States and would appear 
to be a mixed treaty that the EU can only ratify partially because of the sharing of 
competences with its Member States.   
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The feasibility from the point of view of the Geneva Convention is more complicated. This 
Convention is indeed only open to State Parties that is not the case of the European Union. 
This important obstacle can nevertheless be circumvented in two different ways. The first 
one is an amendment to the Geneva Convention that is not commendable because there is 
a risk to reopen a debate about its substance which could at the end be undermined. The 
second of a protocol to the Geneva Convention similar to the one used to organise the 
accession of the EU to the Convention of Human Rights seems to be the best option. 
Another more difficult problem might nevertheless appear. The Protocole n°24 on asylum 
for nationals of Member States of the European Union (the so called “Aznar” Protocole), 
excluding them from asylum in the EU, is generally considered as contradictory to the 
Geneva Convention and could be considered as an obstacle to the accession of the EU. 
 
Before its technical feasibility, the added value of the accession of the EU should be at the 
core of the discussion. Its main value would be linked to the new status that the Geneva 
Convention would acquire in EU law. As an international convention ratified by the EU itself, 
the Court of Justice would become a direct interpreter of it and could give more weight to 
the interpretations given to its provisions by the UNHCR. However, even if it would 
obviously give it more weight as a key player at international level in the refugee policy, 
the accession of the EU to the Geneva Convention would not imply that it becomes 
automatically part of the Executive Committee of the UNHCR, whose composition is 
regulated by another procedure implying the quality of Member of the United Nations. 
3. THE CHANGE FROM HARMONISATION TO REGULA-
TION 
 
Directives have been used until now to adopt the first building blocks of the Common 
Asylum policy. These instruments were the only ones that could be used under the Treaty 
of Amsterdam limiting the competence of the EC to minimum standards. With the removal 
of this limitation by the Treaty of Lisbon, it is now possible to envisage the adoption of 
regulations. While directives are flexible instruments of harmonisation of national rules 
leaving a certain room of implementation to Member States that can and in certain cases 
have effectively undermined the coherence of the European Asylum Policy, regulations 
having direct effect are instruments of unification of national law that are much more 
effective to establish the necessary basis for a Common Asylum System. They should be 
used at least regarding the definition of persons to protect, their status as well as 
procedural guarantees for asylum seekers while types of asylum procedures would still be 
subject to directives. Because they have been proposed by the Commission before the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the recasts are still directives. Due to the fact that it 
will be adequate to coordinate all the texts once they will be adopted, this moment should 
be the occasion to adopt a European Asylum Code based on regulations.  
 
SECTION 2: THE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
Despite the fact the Commission underlined from the beginning the need to coordinate 
national policies and not only to harmonise national legislations in order to build a coherent 
asylum policy in the EU, the Member States ignored the proposal to act in this way made in 
2001. The practical cooperation envisaged in the field of asylum by the Hague Programme 
in 2004 developed therefore too slowly. A decisive step has however very recently been 
made with the creation of the European Asylum Support Office by a regulation of 19 May 
2010.  
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Among the very diverse tasks of the new Office, the adoption of technical guidelines is 
particularly promising if they are, as we propose, properly used under the supervision of 
the Court of Justice to guide the Member States in the assessment of the situation in 
countries of origin of asylum seekers, in order to improve the convergence and the quality 
of the decision making process in the field of asylum by national administrations. The 
political impetus given by the European Council in the Stockholm programme could allow 
the European Asylum Support Office to make up for the lost time with the development of 
the practical cooperation between Member States. It is therefore regrettable that the 
Council, as well as the Parliament have shown that they are not yet fully aware of the 
necessary policy changes by imagining that “The Support Office should have no direct or 
indirect powers in relation to the taking of decisions by Member States' asylum authorities 
on individual applications for international protection” in the preamble of its organic 
regulation. The mandate of the European Asylum Support Office should be aligned on the 
huge ambitions of the European Union in the field of asylum at the occasion of its 
evaluation in 2014.  
 
SECTION 3: THE JURISDICTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
The recognition of asylum as a fundamental right by the EU Charter requires logically a 
better protection by a judge. This is even more necessary throughout the European Union 
where protection is interpreted in various ways in similar cases in breach of equality of 
treatment between applicants. The current control exercised by the Court of Justice is 
necessary but remains insufficient as it allows a common interpretation of European rules in 
law, but not a common assessment of the situation in third countries in fact.  
 
Proposing a new system is nevertheless not easy because the need for more jurisdictional 
control at European level should avoid creating a bottleneck. More particularly, it should 
also fit with the current organisation of jurisdictional control at EU level.  
 
To reform the system by creating a European judge specialised in asylum is not feasible: 
the creation of a brand new European Appeal Court for asylum is not realistic because it 
does not respect the classical division of powers between the European and the national 
judges; the existing option to give more competences to the tribunal on the basis of article 
256, §3 TFEU has not been welcomed by the Court; finally, the establishment of a 
specialised court in specific areas like asylum, has been made possible by article 257 TFEU, 
but cannot be used for all types of action.  
To adapt the existing system by extending the competences of the Court of Justice appears 
to be the best way to regulate the Common European Asylum System. The creation of the 
European Asylum Support Office is an important step in the good direction. Even if they 
have currently been foreseen with a too narrow-minded approach, there exists the 
possibility for the office to adopt guidelines addresses to Member States. Moreover, judges 
can be associated in the working groups of the Office and therefore could contribute to their 
elaboration. The existence of guidelines in the field of European competition law and the 
specific value that has been given to these atypical acts by the jurisprudence of the Court 
could inspire EU asylum law. The idea consists of obliging the Member States to express 
special motives in their decisions when they do not follow the guidelines of the EASO.  
 
This activity could develop under the control of the judge. First of all, regarding problems 
related to the legality of the guidelines that can never be excluded, article 263, §5 TFEU 
foresees that “Acts setting up agencies of the Union may lay down specific conditions and 
arrangements brought by legal or natural persons against acts of these agencies”. 
Setting up a Common European Asylum System:  
Report on the application of existing instruments and proposals for the new system 
 61 
Individuals could so find a possibility to ask the Court to review the legality of EASO’s 
guidelines. Secondly, regarding the respect of guidelines by the Member States which 
would be essential for the coherence of the Common European Asylum System, one could 
imagine to open a special request to the Court to give a ruling on a question of 
interpretation of the guidelines. Afterwards, the Commission could in case use the classical 
infringement procedures against member States and asylum seekers ask the national judge 
to review the legality of national decisions against the guidelines. 
 
SECTION 4: THE SUBSTANTIAL PERSPECTIVE 
1. THE PROBLEMATIC OF ENVIRONMENTAL OR CLIMATE 
“REFUGEES” 
 
There is currently a large normative gap in international refugee law for persons fleeing 
their country of origin for environmental or climate reasons. At the European level, 
subsidiary or temporary protection could only be applicable to certain of those cases. At 
national level, those persons may only find a temporary protection in Finland and Sweden 
on the basis of provisions of national law or humanitarian resident permits based on 
practice in the UK or Denmark.  
 
Knowing that the criteria to define subsidiary protection should be drawn from international 
obligations under human rights instruments and practices existing in member States, there 
seems to be enough ground for thinking to integrate environmental or climate “refugees” 
into subsidiary protection, as the European Parliament envisaged in 2002 to do during the 
second phase of the building of the CEAS. Due to the fact that the Commission has 
announced for 2011 a communication about the link between climate change, migration 
and development, as requested by the European Council in the Stockholm programme, the 
conditions seems to be met to take this problematic issue into consideration in the recast of 
the qualification directive. 
2. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR PROTECTED PERSONS 
 
The problematic issue of freedom movement of protected persons in the European Union is 
not only considered as a question of individual rights, but also as a way to contribute to a 
better burden sharing between Member States in the field of asylum, in particular since 
internal “relocation” within the EU of protected persons from Member States facing 
particular pressures to others is used to implement the principle of solidarity within the EU. 
 
The Commission proposed in 2007 to extend the scope of the directive 2003/109 on long 
term residents to protected persons. This proposal has been blocked because the five years 
period of residence requested to acquire this status has been considered too long by certain 
Member States. Another decisive argument against this proposal is that it can also be 
considered as insufficient because it does not guarantee freedom of movement to long-
term residents as the Member States keep too much discretion on this point within the 
directive.  
 
Starting from the point that it is mandatory for the EU institutions to guarantee a certain 
freedom of movement to protected persons following one of the two possible options based 
either on mutual recognition of protection by another Member State firstly, or the 
acquisition or residence rights in another Member State secondly, it is proposed to extend 
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to protected persons the freedom to work in the European Union. Conditions regulating this 
freedom should be similar to the provisions of directive 2004/38 on freedom of movement 
for European citizens, apart from a waiting period of three years corresponding to the 
renewal of the residence permit for protected persons in the recast proposal of the 
qualification directive in order to avoid abuse and build trust between Member States.  
 
The Commission announces in its action plan implementing the Stockholm programme a 
Communication on a framework for the transfer of protection and mutual recognition of 
asylum decision for the year 2014. This deadline seems to long for a simple communication 
with regard to the aim of showing solidarity with Member States facing particular 
pressures.  
 
SECTION 5: THE DISTRIBUTIVE DIMENSION 
As far as the distribution of protection seekers and protected persons is concerned, the 
Commission has opted for an “improved status quo” in the transition from the first to the 
second phase of the CEAS. This option is unsustainable in the longer term, and a 
fundamental reconsideration of existing arrangements will become necessary. In regard of 
the distribution of protection seekers, experience has shown that the Dublin system is 
unfair, wasteful, and inefficient – these three shortcoming being closely connected. Two 
elements of the system – guaranteed access to an asylum procedure, and the “one chance 
only” principle – are implied in article 78 TFEU and will in all likelihood be retained in their 
present form. By contrast, the Dublin criteria have proved unworkable in practice, and 
should in our view be abandoned. For any distribution system to be workable, a higher 
level of convergence of standards throughout the EU will have to be achieved and, crucially, 
greater relevance needs to be given to the preferences and interests of asylum seekers. 
This being the general direction for reform, there are several alternative models to 
consider.  
 
The UNHCR model, allocating responsibility to the State where the application is first 
lodged, save where the applicant has close links to another Member State, would 
enormously simplify the process of responsibility determination, improve cost-effectiveness 
and be more integration-friendly. More radical, the ECRE model advocates giving protection 
seekers the choice of the responsible State. While maximising the advantages of the 
UNHCR model, it would likely be met with stiff resistance from Member States fearing 
“abuse” and burden-concentration to their detriment. In the alternative, systems based on 
an agreed “distributive key” could be devised, implying inter alia greater involvement of the 
EASO. However, in order not to recreate the problems observed under the Dublin system, 
any such system would still have to ensure that the preferences of asylum seekers are 
taken into account. It would of course be difficult to secure agreement on any of these 
models. To avoid political deadlock, they could however be usefully combined.  
 
In particular, the UNHCR or ECRE models could be combined with an indicative distribution 
key, whereby “above quota” States would automatically receive increased assistance and 
benefit from relocation programmes. Whatever the system chosen, the “once chance only” 
principle and the resulting possibility of coercive “take back” transfers will remain. In light 
of non-refoulement obligations, this will make it necessary to retain also the sovereignty 
clause and attendant guarantees (e.g. effective remedies against transfers). Concerning 
the distribution of beneficiaries of international protection, two options are on the agenda: 
introducing mobility rights (examined in Section 4) and strengthening relocation 
programmes. Our first observation is that both avenues for reform are promising in their 
own right. They would usefully complement the reform of the Dublin system – not 
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constitute an alternative thereto. Our second observation concerns relocation programmes. 
Currently, such programmes are based on “double voluntarism”, and this might be a reason 
why they have remained largely symbolic to-date. To increase their impact, it might be 
necessary to render relocation schemes mandatory for the Member States. However, in 
view of avoiding high human costs and serious legal complications, we consider it crucial to 
retain the principle whereby relocation is voluntary for the beneficiaries of protection 
statuses. 
 
SECTION 6: EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF ASYLUM 
1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Attempting to strike the right balance between border control, migration management and 
access to protection, several proposals have been formulated in the realm of the external 
dimension of asylum. Some engage directly with the individual refugee and his physical 
access to international protection in a safe and orderly way. Both protected-entry 
procedures (PEPs) and offshore processing schemes (Council doc. 13205/09) have been 
quite comprehensively formulated and reappear periodically for negotiation at EU level. 
Building upon them, and on account of the findings of Chapter 5, a medium-term proposal 
for a ‘comprehensive approach’ to access to international protection is submitted at the 
end. 
2. MAIN CONCERNS REGARDING PEPS AND OFFSHORE 
PROCESSING PLANS PROPOSED AT EU LEVEL 
 
It is highly uncertain that offshore processing programmes, as the proposed ad hoc 
protection programme in Libya, can be pursued in practice in accordance with international 
and EU law standards. The selection of addresses shall neither be discriminatory, nor 
amount to a penalty, as articles 3 and 31 GC must be observed. Detention must comply 
with article 5 ECHR levels, both at sea and upon arrival to Libya. Transfers to that country 
cannot be automatic, since the procedural guarantees attached to protection against 
refoulement, as established in the ECHR and the EUCFR, must also be fulfilled.  
 
From Article 78(2)(g) TFEU, it appears that some mechanism shall be introduced ‘for the 
purpose of managing inflows of people applying for asylum’. Since international obligations 
vis-à-vis refugees and asylum seekers can be engaged extraterritorially, in a context of 
pervading pre-border controls, the codification of a system of protected-entry procedures to 
ensure access to protection in a safe and legal way may be considered. Excluding full 
offshore assessments of asylum claims, several arrangements could be envisaged. 
3. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Considering the overly complex system that would have to be developed to ensure the 
compliance of an offshore processing scheme with relevant legal obligations, it is 
improbable that the initiative can be pursued in practice. Its abandonment is highly 
advised. EU Member States should not create situations in which the fulfilment of their 
obligations under international and EU law cannot be fully guaranteed. 
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With regard to PEPs, we recommend the use of LTVs, on the basis of a differentiated 
presumption, for the purpose of organising access to protection in a safe and orderly 
manner. Claims introduced from the country of origin would be presumed arguable, unless 
the asylum authorities of the Member State concerned disprove it. Conversely, claims 
submitted from third countries would be presumed unfounded, unless the applicant 
produces proof of the contrary. In any case, they shall remain complementary to the 
fulfilment of pre-existing legal obligations. 
 
In the medium term, the preferred option should be to develop a comprehensive approach 
to access to international protection in the EU, which incorporates protection-sensitive 
components into the system of border management and entry control at all its stages, 
recognising the mixed character of migration flows and the extraterritorial applicability of 
human rights’ obligations. Such an approach requires a multilateral management to be 
effective, conducted in partnership with the regions and countries of first asylum, the 
UNHCR and other relevant stakeholders. It is proposed that the institutional framework that 
The Hague Conference of International Private Law provides be used to for that purpose. 
 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION3  
1. CONTEXT OF THE STUDY 
 
The construction of a common asylum policy is of great moment nowadays. A first 
generation of minimum standards has been adopted on the basis of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam between 2003 and 2005.  In 2012 a second generation should be carried to 
establish a genuine common European asylum system. Thus the European Union puts 
everything into has in the field of asylum. It is impossible not to contrast its concern in 
asylum with its relatively timid immigration policy. It has acknowledged the flaws of the 
first generation standards politically and intends to find a remedy, except for the Dublin 
Regulation relating to the identification of the State responsible with a view to keep it as a 
founding element of the common asylum system - when it is obvious that this mechanism 
does poorly at a high cost that should no longer be ignored. The entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2005 has given the EU the means to do so. The Stockholm 
program has - in strong terms - confirmed the European Council will to see this political 
momentum happen. A further step has been accomplished with the foundation of the 
European Asylum Support Office on May 19th 2010.  
 
The European Parliament wanted to have a study at its disposal in order to be in the best 
possible position to bring this project to a successful conclusion during this extremely 
complex transition period. The authors of this study hope to meet those expectations and 
contribute to a better understanding of current issues while opening up new avenues of 
reflection for the future since the second phase - scheduled for 2012 – should not finalize 
the common European asylum system. 
2. AIMS AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
 
The primary objective of this study is as the inviting bids insists on, to assist the European 
Parliament to position oneself in relation to the proposed revisal of the instruments in force 
                                                 
3 All the legislative references are mentioned at the end of each chapter., e.g., Rsolution of 2 September 2008 on 
the evaluation of the Dublin system (hereafter - EP 2008b). 
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that have been put forward by the Commission. The second part of the study systematically 
analyses the proposals of the Commission to highlight the numerous strong points of it 
without neglecting the few weaknesses that undermine them. 
 
This second part is structured into five chapters that attempt to give a horizontal view as 
complete as possible of the various instruments under discussion. Indeed, one the 
difficulties is to draw parallels between the provisions of the various proposals related to 
identical items to ensure consistency between the elements of the common European 
asylum system. The authors have systematically analyzed the proposals of the Commission 
and have done their utmost to propose accurate alternatives whenever they considered it 
necessary4.  
 
3. EXTENT AND DIFFICULTY OF THE STUDY  
 
The study is extremely broad as shown by the length of it. In addition to the fact that it 
starts with a first part analysing how the Commission evaluated the instruments of first 
generation - as the call for tender of the Parliament had required - its scope encompasses 
all the elements of the common European asylum policy including its external dimension. 
 
However the major difficulties encountered by the authors in completing the study do not 
arise from the scope of it, but rather from the constant shifts in the matter while its 
implementation was carried out resulting in so many contingencies and uncertainties for 
the research team. First of all the Commission has been several months late to present its 
amendment proposals related to the qualification and procedure directives, which has 
delayed the work of the research team members involved in this very important part of the 
study. In addition the Treaty of Lisbon has entered into force right in the middle of our 
work. The matter has finally ceased to evolve since the adoption of the Stockholm Program, 
the European Asylum Support Office legal basis and the constant development of the 
external dimension of the asylum as far for the main elements only. 
 
The authors have done their utmost to take into account the rampant shifts in this topical 
question in order to provide the Parliament with a study which shall not be useful only but 
as updated as possible. Therefore it includes the latest developments made in May 2010. 
4. THE RESEARCH TEAM 
 
This study was prepared by a genuinely French research team within the Academic 
"Odysseus" Network for legal studies on Immigration and asylum in Europe bringing 
together fourteen experts on asylum law, representing six Member States of the European 
Union associated with it.  
 
The authors of the different parts of the study are specifically identified at the beginning of 
each of them. Even if its various elements have been collectively discussed in three 
successive seminars - seven full days of intense exchanges - allowing the authors to 
                                                 
4  It should be noted that the study does not always confined to issues on which the Commission has 
made amendments using the technique of reviewing legally limit the scope of the debate to the 
subject of the proposal. If it relates to items that are not covered by the various proposals, he will 
return to Parliament if it considers necessary for the study's recommendations are followed to consult 
with the Commission that they be required exercise its right of initiative.  
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collectively assume its findings in a comprehensive manner, their responsibility is only truly 
committed as regards to the part they have written.  
5. REPORT STRUCTURE  
The report is divided into three parts. At first, an analysis of the evaluations of standards of 
first generation for asylum carried out by the Commission.  
 
In the second place, an evaluation of the asylum acquis, including short-term amendments 
proposals to the proposals of the Commission, namely the adoption of second generation 
standards intended to establish the common European asylum system.  
 
This part is divided into five chapters:  
 
1. Distribution of asylum seekers and protected persons in the Member States 
relating mainly to the issue of the Dublin system for determining the State 
responsible. However it includes the issue of the relocation as well. 
2. Definition of persons eligible for international protection within the European 
Union, essentially relating to the Qualification Directive. 
3. The status of protected persons according to the Reception Conditions 
directive laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum 
seekers.  
4. The asylum procedures logically relating to the Asylum Procedure directive 
covering this issue, although it is closely related to the issue of the 
suspensive effect of appeals in the Dublin system. 
5. The external dimension of asylum policy concerning the various elements of 
this large issue such as visa policy and external border control including 
activities of Frontex, interception at sea regarding the fight against illegal 
immigration, the regional protection programmes, resettlement in the EU and 
protected entry procedures. 
 
In the third place, the long-term outlook for the common European asylum system covering 
six issues - legal, institutional, jurisdictional, material, redistribution and external. 
 
Setting up a Common European Asylum System:  
Report on the application of existing instruments and proposals for the new system 
 67 
PART 1: ASSESSMENT OF THE EVALUATIONS OF THE 
ASYLUM POLICY 
INTRODUCTION 
The evaluation must be an integrant part of the creation of a Common European Asylum 
System (CEAS). Indeed according to the Hague Programme, the CEAS will be built on a 
“Thorough and complete evaluation of the legal instruments that have been adopted in the 
first phase5". The inherent function of the evaluation is to ensure the effectiveness of the 
EU action6. The EU action is effective if the objectives pursued have been reached, or if the 
necessary improvements are envisaged to comply with these objectives. The evaluation is 
communally defined in the doctrine as the appreciation of policy efficiency in comparing its 
results against the objectives assigned and against the means of its implementation7. The 
evaluation aims at assessing the adequacy between the results and the objectives. 
 
The evaluation, therefore, has to carry out two purposes. A legal purpose dealing with the 
implementation of the EU measure in the Member States, and a political purpose covering 
the issue of its impact once implemented. The two levels are important as they are 
interlinked. Indeed if a measure is not correctly implemented it won’t, de facto, meet the 
objective pursued. The evaluation is essential to measure and secure the added value of 
the EU as well as to give feed-back and improve the policy making.8 We can differentiate 
two levels of evaluation9, which are important to ensure that an EU policy is coherent with 
its objectives. The first one is the ex-ante evaluation which takes place upon the decision-
making. It aims at prospecting the efficiency, the viability, the accuracy and the coherence 
of the future measures10. The second level is the ex-post evaluation aiming at assessing 
the application of the EU measures in the Member States, as well as its results and its 
consequences. This ex-post evaluation must also encompass at a later stage an assessment 
on the coherence of all measures composing an EU policy, and to assess how far the 
measures altogether meet the objectives of the general EU policy considered11. 
 
This part of the study will focus on the issue of ex-post evaluations of the first generation of 
the asylum legal instruments, as identified as the most problematic due to the lack of a 
coherent evaluation mechanism. On the 28th of June 2006, the Commission tried to set out 
an evaluation mechanism applicable to all EU policies on Freedom, Security and Justice 
(FSJ), through a Communication COM (2006) 33212, but this Communication has been 
confronted to the resistance of Member States upon its submission to the Council and has 
never been implemented. Therefore the evaluation systems existing before the proposition, 
                                                 
5  The Hague Programme Council of the European Union on strengthening freedom, security and Justice 
in the European Union, 13.12.2004,  OJ (2005/C 53/ 01) Part III  point 1.3  page 3 
6  Ibid, Part II point 3 « “Evaluation of the implementation as well as of the effects of all measures is, in 
the European Council’s opinion, essential to the effectiveness of the Union action. The evaluations 
undertaken from 1 July 2005 must be systematic, objective, impartial, and efficient, page 2 
7  Bernard Perret  “L’évaluation des Politiques publiques” Ed la Découverte (2008) “L’évaluation d’une 
politique publique a pour objet d’apprécier l’efficacité de cette politique en comparant ses résultats 
aux objectifs assignés et aux moyens mis en œuvre”, Introduction, page 3 
 Marie-Aude BEERNAERT “Comment évaluer le droit pénal européen” édité par Gilles de Kerchove, 
Anne Wyembergh et Serge de Biolley, edition Université Libre de Bruxelles (2006) « Evaluer l’impact 
d’une législation  c’est apprécier ses effets, ses répercussion dans la réalité », page 21 
8  Annex to the Communication from the Commission COM (2006)332 on the evaluation of the EU 
policies on Freedom, Security and Justice (Impact Assessment),  SEC (2006) 815, 28.06.2006  
9  Op cit, « Comment évaluer le droit pénal européen”, Introduction page 12 
10  Ibid 
11  Op cit « L’évaluation des politiques publiques », page 18  
12  Communication from the Commission on the evaluation of the EU policies on Freedom, Security and 
Justice,  COM (2006)332,  28.06.06 
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which have been deemed as incomplete by the Commission itself13, remained applicable to 
the first generation of evaluation in the field of asylum. The study of the evaluations made 
by the Commission reveals that they were not sufficient enough to comply with the 
Community objectives required for the evaluation.  
 
The first Chapter of this study aims at analysing the evaluations made by the Commission 
in order to bring into attention the weaknesses of those evaluations and to establish the 
reasons behind the problems encountered upon the evaluation process. This part of the 
study will also analyse the issue of a systematic and a regular ex-post monitoring of the 
compliance with the Fundamental Rights in the Member States when implementing the EU 
law. This mechanism does not exist as such in the current evaluations undertaken, whereas 
a scrutiny of compliance with Fundamental Rights is far more important in the context of 
the creation of a CEAS, which very directly implies Fundamental Rights issues, such as the 
right to asylum recognised in article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, that will 
soon become primarily law14.  
 
The second Chapter deals with the recent improvements and the future prospects for a 
better evaluation mechanism in the field of asylum. Among the other things, the adoption 
of the Regulation on Community statistics on migration and international protection15 and 
the new Regulation establishing a European Asylum Support Office16. These two 
instruments are aiming at responding to the shortage of statistics, that weakened the 
evaluations made until now, and will constitute important bases to set out a coherent and a 
comprehensive evaluation mechanism for the CEAS. In this perspective of improvement the 
article 70 of the Lisbon Treaty constitutes also an important step for the evaluation in the 
field of FSJ. Indeed, it endows the Community with a legal basis for an evaluation 
mechanism in this field, and thus constitutes the recognition of a central role of the 
evaluation in the EU legislative process.  
 
                                                 
13  SEC (2006) 815 Ibid, point 3.2 “The need to act” page 6 
14  Article 18 « The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva 
Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees and 
in accordance with the Treaty establishing the European Community. » 
15  Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community statistics 
on migration and international protection and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 311/76 on the 
compilation of statistics on foreign workers, 11.07.2007 
16  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European 
Asylum Support Office COM(2009)66, 18.02.2009 
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CHAPTER 1: THE LIMITS OF THE CURRENT EVALUATIONS 
The analysis of the evaluations of the first generation of the CEAS made, by or for the 
Commission, requires a theological approach. It is indeed important to set first the 
Community objectives attached to the evaluation of the FSJ policies, in order to show 
whether the evaluations carried out for the first asylum instruments can be considered 
sufficient enough to fulfil these objectives. This part proposes, therefore, to start with the 
objectives defined in the Hague Programme with regard to the evaluation of the FSJ 
policies, and with the study of the Communication from the Commission to the Council and 
the European Parliament on evaluation of EU policies on Freedom, Security and Justice17, 
establishing an evaluation mechanism in conformity with the requirement of the Action Plan 
implementing the Hague Programme. It is important to note straight away that this 
Communication has been quickly aborted, as the Council, in its conclusions of 19 June 
200718, considered that the evaluation mechanism proposed by the Commission had to be 
revised before being applied. As no modifications were undertaken by the Commission, the 
evaluation system has consequently never been implemented. 
 
However we considered that the analysis of this Communication is still relevant, as it 
remains the only proposition made in the view to establish an evaluation mechanism for the 
field of FSJ. It draws the expected characteristics of the evaluation with regard to its 
purpose, method and results, that would comply with the Community ambition set up in 
the Hague programme. (Section I). In comparison, the study of the evaluations made by 
the Commission to the first generation of the asylum instruments reveals that they were 
not sufficient enough to comply with the Community objectives (Section II). 
 
SECTION 1: THE EVALUATION MECHANISM ENVISAGED BY THE 
COMMISSION 
 
According to the Hague Programme, “Evaluation of the implementation as well as of the 
effects of all measures is, in the European Council’s opinion, essential to the effectiveness 
of the Union action. The evaluations undertaken from 1 July 2005 must be systematic, 
objective, impartial, and efficient”19. As previously stated, the inherent function of the 
evaluation is to ensure the effectiveness of the EU policies. The evaluation is considered 
also by the Commission as essential to measure and secure the added value of the EU, and 
must provide policy makers with results about the impact and the effectiveness of activities 
planned, in the view of improving the policy making to reach the objectives assigned to an 
EU policy20. 
 
Another function assigned to the evaluation is to ensure the transparency of the 
information on the implementation and the results of policies, which is considered by the 
Commission as an important part of the good governance. 21The Commission has been, 
therefore, mandated by the Council in the Action Plan, to set up a coherent and a 
comprehensive evaluation mechanism for the EU policies on FSJ, which was proposed in the 
above cited Communication COM (2006) 332. This evaluation mechanism was aiming at 
                                                 
17  Op cit, COM (2006)332 
18  Council Conclusions on Evaluation of EU policies on Freedom, Security and Justice, 10893/1/07, 
19.06.2007 
19  Op cit, The Hague Programme « General Orientations » point 1.3, page 5 
20  Op cit, COM (2006) 332 page 3 
21  Op cit, SEC (2006) 815 point 3.2 “The need to act” « There is a need to transmit extensive 
information to all stakeholders on implementation and the results of policies. Transparency is 
becoming more and more important part of good governance… », page 6 
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completing the existing monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, deemed fragmented, as 
well as incomplete22, and consequently not sufficient enough to fulfil the objectives of the 
Hague Programme. In this Communication, the Commission defined the expectations as 
regard to the purpose, the method and the results of the evaluation in order to comply with 
the Community ambition. 
 
SUB-SECTION 1: THE COMMUNICATION OF 2006 
1. THE PURPOSE 
 
In The Hague programme, the evaluation must encompass both a legal and a political 
purpose, respectively the evaluation of the implementation of an EU measure and the 
evaluation of its effects. The Commission in its Communication COM (2006) 332 interpreted 
the evaluation of the implementation of policies referred to in the Hague Programme as “a 
mechanism evaluating the concrete results of FSJ policies. Evaluation is wider than 
monitoring implementation policies and includes studying consequences of the 
implementation”23. The Commission makes a distinction between monitoring 
implementation consisting on reviewing progress towards implementing policies, and the 
evaluation itself, which is considered as “a judgement of interventions (public) actions 
according to their results, impacts and the needs they aim to satisfy”24 Consequently the 
concept of “the evaluation of implementation”, as referred into the Hague Programme, 
must encompass, for the Commission, a monitoring of the implementation of the EU 
measures itself and the evaluation of the results of the measures once implemented. This 
should allow a better evaluation and a general understanding of the quantity and the 
quality of results achieved25. 
 
These two levels are indeed important, as they are interlinked. The objectives of a measure 
cannot be achieved unless the measure has not been effectively implemented. That leads 
to the important issue of the scope of these two mechanisms: “monitoring the 
implementation” and the “evaluation of the results”. What must they cover?  “Monitoring 
the implementation” shall deal with the distinction between the legal transposition and the 
application of the measure in practice. Indeed monitoring the mere transposition is not 
sufficient by itself, and is not sufficient to evaluate how the objectives of the EU measures 
have been met, as the application of the national transposition in practice can fail to comply 
with the provisions of the EU measure. In that sense the Commission in its communication 
of 2006 states that “the scoreboard plus”, which corresponds to the Commission’s annual 
report on the implementation of the Hague Programme, “will aim predominantly at 
assessing proper and adequate transposition of the legislative acts adopted and effective 
implementation of the measures agreed”26. The “evaluation of the results” of an EU 
measure aims at assessing the degree of achievement of the objectives assigned to it. It 
has been envisaged by the Commission as a progressive mechanism, which includes, first, 
the analysis of the immediate results and the outcomes of the measure, then at a later 
stage the analysis of the impact of the measure. The results and the outcomes are defined 
as initial effects and intermediate effects of the measure, whereas the impact is understood 
as the long-term effects in the society27. 
                                                 
22  Ibid, point 3.2, page 6 
23  bid, point 3.1 “Definition of evaluation” page 5 
24  Ibid, point 3.1 page 5 
25  Ibid, point 3.1 page 6 
26  Op cit, COM(2006)332, point 1.4 “Monitoring implementation of the Hague programme” page 94 
27  Ibid, page 98 (glossary) 
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2. THE METHODOLOGY 
 
The evaluation mechanism proposed by the Commission would not have replaced the 
existing mechanisms but completed them in order to establish a common set of minimum 
evaluation requirement across different policies28. In this context, the mechanism was built 
around two pillars the “scoreboard plus”, monitoring the implementation of the Hague 
multi-annual Programme and the evaluation mechanism proposed by the Commission in 
the present Communication. 
 
The scoreboard practice exists since Tampere. It consists of an annual report submitted by 
the Commission and assessing the outcomes of the significant political progress against the 
objectives of the multi annual Programme. The added value of the “Hague scoreboard plus” 
lies in the fact that it combines the follow up of the institutional decision making process at 
the EU level, as well as the follow up of the implementation of FSJ measures at the national 
level. Indeed the Tampere scoreboard used to focus, merely, on the follow up of the EU 
institutional decision making process29. With regard to the evaluation mechanism proposed 
by the Commission, it was conceived in three steps, including first a system of information 
gathering and sharing, then, a reporting mechanism based on the information gathered, 
and at last an in-depth strategic evaluation. The system of information gathering and 
sharing was based on factsheets30 established by the Commission in its Communication 
COM (2006) 332. Factsheets were set up for each policy area of FSJ and for each 
instrument adopted within specific areas.  
 
This first step is determinant as the quality of the evaluation reports will depend on the 
availability of the information, as well as on the quality of the information gathered. 
Therefore, the Commission provided, in these factsheets, a set of relevant indicators for 
each policy area and for each measure taken within a specific area of FSJ. As the evaluation 
must aim at assessing the results of the EU measures taken, as well as, assessing the 
efficiency of an EU policy area, the Commission defined the indicators against the 
objectives of the policy considered, as well, as against the objectives of each specific 
instrument. This is illustrated by two examples of factsheets below, respectively the 
factsheet established for the CEAS and the factsheet related to the Dublin II Regulation. 
                                                 
28  Op cit, SEC(2006)815 point 3.2 “The need to act”, page 6 
29  Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament report on the 
implementation of the Hague Programme for 2005, COM (2006) 333, 28.06.2006, page 2, “In addition 
to this monitoring of the adoption process, for the first time as part of such an exercise for Justice, 
Freedom and Security (“JFS”) policies, this communication looks into the national implementation of 
these policies (Part II and Annex 2) ». 
30  Op cit COM (2006) 332 « Factsheets of JLS policies », page 13, and more particularly factsheets for 
Common immigration and asylum policies are in page 32. 
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Example 1: Factsheets for the Common European Asylum System31 
Policy sub-area 1: Common European Asylum System 
 
Objectives: 
To establish a common asylum procedure and uniform status, To facilitate practical and 
collaborative cooperation, To address pressures on asylum systems and reception capacities. 
 
Policy sub-area level indicators: 
- Number of asylum seekers applying for asylum in Member States other than the country of 
first entry (Source: Eurodac) 
- Instances of MS breaching minimum defined standards (Source: Commission) 
- Differences in standards of reception between Member States (Source: Commission) 
- Differences between Member States with regard to the average time taken to determine the 
outcome of an application for asylum (Source: MS and Commission) 
- Comparison of asylum acceptance rates among Member States (Source: Commission - 
Eurostat) 
- Differences in the level of capacity per Member State (asylum systems and reception 
facilities) relative to needs (Source: Member States) 
                                                 
31 Ibid, factsheets page 32 
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Example 2: Factsheet for the Dublin II Regulation32 
Dublin Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003) 
Objectives:  
- To reduce 'asylum shopping' 
- To increase responsibility sharing among MS. 
- To increase efficiency by granting MS a realistic period in which to Implement decisions on 
transfers 
Implementation at national level 
- Adoption of measures implementing the Regulation at national level 
- Immediate results  
Number of take back requests (Source: 
Commission – Eurostat) 
Number of applicants sent to another Member 
State (Source: Commission – Eurostat) 
Number of multiple claims (Source: Commission – Eurostat) 
Number of registered irregular entrants (Source: Commission –Eurostat ) 
Proportion of cases dealt within country of entry (Source: Commission – 
Eurostat) 
Outcomes  
Decreased delay in the examination of claims and attribution of responsibility 
Measured by: average delay of examination before and after implementation of the Regulation 
(Source: MS) 
Decreased delay to implement decisions on transfers 
Measured by: average delay of transfer before and after 
(Source: MS) 
Impacts 
Increased sharing of responsibility  
Greater efficiency and effectiveness in implementing decisions on transfers 
Reduction of persons making multiple claims 
 
One other added value of the factsheet is to guarantee more visibility and transparency, as 
the information required, as well as, the sources of information is clearly defined. However, 
the system of information gathering can work properly if the information required is 
available. The necessary indicators are generally measured by statistical data provided by 
the Commission, the Member States and by other relevant stakeholders. Thus the 
Commission immediately considered the availability of statistics as a key component in the 
development of an evaluation system, and as one of the principle challenges in the 
evaluation of EU policies in the field of FSJ. Statistics, accordingly, “will be required as 
baseline data to assess whether existing needs are attenuated are aggravated by a policy 
over time and, ultimately, to be able to draw conclusions about the impact of policies”33. 
Therefore the Commission pointed out the necessity to improve the quality, the availability 
and the analysis of the statistical data34. 
 
The reporting mechanism, which was the second step of the evaluation mechanism 
proposed, corresponded to the elaboration of the evaluation report consolidating and 
                                                 
32  Ibid factsheets page 33 and 34 
33  Op cit COM(2006) 332 Point 3.4 « Availability of statistics » page 6 
34  Ibid 
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analysing the information provided on the basis of the factsheets. The third and the last 
step consisted on targeting in-depth strategic evaluations on selected areas focusing on 
policies rather than on individual instruments. These in- depth strategic evaluations,  based 
on the evaluation reports made for each instruments, should aim at evaluating the 
achievement of objectives in the broader context of a policy, as well as at assessing the 
coherence of the different instruments within a given policy35. The strategic evaluations 
were presented by the Commission as an added value to the current evaluation practices as 
they should: 
 
– Focus on policies rather than individual instruments 
– Analyse the coherence of different instruments within a given policy  
– Investigate how certain policy contributes to the overall objective of establishing an 
area of Freedom Security and Justice 
– Determine the overall rate of achievement of that general objective 
– Assess achievement of an overarching objective in the field of freedom security and 
justice, for instance safeguarding the Fundamental rights36. 
 
Basically, the Commission envisaged an evaluation mechanism according to a vertical 
approach; consisting on evaluating the results and the impact of individual instruments 
against their objectives, and to a horizontal approach, consisting on evaluating how these 
legal instruments have achieved altogether the broader objectives of a given policy. This 
latter approach must also include cross-cutting issue as safeguarding of the Fundamental 
Rights. 
3. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EVALUATION 
 
As stated above, The Hague Programme asked for systematic, objective, impartial and 
efficient” evaluation37, but did not defined what those terms cover.  
3.1. Systematic  
 
A systematic evaluation implies that all measures have to be automatically evaluated, but 
this term also evokes the question of the periodicity of the evaluation. According to the 
Commission in its Communication COM (2006) 332 the evaluation mechanism “should 
improve policy-making by promoting a systematic feedback of evaluation results into the 
decision- making progress”38. Following to this, the Commission states that “the proposal 
takes into account the fact that this mechanism should be conducted on regular basis” 
which will “make it possible to monitor progress at regular intervals and draw 
comparison”39. The Commission, accordingly, proposed to conduct the evaluation exercise, 
meaning the collection of factsheets and the elaboration of the evaluation report twice 
every five years, and drew a timetable. This timetable took into account the necessary 
coordination with the monitoring the implementation and was made in the view to enable 
the Council and the Commission to use the results of the evaluation reports as inputs for 
assessing the need to prepare a further strategic Programme in 200940.  
                                                 
35  Ibid  COM (2006)332  point 4.1.3 « Strategic policy evaluation » page 9  
36  Ibid  
37  Op cit Hague Programme, point 3 “Implementation and evaluation” page 2 
38  Op cit COM (2006) 332 point 2 « The Concept of evaluation » page 3  
39  Ibid, point 4.2 « Frequency and follow-up» page 9 
40  Ibid. See also the timetable of the evaluation p 11 of the Communication 
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3.2. Efficient  
 
The evaluation will be efficient if it provides the necessary feed-back to improve the policy 
making. This implies a proper appreciation of the efficiency of a policy by measuring the 
adequacy between the objectives of the EU measures and its results. As already 
mentioned, the evaluation mechanism must encompass a legal purpose and a political 
purpose. The legal purpose of monitoring the implementation of the EU measure is an 
important step of the evaluation mechanism. The good integration of the EU measure into 
the national level is decisive to measure the results and the impact of the EU policy 
intervention. In this context, the Council in The Hague Programme stated that it was “vital 
for the Council to develop in 2005 practical method to facilitate timely implementation in all 
policy areas…” and “Regular progress reports by the Commission to the Council during the 
implementation period should provide an incentive for action in Member State”41. This 
should be the role of the “scoreboard plus”.  
 
Concerning the political purpose, implying the judgment of interventions according to their 
results, impacts and needs they aim to satisfy, the efficiency of such a judgement will 
depend to several factors, which have been defined in the Commission document on 
“reinforcing the use of the evaluation”42. This document defines the evaluation standards 
for each step of the evaluation process, guaranteeing the efficiency of the evaluation 
carried out by the Commission43. First of all the evaluation design must provide clear and 
specific objectives, and appropriate methods. In this context the evaluation indicators 
chosen, as well as the availability of the information required are determinant to conduct 
an efficient evaluation. According to the Commission “The quality of the evaluation must be 
assessed on the basis of pre-established criteria throughout the evaluation process and the 
quality criteria must as a minimum relate to relevant scope, appropriate methods, reliable 
data, credible results, valuable conclusions and clarity of the deliverables”44. Secondly, the 
evaluation should be available in due time for operational and strategic decision making 
and reporting needs. Finally, the question of resources allocated is also a key issue in the 
evaluation process as revealed in this Commission’s document. The evaluation activities 
have to be appropriately resourced to meet their purposes. 
3.3. Impartial 
 
According to the Commission an evaluation mechanism for the field of FSJ can be only 
proposed at EU level, as the Commission, being independent and having the capacity for 
objective analysis, is at a more vantage position than Member States to analyse and 
consolidate the data gathered at national level45. However the independence of the 
Commission must not be the sole guarantee for an objective and an impartial evaluation. 
This has to be ensured by other criteria which has not been defined by the Commission in 
its Communication of 200646. A definition of those terms can be found in the jurisprudence 
                                                 
41  Op cit, the Hague Programme point 3 « Implementation and evaluation » page 2 
42  Communication to the Commission from MS GRYBAUSKAITE, in Agreement with the president 
responding to strategic needs: Reinforcing the use of evaluation, SEC (2007) 213, 21.12. 2007 
43  Ibid, SEC(2007) 213, Annex II “Evaluation standards” page 20 
44  Ibid, SEC (2007) 213 « Evaluation standards –Conducting evaluation », page 23 
45  Op cit SEC (2006) 815 point 3.3 « There is also the issue of independence and capacity for objective 
analysis. The peer review mechanism can be highly politicised exercised and Member States are 
reluctant to criticise each other. Being in a more objective position and having the expertise, the 
Commission is at a vantage position to analyse and consolidate the data gathered at national level. », 
page 7 
46  Nor in the Communication (2006) 332 neither in its impact assessment SEC (2006)815 the 
Commission has defined the criteria for an objective and impartial evaluation as required by the 
Hague Programme. 
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of the ECHR, as well as in other community documents related to the issue of the 
evaluation within the Commission. According to the jurisprudence of the ECHR, the 
impartiality is normally denoted when the judge has no prejudice or bias47 regarding the 
case submitted to him. As the evaluation involves a judgment of the EU interventions 
according to their results, the persons in charge of the evaluation in the same way as a 
judge must be free of prejudice and bias upon the evaluation conduct. In the same way, 
the Communication of the Commission of 21 February 2007 on reinforcing the use of the 
evaluation, reaffirmed as a standard that “All actors involved in evaluation activities must 
comply with principles and rules regarding conflict of interest » and that « Evaluators must 
be free to present their results without compromise or interference, although they should 
take account of the steering group’s comments on evaluation quality and accuracy”48. 
3.4. Objective  
 
The objectiveness will depend on the information used. The objectiveness will not be 
jeopardised if the evaluation statements are evidenced with identified sources and if the 
supporting information are taken from different stakeholders. The evaluation report must 
not be based on an exclusive source such as Member States. The Commission must verify 
the information provided in comparing the different sources of information. This has been 
generally respected by the Commission when conducting the first generation of evaluation 
in the field of asylum. 
 
SUB-SECTION 2: THE ABORTION OF THE EVALUATION MECHANISM 
ENVISAGED BY THE COMMISSION 
The Evaluation mechanism proposed by the Commission as presented above had to be 
subjected to consultations in order to gather comments, as well as propositions for 
improvement to perfect the evaluation system49. To that end the Communication was 
discussed at a conference on the evaluation of policies in the field of Justice and Home 
affairs in Brussels on 19 and 20 October 2006, and Member States were subsequently 
invited to comment on the mechanism proposed by the Commission. The Justice and Home 
Affairs Council on 4-5 December 2006 acknowledged the need to improve the current 
existing evaluation mechanisms and called for further discussion on the future mechanism. 
On the basis of the answers received from Member States, the Council agreed on 19 June 
2007, on proposals to modify the Communication, which were approved by the 
Commission.  
 
It appears clear that the propositions made by the Council are restrictions rather than 
improvements. The Council first proposed to limit the scope of the evaluation mechanism to 
specific areas of the Freedom, Security, and Justice Policy according to four defined criteria: 
(1) The availability of data for the area concerned, (2) The avoidance of overlap with the 
existing evaluation mechanisms for individual legal acts, (3) No duplication of other 
Commission evaluation activities, e.g. in the sectors of justice policy and criminal matters, 
and (4) The relevance of the area selected for freedom, security and justice policy goals. 
The practical reason given by the Council to limit the scope of the evaluation mechanism 
was to reduce the amount of the preparatory work and to enable to take into account the 
                                                 
47  Case of Piersack v. Belgium 01.10.1982 req n°8692/79 
48  Op cit, SEC(2007) 213, Annex II  « Conducting evaluations » page 23 
49  Op cit, COM (2006) 332 point 4.2  p 11, point 40 
 « The proposed mechanism and the factsheets are presented so that comments on and improvements 
to them can be made in the follow up to this Communication. To this end, a wide ranging consultation 
process will be launched, including the organisation of a hearing in the autumn » 
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differences among the different policy area, but raised the question of the objectivity of the 
criteria selected by the Council, especially as concern the “availability of the data” and the 
relevance of the “area selected for freedom, security and Justice Policy goal”. It is 
important to note that the data required in the factsheets proposed by the Commission, in 
its Communication of 2006, are mostly provided by Member States. Then the issue of their 
availability may depend on the Member States willingness to provide them. Therefore, in 
applying such criteria, there is a risk that the application of the evaluation mechanism will 
remain at the Member States discretion. This can also be illustrated, further, in the 
conclusions as the Council “considers that the Commission's proposed factsheets, and 
especially the indicators, need to be substantially revised, and that they should first be 
filled in by the Commission. In this connection, the first evaluation exercise, at least, should 
be based exclusively on the information available50". Also the issue of the relevance of the 
Policy goal is subject to critics, as no criteria have been proposed by the Council to define 
the relevance, which gives room for discretion. This will restrain the purpose of the 
evaluation mechanism, as an evaluation on the results of a policy will be carried out only if 
it has been considered relevant. Finally, the frequency of the evaluation was also 
considered as to be revised by the Council, “The Council considers that the evaluation 
should initially be conducted every five years51..." and yet the Commission has proposed a 
more frequent evaluation to monitor progress at regular intervals guaranteeing the 
efficiency of the evaluation. The Council proposal on the periodicity will somewhat deprive 
the evaluation mechanism of its efficiency. 
 
To conclude it appears that the Council restrained rather than improved the application of 
the evaluation mechanism proposed by the Commission, in limiting the purpose and the 
method applicable, as well as the results. According to the extended report on evaluation of 
the Hague Programme since 200552, the evaluation mechanism proposed by the 
Commission “was not fully implemented” because it did not gain the necessary support 
within the Council, as Member States, perceived it as too demanding and burdensome53. 
Actually the mechanism has not been implemented at all, as the analysis of the evaluations 
made by the Commission in the following part will show. Indeed, as the modifications 
required by the Council have never been undertaken by the Commission, the evaluation 
system could not have been practically implemented as such, without resistances from 
Member States. Therefore, the evaluation systems existing before the proposition, which 
have been deemed as incomplete by the Commission itself, have been applied to the CEAS. 
One may argue that the Commission should have proposed a revised mechanism under the 
Council request, but the modification required by the Council would have been too 
restrictive to ensure the effectiveness of this mechanism. It is difficult to imagine how the 
mechanism proposed by the Commission would be operational if the Member States were 
not really ready to provide “available data.” 
 
                                                 
50  Op cit Council Conclusions on the evaluation of EU policies in the field of FSJ, point 4, page 4 
51  Ibid, point 2, page 3 
52  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social 
 Committee and the Committee of the Regions justice, freedom and security in Europe since 2005: an 
evaluation of the Hague programme and action plan, an extended report on the evaluation of the 
Hague Programme SEC (2009) 766,  10.06.2009 
53  Ibid, point 2.2 “Evaluation and monitoring- II Main developments ” p 13 
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SECTION 2: THE EVALUATIONS IN PRACTICE 
SUB-SECTION 1: IDENTIFICATION OF WEAKNESSES 
Evaluations’ current state of play is made of the scoreboard and the standard evaluation of 
EU measures. The monitoring process proposed through the scoreboard is mainly focusing 
on the quantitative progress of the adoption measures and their implementation according 
to the schedule of the Hague Programme. In this context the evaluation of the legal 
instruments will have an added value compare to the scoreboard, if they carried out a 
qualitative assessment, meaning the evaluation of the results against the objectives of the 
legal instruments itself, but also against the wider objective of the creation of the CEAS. To 
be effective, the evaluations undertaken must, accordingly, include a vertical and a 
horizontal approach as seen previously, which is not the case for the evaluations made by 
the Commission as this part tends to show. This is partly explained by the legal nature of 
the information provided, which does not allow a full assessment on the impact of the EU 
measure. Thus, the weakness of the methodology applied to the first generation of the 
evaluations made by the Commission led to insufficient evaluating results to measure its 
real impact, and to establish the second generation of the CEAS. 
1. NO REAL POLITICAL PURPOSE  
 
The objectives and the purpose of the evaluation carried out by the Commission are 
generally limited to the legal evaluation of the implementation of the asylum instruments. 
When the Commission intended to carry out a “political evaluation”, the evaluations reports 
reveal that the political purpose is not clearly dealt with by the Commission, and seems 
more to have been merged in the legal purpose. Some of the evaluations analysed are 
focused on quantitative assessments such as Frontex evaluation, which does not contain 
balanced qualitative assessments on the impacts of the Agency. However some 
improvement may be observed with the evaluation of the Asylum Procedures Directive 
(APD) where the Commission tends to conduct a more political evaluation. 
1.1. Illustration of the problem 
1.1.1. The evaluation of the Reception Conditions Directive54 
This evaluation has been carried out by the Commission on the basis of two external 
studies conducted by the Odysseus Academic Network and EMN. As determined in the call 
for tender55 and in the evaluation report of the Commission itself, the objective of the study 
is to give an overview of the transposition and application of the Directive in the national 
system of the 23 Member States, and to identify possible problematic issues and possibility 
for improvements. One may say that the purpose in the view of the evaluation is political, 
as identifying areas for improvements implies to assess first the area for which the 
Directive has achieved its objectives or not. Nevertheless, the study of the evaluation 
report of the Commission reveals that the political purpose is not clearly dealt with by the 
Commission, and seems more to have been merged in the legal purpose. The Commission 
has, indeed mainly evaluated how the Directive has been implemented at national level 
assessing whether the national measures transposing the Directive and the national 
                                                 
54  Report from the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament on the application of 
directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum 
seekers COM(2007) 745, 26.11.2007  
55  Specific call for tender on the study on the transposition and implementation by EU Member States of 
Council Directive 2003/9/EC laying down minimum standards on the reception of applicants for 
Asylum in Member States  Specification for General invitation to tender JLS/B4/2005/03  
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practice comply with the specific provisions of the Directive. For areas, where general 
compliance has been respected by the Member States, nor the results of the application of 
these provisions, neither their impacts have been clearly evaluated by the Commission. 
 
The only political purpose of the Commission remains in its final conclusion where it broadly 
shows that the application of the directive has not been effective. “The wide discretion 
allowed to Member States by the Directive in a number of areas…undermines the objective 
of creating a level playing field in the area of reception conditions.” As for illustration, the 
restriction of the right to free movement and residence, where the Commission has not 
found difficulties upon the implementation of this provision due to the broad discretion 
given to the Member States, the Commission displayed the different States’ practices 
without analyzing if the restriction to the right of free movement applied in a Member 
States may preclude the asylum seekers to access to the directive benefits in practice. 
Another example is the access of asylum seekers to the labour market. The Commission 
concluded that no legal problem arose for its application due to the large discretion of 
Member States in this field. From this again, the Commission displayed the results of the 
Member States practices without really assessing how far those practices hinder access to 
labour, and does not answer to important evaluation questions such as, how many asylum 
seekers accessed to labour market in practice? What is the social impact of the 
unemployment? How Member States’ practices contribute to lower the standard of 
reception? Concerning the access to health care, the Commission, while concluding that the 
large number of Member States have broadened access to health care, has not assessed 
neither question of this access in practice.  
 
Furthermore, the information or indicators used or required have not been defined against 
the objectives of the Directive as such proposed by COM (2006) 332, but rather evaluate 
its transposition and its application at national level. According to the call for tender “The 
study should provide the Commission with detailed information on the transposition and 
application of the Directive by the Member States, identify possible shortcomings (in the 
legislation or administrative practice)…”56 The legal nature of the information required can 
explain the difficulty to carry out a more political evaluation. Nevertheless the Commission 
made a reference to article 22 of the Directive requiring provision of statistical data upon 
Member States, but this provision has not been really implemented as stated in the Impact 
Assessment57.Regarding the nature of information provided the purpose of the evaluation 
carried out by or for the Commission could not have been otherwise than legal. 
1.1.2. The evaluation of the Qualification Directive  
The evaluation of the Qualification Directive (QD)58 has been undertaken by the 
Commission in the impact assessment accompanying the proposal for a new Directive59. 
The evaluation proposed in the impact assessment looks like more general statements of 
the problems posed by the Directive than a political evaluation, as such. The Commission 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
56  Ibid, Specific call for tender on the study on the transposition and implementation of the Reception 
conditions Directive point 2.2 « Results to be achieved by the Contractor » page 3 
57  Commission staff working document accompanying the proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers 
impact assessment SEC (2008) 2944,  3.12.2008 « Scope of the problem » page 14 
58  Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status 
of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need 
international protection and the content of the protection granted 
59  Commission staff working document accompanying the proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country 
nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection and the content of the 
protection granted, impact assessment SEC(2009) 1373, 22.10.2009 
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has concluded that the negative impact of the Directive is far from reaching its objectives, 
but has not really assessed the scope of the problems stated. In that sense the Commission 
identified as a main problem the vagueness and the ambiguity of the standards adopted, 
leading to three main negative impacts. First of all the minimum standards adopted are 
deemed insufficient to secure full compatibility with the evolving human rights and refugee 
law standards and to ensure effective access to the rights guaranteed by the relevant 
international instruments. Secondly, they have not achieved a sufficient level of 
harmonisation to enable the establishment of a uniform status, nor to offer a high 
protection. Moreover the current divergences between national asylum laws among the 
Member States still lead to secondary movement. Finally they have a negative impact on 
the quality and the efficiency of the decision-making60.  
 
Although the Commission has briefly targeted the manifestation of those problems stated 
above in specific provisions of the Directive61, it has not measured and evaluated in depth 
the problematic issues. The lack of necessary data can explain the difficulty to undertake a 
political evaluation. Indeed, most of information collected by the Commission is information 
about the transposition and implementation of the Directive. This information was collected 
by the Commission through its monitoring activities, but also on several studies and 
notably a report carried out on behalf of the Commission by the Odysseus academic 
network62. It is important to note that the Commission required in its call for tender63 only 
information about the transposition and the application of the Directive in the Member 
States64. Although further data was collected from academic publications, from 
commentaries of UNHCR, from civil society stakeholders, and from an external study 
conducted on behalf of the Commission65 analysing evidences and results from 
consultations, the Commission recognised that some important data are missing to work on 
improvements in the future proposal. This is the case of the information concerning the 
access of beneficiaries of international protection to the rights granted by the Directive66. 
1.1.3. Evaluation of the Frontex Agency67 
The European Commission has conducted its own evaluation of FRONTEX Regulation, as 
requested by the 2004 Hague Programme68. The Council required the Commission to 
                                                 
60  Ibid point 2.2.2 “Problems with the standards set down by the Directive”, page 10, 11, and 12. 
61  Ibid point 2.2.2 page 12 
62  Ibid point 1.1.2 “ Organization and timing, consultation and expertise” page 7 
63  Tender specifications« Conformity checking of measures of Member States to transpose Directives in 
the sector of asylum and immigration. 
64  Ibid “The objective of the contract is to produce studies, which analyse the conformity of national 
legislation with ten Directives in the sector of asylum and immigration”, which implies “a legal 
examination of the conformity with each Article of the Directive” page 1 and 2 
65  GHK impact assessment studies on the future development of measures on the qualification and 
status of third country nationals or stateless persons as persons in need of international protection 
and on the content of the protection granted, based on Council Directive 2004/83/EC, and the future 
development on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, based on 
the Council Directive 2005/85/EC, Multiple framework service contract JLS/2006/A1/004. See SEC 
(2009) 1373, op cit, point 1.1.2 page 7.  
66  Impact assessment op cit point 2.2.7 “Moreover, there is no information available on the overall costs 
of hosting beneficiaries of protection. Different rights, such as access to education, recognition of 
qualifications, social welfare or employment support, are granted on the basis of individual needs and 
MS do not segregate statistics on the basis of such criteria. This problem is recognised by the EU, and 
it is being addressed by greater cooperation and information sharing among MS, the institutions and 
NGOs, soon to be assisted by the EASO. It is thus impossible to estimate how many applicants might 
actually be affected by any amendments to the grounds of protection or to assess the effects of any 
amendments to the rights granted to beneficiaries of protection. This is unfortunately a constraint 
which future proposals must work within.” 
67  Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004  establishing a European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, 26.10. 
2004 
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undertake before the end of 2007 “a review of the task of the Agency and an assessment of 
whether the Agency should concern itself with other aspects of border management …”69 
The Commission presented the evaluation required as a ‘political evaluation’70 which 
includes a review of the tasks of the Agency, an assessment of the results71 and short term, 
as well as long term recommendations for the future developments of the Agency. 
However, the evaluation report emphasized more on quantitative results and did not 
contain any real, balanced qualitative assessment of the agency’s activities, nor of the 
added value of a new system72. Thus, the Commission addressed recommendations on 
future development of the Agency on the basis of quantitative outputs without assessing 
the impact of the Agency activities. For instance, in respect to the evaluation of the joint 
operations under the cover of the Agency, the Commission displayed the number of joint 
operations undertaken, then the quantitative results in term of Members States 
participation, as well as the cost of those operations73. On this basis, the Commission even 
considered that the results of joint operations cannot be summarized solely in quantitative 
terms concluded that “Nevertheless the quantifiable results so far must be considered 
impressive: more than 53 000 persons, for 2006 and 2007 together, have been 
apprehended or denied entry at the border during these operations. More than 2 900 false 
or falsified travel documents have been detected and 58 facilitators of illegal migration 
arrested74". In this regard, it is important to note that the impact of FRONTEX activities 
over human rights obligations, such the principle of non- refoulement, that EU institutions, 
Community bodies and Member States must comply with, have not been assessed. For 
instance, it is unknown which safeguards of those available have benefited the migrants 
involved in push-backs. (See the part of this study dealing with external dimension of 
asylum, “FRONTEX evaluation). 
 
According to article 33 of the FRONTEX Regulation, the Management Board shall 
commission an independent external evaluation of the implementation of the Regulation 
within three years from the date of the Agency having taken up its responsibilities and 
every five years thereafter. COWI75 was awarded the contract to undertake the evaluation. 
The evaluation covers the activities of FRONTEX in the period from 1 January 2006 - June 
2008. In its draft report of January 2009, COWI sets in the objectives of the evaluation a 
political purpose, as it intended to assess « the working practices, the effectiveness and 
impact of the Agency »76, meaning a review on the results of the activities, on achievement 
of the objectives and on the impact, accompanied with recommendations. Compared to the 
evaluation of the Commission, the external evaluation has attempted to carry out a more 
qualitative assessment. In this context for each area of activities of the Agency, COWI 
presents its general findings with an assessment and conclusions on the effectiveness and 
on the impact of the Agency’s activities. However, some difficulties remain to fully assess 
the results and the impact of the activities of the Agency, as the evaluation intervened at 
                                                                                                                                                            
68  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the regions report on the evaluation and future 
development of the FRONTEX agency  COM (2008) 67 13.2.2008 
69  Op cit,  Hague Programme point 1.7.1  «  Border checks and the fight against illegal immigration » 
page 6 
70  Op cit, COM (2008) 67 “Introduction” point 3, page 2 
71  Ibid, point 4  
72  Elspeth Guild, Sergio Carrera, and Anaïs Faure Atger, « Challenges and prospects for the EU’s area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice » CEPS Working document No 313/April 2009, point 2.2 
“Shortcomings”, page 8 
73  Op cit, COM (2008) 67 “Evaluation achievements” Point, 6, 7 and 8, page 3 
74  Ibid Point 9 
75  COWI external evaluation of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at 
the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, Draft report January 2009. COWI 
(Consultancy within engineering, environmental science and economics) is a northern European 
consultancy group. 
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an early stage of its development. In this regard criticisms can be made with regard to the 
scope as well as the assessments made in the report, which has been developed further in 
this Study77. One of the most important is the lack of evaluation of FRONTEX’s activities 
with regard to their impact on the right to asylum. 
1.2. An improvement with the evaluation of the Asylum 
procedures directive78 
 
The evaluation of the Asylum Procedure Directive, such as the evaluation of the 
Qualification Directive has been undertaken by the Commission in the impact assessment 
accompanying the proposal for a new Directive79. Compared to the other evaluations 
studied above, the Commission attempted to carry out a more political evaluation. Indeed, 
apart from the general conclusion of the insufficient harmonisation due to the vague 
standards set down by the current Directive, the Commission identified specific deficiencies 
in the Directive and assessed their own negative impact on the basis of evidences, as well 
as their negative impact when they are combined altogether80. By way of example, the 
Commission demonstrated how insufficient procedural safeguards, such as the possibility 
for Member States to omit a personal interview under certain grounds, the limited access to 
legal advice, the fact that procedures are not responsive to special needs, and inadequate 
access to effective remedy, can leave room for administrative error and lead to denial of 
protection81. Also the Commission tended to show how the vague procedural notions and 
devices, such as the use of accelerated procedures, and the notion of safe country of origin, 
among the other things that are affecting the accessibility, fairness and efficiency of the 
asylum process82. The Commission has also shown that these specific issues, when 
combined altogether, have a negative impact on the asylum process that can lead to denial 
of protection. For instance, as regards survivors of torture, the Directive’s silence on the 
special needs of this category of applicants in combination with provision allowing Member 
States to treat cases as manifestly unfounded and omit a personal interview, have the 
potential to produce errors upon the asylum decision making83.The Asylum Procedures 
Directive has been the object of a deeper analysis, as the Commission attributed to a large 
extend the limited effectiveness of the asylum acquis to this directive84. 
2. NO HORIZONTAL APPROACH 
 
The Horizontal approach, as seen above, consists on evaluating the achievement of 
objectives in the broader context of a policy, as well as assessing the coherence of different 
instruments within a given policy. This approach has been confirmed through a 
Communication of 21 February200785 on reinforcing the use of the evaluation. This 
approach is indeed essential to create a coherent and a consistent system, such as the 
CEAS. According to this Communication, [The strategic aspect of the evaluation is how it 
assesses the link between individual interventions and horizontal objectives or wider EU 
                                                                                                                                                            
76  Ibid COWI §1.1 « Objective of the Evaluation » page 10 
77  Part on the External dimension of Asylum point 3.4 page 29 
78  Council Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting 
and withdrawing refugee status, 01.12.2005  
79  Commission staff working document accompanying the proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and the Council on min minimum standards  on procedures in Member States for granting 
and withdrawing international protection , impact assessment SEC(2009) 1376, 23.10.09 
80  Ibid point  2.2.6  “specific problems” page 12 
81  Ibid  point 2.2.6.1, page 12 
82  Ibid point 2.2.6.2,  page 16 
83  Ibid point 2.2.6.1 page 14 and 15 
84  Ibid point 2.2.6 page 12 
85  Op cit, SEC (2007)213, Point 2.1 « Relevant focus- making evaluation results more useful » page 8 
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objectives]. “Individual evaluation should therefore, where appropriate include questions 
that put them into the broader policy context”86. This should imply finding answers to 
certain questions such as: To what extent have individual interventions contributed to the 
strategic objectives? And how coherent and complementary have these interventions been? 
This implies a need of information on cross-cutting issues in order to assess the coherence, 
complementarily and combined impact of several intervention pursuing same or similar 
objectives87. In the same way CEPS evokes the need to open wider debate “about the need 
to establish a horizontal evaluation mechanism applying to all relevant policies falling under 
the rubric of an AFSJ88. 
 
The evaluations studied above only carried out a vertical approach focusing on the legal 
instruments evaluated, but the Commission has not assessed whether these instruments 
altogether are achieving the objectives for creating a CEAS. The rationale behind the lack of 
a horizontal approach lies to the fact that the evaluations made by the Commission on the 
legal instruments are not sufficient enough to carry out such a horizontal evaluation, as 
they are essentially limited to the evaluation of the legal implementation. 
3. IMPACT ASSESSMENTS USED AS A SUBSTITUTE TO 
EX-POST EVALUATIONS 
 
The Qualification Directive and the Asylum Procedures Directive have not been subjected to 
an ex-post evaluation before the issuance of the Impact Assessment (IA), accompanying 
the proposals for the new directives. Indeed, their evaluation by the Commission has been 
directly carried out in the IA, which is serving, in that case, as an ex-post evaluation of 
those two directives. Apart from the Qualification Directive and the Asylum Procedures 
Directive, the other asylum instruments, when evaluated89, have been subjected to an ex-
post evaluation made by or for the Commission before the issuance of an IA on the 
developments of the future asylum instruments. However it appears that IA has been also 
used by the Commission to further complete the ex-post evaluations that have been 
already made by or for the Commission. By way of example in the impact assessment 
accompanying the proposal for a new Reception Conditions Directive90, the Commission 
tended to conduct a more political, evaluation and proposed to define the problems 
encountered in applying the Reception Conditions Directive, in order to address solutions 
for improvements91. This has leaded the Commission to exploit the results of the 
application of the directive and analyze their impact in order to have a clear state of play of 
the problems. The Commission first set the deficiencies of the Directive and then set the 
results of the application of the directive in some problematic areas. At the end the 
Commission measured the impacts of the results with regard to the standard of treatment 
of Asylum seekers intended by the directive, the impact on Fundamental Rights, as well as 
social impact, and impact on other areas of asylum. However this evaluation remains also 
limited, as it appears to be more general statements than an in-depth analysis of the 
impact of the Directive. Consequently, in the field of asylum, IA has been used by the 
Commission either to replace the ex-post evaluations of the legal instruments or to further 
complete them, whereas it is not the purpose of these instruments. IAs indeed aim more at 
                                                 
86  Ibid 
87  Ibid  
88  Op cit CEPS working document N° 313/April 2009,point 3.1”Recommendations”, page 12  
89  This is the case of the Dublin II Regulation, as well as, the EURODAC Regulation, the Reception 
Conditions Directive, the European Refugee Fund, the Family Reunification Directive, and FONTEX 
Regulation. 
90  Op cit, SEC (2008) 2944   
91  Ibid  point 2,  page 6 
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analysing future prospects of the efficiency, the viability, the accuracy and the coherence of 
the future measure in order to improve the quality of the Commission’s proposals, as well 
as to provide effective aid to decision making92. The use of the impact assessment as a 
substitute of the ex-post evaluation in the field of asylum reveals the difficulty for the 
Commission to undertake such evaluation within the short timeframe of the political 
agenda. 
4. THE TRANSPARENCY OF THE INFORMATION USED 
 
The Commission in its 2007 Communication93, states that the evaluation results can be 
reliable if “The final evaluation reports must, as a minimum, set out the purpose, context, 
objectives, information sources, method used, evidence and conclusions”94, and if the 
evaluation document or mandate at least “specify the following points; Purpose and 
objectives, Key questions, Scope, Expected outputs, Deadlines, Quality criteria”95. Thus, 
the results will be reliable if there is a minimum of transparency of the evaluation process 
and of the information used. From the evaluation reports, we can conclude that the 
transparency of the evaluation process was generally respected by the Commission. 
Concerning, specifically, the study on the transposition and the implementation of the 
Reception Conditions Directive, the call for tender clearly stated the purpose and the 
objectives, as well as the scope, the expected results, the methodology and the compulsory 
information96 required. The same presentation has been regarded in the call for tender 
related to the study of the “conformity checking of measures of Member States to 
transpose directives in the sector of asylum and immigration”97. The final evaluation report 
on the implementation of the Reception conditions Directive also set out the purpose and 
the objectives of the evaluation, as well as the conclusions concerning the state of 
implementation among the Member States. With regard to the information sources and 
evidences used, the evaluation report clearly mentioned the two external studies, on which 
the Commission drafted its report, and thus respects the principle of transparency. In the 
same way, the Commission in its impact assessments clearly set out the different sources 
of information on which it carried out the evaluation of the Asylum Procedures Directive, as 
well as the Qualification Directive98. As concerns the evaluation of FRONTEX, both 
evaluations (the one carried out by the Commission and the one carried out by independent 
experts), provide the source of information and the statistical data on which the 
conclusions regarding the Agency activities have been drafted.  
5. THE RESULTS OF THE EVALUATIONS 
5.1. Not systematic 
 
The only instrument that remains unevaluated is the Temporary Protection Directive99, 
whereas the evaluation deadline foreseen was the 31 December 2004100. The Commission 
                                                 
92  Evaluation of the Commission’s Impact Assessment System FINAL REPORT – Executive Summary. 
Contract number SG-02/2006, April 2007, “Objectives of the Commission’s IA’s system page 3 
93  p cit, SEC (2007) 213  
94  Ibid,  “Conducting Evaluations” page 23 point 4 
95  Ibid, “Designing evaluation” page 23 point 2 
96  Op cit, Specification for general invitation to tender, points 2, 2.2, 3, 3.4, 3.5, page 2 and 3 
97  Points  2, 3, 4, and 4.2, page 1, 2 and 3. 
98  See SEC(2009)1376 point 1.1.3 page 6 and SEC(2009) 1373 point 1.1.2« Organisation and timing, 
consultations expertises » page 6 
99  Council Directive 2001/55/EC on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a 
mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member 
States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, 20.07. 2001 
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justified the absence of evaluation of this measure by the fact that the Directive has not 
been applied due to its specific nature. But this does not preclude the Commission to 
monitor the transposition and implementation of the Directive, which is important to ensure 
its effectiveness in case it has to be applied. Apart from the Temporary Protection Directive 
the other asylum instruments have been evaluated, but most of time with a significant 
delay. As concerns the evaluation of the Dublin system, the Commission provided with an 
overall evaluation of the Dublin system comprising an assessment of the Dublin II 
Regulation, and of the EURODAC Regulation, which has been submitted to the European 
Parliament and to the Council with one year of delay101.  On the other hand, the specific 
evaluations foreseen for the EURODAC Regulation have been regularly carried out by the 
Commission without significant delay102. 
 
Dealing with the Reception Conditions Directive, the Commission has submitted, to the 
European Parliament and the Council, a report on the application of the Directive on the 6th 
of November 2007103, whereas the deadline enshrined in the final provision of the 
Directive104 was the 6th of August 2006. The Commission, through the impact assessment 
prepared for the recast proposals, has done a kind of evaluation of the Qualification 
Directive and of the Asylum Procedures Directive. If it has respected the deadline for the 
evaluation of the Asylum Procedures Directive105, the evaluation of the Qualification 
Directive should have been made by 10 April 2008106, that is to say one year and half 
earlier.  
5.2. Not Efficient 
 
As concerns the question of the efficiency of the evaluations carried out, by or for, the 
Commission, we can conclude that they have not generally provided inputs as regards the 
impact and the effectiveness of the legal asylum instruments that are to improve the future 
policy-making. The analysis made on the evaluations conducted by the Commission shows 
that these evaluations mainly dealt with the issue of their implementation, rather than their 
impact and we can question whether they will be sufficient and efficient enough to improve 
the policy-making. This underlines the need for a more frequent evaluation to monitor 
progress at regular intervals guaranteeing the efficiency of the evaluation, as the 
Commission proposed in its communication of 2006. Indeed, the evaluation of the 
                                                                                                                                                            
100  Article 31 and 32 of Council directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving 
temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a 
balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences 
thereof. 
101  Articles 28 and 29 of the current Regulation and article 24.5 of the current EURODAC Regulation 
foresaw an overall evaluation respectively for February 2006 and January 2006. The evaluation of the 
Dublin system COM (2007) 299 has been submitted by the Commission on 6th of June 2007. 
102  According to article 24.1 and 24.2 of the EURODAC Regulation, the Commission was on the duty of 
evaluating the EURODAC Central unit activities on the basis of annual reports. The Commission was 
also in charge of dressing a special assessment on the Central unit “focusing on the level of demand 
compared with expectation and on operational and management issues in the light of experience, with 
a view to identifying possible short-term improvements to operational practice.”  
103  Op cit, COM (2007) 745 
104  Article 25 of the Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003, laying down minimum standards for 
the reception of asylum seekers : “By 6 August 2006, the Commission shall report to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the application of this Directive and shall propose any amendments that 
are necessary.” 
105  Article 42 of the Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in 
Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status ““No later than 1 December 2009, the 
Commission shall report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of this 
Directive in the Member States and shall propose any amendments that are necessary. 
106  Article 37 of Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification 
and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise 
need international protection and the content of the protection granted 
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implementation of EU measures shall correspond to the first level of the evaluation, as the 
impact of a measure cannot be effectively assessed if the legal instruments have not been 
correctly implemented at national level. Once the compliance with the provisions of the 
legal instruments has been regarded, the evaluation of their impact can be envisaged. 
Periodical evaluations are foreseen in most of final provisions of the legal instruments of 
the CEAS. But they could not be carried out by the Commission due to the short schedule 
attached to the political agenda for the creation of the CEAS, and the general delay of 
transposition which has constantly postponed the required evaluations. 
 
In addition, the short schedule attached to the evaluation process does not generally allow 
provision of relevant information to measure their impact. The evaluations generally 
intervene at a too early stage when the Member States have just transposed the EU legal 
instruments. In the Extended report on the implementation of The Hague programme the 
Commission, even though aware of the need to improve the evaluation system, deemed 
the evaluations of the specific legislation that has already made, as “providing useful 
appraisal of how they operate and proposing constructive recommendations for possible 
improvements”107 and cited the evaluation of Dublin as evidence. This conclusion lacks of 
credibility, as the Dublin evaluation has been probably one of the most problematic. 
5.3. Objectivity into question 
 
In this regard, it is important to note that the Member States are not the principal source of 
information on which the Commission has undertaken the evaluation of the asylum 
instruments. As seen previously, an exclusive source of information would be a constraint, 
precluding the objectiveness of the evaluator. But the Commission has collected 
information from a wide range of relevant stakeholders as UNHCR, ECRE and other NGO’s. 
This has been specified in the call for tender on the study of the implementation of the 
Reception Conditions Directive108, but also in the two impact assessments accompanying 
respectively a proposal for a new Asylum Procedures Directive, and a proposal for a new 
Qualification Directive109. The objectiveness can be more arguable in the case of FRONTEX 
evaluation, which is exclusively based on the quantitative information given by the Agency, 
evading the issue of its impact on the right of asylum. 
5.4. Impartiality into question 
 
The question of the impartiality has only been problematic concerning the evaluation of 
Dublin system. It seems indeed that this evaluation has been driven in function to the 
“single-minded preference for the status quo”110. 
 
SUB-SECTION 2: THE REASONS BEHIND 
The existing evaluation mechanisms are not sufficient enough to enable the Commission to 
carry out evaluations complying with the community objectives. They are characterised by 
a general lack of instruments, which do not provide precise and sufficient guidelines for the 
evaluations, as they set out a limited purpose and do not require defined specific 
                                                 
107  Op cit  SEC (2009) 766 , Extended report on the implementation of the Hague programme “Main 
developments” page 13 
108  Op cit,  point 3.5 of the call for tender, page 3 
109  Op cit See SEC(2009)1376 point 1.1.3 page 6 and SEC(2009) 1373 point 1.1.2« Organisation and 
timing, consultations expertises » page 6 
110  Francesco Maiani and Vigdis Vevstad, “Reflection Note on the Evaluation of the Dublin System and on 
the Dublin III Proposal, submitted to the European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice 
and Home Affairs” (LIBE Committee) 23 March 2009. 
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information that would be necessary to carry out the evaluation. The evaluation as applied 
to the first generation of the CEAS is also characterised by the lack of statistical data 
available and by the lack of institutional mechanism for monitoring Human rights, which 
should be a key component in the creation of a CEAS. But establishing an overall 
comprehensive evaluation mechanism will also raise the sensitive question of its economic 
impact and feasibility. 
1. THE LACK OF INSTRUMENTS 
 
There was no legal basis in the Treaty for the evaluation of the first generation of asylum 
legal instruments. Consequently, the evaluation mechanisms are spread among the final 
provisions of the different legal instruments. There are two different types of final 
provision; the “standard provisions” and the “specific provisions”. The standard final 
provisions are characterised by insufficient guidelines for the evaluation, as they set out a 
limited purpose and do not require and define specific information. Even if the specific 
provisions are generally more detailed and set out a more political purpose, some 
weaknesses have to be highlighted, especially as concerns the information required. 
1.1. Standard provision 
 
 “Not later than / by… the Commission shall report to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the application of this Directive/ Regulation/ Decision in the Member States 
and shall propose any amendments that are necessary.  
The Member States shall send the Commission all the information that is appropriate 
for drawing up this report.” 
This standard provision is enclosed in the Temporary Protection Directive, the current 
Reception conditions Directive 2003/9/E, the current Qualification Directive 2004/83/EC , 
the current Asylum Procedure Directive 2005/85/EC, and the current Dublin II Regulation 
1560/ 2003/ EC. Concerning the purpose of the evaluation, the standard provision stated 
above does not require a political purpose, as it limits the evaluation to the reporting 
mechanism of the application of the legal instruments in the Member States. There is also 
no further precision on the scope of the evaluation. What does the evaluation of the 
application of the legal instruments mean and imply? The legal purpose set out in the 
standard provision could not preclude the Commission to carry out an evaluation on the 
results of the application of those legal instruments in the Member States, but the 
information required seem not to be sufficient enough to do so. Indeed, the Member States’ 
obligation to provide the Commission information cannot be efficient unless the information 
needed to draw up the evaluation report is clearly defined. What is the “appropriate 
information”? In most of the directives, the only precise information required in the final 
provisions is the obligation for Member States to communicate to the Commission the 
provisions of national law transposing the Directive. Therefore the information required to 
Member States is essentially related to the transposition. In this context, the evaluation 
pursued by the Commission could not have been otherwise than legal evaluations.  
 
There is only a little precision in the Reception conditions Directive, in which the 
appropriate information for the evaluation must include the statistical data provided for by 
article 22. According to this article Member States are compelled to "regularly inform the 
Commission on the data concerning the number of persons, broken down by sex and age, 
covered by reception conditions and provide full information on the type, name and format 
of the documents provided for by Article 6". Aside from the fact that the statistical data 
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required seems not sufficient enough to provide an effective evaluation, the Commission 
has also highlighted in the Impact assessment of the proposal for a new Directive that 
Member States failed to collect this information at national level111. In some instruments 
there is even no obligation for Member States to send information to the Commission for 
the evaluation report. This is the case of the Family Reunification Directive112 where the 
sole obligation the Member States have, is to inform the Commission when they have 
transposed the Directive. (See article 19 and 20). Sometimes there are provisions 
specifying a deadline for Member States to comply with their obligation to send to the 
Commission the relevant information in the view of the EU evaluation report. This is the 
case of the Reception Conditions Directive113 and the Qualification Directive114. The added 
value of such a deadline is to timely provide the Commission with the necessary 
information in order to submit the evaluation report by the deadline foreseen in the final 
provision. 
1.2. Specific provisions 
1.2.1. Council Regulation concerning the establishment of Eurodac115  
The monitoring and the evaluation mechanisms of EURODAC are foreseen in Article 24 of 
the Regulation and based on annual reports and on an overall report, which have been 
submitted by the Commission. The purpose of the evaluation is clearly stated. The annual 
reports are aiming at monitoring the functioning of the Central Unit against its objectives in 
term of outputs, cost-effectiveness and quality of service116, based on information on 
management and performance against pre defined quantitative indicators117.Thus the 
annual reports pursue a quantitative purpose rather a qualitative purpose, which is carried 
out by the overall report, as this latter is aiming at examining the results achieved against 
the objectives118. Aside to the overall report, the political purpose of evaluating the 
effectiveness of the Central Unit must be subject to regular evaluation, in order to establish 
whether its objectives have been attained cost-effectively and with the view to provide 
guidelines for improving the efficiency of future operations119. 
 
The nature of the information required to draft the annual report is clearly defined120, which 
is not the case for the overall report on the evaluation of the results achieved. Furthermore, 
article 24.5 does not impose obligation on Member States to deliver information that would 
be necessary to draft the evaluation report. In this regard, the Commission in its 
Communication COM (2006) 332, defined the necessary information that had to be 
provided by Member States to evaluate the impact of the Regulation. For instance, the 
Member States had to provide the percentage rate of change before and after the 
introduction of the system to measure the increase number of asylum applications being 
examined in the first country of asylum/entry, and to measure the reduction of persons 
                                                 
111  Op cit, SEC (2008) 2244 “scope of the problem” page 14 
112  Council Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, 22.09.2003 
113  Directive 2003/9, laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers 27.01.2003, 
Article 25 “Member States shall send the Commission all the information that is appropriate for 
drawing up this report by 6 February 2006.” 
114  Directive 2004/83 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or 
stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the 
content of the protection granted 29.04.2004, Article 37 “Member States shall send the Commission 
all the information that is appropriate for drawing up this report by 10 October 2007” 
115  Council Regulation n°2725/2000, concerning the establishment of EURODAC for the comparison of 
fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention, 11. 12. 2000 
116  Ibid, Article 24.2  
117  Ibid, Article 24.1  
118  Ibid, Article 24.5  
119  Ibid, Article 24.3  
120  Ibid, Article 24.1 and 24.2  
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making multiple claims121.Therefore, we may conclude that article 24 of the Regulation is 
more focused on the quantitative information than on the qualitative information, which 
could create difficulties to carry out an evaluation on the impact of the Regulation. 
 
1.2.2. Frontex Regulation 
Article 33 of the Regulation clearly set out a political evaluation purpose, as “the evaluation 
shall examine how effectively the Agency fulfils its mission. It shall also assess the impact 
of the Agency and its working practices…”, but no qualitative criteria are required to carry 
out such evaluation. 
2. THE LACK OF INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISM FOR 
MONITORING HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Since 13 March 2001 the Commission decided that any proposals for legislation and any 
draft instruments have to be first scrutinized for compatibility with the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The 2005 Communication122 sets a 
methodology for systematic and rigorous monitoring of compliance with the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which has been designed to ensure that Commission departments 
check systematically and thoroughly that all the fundamental rights concerned have been 
respected in all draft proposals. While an ex-ante monitoring of Fundamental Rights has 
been developed, despite the practical problems in its application123, no systematic and 
regular ex-post monitoring of the situation of Fundamental Rights in the Member States, 
upon the implementation of EU policies, has been effectively set out. And yet such a 
mechanism must be complementary to the ex- ante monitoring of Fundamental Rights. 
Indeed, monitoring the situation of Human rights should be ensured upon the adoption, 
and upon the implementation of the European legislation, especially when the Member 
States can have a margin of discretion or can use exception provided for in such legislative 
instruments124. Moreover, it is an ever growing importance in the area of FSJ, which very 
directly raises fundamental rights issues, such as the impact of FRONTEX Regulation, by 
way of example. And specifically, the Commission recalled in its Green paper on the future 
Common European Asylum System, that the creation of the CEAS must be based on « the 
full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention and on the common humanitarian 
values shared by all Member States125". 
 
The existing monitoring mechanisms are not sufficient enough to allow the necessary 
systematic monitoring of the situation of Fundamental rights in the Member States. Article 
7 TEU126 makes available preventive measures and potential sanctions against a Member 
State upon the determination of the “existence of a serious and persistent breach” of one of 
                                                 
121  Op cit  COM (2006) 332 factsheets page 34 
122  Communication from the Commission, on the compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 
Commission legislative proposals, Methodology for systematic and rigorous monitoring, COM (2005) 
172, 27.04.2005. 
123  Report on the Practical operation of the Methodology for a systematic and rigorous monitoring of 
compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights COM (2009) 205, 29.04.2009  « Experience since 
2005 has shown that the methodology is well conceived as regards the objective sought but that its 
practical application needs to be reinforced. », point 4“Conclusion”, page 9 
124  Op cit “Comment évaluer le droit pénal européen”,  Olivier de Schutter and Valérie Van Goethem,  
« The added value of a systematic and regular monitoring of the situation of fundamental rights in the 
Member States for the evaluation of the implementation of Union laws and policies » page 125 
125  Green paper on the future Common European Asylum system, COM (2007) 301, 6.06.2007, point 1 
“Introduction”, page 2 
126  Article 7 of the Consolidated  version of the Treaty on the European Union, OJ, C 115/13, 9.5.2008 
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the principles mentioned in article 2 TEU127. But the scope of its application is limited to the 
qualification of a serious and a persistent breach of Fundamental rights, and makes room to 
other breaches that won’t be subjected to scrutiny. Furthermore, article 7 TEU would be 
workable if it was accompanied by systematic monitoring mechanism aside, to detect the 
serious and the persistent breach, which is not the case. Thus the EU’s procedure 
envisaged in article 7 TEU to make sure that systematic and serious violations of Human 
rights and Fundamental freedoms do not take place in the EU has never been used128. The 
EU Network of independent Experts on Fundamental Rights (NEFR) was the only group 
performing a monitoring function on the basis of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in 
the EU and in the Member States, through annual reports or in delivering specific 
information and opinions regarding the situation of Fundamental Rights. But the NEFR has 
been removed by the creation of the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA)129. 
 
As highlighted by article 2 of the Regulation establishing the FRA, the Agency has a limited 
mandate and is not in charge to carry out a systematic monitoring of the Member States’ 
compliance with Fundamental rights130. According to this article “The objective of the 
Agency shall be to provide the relevant institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the 
Community and its Member States when implementing Community law with assistance and 
expertise relating to fundamental rights, in order to support them when they take 
measures or formulate courses of action within their respective spheres of competence to 
fully respect fundamental rights.” To that end, the FRA can «formulate and publish 
conclusions and opinions on specific thematic topics, for the Union institutions and the 
Member States when implementing Community law, either on its own initiative or at the 
request of the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission”131. Therefore, the 
Agency has more a role of assistance than monitoring. 
 
As stated above, fundamental rights are an integrant part of the objectives of the FSJ 
policies that have to be evaluated by the Commission. The question of compliance with 
human rights must be taken into account in the in depth strategy as an overarching 
issue132. In this manner, the FRA would be helpful for the Commission to monitor the 
situation of Human Rights in Member States when applying the asylum legal instruments, if 
it establishes an institutionalised cooperation and partnership with the Agency. However, 
the integration of the Fundamental Charter in the Treaty of Lisbon will urge the necessity of 
setting out a monitoring mechanism of fundamental rights carried out by the European 
Commission as the guardian of the Member States’ obligations. 
 
 
 
                                                 
127  Article 2 TEU OJ, C 115/13, 9.5.2008, Former article 6(1) TEU.  
 “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the 
rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These 
values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, 
tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.” 
128  Op cit, CEPS working document, page 14. 
129  Council Regulation (CE) No 168/2007 establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 
15.02.2007 
130  Furthermore a Systematic monitoring mandate has been specifically excluded from the tasks of the 
Agency (cf Explanatory Memorandum to the draft Council Regulation as well as the impact assessment 
SEC (2005) 849 of 30 June 2005) 
131  Article 4d) of the Regulation (CE) No 168/2007 of 15 February 2007 establishing a European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights 
132  Op cit, COM (2006) 332 , point 4.1.3 “Strategic policy evaluation” page 9 
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3. THE LACK OF STATISTICAL DATA 
 
In 2003, the Action plan of the Commission for developing Community statistics on 
migration133 and the Council conclusions of Thessaloniki134 had already pointed out the 
Community needs on statistics on migration and asylum, and therefore the need to adopt a 
more effective mechanism for collecting the necessary information specific to migration and 
asylum. On 14 September 2005, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Regulation on 
Community statistics on migration and international protection, which has been adopted by 
the European Parliament and the Council two years later, on 11 July 2007135.  Therefore, 
the new Regulation on community statistics on migration and international protection was 
not applicable upon the majority of the first generation evaluations made by the 
Commission. The Regulation applicable before the entry into force of the new Regulation on 
community statistics was the Council Regulation (EEC) No 311/76 of 9 February 1976 on 
the compilation of statistics on foreign workers, which was obsolete and not able to satisfy 
the community needs on statistics, related to migration and international protection 
issues136. Besides it transpires from the Council Conclusions on evaluation of EU policies on 
Freedom Security and Justice137, that Member States were merely ready to provide 
information and statistical data that they considered as available. Consequently, the first 
generation of evaluations suffered from a general lack of statistical data. 
4. THE COST OF EVALUATION 
 
The cost of an evaluation process has also to be taken into account, as it may constitute an 
impediment in its application. This is one of the reasons why the evaluation mechanism 
envisaged by the Commission in its communication of 2006 has never been implemented. 
Indeed, the Commission even if it concluded that “the evaluation mechanism proposed 
strikes the right balance between administrative costs and the benefits covered”138, was 
aware that the mechanism implied a negative economic impact due the administrative 
costs to the institutions and Member States. Therefore, the Council in its conclusions 
revised the evaluation mechanism proposed by the Commission in the way of avoiding any 
duplication of efforts at EU and national levels and limiting the administrative burden on 
Member States. 
 
SUB-SECTION 3: THE EVALUATION FORESEEN FOR THE EUROPEAN 
REFUGEE FUND AS A MODEL? 
 
Since 2002, The European Refugee Fund (ERF), as a community financial tool, is regulated 
by the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities 
of 25 June 2002139 as well as, by the Commission Regulation laying down detailed rules for 
                                                 
133  Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament to present an Action 
Plan for the collection and analysis of Community Statistics in the field of migration COM(2003) 179, 
15.04.2003  
134  Thessaloniki European Council 19 and 20 June 2003 Presidency Conclusions 11638/03 
135  Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 of The European Parliament and of The Council of  11 July 2007 on 
Community statistics on migration and international protection and repealing Council Regulation (Ec) 
No 311/76 on the compilation of statistics on foreign workers 
136  Ibid  Recital 11 
137  Op cit Council Conclusions  10893/1/07  
138  Op cit SEC (2006) 815 point 6.3 page 15 
139  Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) N° 1065/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation 
applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (OJ L 248, 16.9.2002 p.1) 
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the implementation of this financial Regulation140. These instruments set out a general 
obligation of ex-post evaluations applied to all programmes and activities which entail 
significant spending. More specifically, all programmes or activities, where the resources 
mobilised exceed 5 000 000 EUR, shall be subject of an interim or/ and an ex-post 
evaluation in terms of human and financial resources and the results obtained. This 
obligation of ex-post evaluations is also laid down in the specific provisions of the three ERF 
decisions141. The specific provisions establish a detailed monitoring and evaluation 
mechanism, which has been improved through the different decisions. The ERF monitoring 
and evaluation mechanism is a shared responsibility mechanism between the Member 
States and the Commission142. The implementation of the ERF actions is a decentralised 
system, where the Member States are responsible for implementing and evaluating actions 
supported by the Fund. To that end, Member States shall appoint a responsible authority 
charged with the implementation of the actions and which shall handle all communications 
with the Commission. This responsible authority may delegate its own implementation 
responsibility to another organisation by a contract143. This part is aiming at determining 
the positive aspects of this ERF evaluation mechanism that could be transposed into the 
other asylum instruments, and at determining also aspects that still require improvements. 
This is based on the analysis of the evaluation mechanism foreseen in the provisions of the 
ERF decisions and the results of its application in practice. 
1. A LEGAL AND A POLITICAL PURPOSE 
 
The ERF evaluation mechanism proposed in all decisions is a regular monitoring mechanism 
operated at national level. This mechanism does not only involve a reporting assignment on 
quantitative aspects of the implementation, but also on qualitative aspects. Reports 
presented at national level have to assess the progress and the results of the actions 
funded, in order to measure the achievement of the objectives assigned to it144. Then, the 
information contained in the national reports will be used by the Commission, which is 
mostly in charge of carrying out the political evaluation. In the context of the ERF I, the 
Commission had to submit a mid-term report to the European Parliament by 31 December 
                                                 
140  Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) N° 2342/2002 of December 2002 laying down detailed rules for 
the implementation of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) N° 1065/2002  on the Financial Regulation 
applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (OJ L 357, 31.12 .2002 p.1) 
141  (ERF I) Council Decision (2000/596/EC)  of 28 September 2000 establishing a European Refugee Fund 
I 
 (OJL L252/12 of 6.10.2000); (ERF II) Council Decision (2004/904/EC) of 2 December 2004, 
establishing the European Refugee Fund for the period   2005 to 2010 (OJL L381/52 of 28.12.2004); 
(ERF III) Decision n° 573/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 May 2007 
establishing the European Fund for the period 2008 to 2013 as part of the General programme 
‘Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows’ and  repealing Council Decision 904/EC; (OJL L144/1 
of 6.6.2007) 
142  See recital 18 of ERF I, recital 18 of ERF II, and recital 33 of ERF III 
143  Article 7 of  ERF I,  Article 13 ERF II, Article 28 ERF III 
144  ERF I (article 20.1)” In each Member States the responsible authority shall take whatever measures 
are necessary to monitor and evaluate the action. To that end, the arrangements and contracts it 
enters into with organization charged with implementing the action shall contain clauses requiring 
them to present at least one report a year detailing progress made with regard the implementation of 
the action and achievement of the objectives attributed to it” 
 ERF II (article 28.1) “In each Member States the responsible authority shall take the necessary 
measures to ensure project monitoring and evaluation. To that end, the arrangements and contracts it 
concludes with organization responsible for action implementation shall include clauses laying down an 
obligation  to submit detailed progress reports on the implementation of these actions and a detailed 
final implementation report on the extent to which stated objectives have been achieved”. 
ERF III (article 50.1) “) “In each Member States the responsible authority shall take the necessary 
measures to ensure project monitoring and evaluation. To that end, the arrangements and contracts it 
concludes with organization responsible for the implementation of the actions shall include clauses 
laying down an obligation to submit detailed reports on the state of progress of 
implementation and completion of the assigned objectives.” 
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2002 at the latest, and a final report by 1st September 2005145. Although the purpose of 
these reports was not defined in the provision of the decision itself, their political purpose 
has been clarified in the European Commission guidelines for the first ERF146. According to 
these Guidelines the reports send by the responsible authority should allow the Commission 
to carry out a mid-term review and assessment of the impact of the ERF actions, as well as, 
an ex-post evaluation aiming at providing an account of the use, effects and final impacts 
of the interventions, as well as all factors contributing to their success or failure, including 
their sustainability147. Thereafter the political purpose of the evaluation carried out by the 
Commission has been clearly set out in the provisions of the two following decisions 
establishing, respectively the ERF II and the ERF III, according to which « The Fund shall 
be evaluated by the Commission in partnership with the Member states to assess the 
relevance, effectiveness and impact of actions in the light of the general objectives... »148. 
In the view of the preparation of the evaluation reports carried out by the Commission, the 
Member States shall submit to the Commission evaluation reports providing the necessary 
information on the results and impact of actions co-financed by the Fund149. Therefore, the 
required information submitted by the Member States to the Commission has a political 
nature. 
2. A HORIZONTAL APPROACH 
 
From the ERF II decision, the Commission, as well as the Member States, have to carry out 
a horizontal approach, when evaluating actions supported by the Fund. Indeed, they have 
to assess whether these actions implemented under the Fund are complementary with the 
actions pursued under other relevant Community policies, instruments and initiatives150. 
This seems to be the result of the ERF I evaluation practice. Indeed, the external final 
report151 and the external mid-term report152, dealing with the evaluation of the ERF I, 
dedicated a chapter to assess the coherence and the complementary of the ERF actions 
with measures supported through other EU instruments, presenting risks of overlaps and 
complementary153. This approach should be a strategic aspect of the evaluation, in view of 
creating the CEAS. Indeed, the asylum legal instruments may present overlaps and cross-
cutting issues, so that the coherence between those instruments has to be assessed, in 
order to measure if they meet altogether the broader objectives for creating a coherent and 
a consistent system such as the CEAS. Also this Horizontal evaluation mechanism should 
take into account the eventual incidences that other Community policies may have on the 
creation of the CEAS.  
 
                                                 
145  ERF I (article 20.4) 
146  Guidelines for the mechanism of monitoring and evaluating European Refugee Fund co-financed 
actions in the Period 2000-2004- European Commission Directorate General for Justice and Home 
Affairs, February 2002 
147  Ibid, Point 4.2  of the Guidelines 
148  ERF II( article 27.2) and  ERF III (article 49.2) 
149  ERF I (article 20.3 b) ERF III (article 51.2), ERF II (article 28.3 b) ) 
150  ERF II (article 27.2) ERF III (article 49.3) 
151  European Refugee Fund: Final evaluation of the first phase (2000-2004), and definition of a common 
assessment framework for the second phase (2005-2010), Final Report, Danish Institute for Human 
rights, Eurasylum Ltd, and Migration Policy institute, March 2006 
152  Mid-term evaluation of the European Refugee Fund  carried out by PLS RAMBOLL Management on 
behalf the Commission  (Directorate General Justice and Home affairs, December 2003   
153  See Chapter 8 of  the mid-term external report, page 225, and Chapter 6 of the Final report, page 
214 
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3. A REGULAR MONITORING AND EVALUATION MECH-
ANISM 
 
In all ERF decisions the Member States, through the responsible authority, or through the 
delegated organisation, have the obligation to report on a regular basis the implementation 
and progress of the actions supported by the fund, as well as an assessment of their results 
and impact. This regular monitoring mechanism at the national level has the advantage to 
provide with necessary feedback to the Commission for its evaluation reports. The 
evaluation reports carried out by the Commission must be also presented on a regular 
basis. The Commission is entailed to carry out at least two evaluation reports154, at 
different periods of the implementation of the Fund. Therefore, all the information 
generated through this monitoring mechanism, at the national and at the EU level, would 
constitute an important feed-back of evaluation results to nourish the decision- making 
process. In the latest ERF decision establishing the ERF III, the transmission of the 
necessary information is more rigorous. The responsible authority has to submit to the 
Commission a final report, which must contain detailed information to measure the 
progress and the effectiveness of the implementation in the Member States155. Thereafter, 
the Commission will judge the report acceptable if it contains all the information required. 
Thus, the Commission has the possibility to ensure that all the information needed for 
assessing the implementation and the results of the implementation of the actions are fully 
provided. This possibility for the Commission to supervise the information required from 
Member States could be interesting for the other asylum instruments, in order to ensure 
that all the information that are necessary for the evaluation are at the Commission 
disposal. 
4. THE LACK OF NECESSARY DATA FOR EVALUATING 
THE ERF 
 
Although the ERF evaluation mechanism enables a regular feedback of information, some 
necessary data for evaluating the Fund are still missing, especially in the context of the ERF 
I and ERF II. In the ERF I, and ERF II decision, there is no obligation for Member States to 
provide in national reports specific and detailed information that is necessary to evaluate 
the Fund, whereas the ERF III decision does. Consequently, in the context of the ERF I, the 
two external studies evaluating the ERF I revealed some problems in collecting necessary 
data. The independent experts in the mid-term report have underlined the lack of data at 
its disposal to conduct the evaluation156. One of the reasons stated was the time frame of 
the evaluation. Data concerning results and impacts are short supply due to the early stage 
of the implementation of the Fund. But the other reason of the lack of statistical data is the 
decentralised structure of the Fund, which seems to be characterised by a lack of 
coordination157. Finally, even in less extend manner, the independent experts in the Final 
                                                 
154  ERF I article 20.4 “The Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and the Council a mid-
term report and a final report ”ERF II  article 28.4  “The Commission shall submit to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions: An intermediate report on the results achieved and on qualitative and quantitative aspects of 
implementation of the Fund together with any proposed amendments, An intermediate evaluation 
report and a proposal on the Fund's future development , An ex post evaluation.” ERF III  article 50.3 
“The Commission shall submit to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions two ex- post evaluations for the different Periods 
of the Fund.” 
155  This information is listed in article 51.1 of the  ERF III decision 
156  Op cit  Mid-term evaluation of the European Refugee Fund  Chapter 3« Methodology and Data 
generating activities », point 3.1” General remarks”, page 31 
157  Ibid   
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report evaluating the first phase of the Fund (2000-2004), drew some shortcomings for 
obtaining even basic information158. Only the ERF III decision set out a duty159 for the 
responsible authority to ensure collection of data on implementation necessary for financial 
management, monitoring, control and evaluation, but the required data have not been 
defined. 
5. NO COMMON DEFINITION OF INDICATORS 
 
As stated previously in the study, the effectiveness of the evaluation also depends on the 
definition of indicators that could measure how the objectives of an EU intervention have 
been achieved. And yet the different ERF decisions do not provide indicators neither 
required statistical data on the basis of which the achievement of the objectives of actions 
supported by the Fund can be judged. Therefore the indicators will be different from a 
Member States to another, while a secure minimum set of common indicators will ensure a 
coherent approach in the evaluation mechanism, and make possible a comparison at the 
community level. However, the Commission Guidelines proposed common evaluating 
indicators for Member States, but these guidelines were only applicable for the ERF I and 
are not legally binding160. Moreover the Commission in its final evaluation of the ERF I 
stated that “with the results available it is not possible to establish a harmonised balance-
sheet of activities because when preparing their activities or during the implementation, the 
project leaders did not have a set of common indicators that were comparable between 
Member States and which could have been measured at the end of the project”161. To that 
end, the Commission expressed its intention to discuss with the Member States on a 
common evaluation frame for the second phase of the Fund, focusing particularly on the 
implementation of common indicators and methods applicable at the level of the projects, 
of the Member States and of the Union. But a definition of common indicators is still 
missing in the ERF II and ERF III decisions. 
6. THE QUESTION OF THE OBJECTIVITY 
 
As already set out the objectiveness of the evaluation will be ensured, if the supporting 
information is provided by different and identified sources. And yet it appears that the 
exclusive source of information of the Commission is the Member States. Indeed, the 
national stakeholders involved in the evaluation mechanism are not independent from the 
Member States. The responsibility authority is appointed and financed by the Member 
State. To secure the objectivity and the independence of the evaluation mechanism, the 
Commission Guidelines for the ERF I recommended to each administration to appoint an 
independent evaluator responsible for the evaluation of all programmes, and selected by an 
open and transparent procedure162. But this has not been transposed in the provisions of 
the following ERF decisions. However, the two external studies carried out by independent 
experts on the behalf of the Commission evaluating the ERF I, are based, in a relative 
                                                 
158  Op cit Final external evaluation European Refugee, Chapter 2 « Methodology and data collection »p.38 
« Sometimes, even the most basic information was difficult to obtain. One example is the list of 
projects, including information on organisation, project title, total programmed project costs, 
programmed ERF contribution, total actual project costs and actual ERF contribution, divided into 
years and strands. Although basic, this information is obviously central to the evaluation and provides 
the basis for the development of crucial statistics to be included in the report. Lack of this basic 
information might be indicative of certain administrative deficiencies  »  
159  ERF III (Article 27.1 h) 
160  Op cit Commission guidelines Annex 1 and 2 of provide examples of indicators that can be used by the 
Member States to measure the objectives achievement of an action supported by the Fund. 
161  Commission staff working document, Final evaluation of the European Refugee Fund for the period 
2000-2004, SEC(2006) 1636, 1.12.2006  “achievement of the objectives” page 13 
162  Op cit the Commission guidelines, point 4 ”Reporting requirement”  
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extend, to other sources than Member States, thus guaranteeing the objectiveness. They 
have notably involved, among the other, information from ECRE and the UNHCR163. As 
illustration to the risk of precluding the objectiveness and the need to have data from 
different sources, the independent experts in the mid-term evaluation report of the ERF I 
revealed that due to the lack of information at their disposal “the evaluation is largely 
reliant on an analysis of the assessments made by the various respondents, i.e. mostly 
those of project administrators, project beneficiaries, National Responsible Authorities and 
DG JHA representatives, which have been collected through questionnaires and interviews. 
Such an approach carries the risks that are associated with a more subjective and biased 
evaluation. However, our involvement of multiple sources, combined with our caution in 
interpreting data that is based on subjective assessments, mitigates the inherent risk”164. 
To conclude, a shared responsibility mechanism between Member States and the 
Commission in evaluating asylum instruments, such as proposed by the ERF decisions 
presents the advantage to provide relevant and regular feed-back to carry out political 
evaluation. But, there is a need to set out a clear obligation for Member states to transmit 
the data collected to the Commission in a coordinate manner165. In that sense, a 
supervisory role of the Commission on the data transmitted by Member States will present 
an added value. Also common indicators required for all Member States have to be defined 
to ensure a coherent approach in the evaluation mechanism, and make possible a 
comparison at the community level. 
                                                 
163  Ibid External mid-term evaluation of the ERF 1 point 3.6 page 41 « In addition, a group interview was 
carried out with the following Community Action representatives: Berend Jonker, Refugee Education 
and Training Advisory Service (RETAS) Henry Martenson, ECRE Richard Stanton, Greater London 
Authority  », op cit, Final external evaluation of the ERF I  point 2.2.2 page 46 « Thus, in many cases 
other agencies such as ECRE, UNHCR and national offices for statistics were used to supplement this 
statistical information 11 . Finally, the team has made use of a range of background documents.  » 
164  Ibid External mid-term report point 3.1 p.32  
165  In that sense recital 33 of the ERF III decision stated that “the effectiveness and impact of actions 
supported by the Fund also depend on their evaluation and the dissemination of the results…” 
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CHAPTER 2: PERSPECTIVES FOR IMPROVEMENTS 
This Chapter aims at analysing the current developments that have been made to respond 
to weaknesses attached to the existing evaluation mechanisms, as well as, the perspective 
for future improvements envisaged for the evaluation in the field of asylum. The new 
Regulation on Community statistics on migration and international protection166, along with 
the future European Asylum Office, which will accomplish a collection and sharing of 
significant quantities of information, will altogether contribute to address the deficits and 
shortage of data encountered in the field of asylum. Despite the fact that a monitoring 
mechanism of the quality of asylum decision has not been taken forward at the EU level, 
the recent developments in the field of evaluation tend to promote a more qualitative 
evaluation. Indeed, the EASO will have the task of identifying and exchanging best 
practices that will contribute to a more uniform interpretation with high standards and 
implementation of asylum instruments in the Member States.  
 
For this task, the EASO will be helped by the UNHCR that could share its experience of 
Quality initiatives projects. Indeed, the UNHCR on the basis of national agreements has 
launched in some Member States projects to set out an evaluation of the quality of national 
asylum decisions process. This could serve as a model for an evaluation mechanism at the 
EU level. Although these improvements are significant, some weaknesses remain and have 
to be taken into account in the current and future legislative process (Section 1).  Also one 
of the most considerable steps is the perspective of the application of article 70 of the 
Lisbon Treaty, which endows the Community with a legal basis for an evaluation 
mechanism of the implementation of the Union policies in the field of FSJ, and thus 
constituting recognition of the central role of the evaluation in the EU legislative process. 
Although this provision would enable to set up a comprehensive evaluation mechanism in 
the field of asylum, it also poses problematic issues that have to be clarified. Finally, this 
Chapter will be closed with the problematic of an ex-post systematic monitoring of 
Fundamental Rights, which has not been addressed yet in the Stockholm programme. This 
issue is of primarily importance, especially in the context of the integration of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Treaty (Section 2). 
 
SECTION 1: ON THE WAY OF IMPROVEMENT? 
SUB-SECTION 1:  THE RESPONSE TO THE DEFICITS AND SHORTAGE 
OF STATISTICS  
1. THE REGULATION ON COMMUNITY STATISTICS ON 
MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 
1.1. Presentation and added value 
 
The Regulation 862/2007 of 11 July 2007 on Community statistics on migration and 
international protection repealing the Council Regulation (EEC) No 311/76 on the 
compilation of statistics on foreign workers, has entered into force on August 2007167 and 
                                                 
166  The Regulation 862/2007 of 11 July 2007 on Community statistics on migration and international 
protection repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 311/76 on the compilation of statistics on foreign 
workers 
167  See article 14 of the Regulation n°862/2007 
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was applicable in practice from the year 2008168. This Regulation is aiming at setting 
harmonised and comparable Community statistics on migration and asylum, essential for 
the development and the monitoring of Community legislation and policies relating to 
immigration and asylum, and to the free movement of persons169. It inserts an obligation 
for Member States to communicate to the Commission (EUROSTAT) common data defined 
in the view of fostering the availability of statistics necessary to conduct a political 
evaluation of the EU action. Also the definition of common indicators is essential to set up a 
coherent evaluation mechanism and to address comprehensive solutions for the next 
legislature. The other benefit of the Regulation on Community statistics is to ensure a 
regular and timely collection and dissemination of data, as the provisions of the Regulation 
precise the frequency and the deadline within the statistics have to be transmitted to the 
Commission170. However the Regulation presents weaknesses. In the field of international 
protection the material scope of the Regulation does not cover all the scope and issues of 
the asylum legislations. Therefore, the lack of statistical data will remain for some issues. 
1.2. A limited scope 
 
Dealing with the statistics for international protection, they are limited to the administrative 
and judicial procedures features (article 1 c) )171, which excludes per se information on 
access to rights granted to asylum seekers and to persons who have been recognised in 
need of international protection. Consequently the Regulation does cover neither the 
statistical data related to the application of the Reception Conditions Directive nor those 
related to the application of the qualification directive as concerns the access of the rights 
granted to beneficiaries of international protection. The statistics required in the Regulation 
concerned essentially those related to the Asylum procedures (Article 4.2 and 4.3) the 
Dublin mechanism (Article 4.4), as well as the Temporary Protection Directive (4.3c). If the 
Regulation on Community statistics covers almost all the information required for the 
application of the Asylum Procedures Directive, on the other hand, some necessary data for 
the evaluation of the Dublin mechanism are missing as described below. 
1.2.1. Statistical data for Reception conditions 
The exclusion of the reception conditions of asylum seekers from the scope of the 
Regulation has been compensated in the proposal for a new reception conditions 
Directive172. Indeed, according to article 27.2 of the Proposal, the Member States shall 
submit relevant information to the Commission in the form set out in Annex I on a yearly 
basis. This annex, attached to the Proposal, defines the statistical data required from the 
Member States, which are namely; The number of asylum seekers in a Member States, 
number of asylum seekers identified as having special needs, detailed information on the 
document provided to asylum seekers according to article 6 of the proposal,  data related 
to the access of asylum seekers to the labour market (number of applicants for asylum in a 
Member State who have access to the labour market, the total number who are currently 
employed,  restrictions attached to the labour market), Amounts of benefits granted to 
asylum seekers (material conditions and social assistance). The introduction of an 
obligation for Member States to provide defined common statistical data on a regular basis 
                                                 
168  The provisions of the Regulation require statistical data from the year 2008 
169  Recital 6 of the Regulation n°862/2007 
170  See article 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 of the Regulation n°862/2007 
171  Article 1 c) of the Regulation “This Regulation establishes common rules for the collection and 
compilation of Community statistics on: (c) administrative and judicial procedures and processes in 
the Member States relating to immigration, granting of permission to reside, citizenship, asylum and 
other forms of international protection and the prevention of illegal immigration” 
172  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down minimum 
standards for the reception of asylum seekers (COM(2008)815, 3.12.2008). 
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in final provisions of the proposal for a new reception conditions Directive, is an important 
step to improve the evaluation mechanism in the field of the CEAS. However, some 
necessary data to evaluate in full and comprehensive manner the situation of reception 
conditions of asylum seekers are still missing. This is the case of the access of health care, 
the conditions of detention, the number of referrals to appropriate treatment for asylum 
seekers with special needs, as well as, the training activities carried out which could play a 
deterrent role in the access of employment. And yet some of these indicators had been 
required by the impact assessment but have not been taken into account in the proposal173. 
Therefore, there is a need to introduce in the final provisions of the proposal for a new 
Reception Conditions Directive all the indicators required to enable the Commission to 
conduct an exhaustive evaluation of the application of the reception conditions of asylum 
seekers in the Member States. 
1.2.2. Statistical data for the Qualification Directive  
Unlike the proposal for a new Reception Conditions Directive, the lack of statistical data in 
the new Regulation on community statistics related to the access of beneficiaries of 
international protection’s rights has not been compensated in the final provision of the 
proposal for a new Qualification Directive174. Even more, the new final provision relating to 
the evaluation reports175 remains unchanged compare to the current provision. Therefore, 
the problems set out in the previous part of the study will persist. If the final provision set 
out an obligation for Member State to provide the Commission with the necessary 
information to draft the evaluation report, this obligation cannot be efficient unless the 
information needed to drawing up the evaluation report is not clearly defined. Especially, 
the final provision must require from Member States information on access of rights for 
refugees such, has those which had been foresaw in the Communication COM (2006) 332. 
According to this Communication the impact of the Qualification Directive must be 
appreciated against the improved access of beneficiaries of international’s rights, and this 
should be measured by numbers refugees accessing education, services, employment, 
appropriate accommodation, and integration programmes176. These requirements are more 
than necessary to enable the Commission to carry out a political evaluation of the 
Qualification directive and should be introduced in the final provisions of the new 
Qualification Directive. 
1.2.3. Statistical data for the Asylum Procedures Directive and for the Dublin Regulation 
Following the example of the proposal for a new Qualification Directive, the proposal for a 
new Asylum Procedures Directive177 has not introduced a new final provision178 related to 
the evaluation report, but this implies little consequences as the statistical data required for 
its evaluation are almost covered by the Regulation on Community statistics. The only 
exception are the data related to third countries designated by Member States as safe 
countries of origin or safe third countries, but Member States are required to provide this 
                                                 
173  Commission staff working document accompanying the Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and the Council laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers 
Impact assessment SEC (2008) 2944, 3.12.2008.  See point 7 “Monitoring and evaluation” the 
Commission required also as indicators the number of vocational training and number of referrals to 
appropriate treatment for asylum seekers with special needs, page 50 
174  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international 
protection and the content of the protection granted COM(2009) 251, 21.10.2009 
175  Ibid, article 38. 
176  Op cit COM(2006)332, factsheets, page 35 and 36 
177  Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and the Council on minimum standards on 
procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing international protection COM(2009) 554, 
21.10.2009 
178  Ibid , Article 45 
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information under the articles referring to these concepts179. With regard the Dublin 
system, the article 42 of the proposal of a new Dublin Regulation set an obligation for 
Member States to provide statistics in accordance with article 4.4 of the Regulation on 
Community statistics180. But the data required in the Regulation on community statistics 
are mostly limited to information related to requests of taking back or taking charge of 
asylum seekers, as well as transfers made181. And yet according to the impact 
assessment182 accompanying the proposal for a new Dublin Regulation, some other 
indicators could be also used to assess the progress and effectiveness of the preferred 
policy option in achieving the objectives. The impact assessment mentioned among the 
other things, the numbers of disputes settled under the settlement mechanism, number of 
sovereignty and humanitarian clause applied, of transfers suspended due to a situation of 
pressure and of asylum expert teams set up and sent to Member States under particular 
pressure. Although the Commission defined the data deemed necessary to carry out a 
political evaluation, those are nowhere clearly required in the provisions of the new 
Regulation. 
 
SUB-SECTION 2: THE UNHCR’S QUALITY INITIATIVES 
As stated in the Commission’s Green paper on the future of Common European Asylum 
system183, the creation of a CEAS emerged from the idea of making the European Union a 
single protection area for refugees, guaranteeing to persons genuinely in need of 
international protection access to a high level of protection under equivalent conditions in 
Member States184. One of the prerequisite to achieve this objective would be setting up a 
monitoring and an evaluation mechanism on the quality of the asylum decision-making in 
the Member States. Such an evaluation mechanism would aim at safeguarding the good 
application of the determination status criteria, as well as procedural criteria, according to 
international and EU asylum legal instruments, and, at further, raising those standards. 
And yet the information required cannot be only quantitative as expected in the Regulation 
on community statistics185, but should be also qualitative information.  
 
In this context, the UNHCR’s Quality initiatives (QI) projects are of a great interest, as they 
could be served as a model for an EU evaluation mechanism of the asylum decision making 
process in the Member States. Indeed QI projects are aiming at evaluating the quality of 
the asylum decisions in some Member States on the basis of their agreement. The first QI 
has been launched in the United Kingdom in 2003. In 2008 the Asylum Systems Quality 
Assurance and Evaluation Mechanism (AQSEM), has been set in Central and Eastern 
                                                 
179  Ibid, Article 32.5  « Safe third countries » « Member States shall inform the Commission periodically 
of the countries to which this concept is applied in accordance with the provisions of this Article”, and 
Article 33.4 “Safe countries of origin” Member States shall notify to the Commission the countries that 
are designated as safe countries of origin in accordance with this Article”. 
180  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for 
international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless 
person COM(2008) 820, 3.12.2008, Article 42:  “In accordance with Article 4(4) of Regulation (EC) No 
862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council36, Member States shall communicate to the 
Commission (Eurostat), statistics concerning the application this Regulation and of Regulation (EC) No 
1560/2003”. 
181  Op cit  article 4.4 of the Regulation on Community statistics 
182  Commission staff working document accompanying the proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member 
State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the 
Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, SEC(2008) 2962, 3.12.2008. See 
point 7 “Monitoring and Evaluation” page 59 
183  Green  Paper on the future Common European Asylum System Brussels, COM(2007) 301 , 6.6.2007 
184  Ibid, “introduction” page 2 
185  Op cit, Article 4 of the Regulation on Community statistics 
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European countries186, and in 2009 a new initiative has been proposed for Mediterranean 
countries187. The overarching objective of the QI projects is to improve the quality of 
asylum decision making by supporting the full and inclusive application of the 1951 
Convention in the context of the specific policy and legislative framework in the EU in the 
view of creating a CEAS188. To that end, the UNHCR, in line with its supervisory role under 
article 35 of the 1951 Refugee Convention189, will provide to participating Member States 
its expertise in order to further raise standards in the asylum decision making process. The 
QI projects are also aiming at building effective and sustainable internal review 
mechanisms that will regularly and objectively maintain good quality standards in EU 
Member States’ asylum systems190, and are aiming at fostering practical co-operation 
between the participating Member States. 
1. EVALUATING AND IMPROVING THE DECISION 
MAKING PROCESS 
 
Under the QI project launched in the UK, the UNHCR has reported191 its findings 
highlighting causes of concerns and draws recommendations that would contribute to 
raising the quality of asylum first instance decision making in the Home Office. These 
reports have been supplied to the Minister for Borders and Immigration. The UNHCR 
reports are mostly based on UNHCR audits of first instance decisions, audits of asylum 
interviews, as well as on several meetings with different relevant stakeholders. These 
findings have highlighted a number of causes for concern, focusing in particular on the 
application of the refugee definition, the approach to establishing the facts (‘credibility’) 
and the conduct of interviews. The recommendations made in UNHCR’s reports have also 
covered different issues such as child asylum cases, recruitment, training and accreditation, 
identification and management of stress, interviews, use of interpreters, provision of 
Country of origin information, and guidance, targets, assessment and monitoring of 
decisions and interviews192. As indicated in the sixth UNHCR report of April 2009, the 
majority of the recommendations were accepted by the Minister by a series of published 
responses193. However The UNHCR is also monitoring its recommendation, as some 
difficulties in their implementations can persist as it has been shown in the forth and the 
                                                 
186  Asylum Systems Quality Assurance and Evaluation Mechanism Project in the Central and Eastern 
Europe sub-region (ASQAEM).  It includes Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. (second Quality initiatives) 
187  urther Developing Asylum Quality in the EU – Establishing New Quality Assurance Mechanisms in 
Southern Europe and Consolidating National Quality Mechanisms in Central and Eastern Europe 
Project Proposal submitted for ERF Funding April 2009 (Third Quality initiative). The southern 
countries included are Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Italy, and Portugal. 
188  Ibid, page 1 
189  Article 35 of the 1951 Geneva Convention “co-operation of the national authorities with the united 
nations”:  
 “1. The Contracting States undertake to co-operate with the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency of the United Nations which may succeed it, in the 
exercise of its functions, and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the 
provisions of this Convention.” 
 “2. In order to enable the Office of the High Commissioner or any other agency of the United Nations 
which may succeed it, to make reports to the competent organs of the United Nations, the Contracting 
States undertake to provide them in the appropriate form with information and statistical data 
requested concerning: (a) The condition of refugees, (b) The implementation of this Convention, and; 
(c) Laws, regulations and decrees which are, or may hereafter be, in force relating to refugees.” 
190  Op cit, (Third Quality initiative) page 1 
191  The UNHCR has already submitted six reports. Five reports are available on the website of the UK 
boarder Agency 
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/aboutus/reports/unhcrreports/.The sixth 
report is now available in the UNHCR website http://www.unhcr.org.uk/what-we-do/Quality-
Initiative.html 
192  For more details see the UNHCR website on QI as referred above, as well as the different reports. 
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fifth reports.  Regarding the AQSEM project in the Central and Eastern sub-region, the 
evaluation of the decision making process is sketched as follow194. The ASQAEM project will 
look at first and second instance decisions of asylum procedures in the participating 
Member States. In a first phase, then ASQAEM will evaluate how the concerned EU Member 
States assess claims for international protection after having transposed EU legislation. 
After the evaluation process ASQAEM will suggest specific actions designed to improve the 
quality, fairness and efficiency of first and second instance decision making. Consequently, 
the UNHCR is putting in place, in collaboration with the participating Member States, a 
progressive internal evaluation to ensure the correct application of the standards upon the 
asylum decision making process and, at further improve these standards.  
2. BUILDING EFFECTIVE AND SUSTAINABLE INTERNAL 
REVIEW MECHANISMS 
 
Through the assistance of the UNHCR, the QI is aiming at developing, in participating 
countries, internal quality mechanisms in the asylum decision-making process. For 
instance, in 2007 a Quality Audit team has been set up in UK to supervise the quality and 
the consistency of the decisions. The team is responsible for auditing decisions and 
interviews, providing direct feedback to case owners and producing monthly reports on the 
outcome of its quality audits195. Also the UK Border Agency (UKBA) and UNHCR have 
together a joint commitment to implementing and maintaining a system of quality 
assurance in UKBA through endorsement of a jointly agreed document on minimum 
standards on quality assurance196. As concerns the southern countries and central/ Eastern 
countries, one of the aims of the project is clearly to establish operational internal review 
mechanism QAUs (Quality Assurance Units) in the involved States197. These internal review 
mechanisms will, therefore, ensure a constant monitoring on the compliance of asylum 
decisions with the quality standards. 
3. COOPERATION BETWEEN THE PARTICIPATING MEM-
BER STATES 
 
The project establishing new quality assurance mechanisms in Southern Europe and 
consolidating national quality mechanisms in Central and Eastern Europe is aiming at 
developing cooperation on asylum between the governments of the 13 participating 
Member States. Notably, it will involve the assistance of the asylum authorities of Austria, 
Germany and the UK, who will provide good practice advice, and there will also be regular 
opportunities throughout the project for all participating Member States to meet and share 
knowledge and experience. The promotion of the practical cooperation between Members 
States on the implementation of the qualification and procedures standards upon the 
asylum decision making process will conduct to raising the standards in the EU by exchange 
of best practices. According to the UNHCR this engagement in practical cooperation reflects 
the EU's Hague Programme objectives, as well as helping to foster greater responsibility-
sharing between Member States198. The QI projects will have a clear added value in the 
context of the new European Asylum Support office (EASO). Indeed, with the EASO, the 
                                                                                                                                                            
193  These responses are also available in the UK Border Agency website as mentioned above 
194  Op cit, (Second Quality evaluation mechanism) 
195  Quality Initiative Project, Fifth Report to the Minister, UNHCR Representation to the United Kingdom in 
London-   March 2008, “Quality Audit Team” page 2 
196  Sixth report of the UNHCR Representation to the United Kingdom in London Quality initiative project 
Key observations and recommendations, April 2009, “Quality Auditing Activities in UKBA” page 2 
197  Op cit, the third Quality initiative. 
198  Ibid. 
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practical cooperation between Member States to exchange best practices will be taken 
forward at the EU level. The European support office will have the task of facilitating the 
exchange of information, among Member States, and developing practical cooperation in 
such a way as to contribute to harmonisation of practices in Member States, with a view to 
ensuring a consistently high standard of international protection in the European Union. In 
this context, the Office should act in close cooperation with the UNHCR and then benefit 
from QI experiences. 
 
SUB-SECTION 3: THE EUROPEAN ASYLUM SUPPORT OFFICE 
 
In late September 2008, the European Council adopted the European Pact on Immigration 
and Asylum and expressly agreed to establish in 2009 a European Support office (EASO) 
with the task of facilitating the exchange of information, analyses and experience among 
Member States, and developing practical cooperation between the administrations in 
charge of examining asylum applications. In response to that request, the Commission 
submitted in February 2009 a proposal for a Regulation establishing a European Asylum 
Support Office199, adopted on 19 May 2010. The EASO aims at improving evaluations 
process at the EU level through different tasks, but will not have a clear function of 
evaluator, even if it could be envisaged in a long term. 
1. A SUPPORT TO THE EVALUATION PROCESS AT THE 
EU LEVEL 
 
The EASO will be engaged in support activities that act as an incentive to practical 
cooperation on asylum, such as sharing of good practices and information about the 
application of rules. Under article 11, §1 of the Regulation, the Support Office shall 
organise, coordinate and promote the exchange of information between the Member States' 
asylum authorities and between the Commission and the Member States' asylum 
authorities concerning the implementation of all relevant instruments of the asylum acquis 
of the Union. To that end, the Support Office may create factual, legal and case-law 
databases on national, Union and international asylum instruments making use, inter alia, 
of existing arrangements.  
 
These tasks will, accordingly, facilitate the dissemination of the necessary information to 
undertake the evaluation of the application of the EU asylum acquis. Also, exchanging best 
practices information will have the added value to allow Member States to compare 
different practices with a view to retaining the best ones, and learning from each other. 
This should allow a better and a more uniform interpretation and implementation of asylum 
legislation and fully contribute to the general objective of improving a fair and more 
harmonised processing of applications for international protection through the EU200. 
However, the nature of the information required is broadly defined and no common 
indicators are defined, although they are necessary to help the Commission to conduct a 
comprehensive and a coherent evaluation. The issue of the availability of information could 
be partly overcome by cooperation between the EASO with relevant stakeholders (NGO’s 
and the UNHCR), as well as the cooperation with other Agencies (FRA and FRONTEX). 
                                                 
199  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European 
Asylum Support Office COM(2009)66, 18.02.2009 
200  Ibid 5.1.1, page 29. 
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2. THE EVALUATION TASK INTO QUESTION  
 
In the Commission’s perspective, the EASO would not only institutionalise a comprehensive 
sharing of specific information on asylum processing through formalised procedures, but 
would also ensure an in-depth systematic evaluation of the data collected. Its' work in this 
area should thus result in a qualitative and quantitative leap in the collection and evaluation 
of information201. But the Regulation establishing the EASO has not clearly given to the 
Office the responsibility of conducting evaluation of the data collected. According to article 
12, §1 of the regulation, the EASO will endorse a reporting function, as it has to draw up an 
annual report on the situation of asylum in the European Union. It does not imply a 
function of evaluator of the policy, but seems more to be “an auto-evaluation” of the Office 
activities.  
 
Nevertheless, the EASO could in the future see its tasks extended in order to include 
systematic evaluations of the data collected. Article 46 of the Regulation provides for an 
evaluation of the Office to be done in 2014. Consequently, the EASO could in the long term 
become a key evaluating actor at EU level. This will present an added value as the Office is 
an independent agency working at EU level and does not take part in the decision making 
process. This will ensure a great level of objectivity in the evaluation process. Furthermore, 
it is at the vantage position as it will have at its disposal a wide range collection of 
information collected from different stakeholders.  
 
To conclude, the availability of the data covered by the Regulation on community statistics 
on migration and international protection, along with the structured and thorough collection 
and sharing of significant quantities of information that will be accomplished by the EASO 
could crucially to contribute to addressing the deficits and shortage of data encountered in 
the field of asylum. Despite the fact that a monitoring mechanism of the quality of asylum 
decision, such as the UNHCR Quality Initiative, has not been taken forward at the EU level, 
the recent developments in the field of evaluation tend to promote a more qualitative 
evaluation.  
 
SECTION 2: FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR A BETTER EVALUATION 
MECHANISM 
SUB-SECTION 1: THE PERSPECTIVE OF ARTICLE 70 OF THE LISBON 
TREATY  
 
Article 70 of the Lisbon Treaty constitutes an important step for the evaluation in the field 
of FSJ, as it endows the European Union with a legal basis for an evaluation mechanism of 
the implementation of the Union policies in this field. The evaluation mechanism proposed 
is a peer review mechanism inspired by the Schengen evaluation model, which will be 
revised and improved, taking into account the changes in the legal situation after the 
integration of the Schengen rules into the framework of the European Union202.  In the 
proposed new Schengen evaluation mechanism, the Commission will take charge of the 
                                                 
201  See impact assessments accompanying the proposal for a new Qualification Directive 
(SEC(2009)1373) point 7 “Evaluation and monitoring criteria” page 52, and the proposal for a new 
Asylum procedures directive (SEC(2009)1376) point 7 “Evaluation and monitoring criteria”, page 52. 
202  Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of an evaluation mechanism to verify the 
application of the Schengen acquis COM(2009)102, 3.03.2009 and the Proposal for a Council Decision 
on the establishment of an evaluation mechanism to monitor the application of the Schengen acquis 
COM(2009)105, 3.03.2009 
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Schengen evaluation process to assess the correct application of the acquis, in collaboration 
with Member States, which will continue to play a key role203. Such collaboration between 
the Member States and the Commission to conduct the implementation of the EU policies in 
the field of FSJ is expressively foreseen in article 70204. The collaboration of the Commission 
in the evaluation is an important guarantee of independence, which is precisely another 
requirement of article 70. Indeed, article 70 specifies that the evaluation must be objective 
and impartial. The objectiveness and impartiality of evaluations should be also guaranteed 
inter alia by enabling relevant professional organisations and stakeholders to contribute to 
the evaluation process and the Council will ask the Commission to reflect on the best 
means of ensuring this. This would be also ensured and facilitated in the framework of the 
EASO, which will collaborate with relevant organisations and stakeholders and will gather 
information from different sources that are a guarantee to conduct an objective evaluation.  
 
It is also important to note that this new evaluation mechanism cannot replace the 
Commission’s control on the Members States’ compliance with their obligations. Article 70 
specifies at the beginning that this evaluation mechanism will be established without 
prejudice to the infringement procedure foreseen in articles 258, 259 and 260 of TFEU. The 
European Council considers that, in the long term, such evaluation mechanisms should 
encompass all policies in the area and not only the judicial cooperation, as the inclusion of 
the terms “in particular in order to facilitate full application of the principle of mutual 
recognition”205 in the provision, could let imagine. Thus, the evaluation mechanism 
foreseen in article 70 will also be applicable to the CEAS, but shall await the Commission 
proposals to that end.  
 
Nevertheless, one may wonder if the peer review mechanism as proposed in the Schengen 
model will work in the context of the CEAS. This mechanism is effective for the Schengen 
acquis because its correct implementation leads to the lifting of internal border controls of 
fundamental importance for the internal security of Member States. Regarding asylum, one 
possible incentive is the foreseen implementation of the principle of mutual recognition of 
asylum decisions between Member States, as well as the fear of Member States to be 
condemned for indirect refoulement when transferring an asylum seeker in another Member 
States under the Dublin Regulation. In this context, the Member States have to be sure 
that the asylum standards are respected in the responsible Member State for the asylum 
claim. However, the peer review mechanism appears to be the best way to require 
information and data from Member States that would be necessary to conduct evaluations 
and would increase the efficiency of the EASO. Also, it would be an incentive of mutual 
trust between Member States and would facilitate the application of mutual recognition of 
positive asylum decisions in the European Union, which is one of the objectives of the 
CEAS206. 
                                                 
203  Ibid, COM (2009), Integration of the Schengen acquis within the European Union framework “Given 
the Commission’s responsibilities under the EC Treaty, it is essential for the Commission to take 
charge of the Schengen evaluation process to assess the correct application of the acquis after the 
lifting of internal border controls. Nevertheless, the expertise of the Member States is also important 
in order to be able to verify implementation on the spot, as well as to maintain mutual trust between 
the Member States.” Page 6 
204  According to article 70 “Without prejudice to Articles 258, 259 and 260, the Council may, on a 
proposal from the Commission, adopt measures laying down the arrangements whereby Member 
States, in collaboration with the Commission, conduct objective and impartial evaluation of the 
implementation of the Union policies referred to in this Title by Member States' authorities, in 
particular in order to facilitate full application of the principle of mutual recognition. The European 
Parliament and national Parliaments shall be informed of the content and results of the evaluation.” 
205  Ibid. 
206  Op cit, Commission Green paper on the future of the CEAS, point 2.3 “granting of protection”: “Finally 
the concept of a status valid throughout the Union invites reflection on the establishment at 
Community level of a mechanism for the mutual recognition of national asylum decisions and the 
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On the other hand, the new evaluation mechanism foreseen by article 70 is not satisfying 
with regard the role attributed to the European Parliament, which is only informed by the 
content and the results of the evaluation. And yet according to article 12, c) of the TEU, 
only national parliaments take part and are associated to the evaluation mechanism on the 
implementation of EU policies in the field of FSJ.  Therefore, the national parliaments seem 
to have a more important role in the evaluation mechanism than the European Parliament. 
The quasi exclusion of the European Parliament from the evaluation mechanism is absurd 
when it has a key role in the elaboration of EU policies in this area. This provision could be 
interpreted as a minimum requirement and should not prevent the Commission, in its 
proposal for an evaluation mechanism, to give a wider role to the European Parliament in 
the evaluation process. The implementation of the evaluation mechanism to all policies of 
the area of FSJ is a long-term process and the asylum policy won’t be at first the priority 
for the Commission, which will await the implementation of the second phase before 
proposing initiatives for an evaluation mechanism for the CEAS.  
 
SUB-SECTION 2: POLITICAL GUIDELINES ABOUT EVALUATION IN 
THE STOCKHOLM PROGRAMME 
The Stockholm Programme envisages a sectoral approach with regard the evaluation of EU 
policies in the field of FSJ, contrasting with the previous general approach of the 
Commission in its communication of 2006. As previously explained, this Communication 
was not applied due to resistance of the Member States and the Commission also deemed 
that its general approach was not operational. Each area or even sub-area of the FSJ 
policies has its own objectives and specificities, so that the purpose and the method of the 
evaluation must take these specificities into consideration.  
 
It is foreseen that “Judicial cooperation in criminal matters should be pursued as the first 
area for the evaluation”, but interestingly added that “other policy areas will have to follow 
such as respect for asylum procedures in relevant legislation”. Concerning more specifically 
asylum, the Commission is invited “to consider, once the second phase of the CEAS has 
been fully implemented and on the basis of an evaluation of the effect of that legislation 
and of the EASO, the possibilities for creating a framework for the transfer of protection of 
beneficiaries of international protection when exercising their acquired residence rights 
under EU law”.  
 
There seems to be a willingness to improve evaluation in the field of asylum. The 
perspective to apply the principle of mutual recognition of national decisions could be an 
incentive to effectively do so. 
 
SUB-SECTION 3: THE ISSUE OF MONITORING FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS  
The European Council invites in the Stockholm programme “the EU Institutions and the 
Member States to ensure that legal initiatives are and remain consistent with fundamental 
rights throughout the legislative process by way of strengthening the application of the 
methodology for a systematic and rigorous monitoring of compliance with the Convention 
and the rights set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights”.  
 
                                                                                                                                                            
possibility of transfer of protection responsibilities once a beneficiary of protection takes up residence 
in another Member State”, p.6. 
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The issue of a systematic ex-post monitoring mechanism on the compliance of 
Fundamental Rights in the Member States when implementing EU policies is on the contrary 
not addressed in the Stockholm programme. It is however, an ever growing importance 
when the Member States have a margin of discretion or can use exceptions provided for in 
EU legislative instruments that may potentially lead to violations of human rights. By way 
of example, the Commission explained that the current disparities between Member States 
create differences of treatment between asylum seekers and may potentially lead in certain 
cases to violations of Fundamental rights such as the right to asylum (Article 18 of 
Charter), equality before the law (Article 20 of the Charter) and non-discrimination (Article 
21 of the Charter)207.  
 
The FRA Regulation could be amended in order to extend the tasks of the Agency to a 
systematic monitoring function, as FRA aims at promoting Fundamental rights including the 
right to asylum enshrined in article 18 of the Charter. Moreover, FRA could be helped in its 
monitoring task by the EASO through a tight collaboration already foreseen into article 52 
of the Regulation establishing the EASO. Such a monitoring mechanism should also be 
applied to legal instruments that could have an incident on the right to asylum, such as 
Frontex Regulation, as far as its activities could amount to an infringement to the principle 
of non-refoulement.  
                                                 
207  Impact assessment accompanying the Regulation establishing the European asylum support office 
(SEC(2009)153 point 5.3 « respect of Fundamental Rights », p. 52). 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. Evaluation must encompass the legal and concrete implementation of the EU 
measures, as well as the results (impact and efficiency) of the measures 
once implemented. 
 
2. A model for a standard final clause to be included in the final provisions of all 
EU instruments should be drafted and made mandatory through an inter-
institutional agreement, in order to ensure that Member States provide to the 
Commission relevant and regular feed-back in view of evaluation, including a 
table of concordance between the provisions of directives and all national 
measures of transposition 
 
3. The new directives on reception conditions and on qualification, as well as the 
new Dublin regulation must contain specific provisions covering statistical 
data not covered by the Regulation on Community statistics on migration and 
international protection 
 
4. The mandate of the Fundamental Rights Agency should be extended to an 
ex-post monitoring of the implementation of Fundamental Rights by Member 
States, in order to cover the right to asylum under article 18 of the European 
Charter of Fundamental rights 
 
5. The mandate of the EASO should be extended in the future to include the 
evaluation in the sense of proposal n°1 of the asylum acquis by the Member 
States 
 
6. An Evaluation of the quality of the asylum decision-making process could be 
promoted by the EU on the model of the UNHCR Quality Initiatives projects  
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PART 2: ASSESSMENT OF THE ASYLUM ACQUIS AND 
SHORT-TERM PROPOSALS FOR THE SECOND PHASE OF THE 
CEAS 
CHAPTER 1: DISTRIBUTION OF APPLICANTS FOR INTER-
NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROTECTED PERSONS 
INTRODUCTION 
1. SCOPE OF THE CHAPTER  
 
The present Chapter addresses Common European Asylum System (CEAS) instruments on 
the distribution of applicants for protection and of protected persons. The focus of analysis 
will in fact be the Dublin system, which as we will see immediately, can be considered as 
the sole significant “distributive” instrument adopted to date. 
2. OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT CEAS INSTRUMENTS  
 
The Dublin system, established under the Dublin Regulation, the EURODAC Regulation, and 
their respective Implementing Regulations, institutes a form of distribution of applicants for 
protection between 30 “Member States” – the EU-27 plus three “associate” EFTA States: 
Iceland, Norway and Switzerland.  
 
In principle, the Dublin system only applies to ”asylum seekers”, that is third-country 
nationals applying for the recognition of refugee status, and not to applicants for alternative 
forms of protection. However, the latter are actually excluded from the scope of system 
only if their applications can be submitted separately in the State concerned (art. 2(c) DR). 
Since this possibility is no longer available in most Member States (SEC (2008)21), the 
Dublin system presently applies to most protection seekers. 
 
While existing EU legislation covers (in part) the distribution of protection seekers, there 
are presently no EU rules dealing directly with the distribution of beneficiaries of 
international protection between the Member States. The Temporary Protection Directive 
purports to regulate the issue in respect of its beneficiaries. However, apart from applying 
in exceptional circumstances, it only establishes a voluntary pledging mechanism for the 
allocation of temporarily protected persons, not a binding system of rules (Hailbronner 
2004:69; Kerber 2002:212). Recent initiatives on the “reallocation” of beneficiaries of 
protection, to be supported by the European Refugee Fund (ERF), must also be mentioned 
(see Pact on Immigration and Asylum, IV (c)). However, such initiatives “have been more 
symbolic than anything else” so far (Matrix 2010:16), and they have been undertaken on a 
strictly voluntary and ad hoc basis. As of now, therefore, there is no EU binding legal 
framework for the distribution of protected persons between the Member States. Nor are 
there any EU provisions allowing for their inter-state mobility, since beneficiaries of 
international protection are explicitly excluded from the scope of the Long-Term Residents 
and Blue Card Directives (see art. 3(2) and 2(2) respectively)208. 
                                                 
208  It should be noted that the European Agreement on Transfer of Responsibility for Refugees of 16 
October 1980 does not deal with this issue either, but only with the transfer of (certain) 
responsibilities from a host State to another once a recognized refugee has lawfully settled in the 
second State (see Lassen et al. 2004:37 ff). 
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Arguably, the Dublin system is the key CEAS instrument also in this area, since it influences 
the distribution of protected persons between the Member States. Absent any EU rules on 
post-status-determination reallocation or mobility, the CEAS operates on the assumption 
that the Member State responsible for examining an application for asylum will also be the 
State of residence for the person concerned, if and once protection is granted. 
3. THE ONGOING REFORM PROCESS: DISTRIBUTION IN 
THE “SECOND PHASE” CEAS 
 
The CEAS as a whole is in the process of being reformed. However, current proposals do 
not prefigure a profound restructuring of its “distributional” components as described 
above. 
 
For the sake of completeness, we will mention the Commission’s proposal to include 
beneficiaries of international protection in the scope of the Long Term Residents Directive – 
which has been pending for years before the Council, as well as the forthcoming 
establishment of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), which will be tasked to 
coordinate voluntary relocation programmes (see EASO Regulation, recital 7 and art. 5). 
However, current debates essentially focus on the Commission proposal to recast the 
Dublin Regulation. 
 
The Proposal does not purport to alter the general scheme of the Dublin system (COM 
(2008b)5). In actual fact, the Commission has not even taken into consideration a 
complete overhaul of the Dublin system (see SEC (2008), in spite of serious doubts as to 
whether Dublin is “fit for purpose” (EP 2008a:13; see further Maiani/Vevstad 2009; on 
desirable amendments to the Dublin system in a long-term perspective, see Part III. 
Instead, the Commission has taken the approach of “confirm[ing] the principles underlying 
[the Dublin Regulation], while making the necessary improvements” (recital 7 DPr).  
 
The first such improvement consists in fully extending the scope of the Dublin system to all 
applicants for international protection, as foreseen by art. 78(2e) TFEU (see (COM 
(2008b)7). This proposal is uncontroversial (EP 2009a:30; Presidency Compromise 
Proposal), and there is no need to examine it at length here. Let it only be noted that we 
support the forthcoming extension of the Dublin system to all applicants for international 
protection. 
 
The other proposals put forward by the Commission aim to tackle a number of deficiencies 
observed in the operation of the Dublin system, in pursuance of two overarching goals: to 
“increase the system’s efficiency and to ensure higher standards of protection for persons 
falling under the ‘Dublin procedure’” (COM (2008b)5). These proposals will be examined in 
detail below, against the background of current Dublin practice, and in light of protection 
principles relevant to the operation of the Dublin system. 
4. OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER 
 
The chapter is organised in five thematic sections, each discussing key problem areas in 
relation to the Dublin system (on the detention of persons subject to the Dublin procedure, 
see however Chapter III): guarantees against refoulement (Section I); the protection of 
family unity and integration-related concerns (Section II); the protection of vulnerable 
persons, including children (Section III); distributive fairness and the burden-concentrating 
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effects of the system on “border” States (Section IV); and finally, concerns relating to the 
effectiveness of the Dublin system and to the adverse impacts it has on the CEAS as a 
whole (Section V).  
 
In each Section, we analyse the problems observed in Dublin practice against the 
background of relevant legal standards, and consider possible solutions in the context (and 
within the constraints) of the current recasting procedure. 
 
SECTION I: DUBLIN AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT 
1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 
It is a widely shared and justified conviction that the Dublin system can only work 
satisfactorily if protection standards are adequate and equivalent throughout the European 
Union (see e.g. EP 2008b, para. 1; see further below in this Section, para. 2.2)209. 
 
Under slightly less restrictive conditions, the system can work sub-optimally, but without 
giving rise to objections based on the non-refoulement principle. For this to be the case, all 
Member States must run fair and efficient asylum procedures, fully in line with international 
standards, and afford asylum seekers dignified standards of living, meeting or exceeding 
the minimum threshold defined by the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment.  
 
Provided that these preconditions are met, Dublin transfers are as said unobjectionable on 
non-refoulement grounds. Better still, in this scenario the Dublin system decisively 
promotes respect for the principle of non-refoulement. This is so because under art. 3(1) 
DR, every application filed with one of the Member States must be “examined” by one of 
them – the responsible State. True, the Regulation does not at present guarantee full 
status determination (i.e. the examination of the claim on its merits) in the responsible 
State210. But this does not detract from the importance of article 3(1) DR. Under the 
conditions spelled out above, access to the asylum procedure in any Member State would 
amount to a guarantee that the non-refoulement principle is respected, whether the 
application is examined on its merits or not211.  
 
As made clear by recital 2 DR, the Dublin system is meant to run in such a “physiological” 
situation: “Member States, all respecting the principle of non-refoulement, are considered 
as safe countries for third-country nationals”. Pathological situations may nonetheless 
arise, whereby a Member State does not afford sufficient protection and reception 
standards to all asylum seekers. In such situations, instead of promoting respect for the 
principle of non-refoulement, the Dublin system generates new risks of refoulement. It 
does so by creating the standing possibility that asylum seekers are removed to a Member 
State whose asylum system is in some way dysfunctional, or where asylum seekers are at 
risk of being ill-treated. 
 
                                                 
209  And, one should add, in the wider “Dublin area”, including the three “associate” States (see above, 
Introduction).  
210  The responsible State must “complete the examination of the application for asylum” (art. 16(1b)DR). 
This obligation is satisfied once “any examination of, or decision or ruling concerning, an application 
for asylum” is made “by the competent authorities” (art. 1(e) DR). Decisions taken without a full 
examination of protection needs are arguably covered by this definition. Moreover, art. 3(3) DR 
explicitly reserves the adoption of “safe third country” decisions, which are by definition taken without 
prior determination of refugee status. 
211  See the explicit terms of art. 3(3) DR. 
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Let us stress that this risk need not materialise: the Dublin Regulation provides Member 
States with the means to take corrective action – i.e. to refrain from effecting transfers that 
would amount to refoulement. Under art. 3(2) DR (the “sovereignty clause”), any State 
receiving an asylum application may decide to take responsibility for it, instead of 
transferring the applicant to the responsible State. The way in which Member States react 
to a risk of refoulement or ill-treatment in the responsible State is therefore (another) key 
variable when determining the overall impact of the Dublin system on the principle of non-
refoulement.  
 
Unfortunately, as we will see below, experience shows that both “lines of defence” against 
refoulement may fail or, to put it otherwise, that the Dublin Regulation falls short of 
“ensur[ing] compliance with the principle of non refoulement” as requested by art. 78 
TFEU: 
 
– In the context of widely diverging protection and reception standards, there are 
persistent concerns that the practices of some Member States fail to afford sufficient 
protection against ill-treatment or refoulement. Observed problems include 
hindrances in access to asylum procedures, unfair asylum procedures (due to e.g. 
insufficient procedural guarantees, the application of unduly restrictive qualification 
criteria, or reliance on flawed risk assessments), and sub-standard reception 
conditions. 
– The “second line” of protection, that ought to be provided by the “sending” Member 
States through a principled application of the sovereignty clause, is also performing 
well below the standard of a “full and inclusive” application of the non-refoulement 
principle. 
2. INSUFFICIENT GUARANTEES AGAINST REFOULE-
MENT AND ILL-TREATMENT IN THE RESPONSIBLE 
STATE 
2.1. Impaired access to the asylum procedure in the responsible 
state 
 
 
PROBLEM: ACCESS TO A MEANINGFUL ASYLUM PROCEDURE IS NOT ALWAYS GUARANTEED 
IN THE RESPONSIBLE STATE 
A key premise of the Dublin system – that each asylum seeker will have access to an 
asylum procedure in the responsible State – has on occasion been belied in practice, on 
account of both lacunae in the Dublin Regulation and Member State practices. Barred 
access to an asylum procedure in the responsible State has entailed, in documented cases, 
the exclusion from asylum procedures in all the Member State, exposing asylum seekers to 
risks of refoulement. 
 
In 2004, Greek authorities started to subject Dublin “returnees”212 to a domestic provision, 
whereby asylum cases were closed if the asylum seeker “arbitrarily” abandoned the stated 
place of residence. Dublin transferees could not, almost by definition, fulfil the strict 
requirements to have their case reopened. As a consequence, many were transferred back 
                                                 
212  I.e. to asylum seekers who, after claiming asylum in Greece, had moved to another Member State and 
were subsequently transferred back to Greece. 
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to Greece, where they faced deportation without having had their claim examined at all in 
any of the Member States (Papadimitriou/Papageorgiou 2005; ECRE 2006:54-55).  
 
The Commission started infringement proceedings against Greece, contending that this 
“interruption” practice was contrary to the Dublin Regulation itself (case C-130/08). This, 
combined with stark criticism from UNCHR (UNHCR 2004; UNHCR 2007a), convinced the 
Greek authorities to alter national legislation so as to render the “interruption” rule 
inapplicable to Dublin returnees.  
 
This notwithstanding, the issue of access to procedures persists in the Dublin context:  
 
– Firstly, “interruption” rules of varying severity are in place in other Member States 
(ECRE 2006:152). In one documented case, the combined application of the Dublin 
system and of the Dutch “interruption” rule led to the deportation of a man whose 
asylum claim was nowhere examined in the EU, and who was subsequently killed in 
unclear circumstances in his country of origin (ECRE 2007:2). 
– Secondly, factual obstacles may hinder access to asylum procedures, as much as 
formal rules. As documented by UNHCR and several NGOs, filing an asylum claim in 
Greece is a difficult and uncertain business (UNHCR 2009c:6-8 and 18-19; DRC 
2009:11-13). Refoulement is a standing possibility during the process. Therefore, 
the end result of a transfer to Greece or to any other State experiencing similar 
problems may be again, removal without access to any asylum procedure (see 
UNHCR 2009c:19). 
 
A less dramatic, but still serious variant of the problem described above concerns access to 
a remedy (rather than to a first instance asylum procedure). Asylum seekers whose claim 
has been rejected by the responsible State, while they find themselves in another State, 
may find, once they are sent back, that they have missed the deadline to lodge an appeal 
and thus have no remedy against the negative decision (SEC 2008)19-20).   
  
SOLUTION: GIVING DUBLIN RETURNEES A CLEAR RIGHT TO HAVE THEIR CASE 
REOPENED, OR TO LODGE AN APPEAL, ON RETURN TO THE RESPONSIBLE STATE 
Art. 18(2) DPr lays down an explicit guarantee that the responsible State must examine the 
application including, if the examination of the claim has been discontinued due to 
“withdrawal”, by reopening the case. This proposal would partially solve the problems 
described above. The version of art. 18(2) DPr currently discussed in Council might, with 
some adjustments, provide a more complete protection. 
 
Under art. 18(2) DPr, a Member State “taking back” or “taking charge” of an applicant, and 
having previously discontinued the examination of his or her claim following explicit or 
implicit withdrawal, would have to resume such examination ex officio. Through this 
provision, the Commission intends to close the protection gaps described above – even to 
ensure in all cases the “examination of the merits of the application” in the responsible 
State (COM 2008b), Annex I, ad art. 18; similarly: UNHCR 2009a:13).  
 
This last expectation is bound to be disappointing since the responsible State would still 
have the possibility of sending the applicant to a “safe third country” (art. 3(3) DPr). But 
even allowing for this self-evident “exception”, the real effects of art. 18(2) DPr would 
ultimately depend on the provisions of the Asylum Procedures Directive. In fact, other than 
specifically requesting the Member State to reopen “withdrawn” applications, art. 18(2) DPr 
only lays down an obligation to “complete the examination” of the application: not to 
examine it on its merits, but to take a decision “in accordance with [the Asylum Procedures 
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and Qualification Directives]” (art. 2(d) DPr; the implications for Denmark and the 
associate States are not clear: see Maiani 2010). Therefore, art. 18(2) can only solve the 
problems discussed above to the extent that the APD: (a) provides that the examination of 
applications can only be discontinued through “withdrawal” (since any other form of 
“discontinuation” would escape art. 18(2) DPr: see UNHCR 2009a:13), and (b) gives Dublin 
returnees the right to appeal negative decisions adopted in absentia, even though the 
deadline has expired. Taken together, art. 18(2) DPr and the Recast APD would guarantee 
the first result (see in particular art. 28 Recast APD; see also Chapter 4, Section IV, 
para. 7). They would not, by contrast, provide clear solutions to the “appeals” problem.  
 
During negotiations on art. 18(2) DPr in Council, the Presidency has for its part suggested 
an interesting solution. The provision in the Presidency Compromise Proposal excludes the 
obligation to “reopen” the case in two situations: “take charge”, and “take back” when the 
application is still being examined by the responsible State (art. 18(1)(a) and (b) DPr). This 
is of no consequence, since in both situations the case would still be pending at first 
instance in the responsible State. In case of “take back” following withdrawal, i.e. in the 
situations that arose during the “Greek interruption practice”, the asylum applicant would 
be entitled to request the case to be reopened. On the one hand, the examination would 
not be resumed ex officio – an acceptable solution, provided the applicant is sufficiently 
informed (see mutatis mutandis Chapter 4, Section IV, para. 7). On the other hand, it is 
unclear whether the asylum applicant would be entitled as a matter of right to have the 
case reopened – and this, for the proposal to achieve its objectives, would need to be put 
beyond dispute through suitable amendments. Finally, in case of “take back” following the 
adoption of a first instance negative decision, the responsible State would have to ensure 
that “the person concerned has, or has had, the opportunity to access an effective remedy 
pursuant to [the APD]”. Provided that the terms “has had” are deleted or clarified, this 
would solve the problem of access to an appeal on return.   
 
To conclude on this point: the Commission’s proposal holds merit, and would go some way 
in solving the problems described above. However, we would recommend taking the 
Presidency Compromise text, examined above, as a basis. If suitably amended, by 
clarifying that the applicant has an unconditional right to have the case reopened and to 
lodge an appeal on return, this text would solve the problems examined above.  
2.2. Failing protection and reception standards in the responsible 
State 
 
PROBLEM: SUB-STANDARD PROTECTION AND RECEPTION CONDITIONS IN SOME MEMBER 
STATES, IN GENERAL OR IN INDIVIDUAL CASES, GENERATE RISKS THAT DUBLIN 
TRANSFERS MAY AMOUNT TO “REFOULEMENT” 
In the context of widely diverging protection and reception standards in the Dublin area, 
there are persistent concerns that the practices of some Member States may fall below the 
requisite standards. When sufficient guarantees against refoulement and ill-treatment are 
not ensured in the responsible State, the Dublin system – apart from operating as an unfair 
“asylum lottery” – generates risks of illegal refoulement. 
 
Despite the progress made in the harmonization of national legislations, asylum practices 
and standards still vary widely between the EU Member States (see COM (2009)4; 
Stockholm Programme, para. 6.2). In 2007, the recognition rate for Iraqi asylum seekers 
was as high as 80% or more in some States (e.g. Cyprus and Germany) and as low as 0% 
in others (e.g. Slovenia and Greece) (ECRE 2008:15). Operating the Dublin system in such 
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a situation is extremely problematic. The Dublin system allocates responsibility on the basis 
of criteria that have nothing to do with the protection needs of asylum seekers (e.g. travel 
routes). In theory, it should be neutral on the outcome of the asylum applications. At 
present, however, the choice of the Member State responsible has a direct and sometimes 
critical influence on the outcome of the asylum application. It is therefore no exaggeration 
to say that the Dublin system currently functions as a “protection lottery” (e.g. ECRE 
2008:5). This, of course, revokes into question the fairness of the Dublin system to asylum 
seekers. It also intuitively explains why so many asylum seekers try to resist or avoid the 
enforcement of transfers, with serious consequences for the effectiveness of the system 
(see below, Section V). This general problem acquires a distinct legal quality whenever the 
practices of a Member State are not only less favourable than those of other Member 
States but also, arguably, in breach of international standards.  
 
In April 2008, UNCHR has issued a position paper detailing the shortcomings of Greek 
asylum procedures, and shedding light on the determinant factors behind Europe’s lowest 
recognition rate (0,04% in 2007). A new paper, published in December 2009 and 
superseding previous positions on Greece (UNHCR 2009c), offers fresh evidence on the 
flaws of the Greek asylum system. It documents practices such as the informal removal of 
registered asylum seekers to Turkey, and details the absence of even basic guarantees in 
status determination procedures (see UNHCR 2009c, particularly at 3-5 and 15-18). 
According to UNHCR, this situation entails risks of refoulement for potentially any asylum 
seeker. For Dublin transferees, in particular, access to an asylum procedure in Greece is of 
small comfort, supposing that they obtain it. They end up having no access to a “fair” 
asylum procedure, ensuring respect for the principle of non-refoulement – neither in the 
responsible State, which has none in place, nor in the other Member States, which have 
declined to examine the claim.  
 
At this juncture, one point needs to be stressed. Greece provides the rather extreme 
example of an asylum system that, according to UNHCR, fails to afford the requisite 
guarantees to virtually all asylum seekers. Dublin transfers to Greece therefore inherently 
imply a risk of refoulement, and UNHCR has advised, in the most general terms, against 
such transfers “until respect for international and EU refugee law is assured” in that country 
(UNHCR 2009c:21). However, it does not take the collapse of the asylum system to render 
a Member State potentially “unsafe”. A Member State may be unsafe for a particular class 
of asylum seekers. Such was the case of France and Germany for persons fearing 
persecution from non-state actors (see UK HL, Adan). A more recent example could be that 
of Chechen asylum seekers in Slovakia (recognition rate close to 0% in 2005, compared to 
approximately 90% in Austria:  see ECRE 2008:15), possibly due to an improper 
application of the “internal protection alternative” concept (UNHCR 2007c:55-61). A State 
may even be unsafe for an individual asylum seeker – e.g., due to his claim having been 
already rejected by the responsible State through a decision that is patently flawed, but 
can no longer be challenged (see e.g. UK CA Dahmas). In such situations, the risk of 
refoulement may be less manifest than in the Greek case. It is not, however, qualitatively 
different, because the prohibition of refoulement is predicated on an individual, concrete 
risk prognosis. 
 
Similar considerations apply in respect of reception conditions. In spite of the Reception 
Conditions Directive, wide disparities persist among Member States (COM (2007b)10-11). 
Reception conditions in Greece give, again, cause for particular concerns. Several reports 
from official bodies and NGOs have documented the practice of systematically detaining 
asylum seekers, including children, in extremely harsh conditions. Over the last few years, 
the ECtHR has repeatedly condemned Greece on this account (ECtHR, Dougoz; ECtHR, 
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S.D.; ECtHR, Tabesh). Apart from detention, reliable sources have reported that asylum 
seekers, including children, do not benefit from reception conditions in line with EU 
standards, and are exposed to difficult living conditions: homelessness and destitution; 
desperate measures such as prostitution – including child prostitution – as a means for self-
support (UNHCR 2009c:10, 13; DRC 2009:28-33). 
 
It must be stressed, again, that Greece has no monopoly on these problems. Sub-standard 
reception and detention conditions have been documented in other Member States, as well 
(see e.g. ECtHR, Muskhadzhiyeva/Belgium; CommDH 2009, 73 ff; MSF 2009). 
 
SOLUTION: NONE TO BE EXPECTED FROM A REFORM OF THE DUBLIN SYSTEM  
The goal of ensuring that adequate and equivalent standards of reception and protection 
are applied throughout the Dublin area is a long-term goal, which can only be achieved 
through decisive advances in harmonisation and, arguably, strengthened supervision, 
capacity building, and burden-sharing. No reform of the Dublin system can tackle this 
issue. 
 
Even though the problem described above has a direct impact on the Dublin system (see 
again EP 2008b, para. 1), amendments to the Dublin system itself cannot provide solutions. 
It is only through decisive advances in the harmonization process, coupled with 
strengthened supervision, capacity-building, and burden-sharing that a “level field of 
protection” and reception, fully in line with the relevant international standards, can be 
achieved throughout the Dublin area. While improvements in these regards can be 
expected under “second generation” CEAS instruments decisive advances of the kind 
described above are only likely to be realised in the longer term. 
3. INSUFFICIENT GUARANTEES AGAINST REFOULE-
MENT IN THE SENDING STATE 
 
While “second phase” amendments to the Dublin system cannot ensure that sufficient 
standards are applied in the responsible State, they can (and should) tackle risks of 
refoulement upstream, i.e. reinforce the protection against refoulement afforded by the 
sending States. Before examining the problems that have been reported in this area and 
possible solutions thereto, it is necessary to recall the basic guarantees that the sending 
States should extend to Dublin transferees. 
3.1. The legal framework: mutual trust and “safety assessments” 
in Dublin context 
3.1.1. Basic principles of international law and “qualified” mutual trust 
All Member States are subject to the principle of non-refoulement. They may not remove 
an asylum seeker to a State where he or she would be at risk of persecution (art. 33 GC). 
Likewise, they may not remove a person to a State where there is a serious risk that he or 
she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading 
treatment (art. 2 and 3 ECHR; see also art. 19(2) CFR). This includes inhuman or 
degrading conditions of detention, or conditions of extreme deprivation (homelessness, 
hunger, degrading hygienic conditions: see UK HL, Limbuela and others). “Indirect” 
refoulement is also prohibited, i.e. the removal to a State where the person concerned, 
though not immediately at risk of persecution or ill-treatment, would incur the risk of being 
illegally refouled. 
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All these prohibitions are fully applicable in Dublin context. A Dublin “transfer” is the 
removal of an asylum seeker from a State to another. As such, it falls squarely under the 
scope of the non-refoulement principle. Furthermore, each Member State, qua party to the 
relevant Conventions, bears an individual responsibility to respect the principle of non-
refoulement at all times, vis-à-vis all the asylum seekers that are under its jurisdiction, 
regardless of whether it is “responsible” for examining their application (see in particular 
ECtHR, T.I.). 
 
The immediate implication of all this is that before effecting a removal under the Dublin 
Regulation, the sending State must properly satisfy itself, through a “rigorous scrutiny”, 
that the responsible State is “safe” for the applicant – i.e. that the latter will be treated in 
conformity with the international standards recalled above (see Chapter 4, Section I, 
para. 5.2 and 5.3; see also Lauterpacht/Betlehem 2003:122). 
 
By essence, the prohibition of refoulement focuses on the risks incurred by the individual 
person. Therefore, the required “safety assessment” should in principle be conducted on a 
concrete, case-by-case basis (see e.g. UNHCR 2000, § 14). When the removal occurs 
between States parties to the Geneva Convention or ECHR, as it is the case for Dublin 
transfers, the principle of “interstate” (or “mutual”) trust allows for a partial relaxation of 
this requirement. The sending State is entitled to presume that the responsible State will 
treat the asylum seeker in accordance with its international obligations under both 
Conventions (see, mutatis mutandis, ECtHR, K.R.S.). Yet, such safety presumptions are 
only deemed compatible with non-refoulement if the asylum seeker is allowed an “effective 
possibility to rebut [them]” (UNHCR 1999:20; UNHCR 2005:37; ECtHR, Saadi/Italy, 147; 
Battjes 2006, § 506 ff). In other words, mutual trust between the Member States must 
necessarily be a “qualified” trust, allowing for exceptions, as opposed to “absolute” or 
“blind” trust. 
 
In this context, it is also worth recalling that before a transfer is carried out, the sending 
State must afford the asylum seeker an effective remedy, entailing independent and 
rigorous scrutiny of any alleged risks of refoulement and ill-treatment in the responsible 
State (for further details, see Chapter 4, Section I, para. 5). 
3.1.2. “Strengthened mutual trust” under the ECHR?  
Some would argue that, contrary to what we have just said, the decision rendered by the 
European Court of Human Rights in the case K.R.S./UK does establish a principle of 
“absolute trust” between the Member States, so far as the compatibility of Dublin transfers 
with the ECHR are concerned213. 
 
In this case, the applicant challenged a transfer to Greece on the grounds that it would 
amount to illegal refoulement under article 3 ECHR. First, he contended that Greek 
authorities would expel him to his country of origin, where he would be tortured (indirect 
refoulement). Second, he alleged that he would be detained in degrading conditions in 
Greece (direct refoulement). The Court dismissed both claims as manifestly unfounded. It 
relied inter alia on the argument that since Greece is subject to the Court’s own 
jurisdiction, the applicant could seek redress for any violation of the ECHR in Greece – first 
with the Greek authorities and then, if all else failed, by lodging an application with the 
Court itself. 
 
                                                 
213  Let it be noted that ECtHR case law has no incidence on the Member States’ duties under the Geneva 
Convention. 
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At first sight, K.R.S. indeed suggests that any issue arising under articles 2 and 3 ECHR 
would need to be raised only after the transfer, with the responsible State or if need be 
with the Court. The sending State, for its part, would be entitled to transfer the applicant 
without having to assess the “safety” of the responsible State. On closer inspection, and in 
light of subsequent case law, things appear to be more complex. 
 
Let us consider, first, the Court’s reasoning in relation to the alleged risk of indirect 
refoulement. Here, the risk of torture can only materialise after the second removal – from 
the responsible State to a third State. In theory, the Court is in a position to prevent this: 
on the application of the person concerned (“Rule 39 application”). It can issue interim 
measures preventing expulsion from any State of the Council of Europe. This holds true, 
however, only if the Court is practically accessible from the responsible State (ECtHR, 
K.R.S., 17-18; see the comments of CommDH 2010, para. 28; Nicol 2004:176). To put it 
differently: the sending State need not concern itself with risks of onward refoulement from 
the responsible State, as long as access to the European Court is ensured, in law and in 
fact, in the responsible State. This, as the Court suggests, is a point on which the sending 
State must “properly satisfy” itself. 
 
As for risks of direct refoulement, the reasoning of the Court in K.R.S. is ambiguous and, 
ultimately, unsustainable. Here, the alleged risk of ill-treatment can materialise already in 
the responsible State, immediately after the Dublin transfer. Redress from the Court can 
therefore only be obtained ex-post-facto. However, according to a well-established 
principle, treatment contrary to art. 3 ECHR must be prevented: “ex-post-facto remedies 
are little comfort to a person who has already suffered torture or ill-treatment” (Nicol 
2004:179). This means that, contrary to what the Court seems to suggest in K.R.S., the 
applicant must have a possibility to raise the risk of ill-treatment already with the sending 
State’s authorities, and that the latter must carry out a rigorous scrutiny thereof and afford 
the applicant an effective remedy.  
 
The Court itself is apparently reconsidering K.R.S., at least on this last point. Between 
January and May 2009, i.e. after K.R.S. was handed down, the Court has instructed several 
States to refrain from effecting Dublin transfers in more than 50 cases, mostly on account 
of detention conditions in the responsible State (ECRE 2009b). Furthermore, in the decision 
Kaplan/Germany of 15 December 2009, the Court was careful to stress that “the fact that 
the Destination State is a Party to the Convention does not in itself eliminate the need for 
judicial protection against expulsion in the sending State. In order to evaluate the risks 
incurred by the concerned person, account must be taken of the nature and seriousness of 
the violations alleged by the applicant, as well as whether and to what extent these 
violation could be corrected in the destination State, in particular through an application to 
the Court” (free translation, emphasis added). It is worth recalling, in this context, that 
violations of article 3 ECHR are regarded as particularly serious and irreversible (ECtHR, 
Gebremedhin, para. 58). It follows, in our view, that risks of ill-treatment in the responsible 
State must indeed be fully examined by the sending State’s authorities prior to transfer. 
3.1.3. Mutual trust and EU asylum standards  
A last point to consider is whether Dublin transfers can be seen to be special – to the point 
of justifying “absolute trust” – insofar as they take place between EU Member States 
subject to a Common European Asylum System214. In addressing this issue, we would first 
clear the ground of three possible misconceptions. 
                                                 
214  For the purpose of the following discussion, it will be borne in mind that: (a) not all Dublin transfers 
take place between EU Member States, since three EFTA States are associated to the Dublin system 
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EU Member States are not, for that reason alone, “safe” for all applicants. In and of itself, 
EU membership is immaterial in this regard (see e.g. ECtHR, T.I.). 
 
At present, EU migration law does not establish an overarching “principle of mutual 
recognition” capable of supporting the proposition that Member States may or must have 
absolute trust in each other’s asylum systems. Quite the contrary, to the extent that EU 
migration legislation establishes specific mechanisms of mutual recognition, it 
systematically couples them with derogations that afford the Member States a sufficient 
margin of discretion to meet their international obligations (see e.g. art. 5(4c) of the 
Schengen Borders Code; art. 11 of the Return Directive; art. 16(1e) DR and art. 3(2) DR). 
No rule of absolute trust between the Member States can be derived through a fortiori 
argument from the “European safe third countries” clause (art. 36 APD). Under this clause, 
asylum seekers may be sent to a non-Member State without an “examination of [their] 
safety […] in [their] particular circumstances”. According to most commentators, however, 
this course of action cannot be reconciled with the principle of non-refoulement, precisely 
because the latter only permits rebuttable presumptions of safety (see Chapter 4, 
Section III, para. 4; see also Battjes 2006, § 535). Therefore, the (optional) rule in 
art. 36(1) APD is inapplicable as a matter of international law – and de facto, there is no 
documented instance of it having been applied. In our view, a fortiori arguments cannot be 
validly based on such a dubious provision. Not if the standard to be achieved in the 
implementation of the Dublin system is a “full and inclusive application of the Geneva 
Convention”. 
 
As a potential basis for absolute or, at least, strengthened mutual trust, one could more 
plausibly point to the Qualification, Procedures, and Reception Conditions Directives.  
 
Compliance with the standards set by these Directives – e.g. access to health care (art. 15 
RCD), recognition of persecution stemming from non-state actors as relevant for refugee 
status (art. 6 QD), or the provision of the services of a qualified interpreter in asylum 
procedures (art. 10 and 13 APD) – certainly contributes to the finding that a Member State 
is “safe”. We also accept the position taken by a number of courts, that a State that is 
bound by these Directives may be presumed to observe them (see e.g. ECtHR, K.R.S.; 
AsylGH, S8 226976-2/2008; for further details: Maiani 2010). This, however, is no basis for 
considering that Dublin transfers to an EU Member State are automatically “safe”.  
 
In the first place, even a Member State complying in full with the Directives may fail to 
respect the standards set by the Geneva Convention and the ECHR – that is, the central, 
minimal, and incompressible standards of “safety”. As it is well-known, the minimum 
standards set by the Directives are at places extremely vague, or far from being 
unquestionably in line with international law. Secondly, and no less importantly, the 
presumption that EU Member States will abide by their obligations under the Directives 
must be a rebuttable presumption – just like the presumption that they will abide by their 
international obligations. In other words: the sending State may presume that the 
responsible State will comply with the Directives, but the central question remains whether 
its actual protection and reception practices are in line with the Directives and, ultimately, 
with the relevant international standards (see e.g. AsylGH, S13 402093-1/2008).  
 
                                                                                                                                                            
and (b) four Dublin States (the EFTA associates plus Denmark) are not bound by the EU Asylum 
Directives. 
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3.1.4. Mutual trust and safety assessments in Dublin context: summary of findings  
When seeking to transfer an asylum seeker to the responsible State, all Member States 
must satisfy themselves that he or she incurs no risk of refoulement or ill-treatment. They 
are entitled to presume that this will be the case in any other Member State, as reflected in 
recital 2 DR. However, such a “safety presumption” must be rebuttable: the asylum seeker 
must be afforded a real opportunity to show good reasons why, in her particular 
circumstances, the transfer would expose her to a risk of chain refoulement, or to inhuman 
or degrading treatment. If that is found to be the case, the sending State may not proceed 
with the transfer, and must apply the sovereignty clause instead (see Noll 2001:162; 
Filzwieser 2007:20). 
 
The fact that all Member States are parties to the ECHR, and subject to the jurisdiction of 
the European Court of Human Rights, justifies a partial relaxation of these rules. In 
particular, the sending State is in principle entitled to dispense with a concrete examination 
of risks of indirect refoulement in breach of art. 2 or 3 ECHR. Yet, to avail itself of this 
possibility, the sending State must first be satisfied that the European Court will be, in law 
and in fact, in a position to prevent onward refoulement from the responsible State. 
 
By contrast, the fact that most Dublin Member States are bound by the Qualification, 
Procedures and Reception Directives, does not justify any fundamental alteration to the 
general principles outlined above. It only strengthens trust to the extent that EU standards 
are in line with international standards, and are complied with in the responsible State. 
3.2. Applying the sovereignty clause to prevent refoulement: 
Member States’ practice 
3.2.1. Introductory remarks 
As sending States, the Member States have followed widely divergent practices in response 
to risks of refoulement and ill-treatment in the responsible State.  
 
In several documented cases, the sovereignty clause has been applied in line with the 
principles set out above, and in line with a firm commitment to maintain the principle of 
non-refoulement. Available documentation suggests, however, that full respect of the non-
refoulement principle has not been consistently ensured in the operation of the Dublin 
system, and that there has been a tendency to sideline protection imperatives in favour of 
an effective implementation of transfers.  
Even in the most critical situations, only a handful of national administrations have taken 
decisive action to prevent risks of refoulement. In response to the Greek interruption 
practice described above in this Section (para. 2.1.), only Finland, Norway and Sweden 
suspended all transfers. The majority of States apparently carried on with “take back” 
transfers as usual (see UNHCR 2006:47; ECRE 2006:151, 154-155). The same scenario has 
materialised after April 2008, when UNHCR invited all Member States to suspend transfers 
to Greece on account of documented and extremely serious flaws in the asylum procedure. 
Again, with few exceptions (e.g. Norway in 2008), no general suspension of transfers has 
been implemented. 
 
Risks of ill-treatment in a Member State have attracted similar responses. Some sending 
States have adopted the policy of suspending the transfer of “vulnerable persons” to 
Greece, on account of poor reception and detention conditions (e.g. Germany since 2008 
and Switzerland in 2009: see Hruschka 2009:6). However, systematic policies of 
suspension – including for vulnerable persons – have been rare. 
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Of course, the lack of general suspensions could have been made good through a 
consistent case-by-case implementation of the sovereignty clause. Reportedly, however, 
only a handful of States have applied the sovereignty clause in individual cases for 
protection-related reasons (e.g. Austria or the Netherlands), while the others have not 
applied the clause at all, or else very rarely (ECRE 2006:154-156; UNHCR 2006:30-32; 
SEC (2008)11-12). 
 
Many factors could explain this unfortunate state of affairs. Key among these are the 
insufficient procedural guarantees available in Dublin procedures, on the one hand, and a 
strong reluctance to consider the risks incurred by the asylum seekers in other Member 
States, on the other hand. These two problems are considered in turn below. 
3.2.2. Procedural guarantees against refoulement 
PROBLEM: DUBLIN PROCEDURES FALL SHORT OF BASIC STANDARDS OF FAIRNESS, AND 
EFFECTIVE REMEDIES AGAINST TRANSFERS ARE NOT ALWAYS GUARANTEED 
The Dublin Regulation does not establish sufficient procedural guarantees. As a result, in 
several Member States, “first instance” Dublin procedures are not up to basic standards of 
fairness. Furthermore, effective remedies against Dublin decisions are not always accessible 
in the Member States. 
 
A rigorous scrutiny of the risks incurred by the asylum seeker in the responsible State 
presupposes a fair Dublin procedure (on this point, and more specifically on the right to be 
heard in EU law, see Chapter 4, Section I, para. 5.4). Unfortunately, the Dublin Regulation 
is lacking in this respect: it merely requires national authorities to inform the applicant 
“regarding the application” of the Dublin system (art. 3(4) DR), and it does not explicitly 
afford asylum seekers a right to be heard and raise objections to transfers. Member State 
practice has been widely divergent in both respect – but the general finding is that scant 
information is provided, and that asylum seekers are not always afforded the right to be 
heard during Dublin procedures (see SEC (2008)15; UNHCR 2006:13 ff; ECRE 2006:153). 
 
The lack of these guarantees has a serious adverse impact on asylum seekers’ rights in the 
Dublin context, including on the rights that flow from the principle of non-refoulement. The 
lack of effective remedies against Dublin decisions constitutes an even more serious 
shortcoming. 
 
Even though remedies against transfer decisions are available in all Member States, in line 
with art. 19 and 20 DR, effective access to justice is far from being ensured everywhere. 
This problem is due, first, to national legislation and practice exploiting the lacunae of the 
Dublin Regulation, and resulting in: 
 
– Extremely short deadlines to file a complaint, the practice of notifying transfer 
decisions immediately before their enforcement, or failure to adequately motivate 
and/or translate transfer decisions (SEC 2008:17; ECRE 2006:167; see also, for 
Swiss practice, Hermann 2009a, § 4-5 and BVG, E-5841/2009); 
– Complex rules for applying to court, coupled with the unavailability of qualified legal 
assistance (SEC (2008)17); 
– The absence of suspensive (“in-country”) remedies, or restrictive practice in 
granting suspension, which deprive remedies of their effect (SEC (2008)17; UNHCR 
2006:19-20; ECRE 2006:166-167; paradoxically, this has led some national courts 
to discontinue proceedings post-transfer owing to “lack of interest”: for analysis, 
BVG, E-5841/2009).  
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Access to a remedy may also be barred through informal practices that evade even the 
minimal guarantees enshrined in the Dublin Regulation. For instance, in the Adriatic ports, 
Italian authorities informally “push back” asylum seekers coming from Greece, who are 
thus denied any recourse to the law (see UNHCR 2009b). 
 
To sum up, as the Commission itself has acknowledged, the “low rate of appeal[s]” against 
transfer decisions observed in many Member States does not reflect acquiescence to 
transfer decisions. Rather, it is mostly due to the absence of accessible or effective 
remedies (SEC (2008)17-18). 
 
SOLUTION: STRENGTHENED PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES, ESPECIALLY IN RESPECT OF 
REMEDIES, AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE COMMISSION’S PROPOSAL 
The Commission proposes the introduction of strengthened guarantees in the Dublin 
procedure: a comprehensive right to information, the right to a hearing and, most 
importantly, a truly effective remedy against Dublin transfer. We fully support the 
Commission’s proposal in its original form, subject to the helpful amendment introduced by 
the Parliament regarding the deadline to file an appeal against Dublin transfers.  
 
The Recast Proposal includes many provisions designed to strengthen the guarantees 
available to asylum seekers in Dublin procedures. All of the proposed amendments to the 
Dublin Regulation deserve unqualified support. The strengthened right to information 
(art. 4 DPr) and the new right to an interview (art. 5 DPr), would bring first instance Dublin 
procedures up to the requisite standard of fairness. 
 
Most importantly, the Proposal foresees the introduction of a fully-fledged right to an 
effective judicial remedy (art. 26 DPr), in line with international standards and with art. 47 
CFR, as well as with EP recommendations (see EP 2009c, para. 22). In light of these 
standards, and in light of past experience, the following aspects of art. 26 DPr can be 
considered as essential contributions towards an effective protection against refoulement: 
 
a. Remedy before a court or tribunal, having full jurisdiction in law and in fact, and 
competent to adjudicate any claim turning on international law and EU fundamental 
rights, including the prohibition of refoulement (art. 18 and 19 CFR; see also recitals 
16 and 17 DPr, as well as art. 47 CFR); 
b. Reasonable time-limits to lodge an appeal, which the EP has helpfully specified in 10 
days minimum (EP 2009b, amendment 26); 
c. Automatic suspension of transfers pending the decision of the court on interim 
measures. This would place beyond doubt the “effectiveness” of the remedy as 
understood, in particular, by the ECtHR (see Chapter 4, Section I, para. 5, 
particularly 5.3; for a more critical appraisal, ECRE 2009a:6). The EP reduced the 
time-limit within which the court must decide from 7 to 5 days (EP 2009b, 
amendment 27). We would recommend reconsidering this position. The gains in 
efficiency are minimal, and 7 days to take a reasoned decision on potentially 
complex issues is already a very strict deadline; 
d. A fully fledged right to free legal assistance for persons who cannot afford it. The EP 
has somewhat watered down this right, by anchoring it to the parallel (and 
conditional) right foreseen in the APD (EP 2009b, amendment 28). This choice is 
fully justified by reasons of coherence in the acquis, but makes it all the more 
important to ensure that the Asylum Procedures Directive is modified to effectively 
ensure effective access to justice under this standpoint (on this matter, see further 
Chapter 4, Section II, para. 11, and Section V, para. 3). 
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Under all the aspects reviewed above, the Recast Proposal would introduce vast 
improvements on the present situation. Art. 26 DPr in particular, which is being met with 
considerable resistance in Council, should be regarded as a core element of the Proposal. 
3.2.3. Over-reliance on safety presumptions 
PROBLEM: UNDERESTIMATION OF RISKS INCURRED BY THE ASYLUM SEEKERS IN THE 
RESPONSIBLE STATE 
In several Member States, national authorities – including courts – are not in a position, or 
not willing, to meaningfully scrutinise the risks incurred by the asylum seeker in the 
responsible State. 
 
Fair Dublin procedures, and access to an effective remedy, are a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for effective protection against refoulement. Indeed, procedural 
guarantees are of little use if national authorities may not – or will not – correctly assess 
and recognise the existence of risks in the responsible State. In this regard, asylum seekers 
are confronted to obstacles of varying nature and intensity in the different Member States. 
 
Statutory safety presumptions constitute a nearly insurmountable obstacle. German and UK 
law provide interesting examples thereof. Art. 16a of the German Constitution was 
traditionally interpreted as an irrefutable presumption of safety applying to all other EU 
States (see Marx/Lumpp 1996; ECRE 2006:46). Since 2008, however, several 
administrative tribunals have suspended or annulled transfers to Greece on account, inter 
alia, of sub-standard asylum procedures (see e.g. VG Frankfurt, case 7 K 4376/07.F.A; for 
an analysis, see Maiani 2010). The German Constitutional Court itself has suspended a 
number of transfers to Greece. However, it has carefully reserved its decision on the 
merits, and pending its final decision no definite conclusion concerning the state of German 
Law on the issue can be drawn. 
 
The United Kingdom has followed an inverse evolutionary trajectory. British case law on the 
Dublin Convention constitutes, to this day, an exemplary application of the non-
refoulement principle in Dublin context. In a string of remarkably well-reasoned decisions, 
British courts have for instance ruled out transfers to Member States applying unduly 
restrictive qualification criteria (UK HL, Adan), or having already rejected the asylum 
application through what they regarded as an “irrational” decision (UK CA, Dahmas). In 
1999 and 2004, however, the UK Parliament introduced statutory provisions to the effect 
that Dublin transfers can no longer be challenged or quashed on the ground that they 
would amount to indirect refoulement under the Geneva Convention or the ECHR (see Nicol 
2004). The compatibility of such “deeming provisions” with the ECHR has been 
unsuccessfully challenged before the House of Lords (UK HL, Nasseri; case pending before 
the European Court of Human Rights). The House of Lords has nonetheless conceded that 
the deeming provision “renders the United Kingdom’s compliance with [art. 3 ECHR] 
fragile” (ibidem, para. 21-22). And, we would add, it is hardly in line with a commitment to 
ensure that the principle of non-refoulement is at all times respected in the operation of the 
Dublin system.   
 
In other States, where statutory provisions of this sort are not in place, irrefutable 
presumptions of safety have been established by the case law either de jure (see e.g. 
Czech Republic, Supreme Administrative Court, Azs 37/2006-64) or de facto (ECRE 2006 
on Hungary, p. 61, Italy, p. 75, Luxembourg, p. 88, Slovenia, p. 124, Spain, p. 130). 
Indeed, as of 2006, evidence that courts meaningfully scrutinised risks of refoulement in 
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the responsible State existed only for a handful of States such as Austria (ECRE 2006:14), 
the UK (see above) and the Netherlands (ECRE 2006:94). 
 
In some Member States, the situation has apparently improved to some extent – in 
particular, owing to increasingly detailed reports on the situation in Greece. We have 
already mentioned the case of Germany. Transfers to Greece have also been suspended or 
quashed in Italy (see e.g. CS, 666/09; TAR Lecce 656/2008). Moreover, the Belgian and 
French Conseils d’Etat have, in recent case-law, abandoned their principled objection to any 
safety assessment concerning the responsible State (see CE Fr, 313915 and, especially, 
339478; CE Be, 12.004).  
 
However, even though Dublin transfers can now be challenged de jure and de facto on 
“safety” grounds in most Member States, the standards on which risks are assessed remain 
widely different, and overall unduly strict. Some Courts apparently apply the wrong test, 
asking themselves whether the applicant has already suffered ill-treatment in the 
responsible State, rather than whether he risks ill-treatment once transferred (CE Fr, 
332917; similarly, although concluding for suspension, CE Fr, 339478). Other Courts base 
their risk assessments on rather unrealistic evidentiary standards (see e.g. CE Be, 40.964; 
AsylGH, case S1 402025-1/2008; this may be contrasted with VG Frankfurt, case 7 K 
4376/07.F.A). Others still tend to dismiss serious problems existing in the responsible State 
as not relevant for the sending State – at most, a matter to be tackled by the responsible 
State, or by EU institutions (see e.g. UK HL, Nasseri). More generally, national Courts 
appear to be unwilling to meaningfully scrutinise the asylum practices of the other Member 
States (see e.g., explicitly, BVG, E-1269/2009). This may well be based on proper 
considerations of comity between nations. At the same time, it is the responsibility of each 
sending State to respect the non-refoulement principle and therefore to scrutinise other 
States’ practices when a Dublin transfer is proposed. As held by the UK House of Lords in 
the case of Yogathas: 
 
The Home Secretary and the courts should not readily infer that a friendly sovereign state 
which is party to the Geneva Convention will not perform the obligations it has solemnly 
undertaken. This consideration does not absolve the Home Secretary from his duty to 
inform himself of the facts and monitor the decisions made by a third country in order to 
satisfy himself that the third country will not send the applicant to another country 
otherwise than in accordance with the Convention. […] But the humane objective of the 
[Dublin] Convention is to establish an orderly and internationally-agreed regime for 
handling asylum applications and that objective is liable to be defeated if anything other 
than significant differences between the law and practice of different countries are allowed 
to prevent the return of an applicant to the member state in which asylum was, or could 
have been, first claimed. 
 
In current case law, even “significant differences” or significant problems in the responsible 
State tend to be ignored. For instance, in a case decided in March 2009 concerning a “take 
back” transfer to Sweden, the Swiss Federal Administrative Court accepted to give 
superficial consideration to the propriety of the Swedish decision rejecting the asylum 
claim. However, it utterly failed to consider the fact that the Swedish decision was based on 
a risk assessment (Southern Iraq is safe) that would have been impermissible in 
Switzerland according to its own case law (BVG, E-1269/2009) – hardly an “insignificant” 
difference. In another judgment, dating from July 2009 and dealing with a transfer to 
Greece, the same Court duly noted that the presumption of safety concerning that State 
was rebuttable. However, it went on to consider that “nothing in the file suggests that 
Greek authorities would fail to observe their international obligation by sending the 
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claimant to her country of origin in violation thereof” (BVG, D-4675/2009) – as if, quite 
simply, the shortcomings of Greek protection standards had not been in the spotlight for 
months. 
 
It would be difficult – and probably unfeasible – to change this state of affairs through 
detailed common rules on safety assessments. To some extent, however, other solutions 
could improve the situation: a collective suspension mechanism for transfers to unsafe 
States, which would make coordinated responses possible, as well as modifications to the 
preamble of the Regulation, designed to underscore the responsibilities of sending States in 
Dublin context. 
 
SOLUTION: A COLLECTIVE SUSPENSION MECHANISM ENABLING COHERENT RESPONSES 
TO SITUATIONS OF SYSTEMIC RISKS IN A MEMBER STATE 
The Recast Proposal includes an innovative mechanism for the general suspension of 
transfers to Member States where “systemic” risks of ill-treatment or refoulement exist. 
This mechanism should be maintained in the Recast Regulation. The substantive and 
procedural rules relating to its functioning could be improved, in order to ensure that the 
mechanism is indeed applied in a protection-minded perspective. 
 
The one true innovation in the Recast Proposal is the establishment of a mechanism for the 
temporary suspension of transfers to a particular Member State (art. 31 DPr). This 
mechanism is conceived as a response to both situations of “overburdening” (see below, 
Section IV) and of “unsafety” in a Member State. As a protection mechanism – our only 
concern in this Section – temporary suspension would occur when, in the judgment of the 
Commission, “the circumstances prevailing in a Member States may lead to a level of 
protection […] which is not in conformity with Community legislation”.  
 
The Council is apparently intentioned to suppress this protection mechanism from the 
Recast Proposal (see Presidency Compromise Proposal). For our part, we would recommend 
that it be maintained. Its introduction would have the great merit of enabling EU-wide 
responses to breakdown situations in a Member State – the kind of response that has been 
sorely missed in the situation of Greece (see Hruschka 2009:7). Another positive aspect of 
the proposal is to entrust the responsibility of triggering the mechanism to the one EU 
institution whose task is to “promote the general interest of the Union” in all independence 
(art. 17 TEU). Rather than being suppressed, the Commission’s Proposal should be refined, 
as detailed below, and accompanied by amendments to the Regulation’s preamble (see 
further below). 
 
– Art. 31 DPr contains a number of substantive rules that govern the suspension 
mechanism both in situations of “overburdening” and in situations of “unsafety”. 
Some of these are inappropriate in the latter context. 
– Art. 31(4) DPr suggests that “the examination of the potential impact of the 
suspension of transfers on the other States” would be a relevant consideration for 
the Commission before it decides to trigger the mechanism. That is no doubt 
appropriate for suspensions addressing issues of “overburdening”. By contrast, it 
would be improper for the Commission to consider this aspect when acting to 
prevent large-scale refoulement. The one valid and overriding consideration, in that 
context, would be whether the State making the object of the decision affords 
sufficient protection to asylum seekers. 
– Art. 31(8) DPr limits the duration of suspension decisions to 12 months maximum 
(6+6). Yet, it might take longer to bring a collapsed protection system up to the 
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standards set by the EU legislation. The suspension should last as long as protection 
concerns persist. 
– Under art. 31(9b) and (9c) DPr, introduced by the EP at first reading (EP 2009b, 
amendments 40 and 41), the suspension mechanism would cease to be applicable 
as soon as binding burden-sharing mechanisms are set up under EU legislation, 
unless the EP and Council accept to extend its application on the proposal of the 
Commission. This is perhaps logical insofar as the suspension mechanism seeks to 
provide relief to overburdened States (see however below, Section IV). And, 
granted, there is a relation between overburdening and the breakdown of protection 
standards (see EP 2009a:25). However, binding burden-sharing arrangements 
under EU Law would not necessarily prevent the situation described in art. 31(2) 
and (3) DPr from arising. In other words: even with a system of burden-sharing in 
place, it would still be useful to retain a tool designed to counter systemic risks of 
refoulement within the UE/EFTA area. 
 
Our recommendation would be to exclude the applicability of all the above rules when the 
mechanism is applied as a “protection mechanism”. 
 
The procedural rules relating to the suspension mechanism could also be refined, in our 
opinion, to make it more responsive to risk situations: 
– It would be both helpful and natural to formally associate UNHCR to the procedure. 
Of course, UNHCR can in any case be expected to play a role in assisting and 
stimulating the Commission, alongside other relevant organizations, by issuing 
reports and position papers (for precedents, see e.g. UNHCR 2008a and 2009c). 
However, formally associating UNHCR would better reflect its mandate of 
supervising the implementation of the Geneva Convention (art. 35 GC), and the 
special role it is given by the Treaties in regard to the CEAS (see Declaration 17 
annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam). It would also bring, we think, added value. 
So far, in asylum matters, the Commission has reacted mainly to formal failures to 
transpose EU standards. It has been far less forthcoming in reacting to protection 
crises on the ground. For instance, the (meritorious) infringement procedure against 
Greece could have been pursued on a broader basis, and was (in our view) 
prematurely withdrawn. Indeed, it was withdrawn following amendments to Greek 
law that possibly worsened the situation of protection seekers. Giving a formal input 
to UNHCR would provide a welcome stimulus to the Commission, without prejudice 
to the latter’s sole competence to decide on applying art. 31 DPr and, a fortiori, 
without prejudice to the Commission’s rights under art. 258 TFEU. 
– It would also make sense to apply the “referral” procedure in Art. 31(5) to decisions 
whereby the Commission declines to suspend the transfers to a particular Member 
State. There is no reason in principle why Member States should have the possibility 
to contest a suspension decision, but should be denied that possibility in the face of 
inaction. 
 
SOLUTION: CLARIFYING THE MEMBER STATES’ RESPONSIBILITIES IN PREVENTING 
REFOULEMENT IN THE PREAMBLE OF THE DUBLIN REGULATION 
Current practice discloses excessive reliance on “mutual trust” by Member State 
authorities. The proposed suspension mechanism might conceivably worsen the situation, 
by sending the wrong “signals” to national authorities – e.g., that the Commission is solely 
responsible to avoid refoulement risks in the operation of Dublin. This should be 
counteracted through limited amendments to the Regulation’s preamble, stressing the 
international obligations of the sending States in Dublin context. 
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As formally posited by the European Parliament (EP 2009b, amendment 7), the collective 
suspension discussed above would be an “exceptional measure”. It would be optimistic 
indeed to assume that art. 31 DPr will always be applied in response to patent and 
persistent problems in a Member State. In any event, art. 31 DPr is not meant to – and is 
not a “sensitive” enough tool to – cater for less clear-cut, or wholly individualised risks of 
refoulement. Thus, the existence of the “collective” suspension mechanism 
notwithstanding, the sovereignty clause would still be the ordinary tool to prevent risks of 
refoulement in Dublin context. 
 
Whatever its inherent merits, the introduction of a “collective” mechanism for suspension 
might have unintended effects precisely in this area: it might obscure or dilute the Member 
States’ own responsibilities in preventing refoulement (see also Hermann 2009b, § 2.4). 
 
In a strictly legal perspective, of course, there is no reason to assume that this should 
happen. Art. 31 DPr would be entirely without prejudice to the duties and responsibilities of 
each sending Member State under the Geneva Convention and the ECHR. However, art. 31 
DPr might make a difference in practice by sending two wrong signals. 
– The first signal, which some national administrations would be only too eager to 
receive, would be that “the Commission is in charge” and that, as long as the 
Commission does not activate art. 31 DPr, all is well in every potential “destination” 
Member State. Such an argument was explicitly made by the defendant 
administration in a German case involving a transfer to Greece: “the Commission, 
which is competent for supervising the observance of the EU minimum standards 
relating to asylum procedures, has not so far requested the Member States to 
renounce transfers to Greece” (VG Frankfurt, 7 K 4376/07.F.A, free translation). 
Introducing art. 31 DPr would only strengthen the (dangerous and flawed) 
impression that there are no risks of refoulement until the Commission says so. 
– The second signal would be that the “adequate standard of safety” is compliance 
with EU standards, not international standards (see recital 22 and art. 31(2) DPr). 
To be sure, in the context of art. 31 it is entirely defensible to use EU standards as a 
yardstick – not least because the Commission is the guardian of EU Law, not of the 
Geneva Convention or the ECHR. But for the authorities of the sending Member 
States, it would be both incorrect in law and dangerous in practice to focus 
exclusively on compliance with EU law, as opposed to international law, in the 
responsible State (see above in this Section, para. 3.1.3). 
 
The problem here is not a matter of altering the law, but rather of making the present state 
of the law clear beyond dispute or misunderstanding. Therefore, we believe that it could be 
addressed by amending the preamble of the Dublin Regulation. The preamble should make 
it absolutely clear that, as Party to the relevant treaties, each Member State that receives 
an asylum application has the primary responsibility to prevent any risk of refoulement, 
including when such risk would derive from a Dublin transfer.  
 
In this regard, the preamble of the DPr lacks the requisite clarity. On the one hand, recital 
17 DPr helpfully refers to the duty of Member States to examine “the legal and factual 
situation in the [responsible Member State] in order to ensure that international law is 
respected”. On the other hand, no reference to this point is made in recital 3 DPr, where it 
would belong, whereas recital 14 DPr only refers to “humanitarian and compassionate 
reasons” when discussing the application of the discretionary clauses. We would suggest 
the following amendments to both recitals: 
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“(3) The European Council […] agreed to work towards establishing a Common European 
Asylum System, based on the full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention […], 
thus ensuring that nobody is sent back to persecution, i.e. maintaining the principle of non-
refoulement. In this respect, without prejudice to the duties arising from the Geneva 
Convention and other relevant treaties for every Member State receiving an asylum 
application, Member States, all respecting the principle of non-refoulement, may be 
presumed to be safe countries for third-country nationals. 
 
(14) Any Member State should be able to derogate from the responsibility criteria, in 
particular for humanitarian or compassionate reasons, or because of international 
obligations, and examine an application for international protection […]”. 
 
SECTION II: DUBLIN, FAMILY UNITY, AND INTEGRATION 
1. THE PROTECTION OF FAMILY UNITY IN THE DUBLIN 
REGULATION 
 
PROBLEM: THE DUBLIN CRITERIA ON FAMILY UNITY ARE RESTRICTIVE TO THE POINT OF 
RAISING HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS. THE DISCRETIONARY CLAUSES HAVE PROVED 
INEFFECTIVE TO CORRECT THIS SHORTCOMING 
The Dublin criteria based on the family ties of asylum seekers are restrictively framed and 
restrictively applied. They fall well short of ensuring respect for the fundamental right to 
family life. The sovereignty and humanitarian clauses, which could in principle correct this 
shortcoming, are not consistently applied to this end. As a result, the Dublin system has a 
negative impact on family unity, causing hardship to the persons concerned and entailing 
the risk of fundamental rights violations. 
 
1.1. The provisions of the Dublin Regulation and the right to family 
life 
 
Preserving family unity is one of the stated objectives of the Dublin Regulation (see recital 
6 DR). To this end, the Regulation places at the top of the “hierarchy” several criteria under 
which asylum seekers must be brought or kept together with their “family members” as 
defined in the Regulation itself (art. 2(i), 6-8, and 14 DR). Member States may, 
furthermore, protect family unity beyond the stipulations of said criteria by applying the 
discretionary clauses (art. 3(2) and 15 DR). 
 
Protecting family unity is not, however, an overriding goal of the Dublin Regulation (see, 
again, recital 6 DR). Indeed, when the Regulation was adopted several considerations 
militated against a broad recognition of family ties as a criterion to allocate responsibility. 
First, the responsibility criteria are based on the principle that responsibility should 
principally lie with the “Member State having played the greatest part” in letting the 
applicant into the Dublin area. This has downgraded family criteria to the role of 
“exceptions” (COM (2001)4). Secondly, the institutions were preoccupied that the Dublin 
system could become a means to “get round” the ordinary conditions for family 
reunification (COM (2001)5). Thirdly, it was felt necessary to prevent asylum seekers from 
“misusing” the family criteria, e.g. through a contrived marriage with a person residing in 
their preferred Member State. Leaving this possibility open to asylum seekers would have 
Setting up a Common European Asylum System:  
Report on the application of existing instruments and proposals for the new system 
 135 
weakened the intended effect of the Dublin system that asylum seekers cannot choose the 
responsible State. 
 
All these policy considerations have left their mark in the text of the Regulation, taking the 
form of stark restrictions to the scope of the family criteria. 
 
Firstly, the applicable definition of “family members” (art. 2(i) DR) only includes: (a) the 
spouse, (b) minor, unmarried, and dependent children, and (c) if the applicant is an 
unmarried minor, the parents or “guardian” – a term that the Regulation does not define. 
All other relatives (e.g. siblings, uncles and aunts) are excluded from the definition, 
regardless of the intensity of family ties and of the existence of a dependency situation. In 
addition, only family ties that existed in the country of origin are as a rule included in the 
definition. 
 
Further restrictions flow from the terms of the criteria. 
 
– Only applicants that are unaccompanied minors must always be reunited with 
“family members” (parents, guardian) that are legally present in a Member State 
(art. 6(1) DR). 
– In all other cases where a family member is already present in a Member State, 
strict status limitations apply. Reunification only occurs with “family members” that 
are recognised refugees, regardless of whether the family existed in the country of 
origin (art. 7), or asylum seekers awaiting a first instance decision (art. 8). The 
“window of opportunity” for reunification opened by art. 8 may indeed be very short, 
especially in States that extensively use accelerated procedures (see ECRE 
2006:158).  
– Families entirely composed of asylum seekers must be kept together, provided that 
they apply for asylum in the same State, at approximately the same time (art. 14 
DR). This rule applies to “accompanying” minors regardless of whether they are 
themselves asylum seekers, including when they are born to the applicant after the 
entry in a Member State and would therefore not qualify as “family members” 
(art. 4(3) DR). 
 
Finally, one has to consider the rule whereby the criteria apply by reference to the situation 
existing when the asylum seeker first lodges an application (art. 5(2) DR). This also 
reduces the chances of family reunification. If for instance an unaccompanied minor files an 
asylum claim some days before a family member receives legal status in one of the 
Member States, art. 6(1) DR cannot apply (for detailed analysis, see Council 
doc. 12364/09). 
 
Taken together, all these limitations mean that the criteria protect family unity in strictly 
defined situations. By way of comparison, the 2002 US-Canada “Safe Third Countries 
Agreement” includes a very broad family criterion, whereby “family members” are defined 
as “the spouse, sons, daughters, parents, legal guardians, siblings, grandparents, 
grandchildren, aunts, uncles, nieces, and nephews” of the applicant (art. 1(b)), and status 
limitations are minimal (“lawful status […] other than as visitors”: art. 4(2a)). 
To put it differently: there are wide gaps in the protection of family unity afforded by the 
Dublin criteria. In the numberless situations that are not covered by the family criteria, the 
application of the other criteria may indeed prevent reunification or break up family unity. 
That is the case, by definition, in all the situations involving extended family ties.  
That is also the case in many situations involving close family members. For example: 
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– Spouses that become separated during flight and apply for asylum in the Dublin 
area have no assurance of being brought together. Family reunification depends on 
timing and chance. Whether they claim asylum in different States or in the same 
State, a few weeks’ delay of the husband, and an accelerated procedure for the 
wife, may well rule out reunification under art. 8 DR or art. 14 DR (see e.g. the facts 
of BVerfG, 2 BvR 99/97). 
– Unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Europe have the assurance, in principle, 
of being reunited with their parents if these are legally present in a Member State 
(art. 6(1) DR). But the reverse is not true. If a parent claims asylum in Europe while 
his or her minor child stays, unaccompanied, in a Member State, reunification will 
only occur if the child is still an asylum seeker, or already a recognised refugee – 
but not if the child enjoys subsidiary protection or any other legal status. 
 
This enumeration could go on almost indefinitely. The important point, to which we must 
now turn, is that these protection gaps generate tension between the Dublin system and 
the right to respect of family life under art. 8 ECHR. 
 
According to settled case law, there is an “issue” under article 8 ECHR whenever a person is 
“exclu[ded] […] from the territory of a State where a member of her family lives” – a close 
family member, regardless of when and where the family tie was formed, or another 
relative, at least in cases of dependency (see ECtHR, Abdulaziz). This applies also to 
asylum seekers who, pursuant to the criteria, may easily be “excluded” from the Member 
State where members of their family are present (contra Battjes 2006, § 574; see 
however, mutatis mutandis, ECtHR, Rodriguez Da Silva; for further details: Maiani 
2006:205 ff). 
 
This is not to say that whenever “family life” within the meaning of article 8 ECHR is 
disrupted, a violation of article 8 occurs. In all such cases, Member States are required to 
carefully assess all the relevant circumstances (ECtHR, W/UK, Ciliz; see also CE Fr, 
302034) and to “strike a fair balance” between the interest to family unity and competing 
public interests. A “positive obligation” to bring or keep family members together may or 
may not arise depending on the relevant circumstances, such as the circumstances of the 
separation (e.g. the degree to which it was voluntary), the intensity of family ties, the 
duration and consequences of separation, and the existence (or otherwise) of obstacles to 
establishing family life elsewhere.  
 
In view of the States’ margin of discretion under art. 8 ECHR, a positive obligation to 
preserve the family unity of asylum seekers may rarely arise. Yet it may arise, especially 
when children-parent relationships are involved (see ECtHR, Sen) or in cases of severe 
dependency. And whenever it does, separating members of a family pursuant to the criteria 
is tantamount to violating art. 8 ECHR (see Brandl 2003:46; SEC 2008:20).  
 
Of course, as already noted, it is open to Member States to use the Regulation’s 
discretionary clauses in order to meet the requirements of article 8 ECHR, and beyond that 
for humanitarian reasons. The sovereignty clause can be used whenever a person seeks 
asylum in a State where family members or relatives are present. The humanitarian clause 
(art. 15 DR) makes it possible to reunite family members and relatives who are separated 
and would remain so pursuant to the criteria. In cases of strong dependency, or when 
unaccompanied minors are involved, article 15 DR even requires that family members or 
relatives be “normally” or “if possible” be brought together. As we will see immediately, 
however, the clauses have not played the role they should have in Member State practice. 
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1.2. Member States practice  
 
As statistical evidence shows, the family criteria only play a marginal role in practice: 
according to EUROSTAT data, in 2008 only 3,2% of the “take charge” requests sent under 
the Dublin system were based on the family criteria. This is hardly surprising. As noted 
above, the family criteria are very narrowly defined. Furthermore, their implementation 
gives rise to a practical problem: tracing family members present in the Dublin space may 
be difficult, as asylum seekers themselves are not always in possession of the relevant 
information215. This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that few Member States reportedly 
engage in active efforts to trace asylum seekers’ relatives (ECRE 2006:157).  
 
But apart from these aspects, the figures given above reflect the tendency of Member 
States to apply strictly the family criteria, or even in an unduly restrictive manner.  
 
Firstly, several Member State set high evidentiary requirements when requested to accept 
responsibility on the basis of family criteria: formal proof of family ties, which may well be 
difficult or impossible to secure, or DNA testing (COM (2007a)7). The Commission has 
criticised the Member States on that account, pointing out that they should “use all means 
of proof foreseen [in the Dublin Regulation and its Implementing Rules] including credible 
and verifiable statements of the asylum seeker” (ibid.). This is a justified criticism, but the 
Commission itself is partly responsible for the situation. Under the Dublin Implementing 
Rules, which it has itself adopted, the “detailed and verifiable statements of the asylum 
seeker” are usually accepted as indicative evidence – except for proving family ties. To 
provide indicative evidence of family ties, only “verifiable information” will do and, as far as 
art. 6(1) DR is concerned, the “statements” of family members. In short, under the Dublin 
Implementing Rules the “verifiable” statements of the asylum seeker presently have no 
evidentiary value – still less his or her “credible” statements. 
 
Secondly, some States interpret restrictively the conditions under which personal 
relationships qualify as family ties under the Regulation. For instance, Germany reportedly 
does not recognise as “valid” for the purpose of the Regulation cultural or religious 
marriages (UNHCR 2006:26) – a formalism that does not sit well with ECtHR case-law on 
the existence of family life and, particularly, of marriage (ECtHR, Abdulaziz). The same rigid 
formalism has been applied to the interpretation of the criteria themselves. In what was 
styled as a “strikingly inhumane” decision (ECRE 2006:159), a Dutch court ruled out the 
applicability of art. 7 DR in the case of an Iraqi woman whose husband, a former refugee, 
had been naturalised in Sweden (for another case, involving the separation of a mother 
from her daughters, see ECRE 2007:5). 
 
Finally, instances of outright misapplication of the criteria have been documented. In 
particular, France reportedly does not apply art. 6 DR to unaccompanied minors at all, 
applying the ordinary criteria instead (ECRE 2006:43, 157). More or less isolated cases of 
this sort have also been documented in other Member States (UNHCR 2006:21-23; VG 
Giessen, 2 E 1131/04.A). In one such case, the German administration repeatedly 
attempted to transfer a minor asylum seeker whose father, a former refugee, had acquired 
German citizenship (UNHCR 2006:22). 
 
To sum up, whereas Member States generally “welcome” the family criteria set out in the 
Regulation (SEC (2007)23), many of them undermine their practical application by 
adopting a formalistic stance or even by seeking to avoid their application. 
                                                 
215  Interviews with members of the British, Dutch, German, and Swedish Dublin units. 
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In theory, this could still be made good by a generous application of the discretionary 
clauses. In practice, such a generous approach has not been forthcoming.  
 
The application of the humanitarian clause has been rare, owing in particular to the 
difficulty of reaching an agreement between different Member States (SEC (2007)22; 
UNHCR 2006:34-35; ECRE 2006:160-161). 
 
The sovereignty clause has been more frequently used, but with wide variations between 
Member States. Good practices have been reported. For instance, the Netherlands 
systematically resorted to the sovereignty clause in order to “expand” the scope of 
application of art. 7 to family members enjoying subsidiary protection (UNHCR 2006:27). 
However, instances of this sort are exceptional and practice has overall been restrictive. 
Until 2006, most national administrations made only exceptional use of the sovereignty 
clause for family reasons, and some never applied it (see UNHCR 2006:30 ff; ECRE 
2006:155). In addition, the sovereignty clause has sometimes been applied against family 
unity, i.e. in derogation of the family criteria (see e.g. the facts of CE Be, 126.387). In such 
cases, core family members, entitled under the criteria to reunite in another State, have 
been kept apart for mere reasons of procedural expediency. Even in the abstract, the 
conformity of this line of conduct with art. 8 ECHR (“fair balance”) is dubious. 
 
In view of the restrictive stance of the administrations, it is not surprising that the matter 
was frequently brought to court – at least in the States affording a real chance of doing so 
(see above, Section I, para. 3.2.2).  
 
In some States, this was to no avail. For instance, Dutch courts have taken the position 
that since the separation would only last for the duration of the asylum procedure, a breach 
of article 8 could not occur (Marinho 2000:252; see also BVerfG, 2 BvR 99/97, allowing 
however for exceptions). In our view, this position is untenable. First, asylum procedures 
may last for months or years. They may also, eventually, create lasting obstacles to 
reunification (e.g.: if all members of the family are granted subsidiary protection in 
different States). Secondly, depending on the facts of the case, even separations lasting for 
a few months may amount to a breach of article 8 ECHR (ECtHR, W/UK; on the ‘time’ 
factor: ECtHR, Jakupovic). In other words, the foreseeable duration of the separation is 
indeed a relevant consideration, but it must be weighted against other relevant 
considerations – such as the fact that in Dublin situations, no possibility to recreate family 
unity “elsewhere” may exist216. 
 
Other courts did ensure a meaningful control and enforcement of the right to family life (VG 
Braunschweig, 5 A 52/04; CE Fr, 263501 and 261913; VwGH, 2004/01/0220). Even so, the 
case law underscores the tension existing between the Dublin system and family unity. 
First, it documents cases in which national administrations utterly disregarded the asylum 
seekers’ interest to maintain family life – even in situations involving, for instance, newborn 
babies and advanced pregnancy (see e.g. CE Fr, 261913). Secondly, it documents cases in 
which even though a violation of the right to family life could not be said to exist – and 
accordingly, judicial redress could not have been forthcoming – a serious commitment to 
protecting family unity and the well-being of asylum seekers would have commanded 
keeping relatives together (see e.g. CE Fr, 281001). 
                                                 
216  That is likely, since the country of origin of the asylum seeker is ineligible, so long as the asylum claim 
is not determined; and reunification in the responsible State may also be ruled out owing to obstacles, 
legal or factual, to the relocation of the family member. 
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2. REFORMING THE DUBLIN PROVISIONS ON FAMILY 
UNITY 
2.1. Introductory Remarks 
 
The Recast Proposal takes a holistic approach to family matters, intervening at all levels 
(preamble, definitions, criteria, discretionary clauses, procedural guarantees). As far as 
procedural guarantees are concerned, we can only reiterate our support for the Commission 
Proposal (see above, Section I, para. 3.2.2): the protection of family unity would greatly 
benefit from strengthened rights to information, to an interview, and to an effective 
remedy.  
 
The material aspects are addressed below. We will address first the proposals concerning 
the criteria (general criteria: 2.2.1; specific provisions on minors: 2.2.2; “time rule”: 
2.2.3), and then the proposals concerning the preamble and discretionary clauses (2.3). 
2.2. Responsibility Criteria and Family Definition  
 
SOLUTION: ENLARGING THE FAMILY DEFINITION AND CRITERIA ALONG THE LINES OF 
THE ORIGINAL COMMISSION PROPOSAL, WITH SOME IMPROVEMENTS 
The proposed reforms of the family definition and family criteria go some way towards 
solving the issues arising under the right to family life. There is nonetheless scope for 
improvement concerning, in particular, the definition of “family member”, the new criterion 
enshrined in art. 11 DPr, and the “time rule” of art. 7(3) DPr. In this regard, we would also 
recommend to the European Parliament to reconsider some of the amendments it has 
adopted at first reading. 
2.2.1. General criteria 
In regard to the “general” family criteria, the Commission proposes to: 
– Extend articles 7 and 8 DR to family members that are beneficiaries of (or applicants 
for) subsidiary protection in a Member State (art. 9-10 DPr); 
– Introduce a new criterion for cases of dependency deriving from pregnancy, a new-
born child, serious illness, severe handicap, or old age. Art. 11 DPr foresees the 
reunification of dependent asylum seekers with relatives that are already present in 
a Member State and vice-versa, provided that family ties existed in the State of 
origin. 
 
Both amendments are welcome and significant. By removing an important “status” 
limitation, art. 9-10 would remedy a serious protection gap (see EP 2009a:30). By turning 
the “semi-mandatory” second paragraph of art. 15 DR into a binding criterion, art. 11 
would ensure reunification in highly human-rights sensitive situations (see ECRE 2009a:8).  
 
The Presidency Compromise Proposal would restrict art. 11 to situations where the asylum 
seeker is dependent on a relative and not vice-versa. This would be a step back, excluding 
from the scope of the family criteria a number of deserving situations. Art. 11 DPr should 
rather be expanded on several points. 
 
– Firstly, art. 11 only refers to “a relative”, whereas it should refer to “a family 
member or relative”. Under the present wording, art. 11 ensures the reunification of 
an asylum seeker with a dependent sister living in a Member State, but not with a 
dependent spouse living there as an ordinary immigrant, i.e., in a situation that 
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owing to status limitations would not be covered by art. 9 or 10 DPr. This (rather 
absurd) result could only be avoided through an extensive interpretation of the term 
“relative”, as including “family members”. However: (a) experience shows that 
Member States are not inclined to interpret the family criteria extensively (see 
above in this Section, para. 1.2); (b) the Proposal itself distinguishes between 
“family members” and “relatives” (see art. 8 DPr); (c) the Council is minded to 
introduce a definition of “relatives” not including family members (see Presidency 
Compromise Proposal). 
– Secondly, art. 11 DPr lays down an exhaustive enumeration of dependency 
situations. As UNHCR has suggested, the enumeration should be made non-
exhaustive (UNHCR 2009a:8) – a modification that would also have a positive 
impact for minors (see below). 
– Thirdly, art. 11 DPr does not say where reunification should occur. Rather, it 
entrusts the Commission with the task of devising an appropriate procedure for a 
case-by-case determination. This is a reasonable approach, but we are concerned 
that the Commission might want to retain the procedure existing under art. 11(5) 
Dublin Implementing Rules (COM (2008b), Annex, ad art. 11: there “might be a 
need to modify [the] implementing rules”). This procedure, designed for the 
humanitarian clause, leaves the matter to the agreement of the States concerned – 
an agreement that may never come. We recommend that when exercising its 
powers under the regulatory procedure with scrutiny, the EP see to it that a new 
procedure is introduced ensuring the identification of a responsible State in every 
case. 
 
While the proposals commented above are welcome, the Recast Proposal is a missed 
opportunity to tackle two outstanding problems. 
 
– Firstly, it maintains the limitation that family ties must have “existed in the country 
of origin” – both in the definition of “family member” and in the definition of 
“relatives” under art. 11 DPr. As ECRE has rightly observed, such a rigid limitation 
“fails to accommodate the wide-ranging displacement experiences of asylum 
seekers” (ECRE 2009a:9). Moreover, it does generate tension with art. 8 ECHR 
since, as we have seen, “family life” under that provision exists regardless of where 
and when it began. The best course of action would have been to do away entirely 
with this limitation. 
– Secondly, “status” limitations have only been partially removed. Art. 9-10 DPr still 
leave out whole categories of persons that are legally present in a Member States. 
Art. 10 DPr still includes the proviso that family reunification with an asylum seeker 
present in a Member State can only occur until a “first decision on the substance” is 
taken on the latter’s application – a rather arbitrary restriction, depriving art. 10 DPr 
of much of its utility (on this point see Maiani 2006:171; see also UNHCR 2009a:8).   
 
Both problems have been left out of the recasting process. If at all possible, it would 
nonetheless be advisable for the European Parliament to reopen a discussion with the 
Commission and Council on whether, and how far, these stark limitations are justified by 
public interest 
 
As a final point, we would note that the Recast Proposal does not tackle the vital problem of 
proof of family ties. This is only natural, since this is a matter for Implementing Rules. But 
although in this matter the Parliament will lack the powers of scrutiny foreseen in art. 5bis 
of the Comitology Decision, we would recommend a close follow-up, since flexible 
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evidentiary rules are vital for the application of the family criteria (see above in this 
Section, para. 1.2). 
2.2.2. Special provisions on minors 
The Recast Proposal includes several provisions aiming to improve the position of minors.  
 
– First, art. 6 DPr makes it clear that the principle of the “best interest of the child” 
applies throughout Dublin procedures. Closer to our subject, art. 6(4) includes an 
explicit obligation for Member States to trace the family members and relatives of 
unaccompanied minors present in other Member States, as soon as the asylum 
application is lodged. This provision constitutes a notable advance on art. 19(3) 
of the Reception Conditions Directive and, as experience shows, it might greatly 
improve the implementation of the family criteria relating to minors (see also 
UNHCR 2009a:5). 
 
– Secondly, the Proposal expands the definition of “family members” in regard of 
minors. First, unmarried minors would be considered as “family members” of: (a) 
their parents regardless of whether they are dependent or not (art. 2(i)(ii) DPr) 
and (b) of minor unmarried siblings (art. 2(i)(v) DPr). These welcome changes 
have not given rise to objections so far. 
 
Furthermore, the Commission proposes to consider married minors as family members of 
their parents and minor siblings (married or unmarried) provided that it is in their best 
interest (or in the best interest of the minor siblings) to reside with them (art. 2(i)(iii)-(v) 
DPr)217. This (minimal) extension has surprisingly attracted a barrage of criticism in the EP 
and Council. The EP, in particular, has amended the proposal to the effect that married 
minors may only be considered as “family members” of parents and siblings when “not 
accompanied by the spouse” (EP 2009b, amendments 10-12). We would recommend 
reconsidering these amendments and reverting to the original Commission Proposal. The EP 
amendments are, in our view, inconsistent with the principle that the best interest of the 
child must be a primary consideration in all procedures under the Regulation – regardless 
of whether the child is married or unmarried (see the observations in UNHCR 2009a:7).  
 
Rather than being restricted, the Commission’s proposals should have been further 
expanded. In particular, the exclusion of adult siblings from the definition of “family 
members”, at least as far as minors are concerned, is rather arbitrary. One example will 
hopefully make this clear. Under the Proposal, art. 12 DPr would be applicable to two minor 
siblings aged 10 and 16 – they would be kept together as of right. But if the elder were a 
mere two years older, and even if he were the breadwinner for the two, the rule would no 
longer apply and they would be at risk of separation. True, adult siblings may on occasion 
be considered as the “guardian” of an (otherwise) unaccompanied minor (see e.g. VG 
Giessen, 2 E 1131/04.A). But again, they may not – and there seems to be no defensible 
reason to consider minor siblings but not adult siblings, as such, as family members of 
minor applicants. We would therefore recommend reformulating art. 2(i)(v) so as to ensure 
that adult siblings of a minor applicant are included in the definition (see also UNHCR 
2009a:7). 
 
                                                 
217  Furthermore, art. 2(h) DPr rightly takes out marital status from the definition of “unaccompanied 
minor” (see UNHCR 2009c:5). 
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Finally, art. 8 DPr expands the scope of current art. 6(1) DR: for applicants that are 
unaccompanied minors, responsibility would be attributed to the State where family 
members and/or relatives are present.  
 
As framed by the Commission, and as far as minor applicants are concerned, art. 8 DPr 
leaves no protection gaps: it ensures family reunification for unaccompanied minors to all 
the extent possible. All the limitations flowing from the definition of “family members” (type 
of family ties; existence of the family in the country of origin) lose their relevance here: for 
instance, an adult sibling living as an ordinary immigrant in a Member State would qualify 
anyway as a “relative”. Unfortunately, the amendment adopted by the EP at first reading 
risks reintroducing gaps and inconsistencies. For situations where both family members and 
relatives are present in different Member States, the Commission has refrained from 
establishing an automatic “priority” between the former and the latter. In keeping with 
art. 6 DPr, it has instead opted for a case-by-case “best interest” determination (see 8(3) 
DPr). At first reading, the EP has instead established the rule that reunification with a 
relative will only be considered if no family member is legally present (EP 2009b, 
amendment 21). This rule is overly rigid. It might well be in the “best interest” of the child 
to reunite him with a prosperous, caring, and beloved uncle, rather than with an 
irresponsible, destitute, and estranged father. Moreover, if strictly applied, the rule 
established by the EP could have the paradoxical consequence that e.g. reunification with 
the father is discarded on the basis of a “best interest” examination (still required under 
art. 8(1) DPr), and reunification with the uncle is not taken into consideration because, 
indeed, a family member is present in a Member State. Accordingly, we would recommend 
to reconsider amendment 21, and to revert to art. 8(1)-(3) as proposed by the 
Commission. 
 
The only real gap left by art. 8 DPr concerns “reverse” situations: when an unaccompanied 
minor is present in one of the Member States, and a family member or relative that could 
care for him applies for asylum. In such situations, reunification is dependent on the 
“ordinary” rules, i.e. contingent on “status” limitations and on the strictures of the “family 
member” definition. However, in such situations, the best interest of the child would require 
reunification no less compellingly than in the cases covered by art. 8 DPr. 
 
Art. 11 DPr on dependent relatives could and should be of assistance here – after all, recital 
13 DPr suggests that it was inserted “to ensure full respect for the principle […] of the best 
interest of the child”. However, it is inapplicable due to its unfortunate wording, which only 
refers to “relatives” (not “family members”) and does not recognise the “dependency” of 
unaccompanied minors from relatives. For this reason, we would insist on the amendments 
to art. 11 DPr proposed above (see above in this Section, para. 2.2.1). In addition, to 
clarify that the provision also applies in situations involving minors, we suggest replacing 
the terms “old age” by the word “age”. 
2.2.3. The “time rule” 
As noted above, article 5(2) DR impedes the application of the family criteria whenever the 
relevant facts (e.g.: recognition of refugee status under art. 9 DPr) arise after the first 
application is lodged.  
 
In a bid to solve this problem, the Commission has proposed that the family criteria be 
applied “on the basis of the situation obtaining when the asylum seeker lodged his/her 
most recent application”, until “the previous applications of the asylum seeker have not yet 
been subject of a first decision regarding the substance” (art. 7(3) DPr). The problems with 
this rule are readily apparent: it might require Member States to reopen a closed Dublin 
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procedure (until a first decision on the substance is taken), and it might also encourage 
asylum seekers to file multiple applications. For these reasons, the EP has deleted it on first 
reading (see EP 2009a:15; EP 2009b, amendment 20). The Council is, for its part, minded 
to replace it by a rule whereby new evidence, turning up after the application is lodged but 
referring to pre-existing situations, would have to be taken into consideration (see 
Presidency Compromise Proposal). This, however, would actually amount to maintaining 
the status quo. 
 
While we agree that the rule as proposed by the Commission is flawed, we believe that the 
idea behind it is valid. Art. 7(3) could be replaced by a provision worded along these lines: 
“By way of derogation from paragraph 2, in order to ensure respect for the principle of 
family unity and of the bests interests of the child, the Member State responsible in 
accordance with the criteria laid down in Articles 8 to 12 shall be determined on the basis of 
the situation obtaining after the asylum seeker lodged his/her first application for 
international protection, and until the process for determining the Member State 
responsible is completed”. 
 
Such a rule would, of course, slightly complicate the Dublin procedure: the proceeding 
Member State would have to take into account all circumstances that arise until another 
State accepts responsibility, or art. 3(2) DPr is applied. If such circumstances were to arise 
late in the process, the proceeding State might even have to send a “subsequent” take 
charge request. However, no need to reopen a closed “take charge” procedure, and no 
incentive to lodge multiple applications, would arise. And of course, the key objective of 
extending the “window of opportunity” for the application of the family criteria would be 
met to a significant extent. 
2.3. The discretionary clauses 
 
SOLUTION: CLARIFYING THE DISCRETIONARY CLAUSES AND THE RECITALS GUIDING 
THEIR APPLICATION, ALONG THE LINES OF THE COMMISSION PROPOSAL 
Even under the provisions of the Recast Proposal, gaps in the protection of family unity 
would remain, and the discretionary clauses would retain a central importance. The Recast 
Proposal introduces welcome amendments to the clauses themselves and to the preamble 
of the Regulation. We support these changes, and furthermore submit that a reference to 
the Member States’ “international obligations”, in connection with the discretionary clauses, 
could be usefully inserted. 
 
As we have just seen, the Commission Proposal reduces some of the gaps and 
inconsistencies of the Dublin criteria, but leaves some others standing. This highlights the 
continuing importance of the discretionary clauses in relation to family issues. In this 
respect, too, the Commission Proposal brings welcome changes.  
 
The preamble acquires special importance here, as it provides guidance for the use of 
Member States’ discretion. Recitals 11 and 12 DPr bring a positive contribution in this 
context. They dispel the ambiguities of current recitals 6 and 7 DR, and they place a new 
emphasis on the fact that “respect for family unity should be a primary consideration of 
Member States when applying [the] Regulation”. Recital 14 is also of importance, insofar as 
it stresses that the discretionary clauses are to be applied “in particular for humanitarian 
and compassionate reasons”. We would only add that our recommendation to include a 
mention of “international obligations” in Recital 14 (see above, Section I, para. 3.2.3) is 
pertinent in the present context, in view of the fact that the application of the (amended) 
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criteria might still cause violations of art. 8 ECHR and/or of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. 
 
As for the discretionary clauses themselves, we welcome the fact that art. 17(1) DPr makes 
the use of the sovereignty clause conditional upon the applicant’s consent. This innovation, 
which is being met with resistance in Council, would avoid the current situation whereby 
the sovereignty clause can be used against the applicant’s interest to family unity. 
 
We also welcome the proposed changes to the humanitarian clause: expanding its scope to 
the reunification of “relatives” regardless of situations of dependency, and introducing a 
deadline for replying to humanitarian requests. The latter reform is fully justified in light of 
the current, disgraceful situation whereby humanitarian requests are quite simply 
disregarded (SEC (2008)7). Of course, since the Proposal does not introduce acceptance by 
default as a sanction, the effects of this amendment remain to be seen. 
3. BEYOND FAMILY UNITY: THE DUBLIN SYSTEM AND 
INTEGRATION 
 
PROBLEM: THE DUBLIN REGULATION DISREGARDS “CLOSE LINKS”, OTHER THAN FAMILY 
TIES, BETWEEN ASYLUM SEEKERS AND A PARTICULAR MEMBER STATE 
Apart from family ties, the Dublin Regulation does not take into account the “close links” 
that an asylum seeker may have to a particular Member State. This has a cost from the 
standpoint of the integration and well-being of asylum seekers, from the standpoint of the 
Dublin system’s own efficiency, and arguably also from a financial perspective 
 
As we have seen above (section II, para. 1) the law and practice developed under the 
Dublin system give such a limited recognition to family unity as to raise concerns under 
art. 8 ECHR. But human rights law violations are not the only problem here.  
 
Disregarding family ties when allocating responsibility – including extended family ties, and 
family ties to persons that are ordinary immigrants in the EU – has considerable costs. It 
has human costs, of course, and costs in terms of integration, since asylum seekers that 
could benefit from supportive environments are “parachuted” in States where they are 
isolated (Blake 2001:106-108). Arguably, and for the same reasons, it also entails financial 
costs. Asylum seekers that could rely on private support in one Member State are forced to 
rely instead on public funds in another State (see mutatis mutandis Toth/Šunjić 2010). 
Finally, disregard for family ties likely has a significant adverse impact on the effectiveness 
of the Dublin system. As suggested by academic research (Boswell 2003) and field reports 
(CIMADE 2008:25-26; JRS 2008:2, 4, 6), the presence of family members in a State other 
than the responsible State is a “pull factor” inspiring attempts to circumvent the Dublin 
system through avoidance or secondary movements (see SEC (2008)20). 
 
It is now important to stress that all these considerations apply well beyond the issue of 
family unity. Social networks in the broadest sense, linguistic affinities, previous abode, are 
all recognised as “pull factors”, explaining the preferences of asylum seekers for a 
particular Member State (see SEC (2008)10; Bocker 1999:9-10; Collyer 2004:376; 
Thielemann 2003:32). Allocating responsibility in keeping with such preferences would be 
conducive to the well-being and integration of asylum seekers – as well as to spontaneous 
compliance with the Dublin system. Disregard for such preferences, by contrast, has the 
cost detailed above and incites asylum seekers to circumvent the Dublin system – including 
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by “going underground” and moving irregularly to the preferred Member State (see 
references above). 
 
Apart from these considerations, and from a normative standpoint, UNHCR has consistently 
advocated for allocating responsibility on the basis of such “close links”, and for giving 
consideration to the “wishes” of the asylum seeker (see ExCom 1979; UNHCR 2001:2 and 
4-5; Hurwitz 1999:675). The Dublin Regulation does neither. It simply disregards close 
links (other than family ties)  – ignoring them even as a ground to apply the humanitarian 
clause. 
 
SOLUTION: IN THE SHORT TERM, THE HUMANITARIAN CLAUSE COULD BE BROADENED TO 
ENCOMPASS “CLOSE LINKS” BEYOND FAMILY TIES 
The Proposal utterly fails to address the broader issue of integration. Enlarging the scope of 
the humanitarian clause to considerations going beyond family unity would be a positive 
step, although real solutions to this problem would require rethinking the whole distributive 
concept underpinning the Dublin Regulation 
 
The Recast Proposal focuses exclusively on family unity and does nothing to alleviate the 
concerns that we have last mentioned. The EP could correct this, albeit to a limited extent.   
 
As noted above, the Commission proposes expanding the cases in which the humanitarian 
clause can be applied to bring together “relatives”. This modification could be taken further, 
by expanding the scope of the humanitarian clause beyond family reunification (cfr. art. 9 
of the 1990 Dublin Convention). To this effect, circumstances reflecting other “close links” 
between an applicant and a Member State (cultural ties, previous abode) could be inserted 
as grounds for the application of the humanitarian clause. 
 
Granted, such a reform would probably have a limited practical impact. However, serious 
advances towards a more “integration-friendly” approach would require nothing less than 
an in-depth reconsideration of the Dublin system, and such a fundamental overhaul is out 
of reach in the ongoing reform process (for long term perspectives see below, Part III). 
Here and now, expanding the scope of the humanitarian clause would at least constitute a 
first step in the right direction. It would cost nothing – including to Member States, who 
would remain free to use the clause – and it would open up new opportunities for a more 
sensible and humane application of the Dublin system. 
 
SECTION III: THE PROTECTION OF VULNERABLE PERSONS IN THE 
DUBLIN SYSTEM 
1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS  
 
The Dublin Regulation explicitly refers to international obligations and humanitarian 
standards as an integral part of the Dublin scheme (see e.g. recitals 2 and 15 DR, as well 
as article 9 and chapter IV of the Dublin Implementing Rules). However, it does not make 
provision for specific safeguards in regard to applicants with special needs, and the lacunae 
of the legal framework have given rise to unsatisfactory practice. The present Section 
covers three problem areas: the identification of vulnerable persons and reception 
conditions in the State conducting the Dublin procedure; health problems and continuity of 
care for vulnerable persons in the context of Dublin transfers; and the treatment of minors 
in Dublin context. 
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2. THE IDENTIFICATION OF VULNERABLE PERSONS 
AND THEIR RECEPTION DURING DUBLIN PROCED-
URES 
 
PROBLEM: RECEPTION CONDITIONS OF VULNERABLE PERSONS IN THE STATE CARRYING 
OUT THE DUBLIN PROCEDURE ARE OF CONCERN, DUE TO BOTH GAPS IN AND 
MISAPPLICATIONS OF THE EU LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
The general problems observed in the implementation of the Reception Conditions Directive 
also affect asylum seekers undergoing the Dublin procedure. The observed lack of 
identification procedures for vulnerable persons, as called for in art 17 of the RCD, are of 
special relevance here. These problems are compounded by the fact that some States do 
not apply the RCD during Dublin procedures. As a result, reception conditions and social 
rights for “Dubliners” fall below the minimum standards contained in the RCD. 
 
In accordance with the Reception Conditions Directive, Member States are obliged to take 
into account the specific situation of vulnerable persons such as “[…] minors, 
unaccompanied minors, disabled people, elderly people, pregnant women, single parents 
with minor children and persons who have been subjected to torture, rape or other serious 
forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence” (art. 17). Article 21 of the Recast RCD 
adds further categories of vulnerable persons: victims of trafficking and persons with 
mental health problems. Quite apart from the obligations flowing from the RCD, several 
instruments of international law prescribe particular attention and treatment. Art. 3 ECHR 
prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment, and it is worth recalling that prohibited 
treatment under this provision is defined in function of vulnerability of the persons 
concerned (ECtHR, Muskhadzhiyeva, para. 55 ff). Furthermore, special standards of 
treatment apply to minors under the Convention on the Rights of the Child.  
 
Unfortunately, State practice discloses serious shortcomings in the treatment of vulnerable 
persons under the Dublin procedure (SEC (2008)23, UNHCR 2006, ECRE 2006:153-154). 
As recalled above, reception conditions of asylum seekers in general are of concern in a 
number of Member States (see Section I, para. 2.2). More pointedly, only few States have 
adopted a proper identification procedure for the special needs of vulnerable applicants in 
accordance with the Reception Conditions Directive (COM (2007b)9). This implies that in a 
number of Member States, the potential special needs of asylum applicants are not readily 
identified. These general problems are compounded by the fact that some Member States – 
including Austria, France and Spain – do not apply the Reception Conditions Directive to 
persons who are subject to the Dublin procedure, even though the Directive should apply at 
all stages of the asylum procedure (COM (2007b)9; SEC (2008)15; Odysseus Network 
2006:76).  
 
The situation results in reception conditions and social rights that fall below the minimum 
standards of the RCD. Traumatised asylum seekers and victims of torture, for example, are 
not necessarily identified nor given appropriate medical counselling and treatment, whereas 
according to medical experts, early assessment and treatment are important factors for 
ensuring rehabilitation (AMNESTY 2009:21-22; IRCT 2009). We would note, in addition, 
that lack of identification at an early stage may have an impact on the outcome of the 
asylum case. An accurate evaluation of protection needs may indeed depend on gathering 
documentation and evidence, such as signs confirming that a person has suffered torture, 
at an initial stage.  
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SOLUTION: CLARIFYING THAT THE RCD APPLIES DURING DUBLIN PROCEDURES, AND 
ESTABLISHING A MANDATORY SCREENING PROCEDURE IN NATIONAL LEGISLATION AS 
PROVIDED FOR IN COMMISSION PROPOSALS  
Recital 9 DPr seeks to ensure the full application of the Reception Conditions Directive 
during the Dublin procedure. We support this initiative as well as the setting up of an 
identification procedure as proposed in art. 21 Recast RCD. Strengthened information rights 
and procedural guarantees, as provided for in art. 4 and 5 DPr, would also be of value in 
this context. Taken together, these proposals would help ensuring appropriate identification 
and treatment of vulnerable applicants at all stages of the asylum process. 
 
As far as asylum seekers undergoing the Dublin procedure in the “first” Member State are 
specifically concerned, the Commission has put forward two welcome proposals. 
First of all, recital 9 DPr states with the requisite clarity that, in order to ensure equal 
treatment of all asylum seekers, the Reception Conditions Directive should apply during the 
Dublin procedure. 
 
Secondly, in order to ensure early and proper identification of vulnerable persons, 
art. 21(2) Recast RCD would specifically oblige Member States to establish procedures in 
national legislation with a view to identifying the special needs of vulnerable persons as 
soon as an application has been lodged (for a detailed analysis of this provision see below, 
Chapter III). This obligation, if fully implemented, would ensure that applicants with special 
needs are identified early in the process in the State conducting the Dublin procedure. The 
possibility of providing adequate treatment in the initial phase of the Dublin/asylum 
process, as well as in all subsequent phases (see below, para. 3), would thus be 
strengthened. 
 
We give our full support to both proposals. We would also note that the procedural rights 
established under art. 4 and 5 DPr would be of considerable value in this context. As noted 
above, applicants in general must be properly informed and given the opportunity to be 
heard about the Dublin procedure if they are to defend their rights effectively, and State 
practice is lacking in this respect (see above, Section I, para. 3.2.2). Vulnerable persons, 
e.g. persons who need to present facts on their medical condition, would particularly 
benefit from art. 4 and 5 DPr. 
3. DUBLIN TRANSFERS AND VULNERABILITY – FITNESS 
TO TRAVEL AND CONTINUITY OF CARE 
 
PROBLEM: THE DUBLIN REGULATION DOES NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT GUARANTEES 
AGAINST HARMFUL TRANSFERS OR AGAINST DENIAL OF NECESSARY TREATMENT IN THE 
DESTINATION STATE 
Applicants with special needs are not adequately protected as far as the conditions in which 
Dublin transfers are carried out are concerned. The Dublin Regulation makes no provision 
for “fit for transfer” screening. Nor does it include appropriate guarantees to ensure 
continuity of care for persons that are transferred in spite of known vulnerabilities. Such 
shortcomings have not been made good by Member State practices, and have resulted in 
serious harm or even fatal incidents on occasion. 
 
According to the Council of Europe Twenty Guidelines on Forced Return, “persons shall not 
be removed as long as they are medically unfit to travel” (Guideline 16). To ensure respect 
for this principle, Member States are “[…] encouraged to perform a medical examination 
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prior to removal on all returnees, either where they have a known medical disposition or 
where medical treatment is required, or where the use of restraint techniques is foreseen. 
States are also encouraged to have ‘fit-to-fly’ declarations issued in cases of removal by 
air”. The guidelines also point to the need to respect the dignity of the returnee, and to the 
safety precautions that must be taken for the person concerned as well as for other 
passengers (Guideline 17). 
 
The elementary principles set out in the guidelines are directly derived from art. 2 and 3 
ECHR. Indeed, if an applicant for protection is to be transferred, the question of whether he 
or she is fit to travel should be an overriding consideration, and medical examinations as 
appropriate should be carried out in order to ascertain his or her mental and physical state. 
 
Unfortunately, the Regulation includes no provision requiring Member States to refrain from 
transferring persons that are unfit to travel, or to carry out a “fit to travel” assessment in 
the first place. Of course, Member States may take the necessary precautions of their own 
motion and, when necessary, make use of the discretionary clauses to avoid harmful 
transfers. The Commission reports, however, that applicants for protection with special 
needs are not adequately protected under the Dublin Regulation, and that persons suffering 
from traumas, or persons with medical needs, are indeed being transferred (SEC 
(2008)23).  
 
A closely related matter to fitness to travel is continuity of care. Conditions of vulnerability 
may be identified that are not so serious as to rule out transfer, but that require 
uninterrupted treatment (or attention) throughout all the Dublin process – before, during, 
and after the transfer. Likewise, special needs may arise later in the process.  
 
In theory, this is taken care of by the Reception Conditions Directive – assuming that the 
responsible State is bound by it (see above Section I, para. 3.1.3, footnote 7). It is the 
responsibility of the destination State to provide adequate follow-up, since addressing the 
needs of a vulnerable applicant is always the responsibility of the State where the applicant 
is present, and the Reception Conditions Directive lays down general guarantees to this 
effect (see e.g. AsylGH, case S8 226976-2/2008; BVG D-2550/2010, deriving “safety” 
presumptions from these general guarantees). 
 
However, the absence of specific mechanisms ensuring continuity of care has given rise to 
serious problems in practice. Indeed, the combination of “risky” transfers and the absence 
of adequate communication between the States involved has resulted not in one (SEC 
(2008)23), but in several fatal incidents (see in particular the striking cases documented 
ECRE 2007; UNHCR 2006:44). 
 
SOLUTION: COMPREHENSIVE GUARANTEES FOR “FIT FOR TRAVEL” ASSESSMENTS AND 
FOLLOW-UP MUST BE INCLUDED, ON THE BASIS OF COMMISSION PROPOSALS 
The Recast Proposal assists in ensuring that the Dublin system is applied with due regard to 
the physical and mental integrity of vulnerable applicant. It lays down the principle that 
applicants may be transferred only if “fit for transfer”, and that relevant information must 
be exchanged between the Member States concerned. These useful proposals could be 
strengthened by the inclusion of a mandatory “fit to travel” screening in the Regulation. 
 
The Recast Proposal includes a number of provisions that, if adopted and fully 
implemented, would go a long way in solving the problems set out above. There is 
nonetheless scope for improvement. 
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Art. 30(1) DPr. stipulates clearly that “only persons who are fit for transfer shall be 
transferred”. It is a matter of serious concern that this provision has been deleted during 
Council negotiations and is no more included in the Presidency Compromise Proposal. 
Indeed, art. 30(1) DPr should not only be retained, but also further developed. If the basic 
guarantee enshrined therein is to be fully implemented in practice, an appropriate medical 
assessment before transfer must, if needed, be ensured. Such a “screening” system could 
be based on offering a pre-transfer medical examination by an independent doctor if the 
applicant appeals a Dublin transfer decision on grounds relating to his or her physical 
and/or mental state. Another option would be to give an applicant the right to request a 
pre-transfer medical examination in connexion with a Dublin procedure as a general rule. 
Any of these options would require a system whereby the opinion and diagnosis of the 
medical findings, physical and/or mental, are respected even when they imply that the 
person is not fit for a transfer and the Dublin procedure cannot be applied.  
We therefore urge the EP to retain art. 30(1) DPr in its original form, and suggest that an 
explicit requirement to establish a pre-transfer medical screening be included. We would 
further note that to ensure the full protection of persons having valid objections to being 
transferred on medical grounds, the guarantee of an effective remedy as provided for in 
art. 26 DPr should be retained in the text of the Regulation (see above, Section I, 
para. 3.2.2). 
 
As for continuity of care, art. 30 DPr clearly requires an appropriate information exchange 
between the sending and receiving State, including information on the applicant’s fitness 
for the transfer and on needs for treatment on arrival. We fully support the inclusion of this 
provision in the proposal. 
4. UNACCOMPANIED MINORS AND THE DUBLIN 
PROCEDURE  
4.1. Introductory remarks   
 
The questions discussed above are, of course, relevant to children as well. Furthermore, 
due to their special vulnerability, children require particular care and consideration. The 
CRC guarantees certain standards of international law in this regard, including the 
fundamental “best interest” principle. State practice reveals, however, that the provisions 
of the Dublin Regulation are not sufficient to ensure that children are consistently treated in 
accordance with their best interest (UNHCR 2009a:4). Indeed, State practice has varied 
considerably, and it has disclosed widespread instances of inadequate treatment of – and 
support for – children. The detention of children, which is a matter of particular concern, is 
dealt with elsewhere in this Report (see Chapter III, Section I, paras. 4, 7 and 8). In the 
following pages, we focus on the application of the “best interest” principle and general 
guarantees for minors, and then consider two specific issue areas – the transfer of 
unaccompanied minors, and age-assessment methods. 
4.2. The “best interest” principle and general guarantees for 
minors  
 
PROBLEM: DUBLIN LAW AND PRACTICE DISCLOSE AN INSUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION 
FOR THE “BEST INTEREST” PRINCIPLE, AND FOR OTHER CHILD-SPECIFIC GUARANTEES 
SUCH AS ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION 
The Dublin Regulation does not adequately reflect the principle that in all actions relating to 
children, the child’s best interest must be a primary consideration. Furthermore, it is 
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lacking in regard of child-specific procedural guarantees. These lacunae of the legal 
framework have paved the way for unsatisfactory practice in the Member States 
 
The Dublin Regulation only mentions the “best interest of the minor” at two very specific 
places: in article 6(1) DR (the family criterion applicable to unaccompanied minors) and in 
article 15(3) DR (the humanitarian clause). Legally speaking, this has no incidence on the 
principle that “in all actions relating to children […] the child’s best interest must be a 
primary consideration” (art. 24 CFR, based on art. 3(1) CRC) – i.e., that all actions 
undertaken in the implementation of the Dublin Regulation should be inspired by the “best 
interest” principle, and guided by “best interest” determinations (see UNHCR 2008b). This 
notwithstanding, the practice of several Member States has been found lacking in this 
respect – as regards the application of the criteria (see below, para. 4.3), but in other 
respects as well (see UNHCR 2006:25). 
 
Child-specific procedural guarantees – which are vital to a proper application of the best 
interest principle – are also unsatisfactorily reflected in Dublin law, and unsatisfactorily 
observed in Dublin practice. The right of minors to express their views freely and to be 
heard in any proceedings affecting them (art. 12 CRC) has been impaired by insufficient, 
and insufficiently child-specific, information on Dublin procedures (ECRE 2006:156 and 
161), as well as by insufficient due process guarantees (see above, Section I, para. 3.2.2).  
 
Furthermore, two specific guarantees foreseen in the Reception Conditions Directive have 
reportedly received an unsatisfactory implementation. We have already referred to the fact 
that systematic efforts for tracing family members have been undertaken only by some 
States (see above, Section II, para. 1.2). We would now point out that the “necessary 
representation” of unaccompanied minors under art. 19 RCD is not always ensured in the 
Member States. Problems have been reported in Greece, for instance, where the Public 
Prosecutor, a representative of the authorities, acts as the formal guardian to thousands of 
children whereas appointment of a permanent guardian is rare (UNHCR 2009c:13-14). 
Other States have also been criticised on that account. In Norway, no guardian is assigned 
to a minor under Dublin procedures, and more generally the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child has expressed concern in 2005 “about the insufficient supervision of and care 
provided to unaccompanied asylum-seeking children” (CRC/C/15Add.263, 44). 
 
SOLUTION: STRENGTHENING THE “HORIZONTAL” GUARANTEES FOR MINORS IN ALL 
DUBLIN PROCEDURES, ALONG THE LINES OF THE RECAST PROPOSAL 
The Recast Proposal aims to introduce, in articles 6 and 4(2), a comprehensive set of 
guarantees for minors including a clear affirmation of the “best interest” principle, spelling 
out its operational aspects in line with international standards, the obligation to ensure 
adequate representation in all Dublin procedures, and a requirement of age-sensitive 
communication. We fully support these proposals, although we suggest to better clarify the 
requirements of independence and qualification for the minor’s representative. 
 
Article 6 DPr, if approved, would introduce a comprehensive set of guarantees for children 
in the Dublin context.  
 
First of all, in line with the request of the European Parliament (EP 2008b, para. 15), 
art. 6(1) DPr would introduce a general reference to the best interest of the child as a 
primary consideration for Member States with respect to all procedures under the 
Regulation. In light of practical experience, this “visualisation” of the “best interest” 
principle would add strength to an obligation that is already in existence, but which is not 
necessarily respected at all times. 
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Art. 6(3) DPr usefully spells out the implications of the principle. Its wording implies, first, 
that Member States must systematically undertake “best interest” determinations in close 
cooperation with each other. Furthermore, the aspects that must be taken into 
consideration when carrying out such determinations are explicitly listed. According to the 
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, “best interest” determinations should imply 
making a clear and comprehensive assessment of the child’s identity, including nationality, 
upbringing, ethnic, cultural and linguistic background, particular vulnerabilities and needs 
(see General Comment No 6, CRC/GC/2005/6). All these elements, alongside with family 
reunification possibilities, the safety of the minor, and his or her views, are accurately 
reflected in the Recast Proposal as mandatory reference points. 
 
The issue of appropriate representation of minors in Dublin procedures is dealt with under 
art. 6(2) DPr, which lays down an unambiguous requirement to appoint a representative. 
This proposal holds merit, but it could be further improved. The provision merely notes that 
the “representative” may be the representative appointed under article 23 RCD. At first 
reading, the EP has adopted an amendment referring, for the notion of “representative”, to 
art. 2(i) APD. Neither proposal stresses the need to have an independent and qualified 
representative – a point that, owing to the specialised nature of Dublin procedures, might 
be of importance (see UNHCR 2009a:6). In this respect, the text of art. 6 DPr, as amended 
by the European Parliament, could be further strengthened. The text proposed in the 
Presidency Compromise Proposal, which points out that the representatives must “have the 
necessary expertise”, constitutes a step in the right direction although it still fails to 
emphasise the requirement of independence. Finally, we would also express our support for 
art. 4(2) DPr, which provides for information to be provided to the applicant “in a manner 
appropriate to [his or her] age”. 
4.3. Unaccompanied minors, responsibility criteria, and “take 
back” transfers 
 
PROBLEM: IT IS APPARENT FROM MEMBER STATE PRACTICE THAT DUBLIN TRANSFERS 
ARE CARRIED OUT EVEN WHEN IN CONFLICT WITH THE “BEST INTEREST” OF THE CHILD  
The flawed wording of art. 6(1) DR notwithstanding, the best interest of the child should be 
a primary consideration whenever the transfer of a minor is being considered. Far from 
reflecting such a principled approach, Member State practices discloses instances where the 
“best interest” principle has been sidelined – or even cases of outright violation of the 
guarantees established by the Regulation for minors. 
 
On account of their special vulnerability, unaccompanied minors are subject to special 
responsibility criteria. According to art. 6(2) DR, the responsible Dublin State is “where the 
minor has lodged his or her application”, unless the family criterion of art. 6(1), examined 
above in Section II, applies. In other words: under the Regulation, no “take charge” 
transfers are possible except for family reasons. “Take back” transfers of unaccompanied 
minors, which usually occur for reasons other than family reunification, can by contrast be 
carried out. No explicit rule stipulates that the “best principle” applies in this context, but as 
said this does not authorise Member States to disregard the best interest of the child as a 
primary consideration (see above, Section 4.2; COM (2007a)7). In practice, however, the 
implementation of art. 6 has given rise to difficulties and to concerns that the “best 
interest” principle is not systematically adhered to.  
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As for take charge transfers, it is a documented fact that some Member States disregard 
article 6 DR and send requests that are based e.g. on irregular border crossing (see 
particularly UNHCR 2006:23; see also above, Section II, para. 1.2).  
 
As for “take back” transfers, practice has varied widely among the Member States. In 
Norway, the vulnerability of children was acknowledged resulting in all unaccompanied 
minors being exempted from the Dublin system by use of the sovereignty clause, unless 
art. 6(1) was applicable. This policy has changed in line with government instructions in 
2008, for the purpose of Norway to be in line with its European partners. In this case, 
partly because of peer pressure, Norway chose to abandon a “best practice”, to the 
detriment of unaccompanied minors. At present, best interest determinations are made on 
a case-by-case basis only, although Norway has suspended all transfers of unaccompanied 
minors to Greece (see also SEC (2008)15).  
 
As far as other Member States are concerned, there are numerous documented examples 
where children (or age-disputed children, see below in this Section, para. 4.4) have been 
returned to asylum countries where they had no links (UNHCR 2006:23 ff; ECRE 
2006:157). In several such cases, unaccompanied children were returned to Greece and 
kept in detention for an extended period of time (ibidem; on the situation of children in 
Greece, and of children returned under Dublin particularly, see UNHCR 2009c:11-15, 21). 
 
SOLUTION: THE PROBLEM COULD BE SOLVED THROUGH THE GENERAL GUARANTEES 
DESCRIBED ABOVE, ALTHOUGH THE COMMISSION PROPOSAL TO EXEMPT MINORS FROM 
(SOME) TAKE BACKS DESERVES CONSIDERATION 
A properly conducted “best interest” determination, along the lines of art. 6 DPr, would 
have the potential for solving the problem. However, practice suggests that Member States 
were not unaware of the relevant principles when dealing with minors in Dublin context, 
but rather sidelined them in favour of an effective implementation of transfers. Owing to 
the special vulnerability of unaccompanied minors, we would support the Commission 
proposal to exempt them in part from “take back” transfers. 
 
If introduced in the Regulation, the general guarantees that we have examined above 
(para. 4.2) would probably have a positive impact in this issue area. Systematic “best 
interest” determinations, based on the correct substantive considerations and on a proper 
procedure, would more likely than not lead to a reduction of “take back” transfers of 
unaccompanied minors under the Dublin system. As noted above, this would mean that 
children would not suffer from the added insecurity of being returned to a country where 
they have no links and which, sometimes, cannot guarantee their well being and 
protection. 
 
Several commentators, including the European Parliament, have nonetheless called for a 
more radical solution, i.e. a “hard and fast” rule prohibiting all transfers of unaccompanied 
minors other than for the purpose of family reunification (EP 2008b, para. 15; see also 
ECRE 2006:156 and 158). This would, of course, go beyond the strict requirements of the 
best interest principle (case-by-case “best interest” determination) and prevent all risks of 
a transfer going against the best interest of the child. On the other hand, if fully exempted 
from take back transfers, unaccompanied minors would be for all practical purposes 
exempted from the Dublin Regulation as a whole – other than as a “mechanism” for family 
reunification. 
 
The Commission has tried to strike a balance through art. 8(4) DPr. This provision 
stipulates that where a child does not have family links, the country responsible should be 
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that “[…] where the minor has lodged his or her most recent application […] provided this is 
in the best interests of the minor”. This proposal, if adopted, would: (a) further restrict the 
situations in which a child may be transferred, by excluding all the cases where a new 
application is made (see art. 18 DPr), and (b) explicitly require a best interest 
determination for the transfers that would remain permissible. The proviso that the best 
interest of the child must be respected, which merely reiterates a point made clear by 
art. 6(1) DPr, has been maintained both in the text as amended by the EP at first reading 
and in the Presidency Compromise Proposal. By contrast, the true innovation introduced by 
art. 8(4) DPr has been deleted from both texts (see in particular EP 2009b, amendment 
22). To reiterate, the introduction of art. 6 DPr should theoretically prevent transfers from 
taking place when they are contrary to the best interest principle. This notwithstanding, the 
amendments adopted by the European Parliament, and discussed in Council, weaken the 
protection of unaccompanied minors under the Regulation. 
4.4. Age assessment and age-disputed children 
 
PROBLEM: SOME MEMBER STATES RELY EXCESSIVELY ON UNCERTAIN AGE ASSESSMENT 
TECHNIQUES OR, WORSE STILL, TREAT AGE-DISPUTED APPLICANTS AS ADULTS 
National administrations make widespread use of techniques such as bone testing, which 
do not always yield clear results. In documented cases, they relied on uncertain results to 
deny applicants the benefits of child-specific rights, or even denied them before age 
assessment had been carried out at all. 
 
A special regime for minors under the Dublin Regulation unavoidably raises the question of 
age assessment. Several Member States are concerned that asylum applicants may 
misrepresent their age in order to enjoy the benefits of the Regulation. This preoccupation 
is, indeed, understandable, and asylum applicants have on occasion given reason to think 
that they were trying to abuse the system, or have induced the authorities in error (see 
e.g. UNHCR 2006:24). 
 
The problem is, however, that Member States place excessive reliance on techniques such 
as bone testing, whereas all known methods for age assessment have a considerable 
margin of error (see SEC (2007)23; UNHCR 2009a:5). This problem is compounded by the 
fact that national administrations apparently tend to treat applicants as adults in contested 
cases (see e.g. AsylGH, case S12 408980-1/2009; see further, on a tendency to “over-
estimate” the age of applicants, UNHCR 2006:27). Worse still, age-disputed applicants 
have been on occasion transferred before a proper age assessment had been carried out 
(see ECRE 2006:157 and 189, case 3). 
 
The issue is of course bound to gain in prominence once a more favourable regime is 
introduced for minors, along the lines of the Recast Proposal. 
 
SOLUTION: INTRODUCING IN THE REGULATION BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR AGE 
ASSESSMENT, AND A “BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT” PRINCIPLE IN FAVOUR OF AGE-DISPUTED 
CHILDREN  
The Commission Proposal does not address the issue of age assessment. At first reading, 
the European Parliament has adopted welcome amendments in this regard, referring both 
to guarantees and standards for medical assessments. These amendments do not, 
however, tackle the central problem of uncertainty in age assessment, and would be 
usefully complemented by a principle whereby applicants must be given the benefit of 
doubt 
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The Commission Recast Proposal does not deal with the issue of age assessment at all. The 
EP, which had called in the past for a “a set of common guidelines on age-assessment [to] 
be adopted at European Union level” (EP 2008b, para. 14), has by contrast adopted an 
amendment on this issue at first reading (EP 2009b, amendment 19). The proposed 
art. 6(5a) DPr would first of all strengthen the procedural safeguards for applicants 
undergoing age assessment, by reference to art. 17 APD (informed consent for medical 
examinations). Furthermore, Member States would have to ensure that medical 
examinations are conducted “in a reasonable and thorough manner, as required by 
scientific and ethical standards”. 
 
Under both points, the amendment is welcome. However, it fails to address the central 
problem, i.e. the problem of “thorough and reasonable” medical tests yielding nonetheless 
uncertain results. In this regard, both the European Parliament and UNHCR have called for 
the explicit recognition of the principle whereby in such cases, applicants must be given the 
benefit of doubt (see UNHCR 2009a:5; EP 2008b, para. 14). From a legal perspective, this 
would be justified by the need to ensure that all minors enjoy the guarantees prescribed by 
the CRC and by EU Law. We support the text as amended by the European Parliament at 
first reading, but would suggest expanding it by laying down an explicit “benefit of the 
doubt” principle. 
 
SECTION IV: DISTRIBUTIVE FAIRNESS 
 
PROBLEM: THE DUBLIN SYSTEM AGGRAVATES IN SOME CASES THE IMBALANCES IN THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS, WITH DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS IN TERMS OF 
EFFECTIVENESS AND PROTECTION 
The Dublin system is not meant to realise a “fair sharing of responsibilities”. It is, however, 
meant to contribute to fair sharing. Due to its distributive concept, linking together 
responsibility and irregular entry into the EU, the system does however entail additional 
burdens on some Member States that are under particular migratory pressure because of 
their geographical location, and that have limited reception and absorption capacity. 
 
Under article 80 TFEU, the common policy on asylum should be “governed by the principle 
of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between 
the Member States” (art. 80 TFEU). The present distribution of asylum seekers among the 
Member States is far from corresponding to a standard of “fair sharing”. In saying this, we 
do not refer directly to the wide disparities existing between Member States in terms of 
absolute numbers (see UNHCR 2010, Table 1). Indeed, it has been convincingly pointed out 
that “while the public debate tends to focus on absolute numbers of asylum seekers, the 
pressure on member states and their capacity to handle those numbers can only be 
meaningfully assessed by looking at relative numbers” (Matrix 2010:18). Even so, it has 
been shown on the basis of several “responsibility indexes” combining GDP, population, and 
population density, that asylum pressures relative to capacity vary widely among the 
Member States (Matrix 2010:67 ff) – with some States taking much more than their “fair 
share”, and other States taking much less.  
 
The Dublin system is not, and is not intended to be, a burden-sharing instrument in the 
proper sense (SEC (2000), para 35; Matrix 2010:13). Thus, it is not intended tackle to the 
problem of unfair distribution as such. This notwithstanding, the Dublin system does have 
redistributive implications (see Noll 2000:318 ff), and should in principle contribute to a fair 
sharing of responsibilities. According to the preamble of the Dublin Regulation, in particular, 
the system should be “based on objective, fair criteria both for the Member States and for 
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the persons concerned” (recital 4), which should reflect “a balance between responsibility 
criteria in a spirit of solidarity” (recital 8). 
 
It is debatable whether the criteria laid down in the Dublin Regulation fit this description. As 
recalled above, the system is based on the principle that responsibility should principally lie 
with the “Member State having played the greatest part” in letting the applicant into the 
Dublin area (see Section II, para. 1.1), and links more specifically responsibility to failure in 
guarding the external borders of the EU against irregular immigration (see art. 10 DR). At 
the time when the Regulation was adopted, this was widely expected to shift 
responsibilities on the States located at the Southern and Eastern external border of the EU 
(see e.g. Byrne 2003:350-351; UNHCR 2001:5). The “losing” States were themselves 
acutely aware of this, as reflected in a Council declaration referring to “the concerns of 
certain Member States, whose geographical position exposes them to illegal immigration, 
that an effective application of the Dublin II Regulation […] may lead to an overburdening 
of their asylum systems” (Council doc. 6360/03; see further Aus 2006). 
 
The (incomplete) data on “real Dublin flows”, provided by the Commission Evaluation 
Report (SEC (2007)49 ff; reference year: 2005), show that these concerns were justified to 
some extent. In the Report, the Commission emphasised that “the overall allocation 
between border and non-border Member States is actually rather balanced”, based on the 
aggregate number of transfers to border and non-border States respectively (COM 
2007a)12). This is, however, an incorrect measure. The data on incoming/outgoing 
transfers for each Member State (SEC (2007)50) show that the border States are, with few 
exceptions (Finland218, Estonia), “net takers” of asylum seekers under Dublin, whereas non-
border States are, again with few exceptions (Austria219, Portugal, Sweden220), “net givers”. 
 
This does not justify the contention that the Dublin system puts, by itself, “an intolerable 
burden on the countries situated in the south and east of the EU” (EP 2006, para. 15). The 
number of persons transferred under the Dublin system is much too low to produce such an 
effect, and it does not alter significantly the workload faced by each Member State (SEC 
(2007)52-53, pointing out the exception of Poland; see also p. 53-54, showing that the 
implementation of all agreed transfers would instead place a number of border States at a 
distinct disadvantage). 
 
The problem stands in different terms. Apart from doing nothing to address current 
imbalances, “[the Dublin system] may de facto result in additional burdens on Member 
States that have limited reception and absorption capacities and who find themselves under 
particular migratory pressures because of their geographical location” (COM (2008a)8; see 
also UNHCR 2007b:39). 
 
This is not only problematic for the Member States concerned or, in more abstract terms, in 
regard of “fair sharing”. The problems experienced by those States may backfire on the 
efficiency of the Dublin system itself, as reflected in the “surprisingly low” number of “illegal 
entrants” registered in the EURODAC system (COM (2007a)9-10). Worse still, the existence 
of “overburden” situations, and their aggravation by means of Dublin transfers, may have 
detrimental effects on the situation of asylum seekers in those States (see UNHCR 2002:5). 
Such an adverse impact has been extensively documented in the case of Greece, where 
                                                 
218  Finland should not, in fact, be considered as an exception. Geographically, it shares a land border with 
Russia. However, according to the Commission, this border is not exposed to migration flows, and 
Finland (a “net giver” in the Dublin system) should accordingly be considered as a non-border State 
(SEC 2008:14). 
219  Due to its inability to carry out agreed transfers (compare SEC 2007, Tables 7 and 8). 
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“the increased return of asylum applicants on the grounds of the Dublin system was the 
straw that broke the camel’s back” (Papadimitriou/Papageorgiou 2005:308; see also 
UNHCR 2008a:8).  
 
SOLUTION: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MECHANISM WHEREBY TRANSFERS TO 
“OVERBURDENED” STATES MAY BE SUSPENDED WOULD BE A PARTIAL SOLUTION 
The Recast Proposal foresees the establishment of a mechanism for the suspension of 
transfers to “overburdened” States, furthermore triggering enhanced assistance to the 
concerned States. This is a positive proposal, which could be further improved by enlarging 
the conditions for triggering the mechanism. It is not, however, a complete solution for the 
distributive imbalances currently observed in the CEAS, whose correction requires decisive 
steps forward in the establishment of permanent burden-sharing mechanisms. 
 
As anticipated above (Section I, para. 3.2.3), the Commission proposes the establishment 
of a collective “suspension mechanism” that would enable it to stop transfers to a particular 
Member State. We have already examined the provisions relating to protection-related 
suspensions (ibidem). We must now turn to the rules on “overburden-related” suspension. 
 
In general, article 31 DPr organises this form of suspension in a satisfactory manner. The 
procedural rules, whereby the decision falls to the Commission on the request of the State 
concerned, subject to “referral” to Council in case of suspension, appear to be entirely 
logical. We would suggest that the concerned State should also be endowed with a 
“referral” right if the Commission rejects its request (similarly above, Section I, 
para. 3.2.3). Likewise, the material rules on the exercise of Commission powers appear to 
be entirely appropriate – we refer, in particular, to the way in which art. 31 (4a-b) Dpr 
defines the relevant circumstances to be taken into account, and to the possibility to attach 
“conditions” to the suspension, including in order to give “due consideration for the need to 
ensure the protection of minors and families”. Finally, it makes perfect sense to link 
together overburden-related suspensions and enhanced assistance to the State concerned 
(art. 31(7) DPr). 
 
Under all these respect, we support the Commission Proposal to establish a mechanism 
allowing for the suspension of Dublin transfers to overburdened States (see also UNHCR 
2009a:11). There are nonetheless several concerns with the way in which the recast 
Proposal defines the scope of application of the suspension mechanism.  
 
On the one hand, overburden-related suspension would only be decreed “[w]hen a Member 
State is faced with a particularly urgent situation which places an exceptionally heavy 
burden on its reception capacities, asylum system or infrastructure, and when the transfer 
of applicants [under the Dublin system] could add to that burden”. In our view, to render 
the mechanism applicable in all relevant situations, it would be appropriate to draft the 
clause using to a more open-ended wording. For instance, the formulation used in the 
preamble of the text adopted by the European Parliament at first reading (EP 2009b, 
amendment 7) could be used: “[w]hen a Member State is faced with [particular pressures] 
on its reception capabilities …”. To our mind, there is no risk that the clause would be used 
other than in “exceptional circumstances” (ibidem), bearing in mind that the Council could 
overturn by QMV any suspension decision. 
 
On the other hand, we believe that the “sunset clause” adopted at first reading by the 
Parliament (EP 2009b, amendments 40 and 41) would entail an unwarranted limitation 
                                                                                                                                                            
220  Due to its “attractiveness” for asylum seekers (SEC 2008:15). 
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ratione temporis of the suspension mechanism. Doing away with overburden-related 
suspensions once “binding” burden-sharing instruments are in place is, of course, a 
defensible policy choice (contrary to what we found above, Section I para. 3.2.3, in relation 
to protection-related suspensions). Still, we fail to see the added value of the amendment. 
On the one hand, retaining the suspension mechanism in parallel with burden-sharing 
arrangements would pose no problem at all. On the other hand, it cannot be assumed with 
reasonable certainty that (as yet undefined) burden-sharing mechanisms would always 
prevent the situation described in art. 31(1) DPr from arising. Accordingly, we would 
suggest reconsidering amendments 40 and 41. 
 
Beyond these legal problems, it is quite obvious that the envisaged mechanism would have 
a limited “reach”: suspending Dublin transfers would do little to improve the present 
imbalances in the distribution of asylum seekers, which are largely independent from the 
operation of the Dublin system. In this perspective, we fully support the position taken by 
the European Parliament through amendments 8 and 39 as adopted at first reading: the 
central problem to be addressed is the insufficiency of existing burden-sharing schemes – 
financial, administrative, and distributive – which must be imperatively be enhanced if the 
Common European Asylum System is to be truly founded on “the principle of solidarity and 
fair sharing of responsibilities” (art. 80 TFEU; see further COM (2008a)8-9; for extensive 
analysis and policy recommendations, see Matrix 2010).  
 
SECTION V: THE INEFFICIENCY OF THE DUBLIN SYSTEM 
1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 
On a rather optimistic note, the “technical” evaluation conducted by the Commission on the 
functioning of the Dublin system concluded that “the objectives of the […] system […] 
have, to a large extent, been achieved” (COM (2007a), para. 4; for criticism, see EP 
2008a:12; Maiani/Vevstad 2009). However, the very facts and figures provided by the 
Report throw into sharp relief the effectiveness deficit of the system in discharging its core 
functions, namely: 
 
1. Allocating responsibility according to the criteria laid down in the Regulation 
and “take charge” transfers; 
2. Preventing asylum seekers from pursuing multiple claims through the so-
called “once chance only” principle and “take back” transfers; 
3. Ensuring swift access to status determination in one Member State. 
 
Available documentation also suggests that, in its present form, the Dublin system has an 
adverse impact on the functioning of the CEAS as a whole. 
2. REQUESTS AND TRANSFERS: DUBLIN IN FIGURES 
 
PROBLEM: MOST AGREED TRANSFERS ARE NOT CARRIED OUT, MEANING THAT 
RESOURCES ARE WASTED, AND THE CRITERIA HAVE A MINIMAL IMPACT IN PRACTICE. 
FURTHERMORE, THE DUBLIN SYSTEM CONSIDERABLY DELAYS ACCESS TO ASYLUM 
PROCEDURE, AND ARGUABLY UNDERMINES THE PROTECTION OBJECTIVES OF THE CEAS. 
APART FROM TECHNICAL IMPERFECTIONS, THESE FAILURES SEEM TO BE LINKED TO THE 
KEY STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF THE SYSTEM 
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More than anything else, two figures show the ineffectiveness of the Dublin system: the low 
number of accepted transfers that are ultimately carried out, and the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of asylum applications are examined where they are first lodged. 
Many of the resources invested in the process are thus, ultimately, wasted. These deficits 
may be due to technical problems, such as inappropriate deadlines, but evidence suggests 
that the constant struggle of asylum seekers to evade the system plays a greater role. The 
inefficiencies of the system, and the “bad incentives” it provides to asylum seekers, also 
have a detrimental impact in terms of protection – delayed access to asylum procedures, 
and incentives to go “underground”. 
2.1. The ineffectiveness of the Dublin system as a mechanism of 
migration management: facts and figures  
 
The figures given in the 2007 Evaluation Report – which, as the Commission warned, are to 
be taken with a pinch of salt – clearly highlight one point: of all the asylum applications 
that were filed with the Member States in the relevant period (Sept. 03-Dec. 05), only a 
relatively small proportion had given rise to transfer requests (indicatively 12%: see SEC 
2007:18). 
 
Furthermore, according to Commission estimates, roughly 70% of these requests were 
“take back” requests (SEC (2007)16) – a prevalence that is easily explained by the fact 
that such requests are backed by EURODAC “hits”, i.e. by a sure and simple means of 
detecting and proving previous applications in other Member States. 
 
EUROSTAT data for 2008 (“outgoing” dataset, i.e. the data provided by 26 Member States 
out of 30 as to “sent” requests) by and large confirm these figures, and suggest that they 
reflect the “structural performance” of the Dublin system. In 2008, about 12.8% of all 
asylum applications lodged in the Member State have given rise to a Dublin request, and 
take charge requests were only about 27% of all the requests. 
 
These figures, as said, relate to requests. The figures on actual transfers are much lower. 
The 2007 report shows that most agreed transfers were ultimately not carried out in 2005 
(COM (2007a)4). EUROSTAT data for 2008 (“outgoing” dataset) confirm the point, and add 
further detail on the different success rate of take backs and take charges. Out of 11’011 
accepted “take backs”, 5’470 were carried out (roughly 50%); and out of 4’066 accepted 
“take charges” 1’196 were carried out in 2008 (roughly 30%).  
 
Taken together, these data suggest a number of conclusions as to the effectiveness of the 
Dublin system in discharging its “migration management” functions (above, para. 1). 
 
– The Dublin system as a whole suffers from a considerable effectiveness deficit, 
owing to the high percentage of failed transfers. 
– Failed transfers mean, moreover, that the Dublin system entails a considerable 
waste of resources (SEC (2008)9; UNHCR 2007b:38; ECRE 2008:10-11). This 
concerns, as said, both “take back” transfers and “take charge” transfers. However, 
the situation is more serious in regard of “take charge” transfers: determining 
responsibility under the criteria is a lengthier and more resource-intensive process 
than acting on a EURODAC hit and, as we have just seen, take charge transfers fail 
more frequently. 
– Independently from these aspects, it is apparent that the Dublin criteria have a 
minimal incidence on the distribution of “new” asylum claims between the Member 
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States. Only a tiny fraction of all asylum applications give rise to a “take charge” 
request – somewhere in the region of 4% of all the applications for the 2003-2005 
period (calculation based on SEC (2007)18), and about 3.4% of the total 
applications lodged in 2008. Even considering these figures, rather than the lower 
figures on actual transfers, it is clear that the overwhelming majority of applications 
are examined by the State where they are first lodged, the Dublin criteria 
notwithstanding.  
 
To put it even more succinctly: 
 
– In theory at least, the system is apt to fulfil its goal of neutralising multiple 
applications through the “one chance only” principle and take back transfers (see 
SEC 2000, para. 53); however, it still fails to deliver satisfactorily because of the low 
number of effected transfers.  
– By contrast, it should be clear by now that the whole distributive concept embodied 
in the criteria is unworkable and ineffective. While still “moving” thousands of 
asylum seekers, and impacting on their lives, the Dublin system fails to make a real 
difference on the distribution of responsibilities, by comparison with a situation 
where responsibility would lie with the State where the application is first lodged. 
2.2. Possible explanations  
 
In explaining the effectiveness deficits of the Dublin system, the 2007 Evaluation Report 
and the Impact Assessment accompanying the Recast Proposal place considerable 
emphasis on the technical imperfections of the Regulation: inadequate time-limits, 
insufficient operational provisions on the execution of transfers, and the absence of a 
dispute settlement procedure in case of disagreement are mentioned in particular (COM 
(2007a)7-8; SEC (2008)7-20). 
 
Without denying the possible relevance of these technical aspects, we would be inclined to 
think that the key problem lies in the structural features of the system, and more 
particularly in the “bad” incentives they provide to its main actors, asylum seekers and 
States. 
 
There is ample anecdotal evidence pointing to the fact that asylum seekers try to evade the 
Dublin system through various means, including the disposal of travel documents, self-
mutilation to avoid fingerprinting, self-harm to make transfers impossible, and absconding 
(see e.g. SEC (2000), para. 45; Van Selm 2005:14; UNHCR 2006:22; CIMADE 2008:22; 
JRS 2008:3). The reasons for this are only too apparent. Two decisive factors were pointed 
out earlier in this Chapter: 
 
– The Dublin system is operated in a situation where the very same asylum 
application might have radically different outcomes depending on the Member State 
where it is examined (see above, Section I, para. 2.2); 
– The Dublin criteria based on family ties are restrictively framed and restrictively 
applied. Moreover, the criteria are wholly “blind” to other connections that asylum 
seekers may have with a particular Member States (see above, Section II). 
 
Both circumstances provide asylum seekers with strong incentives to avoid the application 
of the Dublin (“push” and “pull” factors: SEC (2008)19), and the Commission itself 
suggests that this has a major impact on the operation of the Dublin system. In particular, 
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the failure to carry out agreed transfers is frequently due to absconding (see COM (2007a); 
SEC (2007)29-30; SEC (2008)10; under the Dublin Convention, COM (2001)18). 
 
A parallel argument can be made, mutatis mutandis, in respect of Member States. As noted 
above, the Evaluation Report suggests that border States fail to systematically fingerprint 
illegal entrants, thus reducing the effectiveness of EURODAC as a tool for the 
implementation of the Dublin criteria (COM (2007a)9). Such uncooperative behaviour could 
be explained as the reaction of States that perceive themselves as being “disadvantaged” 
by the system (see above, Section IV).  
 
However, one could also consider that it reflects more generally the spirit in which Member 
States approach the implementation of Dublin. All States reportedly set high evidentiary 
requirements before accepting transfers. Many States, as noted above, go so far as to 
require DNA tests before accepting responsibility based on family ties (SEC (2007)24; ECRE 
2006:159). In short, Member States seem bent on minimizing their “liabilities” under 
Dublin, and the evidentiary difficulties posed by the Dublin criteria provide them with good 
opportunities to do so, to the detriment of the system’s effectiveness. 
2.3. Delayed access to asylum procedures and adverse impact on 
CEAS protection goals 
 
Recital 4 of the DR indicates that the Dublin procedure should “guarantee effective access 
to the procedures for determining refugee status” without “compromis[ing] the objective of 
the rapid processing of asylum applications”. This implies that any undue delay in starting 
status determination procedures should be avoided.  
 
To an extent, the Dublin system inherently contradicts this objective by adding a 
procedural layer to the processing of asylum applications. Of course, a modest delay would 
be more than justified in light of the goal, theoretically secured by the Dublin system itself, 
of guaranteeing access to an asylum procedure (see above, Section I, para. 2.1).  
 
However, the delays generated by the Dublin procedure can hardly be considered as 
modest. This point is best understood in light of art. 23(2) APD. Under this provision, 
asylum procedures should be concluded “as soon as possible”. What is meant by the 
wording “as soon as possible” is, of course, open to interpretation and dependent on the 
circumstances of each case. However, under the same provision, special obligations arise 
when the decision is not taken within six months. A six month period could therefore be 
seen as the “EU norm” in this matter (see also art. 27(3) Recast APD). 
 
There is no data available on the average time of a Dublin procedure, but the deadlines 
established by the DR allow for a Dublin procedure to ordinarily last for eleven months, and 
in particular cases for almost two years. Furthermore, as the Commission has noted, the 
deadlines laid down in the Regulation are not systematically complied with (COM 
(2007a)8).  
 
Such long deadlines, of course, do “compromise the objective of the rapid processing of the 
asylum application” (recital 3, DR). One could also say, taking the applicant’s perspective, 
that the Dublin procedure as a whole generates delays and obstacles in access to a status 
determination procedure (SEC (2008)7-8; UNHCR 2006:40 and 50; ECRE 2006:150-152; 
ECRE 2008:11-12 and 15).  
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In an even broader perspective, the Dublin system may be seen as having an adverse 
impact on the functioning of the CEAS as a whole. 
 
As noted above, the perceived “unfairness” of the system pushes asylum seekers to take 
evasive action – such as disposing of evidence and going “underground”. We would stress 
that such conduct is not necessarily an indicator of the fact that the asylum seeker 
concerned has no valid claim to protection. It may simply indicate that he or she has strong 
reasons for, or against, staying or being sent to a particular State. “Evasive” action may 
however come at a heavy price in terms of protection. The disposal of documents may, at a 
later stage, impair the asylum seeker’s credibility and/or reduce procedural guarantees 
(see e.g. art. 23(4) APD). The same observation applies to those asylum seekers that 
abscond after receiving a transfer decision, and report back eighteen months later – when 
the deadline to carry out the transfer has expired (see art. 19(4) and 20(2) DR). In this 
way, they are able to have their claim examined by the Member State of their choice (SEC 
(2008)10), but at the price of undermining their credibility. Finally, some asylum seekers 
reportedly abscond in order to evade a transfer, and do not claim asylum thereafter. In 
such cases, the Dublin system pushes asylum seekers to entirely forfeit their protection 
chances in favour of irregular stay in a particular State.  
 
This is highly detrimental to the central protection goal of the CEAS – “offering appropriate 
status to any third-country national requiring international protection” (art. 78 TFEU; see 
also recital 1 DR). Furthermore, this side-effect of the Dublin system is also highly 
undesirable in terms of an orderly migration management, entailing as it does “the creation 
of a pool of aliens, most often in an unlawful situation” (SEC (2001)3) and affecting the 
chances of returning those asylum seekers whose claims have been finally rejected (SEC 
(2000), para. 44). 
 
SOLUTION: THE TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS PROPOSED BY THE COMMISSION MAY 
MITIGATE IN PART THE PROBLEMS EXAMINED ABOVE. TRUE SOLUTIONS MAY HOWEVER 
ONLY COME, IN OUR VIEW, FROM A RECONSIDERATION OF THE DUBLIN SYSTEM 
The Recast Proposal includes a number of technical amendments designed to ensure a 
smoother operation of the Dublin system (e.g. new or revised deadlines, clarifications on 
contested points, the generalisation of conciliation procedures). These are all welcome 
proposal. However, they fail in our view to tackle the key efficiency problem, which resides 
in the fundamental unfairness of the Dublin system to asylum seekers 
 
The Recast Proposal includes a number of amendments to the Regulation in view of 
ensuring a smoother operation of the Dublin system (see recital 7 DPr). These 
amendments, largely procedural in nature, include: 
 
– Laying down new deadlines for “take back” requests and for replying to 
humanitarian requests, as well as shortened deadlines for replying to information 
requests; 
– The clarification of several rules whose implementation has given rise to 
disagreements in the past (e.g. burden of proof in case of cessation of 
responsibilities; allocation of costs for transfers); 
– The extension to all disputes arising under the Regulation of the (optional) 
conciliation procedure currently available in the context of the humanitarian clause; 
– The obligation to interview asylum seekers, which in the intention of the 
Commission should provide the Member States with the necessary information, and 
“improve the prospects of [asylum seekers] respecting the system rather than 
trying to evade it” (SEC (2008)16). 
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All of the above proposals are welcome. They may all be expected to increase the efficiency 
of the Dublin system to an extent, and to bring about limited improvements in the position 
of asylum seekers (UNHCR 2009a:15-16, 22-23).  
 
For the reasons explained above, however, we are not persuaded that they will significantly 
alter the situation as it stands today. “Dublin III” will be based on the same principles and, 
subject to limited improvements in regard of family unity (see above, Section II), on the 
same criteria as “Dublin II”. By and large, it will give its main actors, States and most of all 
asylum seekers, the same incentives as the present system. Of course, strengthened 
information rights might improve slightly the “prospects of [asylum seekers] respecting the 
system rather than trying to evade it”. However, securing widespread cooperation will likely 
require more decisive steps: a reduction of the “push” and “pull” factors (e.g. through 
harmonisation) and, crucially, a new approach recognising asylum seekers as “actors” of 
the system – bearers of legitimate interests and preferences – rather than as mere 
“targets” or “objects” of the system (JRS 2008:3; Noll 2003:252; for long-term proposals, 
see below, Part III). 
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KEY FINDINGS  
 
1. Due to both lacunae in the Dublin Regulation and Member States practice, 
and contrary to the goals of the Dublin system, asylum seekers do not 
always have access to a meaningful asylum procedure in the responsible 
State. This exposes asylum seekers to serious risks of refoulement.  
 
2. Despite progress made in the harmonization of national legislation, asylum 
standards still vary greatly, giving rise to concerns of failing protection and 
reception standards in some Member States. As a result, the Dublin system—
in general or individual cases—not only operates as an “asylum lottery”, but 
also generates risks of illegal refoulement.  
 
3. Even when faced with critical situations in some States, only a handful of 
national administrations have taken decisive action to satisfy them that an 
asylum seeker to be transferred does not incur any risk of ill-treatment or 
refoulement in the responsible State. More generally, the sovereignty clause 
is not consistently applied in line with a firm commitment to ensure respect 
for the principle of non-refoulement. A key factor behind the inconsistent and 
insufficient application of the sovereignty clause is that Dublin procedures fall 
short of basic standards of fairness, and effective remedies against transfers 
are not always guaranteed. The sub-standard application of the sovereignty-
clause can also be traced back to the generalised reluctance of sending 
States to consider the risks incurred by the asylum seekers in the responsible 
State.  
 
4. Both in their framing and in their application, the Dublin criteria on family 
unity are restrictive to the point of raising human rights concerns, and the 
discretionary clauses have proved ineffective to correct this shortcoming.  
 
5. Apart from family ties, the Dublin Regulation disregards the “close links” that 
may exist between asylum seekers and a particular Member State, negatively 
impacting on the former’s integration and well-being as well as on the 
efficiency of the Dublin system.  
 
6. Reception conditions of vulnerable persons in the State carrying out the 
Dublin procedure are of concern, due both to gaps in and misapplications of 
the EU legal framework.  
 
7. The Dublin Regulation does not provide sufficient guarantees against harmful 
transfers or denial of necessary treatment in the Destination State, resulting 
in serious harm and even fatal incidents.  
 
8. Due to their vulnerability, unaccompanied minors require particular attention, 
yet Dublin law and practice disclose an insufficient consideration for the “best 
interest” principle, and for other child-specific guarantees such as adequate 
representation. It is also apparent from Member State practice that 
unaccompanied minors happen to be transferred against their “best interest”.  
 
9. Some Member States rely excessively on uncertain age assessment 
techniques or treat age-disputed applicants as adults.  
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10. Though intended to contribute to a fair sharing of responsibilities, the Dublin 
system in some cases aggravates the imbalance in the distribution of asylum 
seekers, with detrimental effects in terms of effectiveness and protection.  
 
11. Most agreed transfers are ultimately not carried out, meaning that resources 
are wasted. Furthermore, the Dublin criteria have a minimal impact in 
practice, as in the overwhelming majority of cases the State responsible is 
the one where the application is first lodged. Finally, the Dublin system 
considerably delays access to asylum procedure and arguably undermines 
the protection objectives of the CEAS, in particular by providing asylum 
seekers with incentives to go “underground”. Aside from technical 
imperfections, these failures are apparently linked to the structural features 
of the system, and particularly to the unfairness of the system to asylum 
seekers.  
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. Solution to the lack of access to a meaningful asylum procedure: Article 
18(2) of the Recast Proposal would partially solve this problem. The version 
proposed in the latest Presidency Compromise text (doc. 17167/09) could 
provide a more comprehensive solution – provided that it is amended so as 
to grant asylum seekers, without ambiguity, a right to have their case 
reopened and to lodge an appeal once returned to the responsible State. 
 
2. Solution to concerns of failing protection and reception standards in some 
Member States: This problem cannot be tackled as such through a reform of 
the Dublin system. It requires decisive advances in harmonisation as well as 
strengthened supervision, capacity-building, and burden-sharing. 
 
3. Solution to the sub-standard application of the sovereignty-clause: We 
unreservedly support the relevant provisions of the Recast Proposal offering 
a comprehensive right to information (art. 4), the right to a hearing (art. 5), 
and most importantly a truly effective remedy against Dublin transfers 
(art. 26). Furthermore, the mechanism to suspend all transfers to a State 
where protection and reception standards fall below EU standards (art. 31 
Recast Proposal) would constitute a partial solution – though only for cases 
where “systemic” risks appear. It should be maintained and refined so as to 
ensure that it is applied exclusively with protection concerns in mind. In 
particular, art. 31 should be amended by making sure that collective 
suspensions are ordered exclusively in light of protection risks, and last as 
long as such risks exist. Formally involving UNHCR in the procedure could 
also bring added value. Finally, the EP amendment whereby the mechanism 
would cease to be applicable once EU burden-sharing mechanisms are put in 
place should, in our view, be reconsidered.  
 
4. In any event, the sovereignty clause would remain the ordinary instrument 
to prevent refoulement in the Dublin context. The preamble of the Dublin 
Regulation (recitals 3 and 14 of the Recast Proposal) should better highlight 
Member States’ responsibilities in preventing refoulement, thus 
counteracting, possibly, excessive reliance on “mutual trust”. This would be 
even more necessary in case the suspension mechanism was established: for 
all its merits, art. 31 Recast Proposal risks sending to national 
administrations wrong and dangerous signals, e.g. that the Commission is 
solely responsible to avoid refoulement in Dublin context. 
 
5. Solution to the restrictive framing and application of the criteria on family 
unity: The issues arising under the right to family life should be tackled, 
primarily, by enlarging the family definition and criteria. The Recast Proposal 
takes some welcome steps in this direction but needs to be improved. We 
fully support some provisions, such as art. 8 Recast Proposal – in regard of 
which, we would urge the European Parliament to reconsider the 
amendments it has adopted at first reading. Other provisions need 
refinement: first, the definition of “family member” should be further 
broadened, so as to include particularly the adult siblings of minors; second, 
the “time-rule” of art. 7(3) is indeed flawed – but it could be changed (see 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 166 
rewording proposal in the Chapter text) rather than deleted (as done in the 
EP first reading). Thirdly, art. 11 should refer to “family members and 
relatives” to avoid paradoxical results, and it should not include an 
exhaustive enumeration of dependency situations. Regrettably, the Proposal 
does not address a number of significant problems resulting from stark 
“status limitations”. 
 
6. Solution to the ineffectiveness of the discretionary clauses in regard to family 
unity: We support the Recast Proposal provisions amending the discretionary 
clauses as well as the “family recitals” in the preamble of the Regulation (for 
a minor suggestion for further improvement, see the Chapter text). 
 
7. Solution to the disregard to other “close links” than family ties: The Recast 
Proposal does not address the issue. In the short term, the humanitarian 
clause could be broadened to encompass “close links” beyond family ties, 
although real solutions to this problem would require rethinking the whole 
distributive concept underpinning the Dublin Regulation. 
 
8. Solution to the sub-standard reception conditions of vulnerable persons: To 
ensure appropriate identification and treatment of vulnerable applicants at all 
stages of the asylum process, the Commission has put forward welcome 
proposals, namely that it be clarified that the Reception Conditions Directive 
applies during Dublin procedures, and that mandatory screening procedures 
be established in national legislation. 
 
9. Solution to insufficient guarantees against harmful transfers or denial of 
necessary treatment in the Destination State: The Recast Proposal includes 
welcome amendments, such as the principle that only applicants that are “fit 
to travel” may be transferred, and provisions on information exchange 
between the competent administrations. These should however be 
strengthened through a mandatory “fit to travel” pre-transfer screening. 
 
10. Solution to the insufficient consideration for the “best interest” principle, and 
for other child-specific guarantees: Articles 4 to 6 Recast Proposal go a long 
way in tackling these problems, by strengthening the “horizontal” guarantees 
for minors in all Dublin procedures (“best interest” principle, appropriate 
representation, age-appropriate communication, right to a hearing). Our only 
suggestion in this respect is that qualification and independence 
requirements for minors’ representatives should be explicitly set out in article 
6 of the Recast Proposal. Furthermore, the Commission proposal to exempt 
altogether unaccompanied minors from (some) “take back” transfers in our 
view deserves further consideration. 
 
11. Solution to problems related to age assessment: The Recast Proposal does 
not address this issue. At first reading, the European Parliament has 
approved welcome amendments introducing some basic guarantees for age 
assessment. These do not, however, solve the central problem (uncertainty 
in age assessment). We would recommend introducing a “benefit of the 
doubt” principle in favour of age-disputed applicants. 
 
12. Solution to imbalance in the distribution of asylum seekers: Article 31 of the 
Recast Proposal would introduce a mechanism whereby transfers to 
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“overburdened” States may be suspended, triggering enhanced assistance to 
the concerned State. We support this proposal, even though we believe that 
the situations where the mechanism would be applicable are too narrowly 
defined (for suggested wording, see Chapter main text). We would also urge 
the European Parliament to reconsider the “sunset clause” introduced at first 
reading (amendments 40 and 41). It is important to bear in mind that the 
suspension mechanism would be a very partial solution: the distributive 
imbalances currently observed are largely independent from the operation of 
the Dublin system, and require decisive steps towards the establishment of 
permanent burden-sharing mechanisms, as required by the EP at first 
reading. 
 
13. Solution to failures linked to structural features of the Dublin system: While 
the technical amendments proposed by the Commission are welcome and 
may mitigate in part the serious inefficiency problems of the system (e.g. 
new or revised deadlines), true solutions can only come from a 
reconsideration of the latter’s central principles. 
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CHAPTER 2: QUALIFICATION DIRECTIVE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This part of the Assessment analyses problematic aspects of the current text of the 
Qualification Directive (qualification part of this instrument, while status part is only 
referred to on several connected aspects) and proposes short-term solutions.  
 
Since the Commission presented its’ Recast Proposal for Qualification Directive on 21 
October 2009, some of the problems identified and proposals to deal with them are already 
included in Commission’s suggestions. Also, due to recast legislative technique possibility of 
amendments to the Directive is limited to what the Commission amended in its proposal. 
However the authors wished to keep here also those suggestions that go even beyond the 
Commission Recast Proposal. The authors believe that the Commission unnecessary 
overlooked some of the very important problems, albeit for understandable reasons, thus 
would like to reflect on them for future perspective. In particular, the proposals may be 
further relevant in view of implementing the Stockholm Programme and building further 
stages of the Common European Asylum System that should be based on full and inclusive 
application of the Refugee Convention and other relevant international treaties. It is fairly 
obvious that existing divergences have a substantial impact upon the aims of the CEAS. It 
can be assumed that practices about the chance of being recognised on refugee grounds or 
subsidiary protection grounds may be a substantial factor in the decision-making process 
on where to apply for international protection (European Parliament evaluation, p. 4). 
 
The analysis of problems and proposed solutions is presented in the order of sequence of 
articles in the directive. 
1. REFUSAL OF PROTECTION WHEN A PERSON CREATES 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO PROTECTION 
NEEDS (ART. 5(2-3)) 
 
PROBLEM: Art. 5(2) comes close to requiring the “continuation of convictions“ as a 
condition for a well-founded fear or real risk, while it is not necessary under the Refugee 
Convention. Art. 5(3) provision may raise concern with regard to compliance with the 
Refugee Convention as the later does not provide for any limitations of protection in cases 
when a person himself/herself creates the circumstances leading to protection needs.  
 
Art. 5(2) comes close to requiring the „continuation of convictions“ as a condition for a 
well-founded fear or real risk, while it is not necessary under the Refugee Convention. Art. 
5(3) provision may raise concern with regard to the Refugee Convention as the later does 
not provide for any limitations of protection in cases when a person himself/herself creates 
the circumstances leading to protection needs. Protection under the Refugee Convention is 
not restricted to applicants acting in good faith. It can be inferred from Art. 4(3)(d) and 
Art. 20(6-7) of QD that engagement in activities for the purpose of acquiring refugee or 
subsidiary protection should not impede the grant of that status (Battjes, p. 261-262; Klug, 
p. 611-613; Storey, p. 26-28). 
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Regarding Art. 5(3), problems exist in the national transposition of QD. E.g., Art. 5(3) is 
applied not just to subsequent, but also to first applications in Bulgaria, Portugal, Slovenia, 
omitting the word „normally“ in Greece, Slovenia. It means that further harmonization with 
international law may be needed in this respect (Odysseus study, p. 42).  
 
SOLUTION: the second part of Art. 5(2) (starting from the words “in particular”) and Art. 
5(3) should be deleted. 
 
These provisions have not been proposed to amend in the Recast Proposal for Qualification 
Directive. Art. 5(2) and Art. 5(3) do not contradict with the Geneva Convention, because of 
the safeguards (the words “in particular” in Art. 5(2); reference to the Geneva Convention 
and the word “normally” in Art. 5(3)), but the transposition of these provisions creates 
problems in Member States’ practice. It is noteworthy, that the MSs could react to such 
situations while accessing the credibility (Art. 4(3)(d)) or while granting the scope of rights 
(Art. 20(6-7)), but not by refusal of protection. Furthermore, the only interpretation of Art. 
5(2-3), which were compatible with the Geneva Convention, is to understand Art. 5(2-3) 
not as grounds for refusing international protection, but as diminishing the credibility of an 
applicant (which is already covered by Art. 4(3)(d)). As international protection under the 
Refugee Convention is not restricted to applicants acting in good faith, Art. 5 should not 
have provisions implying the refusal of protection when a person creates the circumstances 
leading to protection needs.  
 
In spite of the phrase ‘without prejudice to the 1951 Geneva Convention’, the Meijers 
Committee suggests the possibility to incorporate more explicitly the fundamental 
consideration that it should always be assessed whether the requirements of the refugee 
definition are in fact fulfilled taking into account all the relevant facts surrounding the 
claim. The Meijers Committee furthermore emphasizes that it is very well possible that a 
person could create in ‘good faith’ circumstances giving rise to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted. The Committee recognizes that here may also be instances of persons 
‘manufacturing’ asylum motives while being outside their country of origin. However this 
raises issues of evidence and assessment of facts and credibility, which are covered by Art. 
4 (Meijers Committee Comments, p. 4). 
 
Therefore, the second part of Art. 5(2) (starting from the words “in particular”) and Art. 
5(3) should be deleted.  
2. THE POSSIBILITY OF NON-STATE PROTECTION AND 
THE NOTION OF PROTECTION WITHOUT THE 
REQUIREMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS (ART. 7(1-2)) 
 
PROBLEM: while the Refugee Convention does not require state persecution, but 
requires state protection, Art. 7(1)(b) allows the possibility of non-state protection. 
According to Art. 7(2) of the Directive, it is enough that state or non-state actors take 
“reasonable steps to prevent the persecution”, regardless of whether those steps lead 
to effective protection of individuals or not.  
 
While the Refugee Convention does not require state persecution, but requires state 
protection, Art. 7(1)(b) allows the possibility of non-state protection. Non-state entities and 
international organizations do not have the attributes of a State, and in practice can 
provide protection only to a very limited extent. According to Art. 7(2) of the Directive, it is 
enough that state or non-state actors take “reasonable steps to prevent the persecution”, 
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regardless of whether those steps lead to effective protection of individuals or not. Such 
approach might fail to take individual risks sufficiently into account. A number of individuals 
coming from countries of origin where international organization has a role to play may be 
deprived of protection contrary to the provisions of the Refugee Convention (Battjes, p. 
246-249; Klug, p. 606-607; Teitgen-Colly, p. 1545-1551; Storey, p. 25-26; Gil-Bazo, p. 
230; Garlic, p. 64-65). 
 
Regarding Art. 7, there is as yet no guidance on the interpretation of this provision 
regarding international organizations by the Council as provided for in Art. 7(3). It seems 
that a substantial number of EU Member States have not transposed this provision. In 
addition, it is unclear to what extent parties or non-state organizations may be considered 
as controlling a part of the territory of the state (European Parliament evaluation, p. 5). 
There is also a problem of non-state protection and UNHCR pays attention to the Swedish 
practice, where even non-state actors not controlling substantial part of the territory (e.g., 
tribes or clans) are considered as potential actors of protection, because the word „can“ in 
Art. 7(1) is interpreted as providing non-exhaustive list of actors of protection. Also in 
German practice the decisive criterion is not the size of the area under control, but the 
ability to control the area effectively. The example of recognised non-state actor of 
protection is also provided in the French practice, where prior to the entry into force of the 
2003 Asylum Law, UNMIK/KFOR was, in certain cases, considered as capable of providing 
protection in Kosovo (UNHCR study, p. 47-52). Most MSs have transposed Art. 7(1-2), and 
many MSs have not transposed Art. 7(3) (Odysseus study, p. 43-46). However, domestic 
law diverges as regards the question whether “parties and organisations, including 
international organisations” can provide protection as stated in Article 7(1)(b). As the 
reason for this disharmony may be possible tension with international law, amendment of 
these rules is recommendable (Odysseus study, p. 22). Taking into account international 
standards and divergent state practice, ECRE recommends MSs not to use the concept of 
non-state actors of protection to deny refugees asylum in Europe; and MSs should use their 
right to implement higher standards when applying Art. 7(2), and evaluate the actual 
availability of protection, rather than merely whether the state of protection “take[s] 
reasonable steps to” prevent persecution or serious harm (ECRE study, p. 16-17). 
 
As the Commission acknowledges in its Impact Assessment, the definition of the “actors of 
protection” concept does not contain adequate criteria for assessing the level and 
effectiveness of protection required, in line with the Geneva Convention and the ECHR, thus 
allowing MS to reject claims and return applicants to their country of origin despite the lack 
of effective protection. Moreover, this concept is defined in a broad and vague manner 
which creates a risk of diverse recognition practices (Commission Impact Assessment, p. 
12).  
 
The Commission explains that the lack of clarity of the concept allows for wide divergences 
and for very broad interpretations which may fall short of the standards set by the Geneva 
Convention on what constitutes adequate protection. For instance, national authorities 
interpreting broadly the current definition have considered clans and tribes as potential 
actors of protection despite the fact that these cannot be equated to States regarding their 
ability to provide protection. In other instances, authorities have considered non-
governmental organisations as actors of protection with regard to women at risk of female 
genital mutilation and honour killings, despite the fact that such organisations can only 
provide temporary safety or even only shelter to victims of persecution (Explanatory 
Memorandum to Recast Proposal, p. 6). 
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The recent judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union Salahadin Abdulla & 
Others vs. Bundesrepublik Deutschland states that Article 7(1) “does not preclude the 
protection from being guaranteed by international organisations, including protection 
ensured through the presence of a multinational force in that territory”. However, ECRE 
notes that the Court’s conclusion that actors of protection may comprise international 
organisations must be read in the context of the case presented to the Court (ECRE 
Comments on Recast Proposal, p. 7). Noteworthy that the opinion of the Advocate General 
Mazák implies that the protection through multinational troops is considered as the tool 
which the State could employ under Art. 7(1)(a), but not as a non-state protection under 
Art. 7(1)(b).  
 
2. SOLUTION: in Art. 7(1) protection should be characterized as effective, durable and 
provided only by the state. Consequently Art. 7(1)(b) should be deleted or limited only to 
de facto state authority. In Art. 7(2) the words “generally” and “inter alia“ should be 
deleted, making the conditions of Art. 7(2) obligatory, not just exemplary.  
 
Regarding Art. 7(1), in its Impact Assessment the Commission considers 2 main legislative 
options: 
 
– to specify that the list of actors of protection is an exhaustive one, to clarify that 
"parties" means political parties or entities and to require that such actors have 
administrative authority and full control over the territory and population in 
question;  
– to specify that the list of actors of protection is exhaustive, as well as to require that 
protection must be effective and durable and that the parties and organisations in 
question are willing and able to enforce the rule of law.  
 
The Commission concludes that Option 1 would stipulate with precision under what 
conditions parties and organisations may be equated to States regarding their ability to 
provide protection. However, this may exclude entities which might not have a "political" 
character or the attributes of a State but which would nevertheless be able to effectively 
provide protection in the context of a given country/society. To the extent that it imposes 
rather stringent conditions for the definition of the entities able to provide protection, 
Option 1 appears disproportionate. To the extent that it strengthens and clarifies the 
criteria for assessing the nature of the protection instead of overly restricting the definition 
of actors of protection, the Commission chooses Option 2 (Commission Impact Assessment, 
p. 21-22). 
 
Accordingly, in its Recast Proposal for Qualification Directive the Commission adds that 
protection “against persecution or serious harm must be effective and durable“, that 
protection “can only be provided“ by the actors listed in Article 7(1), and that non-state 
actors must be “willing and able to enforce the rule of law“ (Recast Proposal for 
Qualification Directive, Art. 7(1)). ECRE recommends amending recast Art. 7(1) to ensure 
that only State authorities can be considered actors of protection (ECRE Comments on 
Recast Proposal, p. 8).  
 
The Recast Proposal for Qualification Directive should solve most of the problems identified 
regarding Art. 7(1). Firstly, it requires that the list of protection actors must be exhaustive. 
Secondly, it requires that protection must be effective and durable. Thirdly, it requires that 
non-state actors must be willing and able to enforce the rule of law.  
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However, the Recast Proposal for Qualification Directive does not resolve fully the problem 
of non-state protection. As the Geneva Convention requires protection from the state, 
recognizing even a very effective protection from some organization would modify the 
refugee definition of the Geneva Convention. Therefore, the straight way to solve this 
problem is to delete Art. 7(1)(b) at all. It could also be claimed that the Option 1 from the 
Commission Impact Assessment (which has not been chosen by the Commission) might be 
in line with the Geneva Convention as the criteria of administrative authority and full 
control over the territory and population in question from the perspective of international 
law are attributes of de facto state authority.  
 
Regarding Art. 7(2), in its Recast Proposal for Qualification Directive the Commission only 
calls the protection “effective and durable“, but its definition remains the same and does 
not necessary lead to the effective and durable protection as it is still enough that state or 
non-state actors “take reasonable steps to prevent the persecution”, and “operating an 
effective legal system“ is still not necessary (Recast Proposal for Qualification Directive, Art. 
7(2)).  
 
The Meijers Committee suggests reconsidering whether a more elaborated description 
should be laid down with respect to the necessary ‘protection’ available. The current 
formulation of this article still allows an effective denial of protection so long as the State 
takes “reasonable steps” to prevent the infliction of persecution or harm (Meijers 
Committee Comments, p. 2). In order to put Art. 7(2) in compliance with the Geneva 
Convention, the phrase “prevent persecution” instead of the phrase “take reasonable steps 
to prevent the persecution” should be used and “operating an effective legal system“ 
should be an obligatory condition, not just exemplary.  
3. INTERNAL PROTECTION ALTERNATIVE TEST: TOO 
GENERAL AND NOT ENSURING THAT ALTERNATIVE 
IS ACCESSIBLE (ART. 8) 
 
PROBLEM: the test in Art. 8(1) (“the applicant can reasonably be expected to stay 
there”) is not specific at all. It gives complete discretion to the MSs and results in 
divergent interpretations of the concept across national jurisdictions. Art. 8(3) allow 
refusing protection despite technical obstacles to return might be evaluated as contrary 
to the Refugee Convention.  
 
The Refugee Convention as well as Art.3 of ECHR allows for application of the IPA, provided 
that there are three conditions met: (a) the alternative must be accessible; (b) the 
applicant must be safe there from well-founded fear of persecution and real risk of serious 
harm from the agent of persecution or serious harm who threatens the applicant elsewhere 
in the country; (c) there must be no well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of serious 
harm from another agent. If to ignore Art. 8(3) and read Art. 8(1) in conjunction with Art. 
7(2), then all three conditions would be met. The word “stay” in Art. 8(1) should be 
understood as “return”, otherwise a backward view would not be in line with the Refugee 
Convention. Attention should be paid to Salah Sheekh vs. Netherlands case (ECHR) as 
influencing future interpretation of the IPA in EU Member States (Battjes, p. 249-254; Klug, 
p. 607-609; Teitgen-Colly, p. 1551-1553; Storey, p. 45-48; Garlic, p. 65-66). 
 
According to Art. 8, Member States may apply internal protection alternative. This has led 
to divergent MSs practices. Further legislation may clarify the conditions under which the 
internal protection alternative is applicable. The provision should state more precisely the 
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requirements concerning living conditions of an applicant. It is also argued by UNHCR that 
Art. 8 QD omits what is considered by UNHCR an essential requirement of an internal 
protection alternative, i.e. that the proposed location is practically, safely and legally 
accessible to the applicant (European Parliament evaluation, p. 3, 5).  
 
Art. 8 can be described just as initial framework for the assessment of IPA. However, the 
state practice in its application suggests that there are divergent interpretations of the 
concept across national jurisdictions concerning applicants from the same countries and 
similar situations. For example, in France and Sweden the concept of IPA was not applied in 
the cases of Chechen applicants, and contrary, in Germany most parts of the Russian 
Federation were accepted as possible internal protection alternatives. Art. 8(3) is evaluated 
as contrary to the Refugee Convention (UNHCR study, p. 64-66).  
 
Most MSs have transposed Art. 8(1-2), and not transposed Art. 8(3). The Swedish and 
Romanian laws contain interesting practice that may flesh out the conditions for application 
of the rule in Art. 8(1) - „the applicant can reasonably be expected to stay there“. The 
Romanian Law requires that the possibility of IPA is recognized by the UNHCR. Swedish Law 
requires that an applicant has actual possibility to live a life without unnecessary suffering 
or hardship in that part of the country (Odysseus study, p. 46-48). With regard to Art. 
8(3), because of disharmony on application of this provision and possible tension with 
international law, the Odysseus study recommends amending these rules (p. 22).  
 
ECRE study recommends: when applying the IPA, states should always ascertain that the 
country of origin provides sufficient, accountable, and durable protection; Member States 
should not apply the IPA when the state is the actor of persecution, or the persecution is in 
any way imputable to the state; Member States should not apply the IPA as a blanket 
measure, as this contravenes the requirement to consider each asylum application on its 
merits; Member States should not apply the IPA when return is in fact impossible due to 
technical obstacles (without access, no IPA exists); MSs that use article 8(3) to refuse 
protection despite technical obstacles to return should provide an alternative legal status to 
those who cannot return (p. 17-19).  
 
As the Commission acknowledges in its Impact Assessment, the definition of the “internal 
protection” concept does not contain adequate criteria for assessing the level and 
effectiveness of protection required, in line with the Geneva Convention and the ECHR, thus 
allowing MS to reject claims and return applicants to their country of origin despite the lack 
of effective protection. Moreover, this concept is defined in a broad and vague manner 
which creates a risk of diverse recognition practices (Commission Impact Assessment, p. 
12). The Commission explains that the purpose and content of international protection are 
not limited to non-refoulement. It is necessary thus to specify that it may be withheld only 
where protection is available in at least part of the country of origin. It is also necessary to 
ensure the compatibility of the concept of internal protection with Article 3 ECHR, as 
interpreted in a recent judgment of Salah Sheekh vs. Netherlands case (Explanatory 
Memorandum to Recast Proposal, p. 7). 
 
SOLUTION: art. 8(3) should be deleted as contrary to the Geneva Convention. Art. 8(1) 
should specify IPA criteria making reference to Art. 7 criteria (i.e., providing effective and 
durable protection; operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and 
punishment of acts constituting persecution or serious harm, and the applicant has access 
to such protection); making reference to the Salah Sheekh vs. Netherlands judgment 
criteria (i.e., he or she can safely and legally travel, gain admittance and settle); adding 
the word “access” which is important element of the IPA test; and deleting the word „stay“ 
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which could suggest a backward view contrary to the Refugee Convention.  
 
Regarding Art. 8(1), in its Impact Assessment the Commission considers 2 main legislative 
options: 
 
– to specify the criteria to be used for the "reasonableness" analysis based on the 
relevant UNHCR Guidelines, i.e. safety and security of the applicant, respect for 
his/her fundamental rights and the possibility to survive at a basic level of 
subsistence;  
– to introduce an additional requirement, namely that the applicant should be able to 
travel to, gain admittance and settle in the proposed alternative location (according 
to the criteria as mentioned in ECHR judgment in Salah Sheekh vs. Netherlands 
case).  
 
The Commission concludes that by establishing criteria to be used for the reasonableness 
analysis, Option 1 might result in introducing "new", additional restrictions to the use of the 
concept. Option 2, on the other hand, would only introduce in the Directive the conditions 
set out in the Salah Sheekh vs. Netherlands judgment; thus, they would not go beyond the 
transposition of MS' obligations under the ECHR into the EU acquis. Therefore the 
Commission chooses Option 2 (Commission Impact Assessment, p. 22-24). 
 
Accordingly, in its Recast Proposal for Qualification Directive the Commission proposes the 
phrase “he or she has access to protection against persecution or serious harm as defined 
in Article 7 in a part of the country of origin“ instead of the current phrase ”in a part of the 
country of origin there is no well-founded fear of being persecuted or no real risk of 
suffering serious harm“ and the phrase „he or she can safely and legally travel, gain 
admittance and settle“ instead of the current phrase „the applicant can reasonably be 
expected to stay“ (Recast Proposal for Qualification Directive, Art. 8(1)). 
 
ECRE also recommends maintaining the requirement in Article 8 to assess whether the 
applicant “can reasonably be expected to stay”, in line with the UNHCR guidelines on 
“Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative” so as to ensure that the person concerned can 
relocate to the country of origin and lead a relatively normal life there, without undue 
hardship. In this respect UNHCR indicates that a “reasonableness analysis” includes the 
assessment of different factors, including the personal circumstances of the applicant and 
the possibility for economic survival in the area (ECRE Comments on Recast Proposal, p. 9).  
 
The Recast Proposal for Qualification Directive should solve most of the identified problems 
regarding Art. 8(1). Firstly, it specifies the IPA test by making a reference to Art. 7 criteria 
(i.e., providing effective and durable protection; operating an effective legal system for the 
detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution or serious harm, 
and the applicant has access to such protection). Secondly, it also specifies the IPA test by 
making a reference to the Salah Sheekh vs. Netherlands judgment criteria (i.e., he or she 
can safely and legally travel, gain admittance and settle). Thirdly, it adds the word „access“ 
which is the important element of the IPA test. Fourthly, it deletes the word „stay“ which 
could suggest a backward view contrary to the Refugee Convention.  
 
However, one more important element of the IPA test should be added in order to facilitate 
less divergent MS‘ practice based on full and inclusive interpretation and application of the 
Geneva Convention, i.e. the respect for his/her fundamental rights and the possibility to 
survive at a basic level of subsistence. According to the Geneva Convention, without 
respect for fundamental rights and the possibility to survive at a basic level of subsistence 
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in the absence of effective State protection would amount to persecution, but due to its 
economical aspect this element frequently is not taken into account in MS‘ practice. In its 
Impact Assessment the Commission mentions this element as the Option 1 and explains 
that this element is not new (as it emanates from the Geneva Convention). However, the 
Commission does not include this element in its Recast Proposal for Qualification Directive 
for political reasons (as introducing "new", additional restrictions to the use of the concept 
might meet resistance from the Member States).  
 
Regarding Art. 8(3), in its Recast Proposal for Qualification Directive the Commission 
proposes to delete the current Art. 8(3) that IPA may apply notwithstanding technical 
obstacles to return to the country (Recast Proposal for Qualification Directive, Art. 8). As 
the current Art. 8(3) is evaluated as contrary to the Geneva Convention the proposal seems 
to be the best way to solve this problem.  
4. PROSECUTION FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 
NOT COVERED BY PERSECUTION AS A BASIS FOR 
REFUGEE STATUS (ART. 9(2)(E)) 
 
PROBLEM: as conscientious objection is not specifically mentioned in QD, the practice of 
MSs regarding persecution by prosecution of draft evaders varies a lot. Mentioning only 
excludable acts, the QD does not seem to cover other situations (i.e. conscientious 
objection in the absence of alternative to military service). 
 
The practice of MS regarding persecution by prosecution of draft evaders varies a lot. As 
the limited scope to fall under the refugee definition following the QD includes only person 
forced to engage in committing excludable acts, other situations (e.g. conscientious 
objection not related to religion, but e.g. moral convictions, etc.) do not seem to be 
covered. Given the recognition of an evolving right to conscientious objection in human 
rights discussions, recognition of conscientious objection would have been logical (Battjes, 
p. 234; Klug, p. 603-604). 
 
In practice, most MSs have transposed Art. 9(2). In few Member States domestic 
legislation requires that in order to qualify as an act of persecution, performing military 
service must include committing acts as mentioned in Article 12(2) (as suggested by Article 
9(2)(e)): Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Portugal, Romania (Odysseus study, p. 50-
51). As in some states, the danger of committing such crimes in this context is a 
requirement for recognition of draft evaders as refugees, in order to further harmonise and 
avoid possible collision with international law, clarification that this danger is not required is 
recommended (Odysseus study, p. 23). Illustrative of the problems is the example of 
France, where the authorities seem to have a broader understanding than Art. 9(2)(e) 
because acts of persecution can take the form of prosecution or punishment for refusal to 
perform military service in a conflict for political, religious or ethnic reasons. On the other 
hand, in Poland the Office for Aliens does not consider such refusal to perform military 
service as grounds for refugee status (ECRE study, p. 20).  
 
SOLUTION: art. 9(2)(e) should be amended to include refusal to perform military service 
(and not only in a conflict) due to conscientious objection as a possible case of persecution.  
 
This provision has not been proposed to amend in the Recast Proposal for Qualification 
Directive. Art. 9(2)(e) does not contradict with the Geneva Convention, because of the 
safeguards (the words “inter alia” in Art. 9(2)), but the transposition of this provision 
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creates problems in Member States’ practice. It might be other circumstances than 
mentioned in Art. 9(2)(e) in which the prosecution or punishment for refusal to perform 
military service might also amount to persecution (i.e., the cases of conscientious objection 
and not only in a conflict). Noteworthy, that decisions in Streletz and others vs. Germany 
case (ECtHR), Krotov case (UK court), BE case (UK court) show that military forces might 
commit crimes during peacetime as well, e.g. land-mining the border territory and 
shooting-to-kill civilians who attempt to cross the border. Therefore, in order to avoid 
problems in practice with Art. 9(2)(e) being interpreted as the only possible case when the 
prosecution or punishment for refusal to perform military service might amount to 
persecution, Art. 9(2) should also include other cases. The United Nations Human Rights 
Committee in the case of Yeo-Bum Yoon and Myung-Jin Choi vs. Republic of Korea and in 
its General Comment No. 22 (48) on Art. 18 of ICCPR (right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion) specifically interpreted Article 18 of ICCPR (the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion) as protecting conscientious objection to military service. 
The situation became contradictory when on 27 October 2009, in the case of Bayatyan vs. 
Armenia, the European Court of Human Rights held, that freedom of conscience as defined 
in Art. 9 of ECHR does not protect the rights of conscientious objectors who refuse to serve 
in the military. However, the ECtHR practice does not change ICCPR standards, protecting 
the rights of conscientious objectors. ECRE recommends adding a recital relating to Art. 
(9)(2)(e) to recognise persecution arising from conscientious objection to military service 
(ECRE Comments on Recast Proposal, p. 10).  
5. NEXUS BETWEEN LACK OF PROTECTION AND 
PERSECUTION GROUNDS NOT INCLUDED (ART. 9(3)) 
 
PROBLEM: the QD rules on the nexus with the Refugee Convention grounds are overly 
restrictive, because Art. 9(3) excludes possible link between the Convention grounds 
and the lack of protection. It often results in state practice that is not in conformity 
with existing case law on the Refugee Convention. 
 
The QD rules on the nexus with the Refugee Convention grounds are overly restrictive, 
because Art. 9(3) excludes the possible link between these grounds and the lack of 
protection. But the QD is not consistent on this matter, as Art. 6(1)(c) defines actors of 
“harm” by reference to actors of “protection”. This problem might be solved reading this 
provision purposively so as to ensure conformity with existing case law on the Refugee 
Convention (Battjes, p. 258-260; Storey, p. 26). 
 
Legal conflicts may arise from the different interpretation of the Convention. Thus, for 
example, in some Member States a person would not qualify for refugee status if the act of 
persecution was not committed for reasons of a Convention ground even though protection 
is withheld on such a ground. This practice is in accordance with the text of Art. 9(3); 
however, some Member States may argue that recognition in such case is required by the 
Geneva Convention and therefore the directive would have to be interpreted following Art. 
63 of the TEC in accordance with the Refugee Convention (European Parliament evaluation, 
p. 2-3). In practice, most MSs require nexus between persecution (not lack of protection) 
and persecution grounds (ECRE study, p. 144-146). Currently, there are a number of states 
that refuse refugee status in case of lacking nexus to persecution, even if such nexus could 
be established with lacking protection. Worthwhile mentioning that a number of MSs did not 
transpose this mandatory requirement, while in a number of states the transposition states 
more favourable standards (Odysseus study, p. 16). The tension concerning this provision 
would be solved by deleting the provision or by adding the provision that states that a link 
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between lack of protection and persecution grounds would also suffice (Odysseus study, p. 
23).  
 
The Commission explains that in many cases where persecution emanates from non-State 
actors, such as militia, clans, criminal networks, local communities or families, the act of 
persecution is not committed for reasons related to a Geneva Convention ground but, for 
instance, with criminal motivations or for private revenge. However, it often happens in 
such cases that the State is unable or unwilling to provide protection to the individual 
concerned because of a reason related to the Geneva Convention (for example religion, 
gender, ethnicity etc). Therefore, such protection gap should be addressed in Art. 9(3) 
(Explanatory Memorandum to Recast Proposal, p. 7). 
 
SOLUTION: art. 9(3) should be amended by adding a link between lack of protection and 
persecution grounds as a possible nexus in refugee definition.  
 
In its Recast Proposal for Qualification Directive the Commission, in order to address 
potential protection gaps, makes it explicit that the requirement of connection between the 
acts of persecution and the reasons for persecution is also fulfilled where there is a 
connection between the acts of persecution and the absence of protection against such acts 
(Explanatory Memorandum to Recast Proposal, p. 7, Art. 9(3)). And that would completely 
solve the identified legal problem.  
 
ECRE supports recast Art. 9(3) clarifying that the causal nexus requirement encompasses 
not only situations when there is an act of persecution but also where there is a failure to 
provide protection for Convention reasons (ECRE Comments on Recast Proposal, p. 10).  
6. CUMULATIVE TEST OF SOCIAL GROUP AND WEAK 
REFERENCE TO GENDER RELATED ASPECTS (ART. 
10(1)(D)) 
 
PROBLEM: art. 10(1)(d) raises the issues related to cumulative application of “social 
perception“ and “protected characteristics” requirements in social group test, and to 
non-presumption of social group from gender related aspects alone. The provisions are 
weak. They give a broad discretion to the MSs and involve the risk that persecution on 
the basis of social group (in particular on the basis of gender) will not be sufficiently 
considered.  
 
It might be claimed that non-presumption of social group from gender related aspects 
alone does not contradict the Refugee Convention, because it is obvious that social groups 
should be identified in a social context, not in abstract. On the other hand, given the 
positive developments in recognition practice and jurisprudence with regard to persecution 
on the basis of gender, the provision referring to gender related aspects is surprisingly 
weak and involves the risk that persecution on the basis of gender will not be sufficiently 
considered. The clause seems to leave the matter to the MSs. It might also be claimed that 
cumulative application of „social perception“ and „protected characteristics“ requirements in 
social group test does not contradict with the Refugee Convention, because it is doubtful 
that it might be a common characteristic of a social group that is not innate or otherwise 
deserve protection. On the other hand, cumulative social group test might be regarded as 
restrictive. Art. 10(1)(d) is formulated in a cautious manner, probably because of increase 
in applications for protection which could result (Battjes, p. 255-258; Klug, p. 610-611; 
Teigen-Colly, p. 1532-1533). 
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Although Art. 10(1)(d) contributes now to a common understanding of the concept some 
controversial questions have not been solved. Thus, for instance, Art. 10 states that 
“gender related aspects might be considered, without by themselves alone creating a 
presumption for the applicability of this Article”. The existing information on state practices, 
however indicates that domestic law largely differs as regards the question whether a 
particular social group can be defined on gender-related aspects alone. It is also by no 
means clear that Art. 10(1)(d), mentioning two requirements for forming a particular social 
group, means that these requirements apply cumulatively, since the different language 
versions of the Directive indicate different interpretations (European Parliament evaluation, 
p. 3). According to Odysseus study, two requirements for constituting a social group 
mentioned in Art. 10(1)(d) is applied in some MS alternatively and in some - cumulatively, 
thus clarification seems desirable. The same applies to the issue whether such a group can 
be defined on the basis of gender related aspects alone (p. 22). For illustration, German 
definition of persecution solely for reasons of gender as persecution for membership in a 
particular social group could be noted. It encompasses such cases as female genital 
mutilation, forced marriages and honour crimes. Regarding the test of social group, it is 
recommendable to interpret “particular social group” in a broad and inclusive way; MSs 
should use the flexibility afforded by the words “in particular” in Art. 10(1)(d) to grant 
protection based either on innate characteristic or social perception, rather than requiring 
both, as the remainder of Art. 10(1)(d) appears to indicate. This interpretation is consistent 
with the Refugee Convention, in that protection is provided solely on the basis of an innate 
characteristic, but if a persecutor perceives that characteristic, then whether or not an 
individual actually possesses the characteristic is immaterial to the risk of persecution 
(ECRE study, p. 20-21). 
 
As the Commission acknowledges in its Impact Assessment, the definition of the concept 
"membership of a particular social group" regarding the significance to be attached to 
gender-related aspects allows for interpretations which may result in denial of protection 
for women, as well as for diverse recognition practices of applicants with similar claims 
(Commission Impact Assessment, p. 12). The Commission explains that gender as such is 
normally not sufficient as a criterion for the definition of a particular social group; it is 
generally used in combination with other factors, such as class, marital status, ethnic or 
clan affiliation. However, women may form a particular social group in certain societies, as 
evidenced by discrimination in their fundamental rights. The ambiguous wording of the last 
phrase of Art. 10(1)(d) allows for protection gaps and for very divergent interpretations 
(Explanatory Memorandum to Recast Proposal, p. 8). 
 
SOLUTION: art. 10(1)(d) should be amended by stating that „social perception“ and 
„protected characteristics“ requirements are alternative; and that gender related aspects 
are in particular relevant for both social group tests.  
 
Regarding Art. 10(1)(d), in its Impact Assessment the Commission considers 3 main 
legislative options: 
– to explicitly allow MS to adopt the alternative application of the two relevant criteria 
by providing for the possibility to define a particular social group based on either 
one of the two criteria mentioned including based solely on gender-related aspects;  
– to replace the last phrase of Article 10(1)(d) with a provision specifying that gender 
related aspects should be given due consideration for the purposes of recognising 
membership of a particular social group or identifying a characteristic of such a 
group;  
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– to replace the last phrase of Article 10(1)(d) as under Option 2 and also to specify 
that, for this ground to apply, it suffices that one of the two requirements is met.  
 
The Commission concludes that all legislative options can be considered proportionate; 
however it appears that Option 1 would be an inadequate measure in terms of raising 
protection standards, improving efficiency and ensuring a consistent application. Option 3 
would have the most positive effects in terms of ensuring that all MS adopt a progressive 
and inclusive application of this Geneva Convention ground but it might meet with strong 
resistance from a significant number of Member States. Therefore, the Commission chooses 
Option 2 (Commission Impact Assessment, p. 24-26). 
 
Accordingly, in its Recast Proposal for Qualification Directive the Commission does not 
change cumulative test of social group, but adds the phrase “gender related aspects should 
be given due consideration for the purposes of determining membership of a particular 
social group or identifying a characteristic of such a group“ instead of the phrase „gender 
related aspects might be considered, without by themselves alone creating a presumption 
for the applicability of this Article“ (Recast Proposal for Qualification Directive, Art. 
10(1)(d)). 
 
The Commission Recast Proposal for Qualification Directive does not solve the problem of 
cumulative test of social group, but provides a stronger provision for the consideration of 
gender related aspects. The Meijers Committee and ECRE are content with the new 
reference to the role of gender aspects in defining ‘particular social group’ ground for 
persecution in Art. 10(1)(d) (Meijers Committee Comments, p. 4; ECRE Comments on 
Recast Proposal, p. 10-11). However, it is noteworthy that the provision has the word 
“should” instead of “shall”, and thus still leaves a possibility not to consider gender related 
aspects.  
 
As it was identified, a cumulative test might not be fully compatible with the Geneva 
Convention, and therefore must be changed to an alternative test of social group. It is also 
noteworthy that a cumulative test has internal contradiction with Art. 10(2) of QD, which 
could be understood as stating that “social perception” is sufficient even in the absence of 
“protected characteristics”. 
7. CESSATION OF REFUGEE STATUS AND SUBSIDIARY 
PROTECTION: DENIAL OF PROTECTION DUE TO 
INSUFFICIENT HARMONISATION (ART. 11, 14(2), 16 
AND 19(4)) 
 
PROBLEM: due to insufficient harmonisation of requirements for application of cessation 
of refugee status and subsidiary protection some Member States tend to examine the 
existence of current risk of persecution/harm rather than assessing the durability of 
eliminated risk along with availability of protection.  
This results in incorrect practical application of cessation thereby prematurely denying 
protection to persons who continue to be in need of it. 
 
Given that the QD allows issuance of residence permits with limited validity (3 years for 
refugees and 1 year for persons with subsidiary protection), non-renewal of permits may 
become an easy way for MSs to de facto deny protection without having to engage in a 
formal procedure to withdraw status. Also, in some MSs domestic law states additional 
grounds or overly wide grounds for cessation or exclusion. This possibility to deny status to 
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people entitled to it under the directive must be considered as a violation. Furthermore, 
many MSs have failed the rule on the burden of proof, which requires the authorities to 
“demonstrate on an individual basis” that the person has ceased to be a refugee or a 
person eligible for subsidiary protection (Art. 14(2) and 19(4) of QD) (Odysseus study, p. 
17). This leads to a conclusion that cessation under QD has been only partially harmonised 
(Odysseus study, p. 55). On 28 April 2008 German Federal Administrative Court made 
submission to EU Court on application of Art. 11(1)(e) QD. German example may be 
illustrative of the problem in this respect. According to UNHCR, the authorities in Germany 
have interpreted the criteria for cessation in a manner which focuses on whether, at the 
time of the review, the individual faces a risk of persecution in the country of origin, either 
in the form of continuation of the previous danger or a new risk. In practice, this approach 
has led to the systematic revocation of the refugee status of Iraqis, who later on were once 
again recognized as refugees, leaving previous cessation meaningless (UNHCR Statement 
on Cessation, p. 9-11). The Advocate General Mazák claims that cessation can only occur if 
lasting solution free from persecution is available for refugee in country of origin. If the 
situation is unsettled and unpredictable or serious violations of human rights could lead to 
seeking refugee status again, the change of circumstances cannot be considered significant 
and non-temporary and thus the level of protection is clearly unavailable and ineffective. 
On 2 March 2010 the EU Court delivered a decision in Aydin Salahadin Abdulla and 
Others221 stating that “a person loses the status when, following a change of circumstances 
of a significant and non-temporary nature in the third country concerned, the 
circumstances which had justified the person’s fear of persecution no longer exist and he 
has no other reason to fear being persecuted.” This Court decision clarifies the application 
of cessation to a certain extent, while defining the cessation notion in QD would still be 
beneficial.  
 
Considering this situation it is important to note that cessation requires a specific 
assessment of the nature of changes, which goes beyond the recognition. Art. 11(1)(e) QD 
is based on Art. 1(C)(5) of the Refugee Convention, thus in order to cease refugee status, 
changes in the country of origin must be fundamental and durable, and effective protection 
must be available there. As concerns the criteria of cessation, mere absence of risk of 
persecution is not enough, there should be also effective protection available (UNHCR 
Statement on Cessation, p. 12). Therefore, the MSs should not apply Art. 11(1)(e) by using 
the same procedure as for qualification for protection, but rather through cessation 
procedure, which looks not only at existence of the risk, but also durability of elimination of 
previous risk and availability of effective protection. The directive provisions do not 
currently ensure that this is the case (Battjes, p. 268, Gil-Bazo, p. 260).  
 
As concerns cessation of subsidiary protection, the cessation ground in Art. 16(1) combines 
Art. 1C(5) and (6) of the Refugee Convention. This provision seems to imply that there 
should be determination taking place on whether the grounds that caused subsidiary 
protection still exist. Therefore, in order to apply cessation clauses the MSs should ensure 
that proper status determination takes place again. This understanding is also confirmed by 
the rule contained in the QD on burden of proof in case of withdrawal of status. According 
to Art. 19(4), the state has to demonstrate whether any of the termination grounds applies 
to the subsidiary protection beneficiary. Art. 14(2) QD also shifts the burden of proof on the 
state, but only as far as cessation of refugee status in accordance with Art. 11 is 
concerned. The practice of several MSs shows that they did not apply the cessation 
provision correctly, therefore the provision needs to be clarified. Furthermore, it should be 
                                                 
221  Salahadin Abdulla and Others vs. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, C-175/08; C-176/08; C-178/08 & C-
179/08,  European Court of Justice, 2 March 2010. 
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clearly distinguished between the right to protection and residence permit should be 
reinforced. In this context, the imperative nature of the revocation clauses (‘Member States 
shall revoke or end’ the status) contrasts with the system of the Refugee Convention, 
under which cessation de jure ends entitlements under the Convention, but without 
touching upon the issue of the residence right. The Netherlands, for example, has 
implemented the obligation of revocation or ending the status by stating in imperative 
terms that the residence permit must be revoked or ended. Such implementation may 
come in conflict with the goal of facilitating the integration of third-country nationals who 
have resided legally for a period of time, irrespective of the initial grounds on which 
residence was granted. This goal has been repeatedly formulated by the European Council 
(see amongst others the Tampere Conclusions). UNHCR’s Executive Committee, in 
Conclusion No. 69, has also recommended that States consider a (possibly alternative) 
residence status for long-settled refugees whose refugee status is being withdrawn and 
“who cannot be expected to leave the country of asylum, due to a long stay in that country 
resulting in strong family, social and economic links”. Accordingly, the Meijers Committee 
suggests substituting the term ‘shall’ for ‘may’ in Articles 14(1) and 19(1). A paragraph 
could further be added which would clarify that in decisions concerning the revocation or 
ending of the residence right of protection beneficiaries, other factors than the eligibility 
criteria laid down in the Directive should be taken into account, including the family, social 
and economic ties in the Member State (Meyers Committee Comments). 
 
If these issues are not addressed secondary movements within the EU are bound to 
increase and legal limbo situations for persons for whom protection was legally ended but 
who cannot de facto as yet enjoy national protection might become more frequent. 
 
SOLUTION: DENIAL OF PROTECTION DUE TO INSUFFICIENT HARMONISATION (Art. 11, 
14(2), 16, 19(4)): clarify the requirements of cessation of refugee status and subsidiary 
protection notion by adding a definition of cessation in Art. 2, which includes inter alia the 
requirement to assess the previous risk, the durability of its elimination, any new risks and 
the availability of effective protection, as well as reinforces the difference between the right 
to protection and corresponding residence permit. 
 
As the practice of several MSs shows that they do not apply the cessation provision 
correctly, clarification on what cessation means through defining cessation among the main 
notions in Art. 2 QD would ensure better harmonisation of MS cessation practices, reduce 
the number of cases of preliminary rulings to the EU Court and add value of ensuring that 
persons who are not yet able to enjoy national protection of their countries of origin (e.g. 
Afghan, Iraqi, Chechen and other beneficiaries of protection) are not denied protection in a 
premature way. This as a result would prevent secondary movements within the EU and 
minimize occurrence of legal limbo situations for persons for whom protection was legally 
ended but who cannot de facto as yet enjoy national protection. In addition, it will also 
save resources that would be spent as a result of premature cessation and the need to 
examine the applications once again (e.g. refer to situation of Germany with Iraqis).  
8. DENIAL OF PROTECTION: EXCLUSION, CESSATION 
AND REVOCATION CLAUSES BEYOND PERMITTED 
LIMITS OF MEMBER STATES’ OBLIGATIONS (ART. 14 
(4-5), 17 (1), 19) 
 
PROBLEM: confusion of exclusion/cessation clauses with exceptions to non-
refoulement, as well as obligatory exclusion from subsidiary protection disregarding the 
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absolute prohibition of refoulement poses a risk to compliance of MS practices with the 
Refugee Convention and the Treaty of European Union, thereby undermining the 
objective of the Union to provide protection to those in need. 
 
There is an apparent confusion in the QD itself, even more in MS practice, as concerns the 
correct application of the Refugee Convention notions. Therefore various practical and legal 
problems occur: 
 
1. Firstly, Art. 14(4) and 14(5) QD dealing with exceptions to non-refoulement 
include what constitutes de facto provisions on exclusion, going beyond what 
is permissible under the Refugee Convention.  
2. Secondly, mandatory exclusion from subsidiary protection may run counter 
with prevailing international obligations of MSs and “minimum standards” 
required by the TEU.  
 
Provisions of Art. 14(4) and 14(5) QD have a historical relevance because at the time of 
adoption of the Commission proposal, the exceptions to non-refoulement (Art. 19(2) of the 
Proposal) were deleted and security concerns have instead become a ground for exclusion, 
rather than an exception to non-refoulement (considering that the proposal was adopted on 
12 September 2001, just in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 attacks in the US). With 
regard to revocation, this provision constitutes de facto exclusion clause regardless of 
whether or not it was called so. It is misleading to call Art. 14 as revocation article (as 
opposed to Art. 12, the exclusion article), because no meaningful difference is drawn 
between revocation and exclusion. Furthermore, Art. 21 already provides for revocation of 
the right to non-refoulement for refugees on the basis of security reasons or that the 
person constitutes a danger to the community of the state. This already reflects Art. 33(2) 
of the Refugee Convention albeit with the modification that MS may refoule a refugee 
“whether formally recognised or not”. National security reasons and convictions for a 
“particularly serious crime” maintained as quasi-exclusion grounds under the revocation 
provisions may be potentially in breach of MSs obligations under the Refugee Convention 
(ECRE Comments on Recast Proposal, pp. 17, 5). The problem is not only theoretical, but 
also part of practice. E.g., Germany merges provisions on exclusion with provisions which 
stem from exceptions to the principle of non-refoulement. As such, the legislation in 
Germany has expanded the category of persons who may be excluded from refugee status 
beyond the exhaustive list contained in the Refugee Convention (UNHCR study, p. 13). 
Similarly, in the Netherlands and Greece, a person may be excluded for having committed 
serious non-political crime in the asylum country. Argument for this clause was that the 
difference of treatment of a person who is excluded and that of a refugee who is not given 
the benefit of non-refoulement is insignificant (this was concluded by Danish Presidency in 
note to SCIFA in November 2002). It appears that the Directive may have served as a tool 
for an increasingly expansive use of exclusion clauses in the MSs (ECRE Comments on 
Recast Proposal, p. 17). However, there is indeed a difference between denial (exclusion) 
and termination of refugee status (as a form of asylum in the wording of the EU Charter on 
Fundamental Rights) as concerns Art. 14(4) (which is based on Art. 33(2) of the Refugee 
Convention), as the relevant criteria and legal consequences of these two articles differ. 
The consequence of exclusion under Art. 1F is the denial of a set of rights attached to 
refugee status, including protection from removal to a country where s/he could face 
persecution (UNHCR Statement on Exclusion, p. 11, 16). Unlike Art. 1F, Art. 33(2) of the 
Refugee Convention does not form part of the refugee definition and does not constitute a 
ground for exclusion from refugee protection. The application of Art. 33(2) affects the 
treatment afforded to refugees, rather than their recognition. The QD confirms this by 
allowing MSs to reduce or limit the entitlements accorded to refugees or subsidiary 
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protection beneficiaries on considerations of “national security and public order” (recital 28 
read together with Art. 21 and 24 QD). But this is not sufficient to constitute grounds for 
exclusion. In addition, exclusion grounds are exhaustive and do not allow the addition of 
other situations, including those of Art. 33(2) of the Refugee Convention (Art. 42 of the 
Refugee Convention). Therefore, a decision to exclude an applicant based on findings that 
he/she constitutes a risk to the security of the host country, would be contrary to the 
object and purpose of Art. 1F and the conceptual framework of the Refugee Convention 
(UNHCR Statement on Exclusion, p. 8). 
 
This confusion in the QD raises other negative consequences. The person to whom this 
clause applies, may be denied the “status” as meant in Art. 13 and 18 (or “asylum” as 
meant in Art. 18 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights), and thus the rights set out in 
Chapter VII QD. However, s/he continues to be a “refugee” for the purpose of Art. 14(6) 
QD, and should be able to invoke the rights set out in that provision. Hence, if Art. 14(4) is 
transposed as a ground for cessation or exclusion from refugee status at large, it would 
also entail infringement of Art. 14(6) (Odysseus study, p. 54), which provides for certain 
treatment entitlements. In this scenario, a refugee is excluded and cannot thus benefit 
from e.g. non-refoulement (though mentioned as mandatory benefit in Art. 14(6)). 
Therefore, the provision of Art. 14(4) and 14(5) should be clarified in order to avoid the 
situation that persons who are eligible to enjoy the rights of the Refugee Convention are 
deprived of them, as well as excluded/ceased contrary to the Refugee Convention. This can 
be corroborated by MS practice, because in many MSs, after termination of status, usually 
no alternative status is issued, in others, alternative status such as a sort of (exceptional) 
leave to remain can be issued (Odysseus study, p. 59). Lastly, in the opinion of UNHCR, the 
wording of exclusion clauses does not contain any indication that exclusion is linked to 
continuation of posing danger (UNHCR Statement on Exclusion, p. 32), thereby denying the 
link between exclusion and exceptions to non-refoulement as somewhat similar concepts. 
In this respect, German Federal Administrative Court lodged two requests to the EU Court 
in 2009, where it asked if there is a requirement of continued danger in applying exclusion 
clauses under the QD? However the requests for preliminary ruling do not deal with the 
relationship between the concepts of exclusion and application of exceptions under Art. 
33(2) of the Refugee Convention. 
 
On the second aspect - exclusion from subsidiary protection, domestic legislation in a 
number of states differs in the sense that exclusion is not required in all cases covered by 
Art. 17(1). Thus, e.g. under Austrian law, persons, who have committed one of the crimes 
mentioned in Art. 1F of the Refugee Convention or another serious crime are not excluded 
from granting of subsidiary protection (because protection under Art. 2 and 3 of ECHR is 
absolute) (Odysseus study, p. 65). On the other hand, with regard to Art. 19(2) QD, in 
many MSs persons excluded from international protection status may qualify for other 
statuses (which may render the obligatory exclusion rather symbolical). Given that 
exclusion from subsidiary protection is mandatory in the QD and as noted by UNHCR, 
leaves no scope for more favourable approach under national law, MSs granting protection 
in their practice to excludible individuals whom they are not allowed to remove under 
international human rights law, may be interpreted in breach of Art. 3 QD as this would be 
incompatible with regard to obligation imposed under Art. 17(1) QD.  
 
This situation also leads to another problem - exclusion from subsidiary protection (Art. 17 
and 19 QD) may raise concerns with regard to “minimum standards” as required by Art. 63 
TEU. Lack of harmonization with regard to persons who are in need of international 
protection (based on Art. 3 ECHR) may be considered below the standards established by 
international refugee and human rights law, leaving it to the MSs to develop them further 
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to meet their obligations under international law. As the Commission states in its Impact 
Assessment, the human rights and refugee law standards set solely the lower threshold, 
not the upper limits of harmonisation, thus the harmonisation cannot take place at a level 
lower than those standards (p. 10). If granting of subsidiary protection in this case by MSs 
to excluded individuals who cannot be returned based on international obligations, would 
be considered a breach of EC law, then this would also constitute a breach of minimum 
standards requirement in Art. 63 TEU (Battjes, p. 26, 265, Gil-Bazo, p. 246-250, 252). In 
MS practice, it has been noted that provisions on revocation, ending of or refusal to renew 
refugee status (Art. 14) or subsidiary protection status (Art. 19) have led to cases of 
deterioration due to obligation to terminate the status (European Parliament, p. 2).  
 
The Commission in its Recast Proposal for Qualification Directive does not address any of 
the legal and practical problems related to exclusion and revocation of status, presumably 
because of the sensitivity that exists around these issues among the MSs. 
 
SOLUTION: in order to eliminate confusion and ensure correct implementation of the 
Refugee Convention notions in the MSs, define firstly the concept of exclusion and 
revocation in Art. 2, also define Art. 14(4) and (5) clearly as termination of “residence 
status” (or “asylum” in terms of Art. 18 of the EU Charter) and move these provisions and 
Art. 14(6) to Status part of QD. Observance of MSs obligations under human rights law 
may only be ensured if a requirement is introduced to apply exclusion/revocation only when 
there is no issue of absolute prohibition of refoulement based on the circumstances of the 
case. 
 
Firstly, to prevent misinterpretation by MSs of Art. 14(4) and (5) as exclusion or cessation 
clauses (which already happens in practice, e.g. in Germany), it is suggested to move these 
provisions to Status Rights’ part of the QD. This would ensure that MSs apply this article 
strictly as termination of “residence status” (“asylum” in the meaning of the EU Charter on 
Fundamental Rights) rather than refugee status or subsidiary protection as such, which 
would also ensure the elimination of risks pertaining to compliance with the Refugee 
Convention. Moving of Art. 14(6) to Status Rights’ Part of the QD would also contribute to 
eliminating confusion with regard to rights enjoyed by persons who are allowed to remain 
when status is removed after being granted. Secondly, Art. 2 would benefit from defining 
the concept of exclusion and revocation. Such a clarification would reduce disparities in MS 
exclusion practices and ensure compliance with the Refugee Convention. Lastly, limiting 
exclusion under Art. 17(1) and 19 to those cases when there is no issue of absolute 
prohibition of non-refoulement would ensure the elimination of risks pertaining to 
compliance with the absolute prohibition of refoulement, thus minimum standards under 
Art. 63 TEU and harmonisation of practices among MSs thereby reducing disparities that 
cause secondary movements within the EU. Alternatively, provisions on exclusion should be 
stated in non-obligatory terms in these Articles. As a result, only those persons who fall 
under Art. 17 and with regard to whom no international obligations apply would be 
excluded and effectively removed from the territory of the EU. 
9. SUBSIDIARY PROTECTION: SCOPE TO BE ALIGNED 
WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND PRACT-
ICE OF MEMBER STATES (ART. 15) 
 
PROBLEM: not all persons who are non-removable under international obligations or 
Member State practice are covered by current wording of the subsidiary protection. 
This undermines the EU’s harmonisation objective and encourages onward movement 
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within the EU. 
 
The QD provisions on qualification for subsidiary protection and the Temporary protection 
directive are based on Art. 63 (2a) of the TEC, therefore it must comply with general 
principles of Community law reflecting relevant international law. Following the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty, accession to ECHR becomes possible and once completed, the 
ECHR will be fully integrated in the EU legal order. Art. 63(2a) of the TEC requires 
minimum standards, while several provisions of the Directive raise concern that the level of 
minimum standards (sufficient harmonisation) was not achieved. In addition, the preamble 
of the QD (recital 25) states that criteria on the basis of which the applicants for 
international protection are to be recognised as eligible for subsidiary protection […] should 
be drawn from (a) international obligations under human rights instruments and (b) 
practices existing in Member States. It can be seen therefore that the scope of subsidiary 
protection is expected to be broader than international protection, as it may encompass 
practices of MSs. However, current situation under the QD as described below is different. 
 
Firstly, current scope of subsidiary protection (grounds) does not coincide with the scope of 
all persons who are not removable under human rights instruments on the basis of which 
subsidiary protection was developed (CAT, ECHR, ICCPR) (Battjes, p. 221). In practice, 
subsidiary protection is not granted to significant numbers of persons who appear to be in 
need of international protection. In other words, the definition of subsidiary protection as is 
presently defined by Art. 15 of the QD […] does not fully cover the public international law 
dimension of “international protection” (Hailbronner, p. 5). It goes against the objective of 
the directive - to ensure minimum level of protection to all those in need. This is due both 
to the impact of procedural flaws and to a narrow interpretation of the directive itself 
(UNHCR study, p. 11). Thus it can be asserted that the first phase of building Common 
European Asylum System addresses MS obligations under non-refoulement only partially. 
 
Secondly, subsidiary protection does not cover all cases when MSs in their practice grant 
protection, e.g. most MSs do grant some form of protection to victims of generalised 
violence, while subsidiary protection under the QD clearly does not (Battjes, p. 241). 
Domestic law in a number of MSs grants (forms of) subsidiary protection to broader 
categories of persons if compared to those defined in Art. 15 QD, which shows a lack of 
harmonisation among MSs (Odysseus study, p. 20, 75; European Parliament evaluation). 
Furthermore, there is a tendency because of widely divergent practices in the application of 
Art. 15(c) to narrow its scope in relation to other non-refoulement provisions (ECRE study, 
p. 6).  
 
The problem of scope of subsidiary protection is recognised at EU level, thus in order to 
ensure a truly common interpretative approach and to achieve the objective of introducing 
uniform statuses (as required by the Hague Programme and the TEU) the Commission was 
supposed to propose to amend the criteria for qualifying for international protection under 
this directive. To this effect, it may be necessary inter alia to clarify further the eligibility 
conditions for subsidiary protection, since the wording of the current relevant provisions 
allows for substantial divergences in the interpretation and the application of the concept 
across Member States (Policy Plan on Asylum). The Commission acknowledges in its’ 
Impact Assessment that the Directive does not guarantee the full compatibility of national 
implementation measures with these instruments [international law] and allows for wide 
divergences amongst national decision-making practices (Summary, p. 2). Despite that and 
notwithstanding the specific policy objective (to ensure full respect of the ECHR and of the 
EU Charter on Fundamental Rights), the Recast Proposal for Qualification Directive does not 
touch upon Art. 15 of the QD and thus does not address the problems of limited scope of 
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subsidiary protection, as well as does not follow the objective of the directive - to address 
disparities between MS legislation and practice. 
 
Who are those persons who are currently falling out of the scope of subsidiary protection, 
but are in need of protection under international human rights law or MSs practice? For the 
purpose of analysis, they could be conditionally grouped into four categories: 
 
(1) Non-returnable individuals222 
The baseline for the need to harmonise MS practice for these individuals lies in 
international/regional obligations. Firstly, since all MSs are bound by the results of cases 
such as D. vs. UK based on Art. 3 of ECHR, there should be harmonization of MSs practices 
in this respect. Worthwhile noting that obligation to refrain from expulsion of a seriously ill 
alien in very exceptional circumstances has not been repealed by the ECtHR since the 
judgment in D. vs. UK, even if none of the subsequent applicants satisfied the test of 
exceptional circumstances, thus no violation of Art. 3 was found (e.g. N. vs. UK, Judgment 
of the Grand Chamber of 27 May 2008). 
 
Secondly, there are also other situations (beyond Art. 3 of ECHR), which require prevention 
of expulsion due to international obligations of states (Art. 8 ECHR cases in order to ensure 
family life; observance of the best interest of the child principle under Art. 3(1) and 37(a) 
CRC223). This is also acknowledged in the EU Returns Directive which states in Art. 5 the 
expanded scope of the principle of non-refoulement. The nature of cases that involve these 
individuals is such that the act of expulsion itself attributes to the liability under 
international law. Due to the terms “in the country of origin” in Art. 15(b) QD, it is possible 
to read the provision as not applying to mentioned individuals, thus as a result they are 
excluded from the scope of subsidiary protection. With regard to suspension of expulsion in 
case of a need to protect family life expansion of subsidiary protection would help to cover 
those persons who are not covered by the EU Family Reunification Directive of 2003 (e.g. 
family members of subsidiary protection beneficiaries) or other EU instruments. Family 
reunification cases would be strictly covered here only when there is no possibility to 
exercise the right to family life in the country of origin. Clearly, residence permit on the 
basis of family reunification might be a more desirable solution, thus this status will only 
apply when there are no other available statuses for the person (e.g. family members of 
subsidiary protection beneficiaries or persons who do not meet strict conditions of family 
reunification or to whom family reunification was withdrawn under Family Reunification 
Directive). What is also noteworthy, that in some MSs family reunion takes place after the 
final determination of asylum claims only. Another possibility would be to amend Family 
Reunification Directive by including a possibility to prevent deportation in case of risk to 
protection of the family irrespective of any other criteria. The rationale for nevertheless 
including those persons under subsidiary protection lies in the basis of international 
obligations that the EU MSs must respect. Furthermore, the concept of Art. 8 of ECHR has 
been considerably expanded by the ECtHR recently by the concept of protection of private 
life (regardless of family connections) for persons who have established close links with the 
country of actual residence and whose return may on balance constitute therefore a 
                                                 
222  This group does not include purely compassionate cases, which are beyond the international 
obligations of MSs. It does not also cover grounds like environment disasters or social integration that 
lack mandatory requirements under the international law, but are rather based on States’ 
discretionary protection policies, as well as situations when aliens cannot be returned for 
practical/technical reasons. 
223  According to the recommendations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, no return or removal 
decisions should be issued without completion of assessment on the “best interests of the child”: 
General Comment No. 6(2005); Treatment of unaccompanied and separated children outside their 
country of origin, CRC/GC/2006/6, Chapter VII(c), Return to the country of origin. 
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violation of Art. 8 of ECHR (Hailbronner, p. 6). For instance, in a case Maslov vs. Austria224, 
the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR has held that the deportation of a youth who had spent 
the majority of his childhood in Austria constituted a violation of his right to respect for his 
family and private life. However, these cases may not be necessarily based on international 
protection needs because these persons may still enjoy the protection of their country of 
origin.  
 
In this context, a substantial number of MSs has maintained the existing concepts of 
humanitarian residence permits which partially may have a larger scope of application, 
partially may be more restrictive with respect to the requirement to be granted a residence 
permit (European Parliament evaluation, p. 4). E.g. Austria introduced by the new 2005 
Asylum Act complementary protection based on Art. 8(1) of the ECHR, which protects 
private and family life (ECRE Report on Complementary Protection, p. 5).  Also, only in six 
MSs Art. 15(b) does not apply to mentioned cases within the scope of Art. 3 ECHR, while 
according to domestic legislation of the vast majority of MSs the provision can apply to 
such cases (Odysseus study, p. 73). It would be therefore logical and useful to harmonise 
granting of protection in these cases in the MSs as they are beyond the discretion of states, 
but are rather based on objective mandatory criteria of international law. More specifically, 
these persons must be clearly distinguished from purely compassionate situations (e.g. old 
age, integration into host country society, etc.), which would continue being part of 
discretionary decisions of MSs due to absence of internationally or regionally defined 
standards how to deal with these individuals. A good example of such a distinction is a new 
Immigration Act in Norway that entered into force on 1 January 2010 and which 
differentiates between protection grounds and the more humanitarian reasons for granting 
residence.  
 
(2) Persons fleeing systematic or generalized violence 
While through the Temporary Protection Directive the MSs acknowledged the need for 
protection in relation to generalised violence (TPD envisages among its beneficiaries also 
“persons at serious risk of, or who have been the victims of, systematic or generalized 
violations of their human rights”), they do not fall under any of the two protection statuses 
under the QD, Art. 15 in particular. The Commission acknowledged in the Policy Plan on 
Asylum that there are substantive divergences in the interpretation and application of the 
concept across MSs. Such divergences, resulting in particular from the application of 
subsidiary protection against a “serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by 
reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict”, 
have been widely documented. Research has also shown a tendency to narrow the scope of 
certain notions in this provision, most prominently that of “individual threat” (ECRE 
Comments on Recast Proposal, p. 15).  
 
The potential of current Art. 15(c) to provide protection to those who fear serious harm to 
life or person is thus undermined by:  
a. highly restrictive interpretation of the term “individual threat” in line with recital 26 
of the Directive;  
b. limitation on the scope to “internal armed conflict” only;  
c. varying definitions of “armed conflict”.  
 
The first limitation has resulted in authorities of some MSs requiring that the applicant is 
personally targeted or, in line with the restrictive approach enshrined in recital 26, that the 
applicant faces a greater risk of harm than the rest of the population, or sections of it, in 
                                                 
224  Maslov vs. Austria, [2008] ECHR [GC] 1638/03 (23 June 2008). 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 194 
his or her country of origin. This renders the protection offered by the QD illusory for many 
persons, it appears to be incompatible with case-law of the ECtHR regarding risk 
assessment and is inherently contradictory to Art. 15(c) which provides for protection from 
serious harm caused by “indiscriminate violence” (UNHCR study, pp. 11, 15). With regard 
to this concern prior to 2009, the explanation of “individual threat” requirement was 
provided in two leading UK cases: HH and KH vs. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department in spring 2008 where indiscriminate violence was defined as violence that does 
not distinguish between civilian and military targets. In February 2009, the EU Court in 
Elgafaji vs. Netherlands225 case reasoned that in contrast to Art. 15(a) and (b) (which refer 
to types of harm that specifically target the applicant), Art. 15(c) “covers a more general 
risk of harm.” Term “indiscriminate” reinforces that. Thus the term “individual” in Art. 15(c) 
is to be understood as covering harm to all civilians, where violence reaches such a high 
level as to show “substantial grounds” to believe that a civilian, if returned, would face a 
real risk solely on the basis of being present. The more the applicant can show an individual 
risk due to factors particular to his/her personal circumstances, the lower the level of 
indiscriminate violence that must be shown. If to consider that this EU Court decision has 
resolved the main interpretation issue in Art. 15(c), maintaining recital 26 in QD continues 
to leave a room for divergent interpretations by MSs.  
 
Therefore, there is a need to widen the overall scope of Art. 15(c) as most MSs have 
developed national subsidiary forms of protection with regard to persons from countries of 
conflict. In conflict situations chances of violation of fundamental human rights for 
individual citizens are generally high. Because of the often volatile and dangerous situation, 
individualized risks are harder to substantiate and to assess. Thus, there is still a need for a 
wider ground for protection in conflict situations, to reflect the EU and its Member States’ 
humanitarian traditions not to expel persons to a situation of (internal) conflict. A less 
individualized ground for protection for persons fleeing situations of large scale violations of 
human rights, could by nature involve larger numbers of persons. However, such situations 
are exceptional and State practice shows that in these situations Member States often do 
operate general protection schemes or at least some sort of expulsion stop. Until now, such 
national schemes have often been under pressure, because responses of other 
neighbouring Member States may be very different. Hence, there could be a need for 
further EU legislation both on granting and withdrawal of status(es) in situations where 
dictatorial regimes or factions randomly commit large scale, gross violations of human 
rights against the population or parts of the population (Meijers Committee Comments). 
 
Furthermore, the term “internal armed conflict” in Art. 15(c) is another source of divergent 
interpretations across MSs, since there is no agreed definition of “internal armed conflict” in 
international law. Decisions in France, Germany and Sweden highlight divergences in 
interpretation and application. As a result, the situation in parts of Iraq was accessed as 
“internal armed conflict” in France, but not in Sweden where it was described as a “severe 
conflict”. Whilst the Swedish authorities considered the conflict in Chechnya as an “internal 
armed conflict”, the Slovak authorities did not. The application of this term in the QD in at 
least some MSs appears to deny subsidiary protection to persons facing a real risk of 
serious harm in their country of origin (UNHCR study, p. 11-12). Thus it would seem 
inconsistent to deny subsidiary protection to a person who would qualify for temporary 
protection if s/he entered in the context of a mass influx, on the grounds that the situation 
s/he fled is not considered an “internal armed conflict” under Art. 15(c) (UNHCR study, p. 
79). Furthermore, the scope of Art 15(c) is also limited by its application only in “situations 
of international or internal armed conflict”. It is not clear what added value this term brings 
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to a legal provision on subsidiary protection, as persons who face a real risk of serious 
harm due to indiscriminate violence and widespread human rights violations are in need of 
international protection (based on ECHR, CAT and ICCPR) regardless of whether the context 
is classified as an internal armed conflict or not (UNHCR study p. 11-12). E.g. in a case V.L. 
vs. Switzerland226, the Committee against Torture established a violation by Switzerland to 
deport a person to Belarus even though the violations of human rights were not related to 
armed conflict situation. The Committee established widespread violations in Belarus and 
based on individual circumstances declared a violation. Protection should thus also cover 
situations of generalised violence and systematic violations of human rights violations, 
which do not equate to armed conflicts under international humanitarian law. This would 
remove any remaining ambiguities and allow for the realisation of Article 15(c)’s key added 
value, which lies in the potential “to provide protection from serious risks which are 
situational, rather than individually targeted” (ECRE Comments on Recast Proposal, p. 16). 
 
Lastly, the definition of “armed conflict” in MSs varies (ECRE study, p. 6). Since the 
definition is limited to international or internal armed conflict, many MSs grant under 
national law alternative forms of humanitarian protection to persons facing a comparable 
danger in situations which may not be qualified as an armed conflict (European Parliament 
evaluation, p. 5). Therefore, to ensure consistency with TPD it is necessary to include this 
group of persons under subsidiary protection. 
 
(3) Excludable individuals227 
In certain circumstances these persons cannot be returned due to absolute nature of non-
refoulement under Art. 2 and 3 ECHR, Art. 3 CAT, Art. 7 ICCPR. It is of concern that Art. 17 
QD does not explicitly confirm the absolute prohibition of returns that would breach 
international human rights law (ECRE study, p. 29). It is paradoxical that subsidiary 
protection partially developed on the basis of ECtHR jurisprudence on Art. 3, which in 
absolute terms prohibits refoulement. Even though the intention is to provide protection 
only to persons deserving it, the limitations on subsidiary protection placed by exclusion 
clauses cause the situation that MSs continue maintaining a variety of other forms of 
residence permits as they cannot expel these individuals due to absolute prohibition of 
refoulement. The standard of treatment of these persons should also respect fundamental 
human rights. It is therefore, necessary to address the situation of those persons who are 
excluded from protection but who cannot be returned. The MS practice shows that at least 
two states (Finland and UK) have provisions for the protection of people denied status due 
to the application of exclusion clauses (ECRE Report on Complementary Protection, p. 8). 
 
(4) Persons fleeing other human rights violations 
Art. 2(a) QD brings about an important distinction between the Refugee Convention 
refugees on one and persons eligible for subsidiary protection on the other hand. “Serious 
harm” in the later definition concerns only the right to life or person. “Persecution” on the 
other hand can concern also other human rights’ violations. Thus it seems that “serious 
harm” is narrower than “persecution”, while it would be logical that it covers those cases 
that fall out of persecution (if we consider that subsidiary protection covers cases left 
outside the refugee situations) (Battjes, pp. 221, 236, 241, 269-270, Gil-Bazo, p. 241, Noll, 
p. 186-191). 
 
SOLUTION:  
(a) Supplement Art. 15 with paragraph 2 requesting MSs to grant subsidiary protection also 
                                                 
226  CAT/C/37/D/262/2005. 
227  These are persons who are excluded from refugee status under Art. 1(F) of the Refugee Convention 
and Art. 12(2) of the QD. 
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in cases when international obligations of MSs prevent expulsion;  
(b) Recital 26 should be deleted, as well as the terms “individual threat” and “internal or 
international armed conflict” in Art. 15(c); 
(c) Amend Art. 17(1) and 19 to state that exclusion from subsidiary protection should only 
be considered when there is no issue of absolute prohibition of refoulement based on the 
circumstances of the case. 
 
There is general unwillingness to touch upon Art. 15, in order to expand subsidiary 
protection to additional individuals, as there is a belief that re-opening of discussions on 
Art. 15 after rather broad interpretation by the EU Court in Elgafaji case may tempt some 
MSs to seek the inclusion of more restrictive provisions. Notwithstanding, amendment of 
the QD as proposed above through three sub-proposals would be beneficial because: 
 
Firstly, supplementing Art. 15 by paragraph 2 (that encompasses all international 
obligations of MSs that prevent expulsion) would contribute to the objective of QD to 
ensure minimum level of protection to those in need, as currently protection is not 
harmonised for all individuals who need it and to whom MSs grant protection under their 
national legislation. The disparity of national asylum legislations was recognised from the 
beginning as one of the main factors affecting asylum flows across the EU, thus 
harmonisation of this practice would likely have an impact of reducing the onward 
movements within the Union. Evidence suggests that the harmonisation achieved by the 
Directive so far has not had any effect on secondary movements. Multiple applications 
remained high - at 17% in 2006 and 16% in 2007 (Commission Impact Assessment, p. 
14). The European Council even states in the Stockholm Programme that “common rules, 
as well as better and more coherent application of them, should prevent or reduce 
secondary movements within the EU, and increase mutual trust between Member States” 
(Stockholm Programme, p. 69). This would also ensure full compliance with ECHR (Art. 3 
and 8), CAT, ICCPR and the observance of the best interests of the child principle. As we 
are entering a second phase of harmonization, it is important to consider that the whole 
CEAS is based on the full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention, the 
obligations that flow from human rights instruments such as the ECHR, and the full respect 
of the rights enshrined in the Charter on Fundamental Rights (Summary Impact 
Assessment, p. 6). Furthermore, once the EU accedes to the ECHR as a party, it will be 
bound to implement Art. 3 without any limitations on national security or other grounds. 
There is already the practice among MSs to refer to international obligations: at least three 
MSs have national clauses that mention either international obligations in general (e.g. 
Finland “fulfil international obligations”; Germany “international law considerations”) or 
ECHR in particular (e.g. UK “flagrant denial of any right guaranteed by the ECHR”) (ECRE 
Report on Complementary Protection, Summary, p. 6). If general reference to international 
obligations of MSs may seem too broad and vague, reference to obligations under ECHR 
would be more concrete. Current provisions do not secure full compatibility with the 
evolving case law on human rights of the ECtHR and EU Court as well as refugee law 
standards. From the practical perspective in order to distinguish these individuals for the 
purpose of standard of treatment (if different from Art. 15(1) beneficiaries as proposed 
below), a special mark on the residence permit may be introduced (e.g. similarly to remark 
for planned “Blue Card” holders). 
 
Secondly, by deleting recital 26 and the phrase “internal or international armed conflict” in 
Art. 15(c) a source of divergence both within the MSs and across the MSs would be 
eliminated and result in inclusion of persons who are in need of international protection, but 
who were denied protection because of unclarities/divergences raised by these provisions. 
In addition, since the current wording of Art. 15(c) is confusing elimination of “individual 
Setting up a Common European Asylum System:  
Report on the application of existing instruments and proposals for the new system 
 197 
threat” requirement would ensure that subsidiary protection covers victims of generalised 
violence (which would be covered by temporary protection in case of mass influx) and 
provide coherence with TPD. Lastly, slight amendment to Art. 17(1) and Art. 19 by linking 
exclusion/revocation of subsidiary protection with legal possibilities of expulsion based on 
international law would ensure effective implementation of MSs obligations under absolute 
prohibition of refoulement, since under ECHR these persons are considered in need of 
protection irrespective of their criminal or undesirable behaviour. This would in fact mean 
not to eliminate exclusion from subsidiary protection as such, but to apply it only when no 
concerns under international law are raised. Because there could still be persons who are 
excluded from refugee status/subsidiary protection and can be returned (mainly this will be 
possible in Art. 15(c) cases, but not in 15(a) and 15(b) cases, as they cover absolute 
obligations under human rights law). 
 
In addition, from the financial point of view, expansion of the scope of subsidiary protection 
would not bear significant consequences, because 9 MSs already protect those persons 
under national law and many of them grant access to education, health care, employment 
and social welfare (ECRE Report on Complementary Protection, Summary, p.12).  
 
If, following the adoption of the Recast Proposal status rights of refugees and beneficiaries 
of subsidiary protection become equal, the issue of standards of treatment to persons e.g. 
who were excluded for refugee status, but still protected under international human rights 
law in Art. 15(2) may need to be addressed given the sensitivity of the issue (e.g. there is 
clearly a preference of MSs (e.g. Germany) to have the possibility to restrict status rights in 
such cases, thus it might therefore be difficult to mobilise agreement of MSs on this 
point228). However, to address this concern, the MSs could react to this additional need of 
protection while granting the scope of rights (Art. 20(6-7)), e.g. by limiting the rights to 
basic access to education, health care, employment and social welfare only. Thus 
establishing a connection with Art. 20(7) may be considered in this context229. This may be 
possible since there are no international/regional obligations towards the treatment of 
these persons (except basic human rights), as it exists for refugees under the Refugee 
Convention or current beneficiaries of subsidiary protection under the QD. This would thus 
be in line with obligations under ECHR and the Charter on Fundamental Rights and would 
be beneficial for MSs that wish to exercise stricter control of these individuals, as well as 
ensure some minimum level of harmonisation of their treatment. Furthermore, currently 
QD provides for certain rights to persons whose “status”/residence rights are revoked 
(under Art. 14(6) - so called “toleration” status), thus this standard of treatment by 
granting similar rights to persons who are excluded from refugee status but enjoy 
international protection on the basis of human rights law, should be provided as a 
minimum. According to current practice, majority of MSs grant lower standards of social 
rights than beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, but at least Belgium and France places 
them on equal footing (ECRE Report on Complementary Protection, Summary, p. 9). 
 
                                                 
228  E.g. in Germany, if protection from expulsion is granted (in case of dangers threatening the whole 
population), the rights accorded to persons with subsidiary protection under QD are not (UNHCR 
study, p. 68). 
229  E.g. stating that: “Within the limits set out by international obligations of Member States, they may 
reduce the benefits of this Chapter, granted to a person protected under Art. 15(2) of this Directive”. 
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF PROTECTION STATUS UNDER QUALIFICATION DIRECTIVE 
(as per current version of the Directive) 
 
Persons to be protected under QD Status Rights granted, 
relevance to right of asylum 
in the Charter 
Corresponding 
Articles  
1. Refugees under 1951 Convention Full; right to asylum Chapter VII 
2. Persons facing serious harm due 
to: 
  
2.1. death penalty, etc. Possibilities to limit; outside 
Art. 18 of the Charter 
Chapter VII 
2.2. torture, etc. Possibilities to limit, outside 
Art. 18 
Chapter VII 
2.3. serious individual threat to life 
or person in conflict situation 
Possibilities to limit, outside 
Art. 18 
Chapter VII 
3. Refugees whose status was 
revoked  
Only rights mentioned in 
Art. 3, 4, 12, 31-33 of the 
Refugee Convention 
(“toleration status”), 
outside Art. 18 
14(6) 
4. Persons granted refugee status 
or subsidiary protection as a result 
of their own activities in country of 
asylum 
Possibilities to reduce 
benefits, refugees entitled 
to right to asylum, 
subsidiary protection 
beneficiaries - outside Art. 
18 
20(6-7) 
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TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF PROTECTION STATUS UNDER QUALIFICATION DIRECTIVE 
(as per proposals of the authors of the present report) 
 
Persons to be protected under QD Status Rights granted, 
relevance to right of asylum 
in the Charter 
Corresponding 
Articles  
1. Refugees under 1951 Convention Full, right to asylum Chapter VII 
2. Persons facing serious harm due 
to: 
 Chapter VII 
2.1. death penalty, etc. Possibilities to limit/possibly 
full under Recast proposal, 
outside Art. 18 
Chapter VII 
2.2. torture, etc. Possibilities to limit/ 
possibly full under Recast 
proposal, outside Art. 18 
Chapter VII 
2.3. serious individual threat to life 
or person in conflict situation 
Possibilities to limit/ 
possibly full under Recast 
proposal, outside Art. 18 
Chapter VII 
2.4. Non-returnable individuals 
under international law (excluded 
from refugee status, family and 
child protection cases) (proposed 
Art. 15(2)) 
Possibilities to limit to basic 
access to education, health 
care, employment and 
social security, no right to 
asylum under Art. 18 
20(7) 
3. Refugees whose status was 
revoked (new Art. in Status part of 
QD or merge with Art. 21) 
Only rights mentioned in 
Art. 3, 4, 12, 31-33 of the 
Refugee Convention, no 
right to asylum under Art. 
18 
New Art. in Q D 
or merge with 
Art. 21 
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KEY FINDINGS 
 
1. Art. 5(2) QD comes close to requiring the „continuation of convictions“ as a 
condition for a well-founded fear or real risk, while it is not necessary under the 
Refugee Convention. Art. 5(3) provision may raise concern with regard to 
compliance with the Refugee Convention as the later does not provide for any 
limitations of protection in cases when a person himself/herself creates the 
circumstances leading to protection needs.  
 
2. While the Refugee Convention does not require state persecution, but requires 
state protection, Art. 7(1)(b) QD allows the possibility of non-state protection. 
According to Art. 7(2) of the Directive, it is enough that state or non-state actors 
take “reasonable steps to prevent the persecution”, regardless of whether those 
steps lead to effective protection of individuals or not. 
 
3. The test in Art. 8(1) QD („the applicant can reasonably be expected to stay there“) 
is not specific at all. It gives complete discretion to the MSs and results in 
divergent interpretations of the concept across national jurisdictions. Art. 8(3) 
allows refusing protection despite technical obstacles to return might be evaluated 
as contrary to the Refugee Convention. 
 
4. As the recognition of conscientious objection is not specifically mentioned in QD, 
the practice of MSs regarding persecution by prosecution of draft evaders varies a 
lot. Mentioning only excludable acts, the QD does not seem to cover other 
situations (i.e. conscientious objection in the absence of alternative to military 
service). 
 
5. The QD rules on the nexus with the Refugee Convention grounds are overly 
restrictive, because Art. 9(3) excludes possible link between the Convention 
grounds and the lack of protection. It often results in state practice which is not in 
conformity with existing case law on the Refugee Convention.  
 
6. Art. 10(1)(d) QD raises the issues related to cumulative application of „social 
perception“ and „protected characteristics“ requirements in social group test, and 
to non-presumption of social group from gender related aspects alone. The 
provisions are weak, they give a broad discretion to the MSs and involve the risk 
that persecution on the basis of social group (in particular on the basis of gender) 
will not be sufficiently considered. 
 
7. Due to insufficient harmonisation of requirements for application of cessation of 
refugee status and subsidiary protection (Art. 11, 14(2), 16 and 19(4) QD) some 
Member States tend to examine the existence of current risk of persecution/harm 
rather than assessing the durability of eliminated risk along with availability of 
protection. This results in incorrect practical application of cessation thereby 
prematurely denying protection to persons who continue to be in need of it. 
 
8. Confusion of exclusion/cessation clauses with exceptions to non-refoulement (Art. 
14 (4-5) QD), as well as obligatory exclusion from subsidiary protection (Art. 17 
(1), 19 QD) disregarding the absolute prohibition of refoulement poses a risk to 
compliance of MS practices with the Refugee Convention and the Treaty of 
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European Union, thereby undermining the objective of the Union to provide 
protection to those in need. 
 
9. Not all persons who are non-removable under international obligations or Member 
State practice are covered by current wording of the subsidiary protection (Art. 15 
QD). This undermines the EU’s harmonisation objective and encourages onward 
movement within the EU. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. Solution for refusal of protection when a person creates the circumstances leading 
to protection needs (Art. 5(2-3)): The second part of Art. 5(2) (starting from the 
words “in particular”) and Art. 5(3) should be deleted. 
 
2. Solution for the possibility of non-state protection and the notion of protection 
without the mandatory requirement of effectiveness (Art. 7(1-2)): In Art. 7(1) 
protection should be characterized as effective, durable and provided only by the 
state. Consequently, Art. 7(1)(b) should be deleted or limited only to de facto state 
authority. In Art. 7(2) the words “generally” and „inter alia“ should be deleted, 
making the conditions of Art. 7(2) obligatory, not just exemplary. 
 
3. Solution for internal protection alternative test, which is too general and not 
ensuring that the alternative is accessible (Art. 8): Art. 8(3) should be deleted as 
contrary to the Geneva Convention. Art. 8(1) should specify IPA criteria making 
reference to Art. 7 criteria (i.e., providing effective and durable protection; 
operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment 
of acts constituting persecution or serious harm, and the applicant has access to 
such protection); making reference to the Salah Sheekh vs. Netherlands judgment 
criteria (i.e., he or she can safely and legally travel, gain admittance and settle); 
adding the word „access“ which is important element of the IPA test; and deleting 
the word „stay“ which could suggest a backward view contrary to the Refugee 
Convention. 
 
4. Solution for prosecution for conscientious objection, which is not covered by 
persecution as a basis for refugee status (Art. 9(2)(e)): Art. 9(2)(e) should be 
amended to include refusal to perform military service (and not only in a conflict) 
due to conscientious objection as a possible case of persecution. 
 
5. Solution for possible nexus between lack of protection and persecution grounds not 
included (Art. 9(3)): Art. 9(3) should be amended by adding a link between lack of 
protection and persecution grounds as a possible nexus in refugee definition. 
 
6. Solution for cumulative test of social group and weak reference to gender related 
aspects (Art. 10(1)(d)): Art. 10(1)(d) should be amended by stating that „social 
perception“ and „protected characteristics“ requirements are alternative; and that 
gender related aspects are in particular relevant for both social group tests. 
 
7. Solution for cessation of refugee status and subsidiary protection in relation to 
denial of protection due to insufficient harmonisation (Art. 11, 14(2), 16, 19(4)): 
requirements of cessation of refugee status and subsidiary protection notion should 
be clarified by adding a definition of cessation in Art. 2, which includes inter alia 
the requirement to assess the previous risk, the durability of its elimination, any 
new risks and the availability of effective protection, as well as reinforces the 
difference between the right to protection and corresponding residence permit. 
 
8. Solution for denial of protection because exclusion, cessation and revocation 
clauses are beyond permitted limits of MSs obligations (Art. 14 (4-5), 17 (1), 19): 
In order to eliminate confusion and ensure correct implementation of the Refugee 
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Convention notions in the MSs, firstly the concept of exclusion and revocation 
should be defined in Art. 2, Art. 14(4) and (5) should be defined clearly as 
termination of “residence status” (or “asylum” in terms of Art. 18 of the EU 
Charter) and these provisions plus Art. 14(6) should be moved to Status part of 
QD. Observance of MSs obligations under human rights law may only be ensured if 
a requirement is introduced to apply exclusion/revocation only when there is no 
issue of absolute prohibition of refoulement based on the circumstances of the 
case. 
 
9. Solution for subsidiary protection in order to align its’ scope with international 
obligations (Art. 15): Proposed solution comprises three sub-proposals: (a) Art. 15 
should be supplemented with paragraph 2 requesting MSs to grant subsidiary 
protection also in cases when international obligations of MSs prevent expulsion; 
(b) Recital 26 should be deleted, as well as the terms “individual threat” and 
“internal or international armed conflict” in Art. 15(c). (c) Art. 17(1) and 19 shall 
be amended to state that exclusion from subsidiary protection should only be 
considered when there is no issue of absolute prohibition of refoulement based on 
the circumstances of the case. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE STATUS OF PROTECTED PERSONS 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Two essential issues are dealt with in Chapter III related to the Status of Protected 
Persons: the detention of asylum seekers and the taking into account of the situation of 
vulnerable asylum seekers and vulnerable refugees with special needs. These two issues 
are analysed in a horizontal way through the various relevant legal instruments of the EU. 
The reception conditions directive, the asylum procedure directive and the Dublin regulation 
make rules for asylum seekers' detention. The qualification directive applies to the second 
issue as well. The analysis focuses mainly on the content of the second generation 
instruments that is the texts proposed by the Commission. The valuation of the 
Commission proposals can nevertheless imply an examination of the first generation 
instruments (texts currently into force). In addition, mentioning the texts proposed by the 
Parliament and/or the Council proves sometimes useful when these authorities have 
already come to a conclusion about the texts of the Commission.  
 
As shown in the following considerations, the legal debate relating to the detention of 
asylum seekers does not question the principle of the detention itself but the substantive 
conditions of the detention, the procedural guarantees and the framing of the conditions of 
detention. The substantive conditions raise the question of the reasons for detention. In 
this respect, the reception directive Commission proposal differs from the directive in force 
since it restricts the deprivation of freedom to four cases only. On the contrary, the current 
directive leaves an important margin of appreciation to the Member States. In that, the 
Commission proposal is likely to contribute to a better Community harmonization, objective 
sought within the framework of the 1st phase of the CEAS. 
 
The reasons for detention suggested by the Commission do not cause any problem taking 
into consideration the international law. In other respect the Council has added a fifth 
reason for detention. This raises the issue of a proper balance to be found between the 
right for the states to fight illegal immigration and the asylum seekers' right to freedom. 
 
Being of vulnerable asylum seekers and vulnerable refugees with special needs, the second 
generation instruments  also differ from the instruments in force insofar as the texts 
proposed by the Commission imposes on the States, more explicitly and more generally, to 
take into account the situation of these people. Nevertheless, the reception conditions 
directive Commission proposal raises a problem of concept regarding the determination of 
the people and the special needs one intends to meet. In both the other texts relating to 
asylum seekers (asylum procedure directive and Dublin regulation) the Commission obliges 
the Member States to take into account the situation of vulnerable people with special 
needs. Nevertheless the Commission does not force the States to carry out the 
identification of these people. However, in the absence of express provisions imposing on 
the States the installation of mechanisms of identification, the positive measures set in 
favour of these applicants are likely to remain dead letter. Moreover, the introduction of 
new provisions relating to vulnerable asylum seekers in the asylum procedure directive and 
the Dublin regulation raises the question of how these provisions will hang together well 
and no forgetting the provisions of the reception directive. No link between these texts has 
been established.  
 
On the border between the above mentioned issues, a third one is tackled: the detention of 
vulnerable asylum seekers with special needs. A specific provision has been introduced by 
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the Commission into the reception directive. The purpose of this provision is to avoid the 
deprivation of freedom of people whose physical or mental health condition could be 
seriously affected following a placement in detention. If the text of the Council maintains 
this principle, it has however removed the mechanism of identification of these people 
initially envisaged by the Commission. This modification is likely to compromise the 
effective implementation of the stated principle.  
 
SECTION I:  DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Before carrying out the transversal analysis of the contents of the second generation 
instruments with regard to the detention of asylum seekers, it is essential to briefly point 
out the principles which prevail on the matter in pursuance of the Geneva Convention, the 
international and regional framework of human rights and the jurisprudence of the Court of 
justice of the European Union mainly.  
1.1. The Principle itself of the detention of asylum seekers 
 
If one can underline, as Professor Teitgen-Colly230 does « la banalisation de la privation de 
liberté » des étrangers -au nombre desquels figurent de nombreux demandeurs d’asile- en 
tant qu’« instrument normal de contrôle des flux migratoires » [the fact that loss of 
freedom has become commonplace for foreigners - including many asylum applicants - as 
the instrument used to control migratory flux]231 one must agree that from a legal point of 
view asylum seekers can be subjected to detention. The main relevant international 
standards are to be found in article 31 of the Geneva Convention (GC), article 9 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), article 5, § 1 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and article 6 of the European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. The case of law relating to them and the Court of Justice of the European Union 
case of law must also be taken into account. 
1.1.1. Article 31 of the Geneva Convention 
Article 31 § 1 of the Geneva Convention states the principle that “Contracting States shall 
not impose penalties on refugees on account of their illegal entry or presence [because] 
they have entered or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they 
present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal 
entry or presence [and in so far as they come] directly from a territory where their life or 
freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1 ”of the Geneva Convention. Although 
article 31 refers to the “refugees” this provision applies to asylum seekers as well232.  
 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (here after UNHCR) admits first of all that 
this provision does not prohibit a provisional detention “when necessary and if it is limited 
to the purposes of preliminary investigation”233. 
 
                                                 
230 C. Teitgen-Colly,  La détention des Etrangers et les droits de l’homme, Mondialisation, migration et 
droit de l’homme : le droit international en question, Bruylant,  Bruxelles, 2007, p. 576 et 577. 
Hereafter : C. Teitgen-Colly. 
231  Non official translation. 
232 UNHCR, La protection des réfugiés en droit international, Sous la direction de Erik Feller, Volker Türk 
et Frances Nicholson, Larcier, Bruxelles, 2008,  p. 232. Hereafter: UNHCR : La protection des réfugiés. 
233 UNHCR, La protection des Réfugiés,  Article 31, § 10, p. 259. 
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It also recognizes that the States retain « considerable discretion, however, as to the 
measures to be applied pending determination of status, and in relation to the treatment of 
those who, for whatever reason, are considered not to fall within the terms of the Article 
»234. The assertion “for a reason or another” for instance refers to the situation of asylum 
seekers who would not meet the conditions given in article 31 § 1 namely: to arrive directly 
from a territory where their life or their freedom was threatened, to have valid reasons 
justifying their irregular entry or presence and to have presented themselves without delay 
to the authorities235.  
 
Article 31 § 1 applies only to certain cases. Nevertheless § 2 of this provision implies that 
after any acceptable initial period of detention, the contracting States shall not apply 
restrictions other than those which are necessary to the movements of refugees who, 
because of their irregular entry or stay, are on the territory without authorization. 
 
In 1986, the UNHCR Executive Committee, after having pointed out article 31 of the 
Geneva Convention, “expressed the opinion that in view of the hardship which it involves, 
detention should normally be avoided. If necessary, detention may be resorted to only on 
grounds prescribed by law to verify identity; to determine the elements on which the claim 
to refugee status or asylum is based; to deal with cases where refugees or asylum-seekers 
have destroyed their travel and/or identity documents or have used fraudulent documents 
in order to mislead the authorities of the State in which they intend to claim asylum; or to 
protect national security or public order”236. These principles were reiterated and developed 
by the UNHCR into 1999237. The range of these principles will be examined in Title 2 of this 
SECTION I.  
 
Professor Goodwin-Gill considers for its part that « The 1951 Convention explicitly 
acknowledges that States retain the power to limit the freedom of movement of refugees, 
for example, in exceptional circumstances, in the interests of national security, or if 
necessary after illegal entry. Article 31's non-penalization provision applies in some but not 
all cases, but Article 31(2) implies that, after any permissible initial period of detention, 
States may only impose restrictions on movement which are ‘necessary’, for example, on 
security grounds or in the special circumstances of a mass influx, although restrictions are 
generally to be applied only until status is regularized or admission obtained into another 
country»238. 
 
Consequently, under the terms of article 31 § 2 of the Geneva Convention, limiting the 
freedom of movement of an asylum seeker after any permissible  initial period of detention 
is not excluded as such in so far as this limitation of freedom is “necessary”239. 
1.1.2. Article 9, § 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
Article 9 § 1 states that « Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty 
except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law ». 
                                                 
234 UNHCR, La protection des Réfugiés, Article 31, p. 262. 
235 On the interpretation of these conditions see : UNHCR, La protection des Réfugiés, Article 31, pages 
227 à 233, 242, 243, et 257 à 259. 
236 UNHCR, Executive Committee, Conclusions 44, recital b). Hereafter: UNHCR, Conclusions 44. 
237 UNHCR, Guidelines on applicable criteria and standards relating to the detention of asylum seekers, 
Geneva 1999. Hereafter: UNHCR, Guidelines. 
238 Goodwin-Gill, Article 31 of the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugee: non-penalization, 
detention and protection, 2001, § 121, p. 37. Hereafter: Goodwin-Gill, Article 31. 
239 This condition of necessity will be addressed in Title 2. 
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In a case240 where the Human Rights Committee (HRC) was to come to a conclusion about 
the legality of the detention of an asylum seeker within the framework of article 9 § 1 of 
the ICCPR,  it agreed “that there is no basis for the author's claim that it is per se arbitrary 
to detain individuals requesting asylum. Nor can it find any support for the contention that 
there is a rule of customary international law which would render all such detention 
arbitrary” (§ 9. 3).  
 
Thus, article 9 § 1 of the Pact does not exclude the principle of the detention of an asylum 
seeker as such.  
1.1.3. Article 5 § 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
Article 5 § 1 of the ECHR establishes the right to liberty and security of any person as well. 
Nobody can be deprived of the right to liberty and security of person “except in the 
following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law”. 
 
The restrictive enumeration of the cases follows where a person can be arrested or held. 
Being the detention of asylum seekers, three of these cases must be mentioned specifically 
- the indent b), 2nd branch and the indent f), first and second branches of article 5 § 1: 
 
b) The lawful arrest or detention of a person in order to secure the fulfilment of any 
obligation prescribed by law;  
f) The lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry 
into the country (1st branch) or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view 
to deportation or extradition (2nd branch). 
 
It results from the decisions of the European Court of Human rights241 (ECtHR) that the 
principle itself of the detention of an asylum seeker is not included as such according to the 
above mentioned provision as well.  
1.1.4. Jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
In a judgment delivered on November 30, 2009 (Kadzoef)242, the Court of justice of the 
European Union admits very clearly for its part the principle of the detention243 of asylum 
seekers. It is interesting to take a close look at this judgment delivered within the 
framework of a claim for preliminary ruling, insofar as the Court underlines the fact that 
detention of an asylum seeker (in particular under the reception directive and the asylum 
procedure directive) and detention for the purpose of removal fall under different legal 
rules. 
 
The principal relevant facts of the case that was subjected to the Court are the following: 
on October 21st 2006 a third-country national, Mr. Kadzoef, was arrested by Bulgarian law 
enforcement near the border with Turkey. He had no identity documents. By decree of 
22nd October 2006 of the competent police department, a coercive administrative measure 
of deportation was imposed on him. He was placed in the detention centre on 3rd 
November 2006, to be detained until it was possible to execute the decree, that is, until 
                                                 
240 HRC, A. v.  Australia,  Communication n° 560/1993, 30 April 1997, UN Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993. 
Hereafter: HRC, A. 
241 Among other: ECtHR, Saadi v. United Kingdom, Application n° 13229/03, Judgment 29 January 2008. 
Hereafter ECtHR, Saadi. 
242 CJEU, C-357/09, Kadzoef  v. Bulgaria, Judgment 30 November 2009. Hereafter: CJEU, Kadzoef. 
243  The term detention is defined in the reception directive Commission proposal as in the reception 
directive in force: « confinement of an asylum seeker by a Member State within a particular place, 
where the applicant is deprived of his or her freedom of movement »: article 2, k) of the reception 
directive in force and article 2, i) of the Commission proposal. 
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documents were obtained enabling him to travel abroad.  On 31st May 2007, while he was 
detained in the detention centre, Mr. Kadzoev applied for refugee status. The action he 
brought against the refusal of the Bulgarian administrative authorities to grant that 
application was dismissed by judgement on 9th October 2007. On 21st March 2008 he 
made a second application for asylum, but withdrew it on 2nd April 2008. On 24th March 
2009 he made a third application for asylum. By decision of 10th July 2009 his asylum 
application is rejected. No appeal lies against that decision. During all this time Mr. Kadzoef 
remains held in the temporary detention.  
 
One of the questions put to the Court is that to know if “when calculating the period of 
detention for the purpose of removal under Article 15(5) and (6) of Directive 2008/115 
[return directive], the period must be included during which the execution of the removal 
decision was suspended because of the examination of an application for asylum by a third-
country national, where, during the procedure relating to that application, he has remained 
in the detention centre.” 
 
In its judgment, the Court recalls first of all the terms of recital (9) of the return directive, 
those of article 7 § 3 of the reception directive244 and those of article 18 of the asylum 
procedure directive245. It also mentions judicial appeals - made possible by the reception 
and asylum procedure directives - against a decision of detention taken under the terms of 
the above mentioned relevant provisions of these directives. On the basis of these 
provisions, the Court has concluded that “Detention for the purpose of removal governed 
by Directive 2008/115 [return directive] and detention of an asylum seeker in particular 
under Directives 2003/9 [reception directive] and 2005/85 [asylum procedure directive] 
and the applicable national provisions thus fall under different legal rules » (§ 45). 
 
According to the Court, the claimant stayed in the detention centre during the period in 
which he was an asylum seeker therefore the decision of detention had to be based on 
provisions of the Community and national law concerning asylum seekers instead of 
provisions of the Community and national law related to returning illegally staying third-
country nationals. It concludes from it that the preliminary prejudicial question should be 
given an affirmative answer and that therefore “…a period during which a person has been 
held in a detention centre on the basis of a decision taken pursuant to the provisions of 
national and Community law concerning asylum seekers may not be regarded as detention 
for the purpose of removal within the meaning of Article 15 of Directive 2008/115 [return 
directive] » (§ 48). 
 
However, the Court specifies that this conclusion is valid only in so far as one decision on 
the claimant placement in the detention centre was taken in the context of the procedures 
opened following his applications for asylum.  It belongs to the qualified national court to 
check if such is the case and to determine whether the claimant stay « in the detention 
centre during the period in which he was an asylum seeker complied with the conditions 
laid down by the provisions of Community and national law concerning asylum seekers » (§ 
46). On the other hand if the detention remained based on the previous national rules on 
detention for the purpose of removal or on the provisions of return Directive, the period of 
detention corresponding to the period during which those asylum procedures were under 
way would have to be taken into account in calculating the period of detention for the 
purpose of removal mentioned in article 15(5) and (6) of return Directive (§ 47). 
                                                 
244   That Member States may confine asylum seekers "... in accordance with national law ..." "... when it 
proves necessary for example for legal reasons or reasons of public order”. 
245 “Member States shall not hold a person in detention for the sole reason that he/she is an applicant for 
asylum”. 
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If the Court admits the principle itself of detention of asylum seekers, according to it, this 
detention must be based on specific provisions of Community and national law concerning 
asylum seekers and cannot be based on the provisions relating to detention for purposes of 
removal (return directive).  
 
In accordance with recital (9) of the return directive246, on the contrary, this position does 
not apply however with regard to asylum seekers whose request was rejected in first 
instance and with regard to those whose right of stay ended, both of them not being 
authorized any more to remain on the territory of the Member States. The first assumption 
also includes applicants who made an appeal against the negative decision when under 
national law this appeal has no suspensive effect since in this case, in spite of the recourse, 
the applicant is not authorized any more to remain on the territory of the State247. This 
applicant can be subjected to the legal mode of detention for the purpose of removal 
(return directive). 
 
Concerning the right of stay it can be reminded that article 7 § 1 of the asylum procedure 
directive in force - which has not been amended on that specific point by the directive 
Commission proposal (article 8 § 1), allows the asylum seekers to remain on the territory 
of the State of reception until the authority comes to a conclusion about its request in first 
instance. It should be stressed that this authorization to remain neither is equivalent to a 
residence permit nor is a way to make a possible illegal entry or a possible illegal stay 
become a legal entry or stay248.  
1.1.5. Conclusion related to the principle itself of the detention  
Thus, the legal debate relating to the detention of asylum seekers does not question the 
principle itself of the detention but the substantive conditions of the detention (1. 2), the 
procedural guarantees (1. 3) and the framing of the conditions of detention (1. 4). These 
three aspects are briefly pointed out below.  
1.2. The substantive conditions of the detention 
1.2.1. The ECHR and the ICCPR 
According to article 9 § 1 of the ICCPR detention can not be "arbitrary" and it can be 
applied only "on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by 
law". Meanwhile article 5 § 1 of the ECHR states that « No one shall be deprived of his 
liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law » 
and that « Everyone has the right to (…) security of person” These two provisions set the 
substantive conditions of deprivation of liberty: the legality and the lawfulness. 
 
1. Conditions of legality 
 
The notion of legal means « in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law » set in 
article 5 § 1 requires that the detention is based on a legal basis in domestic law and that 
this latter conforms to the Convention, including the general principles expressed or implied 
                                                 
246   “…a third-country national who has applied for asylum in a Member State should not be regarded as 
staying illegally on the territory of that Member State until a negative decision on the application, or a 
decision ending his or her right of stay as asylum seeker has entered into force”. 
247 See infra Title 2. 2. 3, 2°. 
248 See infra Title 2. 2. 3, 2°. 
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therein249. Such compliance commands inter alia that the deprivation of freedom 
corresponds to one of the 6 "cases" specifically enumerated in § 1. This exhaustive list 
must be given a narrow interpretation250. Compliance with “legal means” also implies with 
the quality of the law.  
 
According to the Court, quality in this sense implies that where a national law authorises 
deprivation of liberty -especially in respect of an asylum-seeker - it must be sufficiently 
accessible and precise, and must prescribe adequate legal protection in domestic law 
against all risk of arbitrariness251.  
 
That implies that the domestic law that authorizes the deprivation of liberty shall contain 
provisions providing for access to legal, humanitarian and social assistance and must also 
be amenable to judicial review252. This also implies that the law meets the test of “being 
provided for”. That is not the case if the legislation does not specify whether the detention 
of a person receiving a temporary suspension of a deportation order may take place or 
not253. 
 
Unlike article 5 § 1 of the ECHR, article 9 § 1 of the ICCPR does not enumerate the reasons 
why a person may be detained. Nevertheless the Covenant does require the motive of 
detention to be based on a domestic law legal basis254. 
 
2. Conditions of lawfulness 
 
Both the ECtHR and the HRC have made lawfulness a substantive condition for any 
deprivation of liberty. 
 
According to the ECtHR « Where the “lawfulness” of detention is in issue, (…) compliance 
with national law is not, sufficient: Article 5 § 1 requires in addition that any deprivation of 
liberty should be in keeping with the purpose of protecting the individual from 
arbitrariness»255. The condition of absence of arbitrary detention is assessed differently 
depending on the type of detention at issue. 
 
For the ground mentioned in indent b), second branch of article 5 § 1 - arrest or detention 
in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law – as well as for the 
ground mentioned in indent f), first and second branches of this provision - the lawful 
arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorized entry into the 
territory or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or 
extradition – absence of arbitrariness implies:   
 
1. That detention has been implemented honestly and without deception. 
2. Detention must be closely related to the purpose of the restrictions 
exhaustively authorized by article 5 § 1. 
                                                 
249 ECtHR, Winterwerp v. The Netherlands, Application n° 6301/73, Judgment 24 October 1979, § 45. 
Hereafter: ECtHR, Winterwerp. 
250 ECHR, Winterwerpc, § 37. 
251 ECthr, Amuur v. France, Application n° 19776/92, Judgment 25 June 1996, §§ 50 et 53. Hereafter: 
ECtHR, Amuur. 
252 ECtHR, Amuur, § 53. 
253 ECtHR, Mohd v. Greece, Application n°11919/03, Judgment 27 April 2006, § 24. Hereafter: ECtHR, 
Mohd. 
254 HRC, Jalloh V. The Netherlands, Communication n°794/1998, 15 April 2002, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/74/D/794/1998. 
255 ECtHR, Saadi, § 67. 
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3. The length of detention should not exceed that reasonably required for the 
purpose pursued. 
4. There is some connection between the reason for the deprivation of liberty 
and the place and conditions of detention. They must be adequate since, for 
asylum seekers in particular, the deprivation of liberty “is applicable not to 
those who have committed criminal offences but to aliens who, often fearing 
for their lives, have fled from their own country”256. 
 
As regards indent b) above mentioned the Court considers that the notion of arbitrariness « 
also includes an assessment whether detention was necessary to achieve the stated aim. 
The detention of an individual is such a serious measure that it is justified only as a last 
resort where other, less severe measures have been considered and found to be insufficient 
to safeguard the individual or public interest which might require that the person concerned 
be detained »257. 
 
This necessity test applied under the principle excluding any arbitrariness is not retained by 
the Court when supervising a detention based on indent f) above mentioned258. 
 
For its part, the Human Rights Committee considers “that the notion of "arbitrariness" must 
not be equated with "against the law" but be interpreted more broadly to include such 
elements as inappropriateness and injustice. Furthermore, remand in custody could be 
considered arbitrary if it is not necessary in all the circumstances of the case, for example 
to prevent flight or interference with evidence: the element of proportionality becomes 
relevant in this context”259. 
 
The Committee does not explicitly accept the necessity test as described above (the 
detention may be imposed only as a last resort when other less severe measures have 
been considered and found inadequate to safeguard individual or public interest requiring 
detention). It refers to a necessity in all respects by citing examples that do not - as such - 
seem to require the consideration of less severe measures. In any event, it should be noted 
that the HRC "communications" are not legally binding260.  
1.2.2. The Geneva Convention 
As a reminder, Article 31 § 2 of the Geneva Convention authorizes restrictions to the 
movement of refugees who,  on account of their illegal entry or presence, enter or are 
present in their territory without authorization, only if they are necessary. The provision 
fails to define the concept of necessity.  
 
For Professor Carlier261 who refers to the detailed examination of the preparatory work for 
the disposition by James Hathaway, the concept must be understood as imposing a test of 
necessity in the sense of an obligation “to rely on less intrusive restrictions on freedom of 
movement, unless detention is clearly required”262. A more nuanced view is expressed by 
Professor Hailbronner who insists on the absence of any necessity criteria and on the non-
                                                 
256   ECtHR, Amuur, § 43. See also for the 4 conditions: ECtHR, Saadi, §§ 69, 70 and 74 and the Judgments 
cited. 
257    ECtHR, Saadi, § 70 and the Judgments cited. 
258 ECtHR, Saadi, §§ 72 and 73 and the Judgments cited. 
259    HRC, A.,  § 9.2. 
260 Frédéric Sudre, Droit européen et international des droits de l’homme, PUF, Paris, 2008, §§ 368 et 369, 
p. 772 à 776.  
261 J-Y Carlier, L’accès au territoire et à la détention de l’étranger demandeur d’asile, Revue trimestrielle 
des droits de l’homme, Juillet 2009,  p. 806. Hereafter: J-Y Carlier. 
262 JC Hathaway, The right of refugees under International Law, Cambridge University Press, p. 429 
mentioned by par J-Y Carlier, p. 806. 
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binding aspect of the interpretative “resolutions and recommendations” of Geneva 
Convention263 provisions in international law.  
1.2.3. The European Charter of Fundamental Rights 
Article 6 of the Charter enshrines the right to liberty and security. The Praesidium264 of the 
Convention states that the rights provided for in article 6 correspond to those guaranteed 
by article 5 ECHR. It follows that the meaning and scope of Article 6, including the 
limitations which may legitimately be imposed are - in accordance with article 52 § 3 of the 
Charter - the same as those conferred by the ECHR, including the jurisprudence Court - 
being specified that this provision does not preclude the right of the Union to grant a more 
extensive protection (article 52 § 3 in fine). This last assertion can guarantee the autonomy 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Praesidium 's explanations). 
1.3. Procedural guarantees 
1.3.1. The right to information 
Article 5 § 2 of the ECHR states that “Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, 
in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against 
him”. 
 
As for article 9 § 2 of the ICCPR it states that “Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at 
the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest (…)”. 
 
The ECtHR has clarified the scope of the "elementary safeguard" prescribed by article 5 § 2, 
which applies both to persons deprived of liberty by arrest or by detention. This elementary 
safeguard requires authorities to inform any person arrested of the legal and factual 
grounds for his detention, in simple language accessible to her and promptly. To assess 
whether the content and the promptness conveyed were sufficient one must pay attention 
to the special features of each Court case265 and the Court has concluded there is no 
violation of Article 5 § 2 when at the time of their arrest the applicants have received the 
services of an interpreter, explaining - in a simple and non-technical language that he can 
understand - the content of verbal and written communications which they received,  in 
particular the document ordering  their arrest (§ 52). The communication of the essential 
legal and factual grounds for his detention must allow the person, where appropriate, to 
take proceedings under of article 5 § 4 of the Convention. For this purpose, this 
communication may, depending on the special features of the case require free legal 
assistance266. In others respects, in the Saadi case, mentioned above, the Court held that a 
period of 76 hours did not meet the requirement to provide information "promptly" (§§ 84 
and 85). 
 
For its part the Human Rights Committee has concluded that the fact the reasons 
motivating his arrest267 had not been communicated to the complainant at the time of his 
arrest violated article 9 § 2 of the ICCPR.  
                                                 
263 K. Hailbronner, Detention of Asylum seekers, European Journal of Migration and Law 9, 2007, p. 163. 
Hereafter : K. Hailbroner. 
264 UE, Praesidium EC's explanations, Conv  828/1/03. Hereafter: Praesidium 's explanations. 
265 ECtHR, Conka v. Belgium, Application n° 51564/99, Judgment 5 February 2002, § 50. Hereafter: 
ECtHR, Conka. 
266   For example because the person deprived of his liberty was unfamiliar with the language and the case 
was complex: European Commission for Human Rights, Zamir v.United Kingdomi, Report 11 October 
1983. 
267 HRC, Wilson c. Philippines, Communication  n°868/1999, 11 November 2003, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/D/868/1999, § 7.5. 
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1.3.2. The right to judicial protection 
 
1. The ECHR and the ICCPR  
 
This right is prescribed by article 5 § 4 of the ECHR which provides that “Everyone who is 
deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which 
the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered 
if the detention is not lawful” and by article 9 § 4 of the Covenant in terms almost identical: 
the requirement of a "speediness" in the ECHR is replaced by the requirement of "without 
delay". 
 
In determining whether the requirement for "speediness" is fulfilled, the European Court of 
Human Rights states that the deadline cannot be fixed in the abstract, but must be 
assessed in light of the circumstances of each case268. It requires in any event a guarantee 
of rapidity from the states: both access to judicial review and the decision of the court must 
be done quickly. In Conka v. Belgium supra, the Court further considers that the court 
must be independent and impartial, the procedure adversarial and the remedy effective and 
accessible that is to say that the existence of the remedy must have a sufficient degree of 
certainty and the applicant must be given a realistic possibility of using the remedy (§ 46).  
This is not the case when information about the available remedies was in tiny characters 
on the document presented at the time of arrest at the police station and in a language 
that the applicants did not understand when only one interpreter (§ 44 and 45) but no 
other form of legal assistance was available to assist  dozens of families. The requirement 
of an adversarial procedure requires that the person deprived of liberty shall be heard 
either in person or, where necessary, through some form of representation269.  
 
The review of the legality of detention must be assessed both in terms of compliance with 
substantive rules of detention (as defined in Title 1. 2) and in terms of procedure rules. The 
court must also be empowered to order the release of the person when the detention is 
deemed illegal. In addition, article 5 § 4 also requires that any continued detention is 
subject to judicial review at regular interval as safeguard against the arbitrary270.  
 
2. The European Charter of Fundamental Rights 
 
Article 47 of the European Charter establishes the right to an effective remedy before a 
court to any person whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law have been violated. 
The scope of Article 47 is not limited to controversial points and obligations related to civil 
rights and the merits of any criminal charge as article 6 of the ECHR is. It applies when 
rights guaranteed by the law of the union are involved. Everyone is entitled to: 
 
– the right to a fair and public hearing in a reasonable time, 
– by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law, 
– the right of being advised, defended and represented. 
 
According to the last indent of article 47 legal aid should also be made available to those 
who lack sufficient resources insofar as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to 
justice.  
                                                 
268 ECtHR, Sanchez-Reisse v Switzerland,  Application n° 9862/82, Judgment 21 October 1986, § 52. 
269 ECtHR, Megyeri v. Germany, Application n° 13770/88, Judgment 12 May 1992, § 22. Hereafter: 
ECtHR, Megyeri. 
270 ECtHR, Shamsa v. Poland, Application n° 45355/99 and 45357/99, Judgment 27 November 2003, § 
59; ECtHR, Megyeri, § 22. 
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The explanations of the Praesidium of the Convention state that - according to the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights - a legal aid should be granted where 
the lack of it would make it impossible to guarantee an effective remedy271. 
1.4. The framework of conditions of detention 
 
It has already been stated - in Title 1.2.1, 2° mentioned before - that the lawfulness of the 
detention required a certain link between the ground for the deprivation of liberty and the 
place and conditions of detention. These should be adequate because, regarding in 
particular asylum seekers, deprivation of liberty “is not applicable to those who have 
committed crimes but to aliens who, often fearing for their lives, have fled from their own 
country”272. Article 3 of the ECHR and article 4 of the European Charter enshrine the 
prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The same ban is 
enshrined in article 7 of the ICCPR establishing the prohibition of cruel punishment or 
treatment. The ECHR considers that it follows from the non-derogatory right prohibition of 
subjecting prisoners "to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level 
of suffering inherent in detention"273. 
 
As such, are prohibited absolute isolation, humiliating body searches, unhealthy cells or 
certain conditions of confinement. These conditions of detention must be respected 
regardless of the place imprisonment274. One must also mention the right to physical 
integrity and mental health enshrined in article 3 § 1 of the European Charter. Professor 
Teitgen-Colly recalls that “pèsent aussi sur les Etats  des obligations positives comme celle 
de protéger la vie des détenus qui se décline en des obligations de soins médicaux, de 
prévention du suicide, de protection des plus vulnérables (…) [the States have positive 
obligations towards inmates as obligations of medical care, suicide prevention, protection of 
the most vulnerable (...)]275. 
 
It is clear that with regard to the detention of asylum seekers these principles are not 
respected in practice in a number of Member States. There are many various deficiencies 
and/or breaches in this field276. In his study277 on the assessment of the implementation of 
the reception directive in the Member States, the Odysseus Academic Network has also 
heighten the fact that a number of rights conferred by the directive were not effective for 
detained asylum seekers. The problem is partly due to the fact that 9 Member States 
consider that the directive does not apply in centres where asylum seekers are detained 
(on this issue see below the Title 9).  
 
It is important to check the compatibility of legal community standards with international 
standards on human rights. At the same time, however, it is necessary to ensure that these 
EU and international standards are not only enshrined in the national legal frameworks but 
are also effective in practice. 
 
The legal principles that prevail in matter of detention under the Geneva Convention, the 
                                                 
271    Regarding article 6 ECHR: ECtHR, Airey c. Ireland, Application n° 6289/73, Judgment 9 October 1979.  
272    ECtHR, Amuur, § 43.  
273  ECtHR, Kudla v. Poland, Application n° 3021/96, Judgment 26 October 2000, § 94. 
274  C. Teitgen-Colly, p. 615 et 616. 
275  C. Teitgen-Colly, p. 615: non official translation 
276  Among other: Report of the European Parliament, IP/C/LIBE/IC/2006-181. 
277   Study on the conformity checking of the transposition by member States of 10 EC directives in the 
sector of asylum and immigration” done for DG JlS of the European Commission End 2007. Q. 33 G, p. 
107 et 33 J, p 109 et 110. Hereafter: Odysseus Report. 
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international and regional framework of human rights and the jurisprudence of the CJEU 
have been laid. It is now of paramount importance to carry out the analysis relating to the 
issue of asylum seekers' detention in the light of these principles.  
2. ARTICLE 8 OF THE RECEPTION DIRECTIVE PROPOSAL 
 
PROBLEM: the grounds for detention278 of asylum seekers do not generally create a 
problem in terms of international law but which nevertheless give way to some 
interpretation and /or are unclear. Article 8 § 2 of the reception directive Commission 
proposal contains four comprehensive reasons justifying the detention of an asylum seeker. 
In doing so the Commission proposal contrasts with article 7 § 3 of the reception directive 
in force which does not lay down in an exhaustive way the grounds justifying the detention 
of asylum seekers.  The Commission proposal is likely to contribute to a better Community 
harmonization aimed at under the first phase of the Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS). Article 7 § 3 did not contribute to achieve this purpose.  The four motives for 
detention proposed by the Commission do not generally pose a problem in terms of 
international law however some give way to interpretation and/or are unclear:  
 
- Title 2. 2. 3 below:  About the ground based on article 8 § 2, c): “in the context of a 
procedure, to decide on his right to enter the Territory ": the wording casts doubt on the 
situations it refers to border procedures (article 37 of the asylum procedure directive 
proposal) and/or procedure designed to determine the right to enter the territory while the 
asylum seeker is already in the territory of the State, outside a border or transit zone, but 
was not allowed to enter the territory and/or another situation? 
 
- Title 2. 2. 5 below: About the ground based on article 8 § 2, indent b): "in order to 
determine the elements on which his application for asylum is based which in other 
circumstances could be lost ": the formulation “to determine the elements on which his 
application for asylum is based “is vague, the formulation “and in other circumstances could 
be lost” is unclear. 
- Title 2. 2. 6 below: About the ground based on article 8 § 2, indent d) "when protection of 
national security and public order so requires»: the conjunction "and" is inadequate since 
the notions of national security and public order are different.  
2.1. Specific justification, individual examination and necessity 
test 
 
Before examining the four grounds for detention proposed by the Commission, one must 
emphasize first the fact that article 8 of the Commission text: 
 
– Requires specific justification and an individual examination. 
– Requires a necessity test.  
2.1.1. Specific justification and individual examination 
Article 8 § 1 incorporates the principle stated in  article 22 § 1 of the asylum procedure 
directive Commission proposal (principle already enshrined in article 18 § 1 of the asylum 
                                                 
278  The term detention is defined in the reception directive Commission proposal as in the reception 
directive in force: « confinement of an asylum seeker by a Member State within a particular place, 
where the applicant is deprived of his or her freedom of movement »: article 2, k of the reception 
directive in force and article 2, i of the Commission proposal. 
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procedure directive in force): “Member States shall not hold a person in detention for the 
sole reason that he/she is an applicant for international protection”.  Recalling this principle 
is recalling in another way the principle that detention requires a specific justification and 
an individual examination. Article 8 § 2 also clearly lays down the requirement to conduct 
“an individual assessment of each case”. 
2.1.2. Necessity test 
Article 8 § 2 provides that Member States can hold an asylum seeker only "when it proves 
necessary" and provided that "other less coercive measures cannot be applied effectively ". 
This wording states the requirement of a necessity test clearly - as described in the above 
Title 1. 2. 1. This requirement has a general significance: whatever motive the detention of 
asylum seekers is based a necessity test should be carried out. In this the text of the 
Commission contrasts with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR279. Article 8 § 3 of the directive 
Commission proposal also provides the corollary to the requirement of the necessity test by 
requiring Member States to enact alternatives to detention.  
2.2. Review of the grounds for detention stipulated in Article 8§2  
2.2.1. Comprehensive grounds justifying the detention 
Article 8 § 2 of the Commission proposal contrasts with article 7 § 3 of the directive into 
force since it allows detention only in four cases exhaustively listed. As a reminder, article 7 
§ 3 of the reception directive allows Member States to detain asylum seekers "... in 
accordance with national law …", “When it proves necessary, for example for legal reasons 
or reasons of public order (…)". No further explanation is stipulated. This incomplete 
provision leaves considerable discretion to Member States and for that reason led to a great 
disparity in detention practices within the Union.  
 
The Odysseus report has underlined how numerous and divergent the motives for detention 
of asylum seekers were within members States280. In some States the detention is allowed 
only in one circumstance while in other States the grounds for detention are multiple. It is 
obvious that such a diversity of practices do not contribute to harmonize national legal 
frameworks through minimum standards - a Community harmonization aimed at under the 
first phase of the Common European Asylum System. 
 
In this sense, article 8 § 2 of the reception directive Commission proposal contributes to a 
better community harmonization. A debate relating to the choice of grounds is however 
open. Indeed, as it will be discussed in Title 4 below, the Council proposes to add a fifth 
reason for detention to which the Commission is opposed281. 
2.2.2. The four motives exhaustively listed 
According to article 8 § 2 an applicant may only be detained to a particular place: 
 
a. In order to determine, ascertain or verify his identity or nationality; 
b. In order to determine the elements on which his application for asylum is based 
which in other circumstances could be lost; 
c. In the context of a procedure, to decide on his right to enter the territory; 
d. When protection of national security and public order so requires. 
 
                                                 
279 See supra Title 1. 2. 1, 2° regarding article 5, § 1, indent f) ECHR. 
280    Odysseus Report, Q. 33 A, p. 101 à 103. 
281 Council of the European Union, Note from the Presidency to the Strategic Committee on Immigration, 
Frontiers and Asylum, 8777/10, 26 April 2010. 
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These four reasons are exactly the four cases exhaustively listed in a recommendation 
adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 16th April 2003282. This 
recommendation has no binding legal force whatsoever.  
 
However, the reasons given by the Commission proposal do not correspond with the 
comprehensive reasons defined by the UNHCR Executive Committee in its Conclusion No. 
44, October 13 1986283. It will be shown how each of the grounds cited by the Commission 
falls within or outside of the grounds listed in the conclusions of the UNHCR Executive 
Committee. The legal value of the Conclusions of the UNHCR Executive Committee, 
however, raises an argument. According to Professor Hailbronner “Even UNHCR-EXCOM 
conclusions, although adopted by representative of Member States, are not intended as 
binding instruments of refugee law expressing the will of states to be bound to comply with 
them in their application of the Geneva Convention. They represent recommendations of 
preferable practices in specific situations and may therefore have political weight in 
providing guidelines for the future development of standards”284. This must be taken into 
account in what follows.  
 
After the comparative examination between the Commission proposal and the Conclusions 
of the UNHCR Executive Committee, the motives for detention proposed by the Commission 
will be more specifically assessed in the light of Article 5 § 1 ECHR that defines exhaustively 
the reasons for deprivation of liberty may be based on and more particularly in the light of 
the three cases already mentioned in relation to detention of asylum seekers (see Title 1. 
1. 3):  
 
– Indent b), second branch, article 5 § 1: the lawful arrest or detention of a person 
in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law, and 
– Indent f), first and second branches, article 5 § 1: the lawful arrest or detention 
of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a 
person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or 
extradition. 
 
In any event the review of the motives for detention raises the issue of a proper balance to 
be found between the right for the states to fight illegal immigration and the asylum 
seekers' right to freedom. 
This issue will be raised in particular when considering the 5th ground proposed by the 
Council (see infra Title 4). 
 
The ground of indent c), article 8 § 2 of the text of the Commission will be considered first 
since its previous analysis allows a better understanding on grounds of indents a) and b)  
article 8 § 2.  
 
2.2.3. The ground of indent c) article 8 § 2 “in the context of a procedure to decide on 
his right to enter the territory”: conform to international law but the formulation 
casts doubt on the circumstances it is referring to 
– Does it refer to the border procedures mentioned in Article 37 of the asylum 
procedure directive proposal? (Article 35 of the directive in force) 
 
                                                 
282 Recommendation (2003) 5 related to detention of asylum seekers, Committee of Ministers, Council of 
Europe. Hereafter: Recommendation (2003) 5. 
283 UNHCR, Conclusions 44. 
284 K. Hailbronner, p. 162. 
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And/or  
 
– Does it refer to the event of a procedure designed to determine the right to enter 
the territory while the asylum seeker is already in the territory of the State, outside 
of a border or transit zone, but has not been allowed to enter the territory? 
 
And/or  
 
– Another situation?  
 
1. The border procedures mentioned in the asylum procedure directive (Article 
37 of the asylum procedure directive proposal)? 
 
Article 37 of the asylum procedure directive Commission proposal states that:  
 
«1. Member States may provide for procedures, in accordance with the basic principles and 
guarantees of Chapter II [of the directive], in order to decide at the border or transit zones 
of the Member State on: 
(a) the admissibility of an application made at such locations; 
and/or  
(b) the substance of an application in an accelerated procedure pursuant to Article 27(6) ». 
 
In this case, in accordance with § 2 of article 37 of the proposal, Member States shall 
ensure that a decision in the framework of the procedures provided for in article 37 § 1 is 
taken within a reasonable time. When a decision has not been taken within four weeks, the 
applicant for asylum shall be granted entry to the territory of the Member State in order for 
his/her application to be processed in accordance with the other provisions of this directive 
(article 37, § 2 in fine).   
 
From this wording it can be argued that the reason for detention based on indent c) of 
article 8 § 2 of the directive Commission proposal refers to the procedures at the border or 
at transit zones set in  article 37 of the asylum procedure  directive  Commission proposal. 
The issue is really within the context of these procedures to decide on [the] asylum 
application, in the context of a procedure aiming to determine [the] right to enter the 
territory. 
 
2. A procedure designed to determine the right to enter the territory while the 
asylum seeker is already in the territory of the State, outside of a border 
zone or transit, but has not been allowed to enter the territory?  
 
In the case Saadi v. United Kingdom supra, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR was asked to 
rule on the application of article 5 § 1, indent f), first branch of the ECHR: the detention of 
a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country. In this case, 
several important findings have been made by the Court. One of them is particularly 
relevant when considering the ground based on indent c) article 8 § 2 of the Commission 
text. The Court held that as long as a potential immigrant, even when he/she is an asylum 
seeker, has not been authorized by a State to enter its territory, this entry is irregular. So  
« detention of a person who wishes to effect entry and who needs but does not yet have 
authorisation to do so, can be (…) to “prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry ». The 
court « does not accept that, as soon as an asylum seeker has surrendered himself to the 
immigration authorities, he is seeking to effect an “authorised” entry, with the result that 
detention cannot be justified under the first limb of Article 5 § 1 (f). To interpret the first 
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limb of Article 5 § 1(f) as permitting detention only of a person who is shown to be trying 
to evade entry restrictions would be to place too narrow a construction on the terms of the 
provision and on the power of the State to exercise its undeniable right of control referred 
to above [undeniable sovereign right of States to control aliens' entry into and residence in 
their territory]. Such an interpretation would, moreover, be inconsistent with Conclusion 
No. 44 of the Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' 
Programme, the UNHCR Guidelines and the Committee of Ministers' Recommendation (…) 
all of which envisage the detention of asylum seekers in certain circumstances, for example 
while identity checks are taking place or when elements on which the asylum claim is based 
have to be determined »285. 
 
It can be argued that the Court assessment stating that detention of an asylum seeker - to 
prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country - is justified as long as the 
applicant has not received permission to remain in the country even if he/she is there de 
facto (in the Saadi case the applicant had been awarded by the British authorities a 
temporary admission. Temporary admission, however, is not equivalent to permission to 
enter under the British domestic law). This implies that the detention of an asylum seeker 
based on article 5 § 1, indent f), first branch ECHR is permitted not only under border 
procedures but also in situations where the person is already on the territory of the State, 
outside of a border or transit zone  and  has not been  allowed to enter the territory.  
 
Since article 5 § 1, indent f), first branch ECHR allows to justify the detention of an asylum 
seeker in this case one shall wonder whether the ground of indent c) article 8 § 2 of the 
text of the Commission intends to cover, in addition to border procedures specified in the 
asylum procedure directive, situations where an asylum seeker is already in the territory of 
a State, outside of a border zone or transit, and has not been allowed to enter as defined 
by the ECHR in the case Saadi. The ground based on indent c) of article 8 § 2 of the 
Commission proposal is formulated in general terms without any specific reference to 
border procedures covered by the asylum procedure directive proposal. Without any further 
precision the motive for detention refers to a procedure in order to decide on the right to 
enter the territory. Such a formulation seems to allow including the situations referred to in 
the preceding indent. The wording of the Commission nevertheless deserves to be clarified 
(see infra Title 2).  
 
3. Other circumstances? 
 
The case Saadi makes one wonder whether article 5, § 1, indent f), first branch ECHR 
prevents the unauthorised entry into the country and hence the reason for detention based 
on article 8 § 2, indent c) of the Commission proposal applies or not to the following 
circumstances: at the time of asylum application the person's stay is illegal, but he/she has 
entered legally.  
 
A negative answer could be given to this question on the basis of the following elements: 
 
– The literal analysis of the wording of indent f), first branch which refers to the 
irregular entry and not to the irregular stay.  
– The fact that the exhaustive list of grounds for detention under article 5 § 1 must 
receive a narrow286 interpretation.  
 
                                                 
285 ECtHR, Saadi, § 65. 
286 ECtHR, Winterwerp, § 37. 
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A positive response could be given to this question on the following basis:  
 
– The asylum seeker was allowed to enter but is no longer allowed to stay. Now it can 
be defended that the purpose of article 5, § 1, indent f), first branch is to fight 
against illegal immigration. Therefore it would not be excluded that when the ECtHR 
had to decide on such a case it regards it as falling within its scope.  
 
The question remains open. It must therefore be taken into account in the solutions that 
are recommended below.  
 
The ground for detention under indent c) of article 8 § 2, is not mentioned by the Executive 
Committee of the UNHCR. In his comments on the Commission proposal287 the UNHCR 
estimated that this ground could lead to widespread and systematic detention of asylum 
seekers in the context of border procedures. UNHCR considers that, depending on its 
implementation and interpretation, it could result in penalization of asylum seekers who 
enter the EU in an irregular manner. Without a doubt this ground is relating to illegal 
asylum seekers applying for asylum at border or transit zones (under article 37 of the 
asylum procedure directive Commission proposal). However, as just noted, this ground 
seems to apply to other situations. The fact remains that some States tend to detain the 
asylum seekers who apply for asylum at the border or in a transit zone systematically. Even 
if the Commission provisions require the submission of any deprivation of liberty to a 
speedy judicial review288, the possibility of detaining asylum seekers in the context of 
border procedures might maintain or generate administrative practices giving way to 
widespread detention of irregular asylum seekers who are at the border or in transit zones 
at least for a limited time (because of judicial review). This consideration is however closely 
linked to the directive since it allows specific procedures at the border.  
 
In addition, in view of the Saadi case mentioned above the motive in itself is neither 
contrary to article 5 § 1, indent f), first branch of the ECHR nor to article 31 of the Geneva 
Convention  against  the opinion of ECRE  regarding the latter provision289.  
 
ECRE position is based on the partly dissenting opinion made on the fringe of the Saadi 
case. The six judges at the origin of the dissent consider among others that “asylum 
seekers who have presented a claim for international protection are ipso facto lawfully 
within the territory of a State, in particular for the purposes of Article 12 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (liberty of movement) and the case-law 
of the Human Rights Committee, according to which a person who has duly presented an 
application for asylum is considered to be “lawfully within the territory”. ECRE maintains 
that this approach is also reflected in EU asylum law in article 7 § 1 of the asylum 
procedure directive in force (now article 8 § 1 in the directive Commission proposal - whose 
terms are unchanged) and recital (9) of the return directive.  
 
In his comment290 on the Saadi case, Jean-Yves Carlier wisely dismantles the judges' 
dissenting opinion according to which an applicant for asylum must be considered as 
lawfully in the territory of a State simply because of his asylum application, Professor 
Carlier mainly uses articles 31 and 33 of the Geneva Convention as an as argument. 
According to Professeur Carlier if the principle of non refoulement enshrined in article 33  
                                                 
287   UNHCR, Comments on the European Commission’s proposal, p. 5. Hereafter: UNHCR, Comments RCD 
proposal. 
288 See infra Title 5. 2. 
289 ECRE, Comments on the European Commission proposal to recast the reception conditions directive, 
April 2009, article 8 – detention.  Hereafter: ECRE, Comments RCD proposal. 
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« ouvre un droit à l’asile provisoire du candidat réfugié qui ne peut être envoyé vers un 
pays qui ne serait pas sûr, il ne convertit pas pour autant son accès au territoire en accès 
régulier. L’Etat demeure maître de la portée qu’il donne à cet accès au territoire. 
L’importance de l’article 33 est précisément de protéger le candidat réfugié qui accède 
irrégulièrement au territoire d’un Etat, à la différence de l’article 32 qui ne protège que le 
réfugié « se trouvant régulièrement » sur le territoire » [gives a right to temporary asylum 
to the asylum seeker who cannot be sent to a country that is not safe, it does not mean 
his/her entry on the territory becomes a legal entry. The state retains control of the scope 
he gives to access to its territory. The importance of article 33 is precisely to protect the 
asylum seeker who enters illegally into the territory of a State, in contrast to article 32 that 
protects only the refugee lawfully in the territory]291. 
 
As to article 31 invoked by ECRE, Professeur Carlier goes on to say « La Convention de 
Genève est encore plus explicite en son article 31, dont le titre est « réfugié en situation 
irrégulière  dans le pays d’accueil, en indiquant, par là même, comme le confirment les 
travaux préparatoires, que tout réfugié ou candidat réfugié n’est ni automatiquement en 
séjour régulier, ni nécessairement en séjour irrégulier. Il peut, selon les circonstances, être 
dans l’une ou l’autre hypothèse.» [The Geneva Convention is even more explicit in its 
Article 31 - headed "refugees unlawfully in the country of refugee”, indicating thereby that 
any refugee or asylum seeker is neither automatically lawfully in the territory nor 
unlawfully as confirmed by the preparatory work. It may, depending on circumstances, be 
in either case]292. 
 
It is worth recalling the content and the terms of article 31 § 1, which aim at providing 
penal immunity to refugees (and asylum seekers) who « (…) on account of their illegal 
entry or presence (…) enter or are present in their territory without authorization (…) ». In 
addition to the explicit mention of illegal entry or presence, the lack of mention of 
authorization leads to make a connection with article 7 § 1 of the asylum procedure 
directive in force invoked by ECRE as well. This article provides that: "Applicants shall be 
allowed to remain in the Member State, for the sole purpose of the procedure, until the 
determining authority has made a decision in accordance with the procedures at first 
instance set out in Chapter III. This right to remain shall not constitute an entitlement to a 
residence permit ". This provision does not prescribe on any account the principle that an 
asylum seeker would be legally present on the territory - because of his application for 
asylum only. However article 7 § 1 recognizes the right for the asylum seeker to remain on 
the territory of the State that is to say precisely the right to a temporary stay. Articles 3 § 
1 and 6 § 1 of the reception directive Commission proposal refer to the same temporary 
stay authorization to remain on the territory of the State293.  
 
Finally, ECRE invokes recital (9) of the return directive mentioned in Title 1. 1. 4 here 
before according to which « (…) a third-country national who has applied for asylum in a 
                                                                                                                                                            
290 J-Y Carlier, p. 800 et 801. 
291 Non official translation 
292  Non official translation. 
293   Article 3 § 1 related to the scope of application states: “This Directive shall apply to all third country 
nationals and stateless persons who make an application for international protection at the border, or 
in the territory, including at the border or in the transit zones, of a Member State, as long as they are 
allowed to remain on the territory as asylum seekers, as well as to family members, if they are 
covered by such application for international protection according to the national law”. The content of 
this provision is identical in the reception directive in force. Article 6 § 1 related to the documents 
states: “Member States shall ensure that, within three days after an application is lodged with the 
competent authority, the applicant is provided with a document issued in his or her own name 
certifying his or her status as an asylum seeker or testifying that he or she is allowed to stay in the 
territory of the Member State while his or her application is pending or being examined”. The content 
of this provision is identical in the reception directive in force. 
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Member State should not be regarded as staying illegally on the territory of that Member 
State (…) ». Does this detail imply that an asylum seeker must generally be considered as 
legally present on the territory of a state because of his asylum application only? A 
negative answer must be given taking into account the following consideration among 
others: the scope of recital (9) must be analyzed in the specific context of the return 
directive and the objectives of the latter. This directive sets out common standards and 
procedures to be applied in Member States for returning illegally staying third country 
nationals. These standards include provisions relating to detention of the third-country 
national who is the subject of return procedures in order to prepare the return and/or carry 
out the removal process. In this context, recital (9) can be interpreted as aiming at 
avoiding the third-country national staying illegally, but seeking asylum also, to be 
subjected to the standards and community return procedures - including the detention 
framework - and this « until a negative decision on the application, or a decision ending his 
or her right of stay as asylum seeker has entered into force »:  recital (9) in fine.  
 
The Court of Justice of European Union ruled in this sense in the case commented in Title  
1.1.4. (Case Kadzoef). 
 
It follows from all the foregoing that the reason for detention mentioned in indent c) of 
article 8 § 2 of the reception directive Commission proposal is not an issue under the 
relevant international standards (article 5 § 1 of the ECHR, article 31 of the Geneva 
Convention and article 9 of ICCPR).  However the wording of recital c) needs to be clarified 
with regard to situations that this provision refers to: see below Title 2.  
2.2.4. The ground of indent a) article 8 § 2: « in order to determine, ascertain or verify 
his identity or nationality »: a ground consistent with international law and 
requires no modification  
Detention for the purpose of verifying an asylum seeker's identity is one of the four reasons 
given by the UNHCR Executive Committee294. In its 1999 guidelines, UNHCR stated that 
« This relates to those cases where identity may be undetermined or in dispute »295. This 
motive for detention does not violate Article 5 § 1 of the ECHR. When the identity and/or 
nationality are indeterminate or controversial the detention of the asylum seeker based on 
this initial motive is in the scope of indent f) second branch of this article at first: detention 
of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorized entry into the country. In its judgment 
in the case Saadi the ECtHR expressly endorsed the reason for verification of identity under 
the application of indent f, the second branch (§ 65 of the Judgment). This motive may also 
fall within the scope of the indent b), second branch of article 5 § 1 ECHR, secure the 
fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law as long as the national law:  
 
– Imposes anyone the obligation to prove his identity. 
– Allows the detention of a person to compel him to fulfil this specific and definite 
obligation296. 
 
So the ground mentioned in indent a) article 8 § 2 of the Commission proposal can legally 
justify the detention of asylum seekers both at the border and in transit zone or on the 
territory of a Member State. This ground is in itself no more incompatible with the contents 
of Article 31 of the GC or with that of article 9 of the ICCPR as a test of necessity is 
imposed by the directive Commission proposal.  
                                                 
294 The executive committee does not refer to nationality. 
295 UNHCR, Guidelines, Guideline 3 (i). 
296 Nuala Mole, Le droit d’asile et la Convention Européenne des droits de l’homme, Conseil de l’Europe, 
Strasbourg, 2008, p. 88.  
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2.2.5. The ground of indent b) article 8 § 2: « in order to determine the elements on 
which his application for asylum is based which in other circumstances could be 
lost »: a ground consistent with international law but the wordings “in order to 
determine the elements on which his application for asylum is based” as well   
“which in other circumstances could be lost” lack clarity 
This ground is recognized by the Executive Committee of UNHCR that does not however 
prescribe the circumstances related to elements “which in other circumstances could be 
lost”. Under the 1999 guidelines, the UNHCR specifies that on this ground the asylum 
seeker «may be detained exclusively for the purposes of a preliminary interview to identify 
the basis of the asylum claim. This would involve obtaining essential facts from the asylum-
seeker as to why asylum is being sought and would not extend to a determination of the 
merits or otherwise of the claim. This exception to the general principle cannot be used to 
justify detention for the entire status determination procedure or for an unlimited period of 
time »297. 
 
In its comments on the reception directive Commission proposal298 UNHCR reiterates the 
limitations of the application of this ground and asks for the mention “within  the context of 
a preliminary interview” to be  added299 so that the text of the Commission can not be 
interpreted as allowing to detain an asylum seeker throughout the whole asylum procedure. 
UNHCR concern to see the text of the Commission authorize the detention of an asylum 
seeker throughout the whole procedure does not seem justified. Such detention could be 
sanctioned through the judicial review. The fact remains that the text of the Commission 
needs to be further clarified to better define and specify the purpose and scope of the 
ground. 
 
The reference to the specific context of preliminary interview proposed by the UNHCR is not 
adequate insofar as such preliminary interview is not referred to in the asylum procedure 
directive Commission proposal even if it is in some national legal framework: it is only 
referred to personal interview where the application is examined on the merits: article 13 of 
the Commission text. The phrase "preliminary interview" could also be confusing given the 
terms of article 35 of the asylum procedure directive Commission proposal  mentioning a 
"preliminary examination" that Member States may apply in case of  "subsequent"300 
applications.  Another phrase must therefore be sought to circumscribe the ground of 
indent b), article 8 § 2: see SOLUTIONS below.  
 
The condition relating to “elements which in other circumstances could be lost” is unclear. 
The above Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe puts 
this ground into words as follows: “(…) when elements on which the asylum claim is based 
have to be determined which, in the absence of detention, could not be obtained”301. 
Examination of the explanatory memorandum of the Recommendation provides no further 
explanation. This criterion is not mentioned either in the Conclusions of the UNHCR 
Executive Committee.  
 
The third reason for detention stated in the Commission proposal does not raise any 
problem regarding article 5 § 1 of the ECHR. As for the first ground, the detention of 
asylum seekers on this ground is within the scope of indent f), second branch: detention of 
a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorized entry into the country. In its ruling of 
Saadi case, the ECHR Court expressly endorsed the reason for determining the factors 
                                                 
297 UNHCR, Guidelines, Guideline 3 (ii). 
298 UNHCR, Comments RCD proposal, p. 5. 
299 ECRE shares this opinion: ECRE, Comments RCD proposal. 
300  See Chapter IV: Section IV, Title 7. 
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underlying the request according to the implementation of indent f), second branch (§ 65). 
This ground can legally justify the detention of an asylum seeker at the border as well as at 
a transit zone or on the territory of a Member State. This ground is not in itself 
incompatible with the content of article 31 of the Geneva Convention or with that of article 
9 of the ICCPR as a necessity test is imposed by the directive Commission proposal.  
2.2.6. The ground of indent b) article 8 § 2: « when protection of national security and 
public order so requires »: a ground consistent with international law but the 
conjunction "and" is inadequate, however since the concepts of national security 
and public order are distinct  
This ground also mentioned by the Executive Committee of UNHCR raises no legal problem. 
It is however necessary to replace the conjunction "and" by the conjunction "or" the 
concept of national security and public order being distinct.  
 
SOLUTION: 
- Title 2. 2. 3. above: The ground of indent c) of article 8 § 2: 
Proposal to redraft the ground in these terms: "to prevent unauthorized entry into the 
territory”. 
This formulation is identical to that of article 5 § 1, indent f), first branch of the ECHR. Such 
a formulation allows to understand the ground at the light of the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR (present and future) and thus removes any doubt as to the question of what 
circumstances the reason given by the Commission intends to address.  
 
- Title 2. 2. 4. above: the ground of indent a) of article 8 § 2: It does not require any 
modification   
 
- Title 2. 2. 5. above: The ground of indent b) of article 8 § 2:  
Proposal to redraft the ground in these terms: "clarify the facts and the essential elements 
underlying the claim’."  
This formulation allows in one hand to clarify the purpose and scope of the grounds and on 
the other hand removes the unclear statement “the elements which in other circumstances 
could be lost” which is not taken up either by the Committee UNHCR Executive.  
 
- Title 2. 2. 6. above: The ground of indent d) of article 8 § 2: 
Proposal to redraft the ground in these terms: "when protection of national security or 
public order so requires".  
This formulation substitutes the conjunction "and” by the conjunction "or". 
3. ARTICLE 8 § 2 OF THE RECEPTION DIRECTIVE 
PROPOSAL (TEXT OF THE PARLIAMENT)   
 
PROBLEM: The grounds for detention of asylum seekers: Coexistence of two different 
regimes of detention frameworks, inconsistent with each other. While maintaining and not 
amending article 8 § 2 of the directive Commission Proposal, Parliament has reintroduced § 
3 of the reception directive into force to article 7. This § 3 authorizes member states to 
detain asylum seekers "... in accordance with their national law ...", “When it proves 
necessary, for example for legal reasons or reasons of public order (…)”. This reintroduction 
leads to the coexistence of two different regimes of detention and mutually exclusive: a 
                                                                                                                                                            
301  Recommandation (2003) 5. 
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restrictive regime - the new article 8 § 2 - another leaving a wide margin of discretion to 
the States - that of § 3 of article 7.  
 
The incompatibility of the two regimes of detention required to remove one. The restrictive 
regime of detention proposed by the Commission allows a better community harmonization 
than § 3 of article 7 of the reception directive into force. Furthermore, this restrictive 
regime is likely to contribute more to achieving a proper balance between the right of 
States to fight against illegal immigration and the right to liberty of asylum seekers. It is 
therefore recommended to retain only the restrictive regime of the Commission proposal 
(with the arrangements set out in Title 2, Box: SOLUTIONS and those recommended in 
Title 4, Box: SOLUTIONS).  
 
SOLUTION: 
 
§ 3 of article 7 shall be removed 
Then remains only the new detention regime proposed by the Commission (subject to the 
amendments proposed in Titles 2 and 4, Box: SOLUTIONS).   
4. ARTICLE 8 § 2 OF THE RECEPTION DIRECTIVE 
PROPOSAL (TEXT OF THE COUNCIL) 
 
PROBLEM: the grounds for detention of asylum seekers: Adding a fifth reason for detention, 
being the risk absconding. If this reason is in principle in line with international law, it 
nevertheless raises the question of its relationship with the ground for risk absconding in 
the proposal for a Dublin regulation and the question of its merits  
 
The Council did not adopt the amendment of the Parliament above mentioned namely the 
reintroduction of Article 7 § 3 of the reception directive in force. Moreover, while 
maintaining four grounds for detention enacted in the Commission proposal, the text 
proposed by the Council included in article 8 § 2 a 5th reason for detention: the risk of 
absconding. If this ground is consistent with international law principle, the text proposed 
by the Council nevertheless raises two questions:  
 
- Title 4. 1. below: The question of its relationship with article 27 § 2 of the Dublin 
regulation Commission proposal (and the text of this proposal as amended by the 
Parliament and that proposed by the Council) which authorizes the detention of asylum 
seekers for risk of absconding only from the time an asylum-seeker is subject to a decision 
of transfer when the text of the reception directive proposed by the Council enacts this 
ground in a general and not restrictive way making article 27 § 2 unnecessary. 
 
- Title 4. 2. below: The question of its adequacy in terms of a proper balance to be found 
between the right for the States to fight illegal immigration and the asylum seekers' right 
to freedom. The expansion of the scope of the ground for detention based on a risk of 
absconding proposed by the Council modifies the balance in favour of the States. One 
needs to examine whether this change is excessive or not. 
 
In itself, the reason for detention based on a risk of absconding of the asylum seeker is not 
an issue under article 5 § 1 of the ECHR. This ground may, depending on circumstances, 
enter the scope of indent f), first or second branch of this article - detention of a person to 
prevent his effecting an unauthorized entry into the country or of a person against whom 
action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition - or within the scope of 
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indent b) - detention of a person in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation 
prescribed by law-. It can therefore legally justify the detention of an asylum seeker at the 
border as well as in transit zone or on the territory of a Member State. This motive in itself 
is also compatible with the content of article 31 of the GC and with that of article 9 of the 
ICCPR as well since a necessity test is enshrined in the directive Commission proposal. The 
addition of this fifth ground in the reception directive proposal nevertheless raises the two 
following questions:  
4.1. The question of the articulation of the fifth ground added by 
the Council with article 27 § 2 of the Dublin regulation 
Commission proposal (and the text of this proposal as 
amended by Parliament and the text proposed by the 
Council), which authorizes the detention of asylum seeker for 
risk of absconding only  when an asylum-seeker is subject of 
a decision of transfer while the text of the reception directive 
proposed by the Council enacts this ground in a general and 
not restrictive way making Article 27 § 2 unnecessary. 
 
According to article 27 § 2 of the Dublin regulation Commission proposal, all asylum 
seekers subject to its application may be held for detention under the grounds set in the 
reception directive Commission proposal. In addition, article 27 provides for a specific 
autonomous reason for the asylum seekers subject to a decision of transfer: those can also 
be detained if there is a significant risk of him/her absconding. The § 4 of article 28 
stipulates that in this case the detention may only be applied from the moment a decision 
of transfer to the responsible Member State has been notified to the person concerned and 
until that person is transferred to the responsible Member State. As for the other 4 reasons, 
this specific autonomous reason for detention can be ordered only when it proves 
necessary, on the basis of an individual assessment of each case, and if other less coercive 
measures cannot be applied effectively. 
 
This proposal was welcomed by the UNHCR302 subject of continuing concern about the 
concept of absconding risk (see below the Title 4.2).  
 
The Parliament has restricted the possibility of detention for risk of absconding of an 
asylum seeker subject to the Dublin regulation. The States shall not just do necessity test 
beforehand but they shall - before issuing any deprivation of liberty for risk of 
absconding303 - submit the applicant to other less coercive measures and make the 
conclusion that these measures “have not been effective”. The amendment, which was 
carried out by the Parliament led to the following scenario: delivery of the transfer decision, 
possibly accompanied by less coercive measures, statement of failure of these measures 
and therefore possibility to order the detention of the person for risk of absconding. Such a 
scenario that goes beyond the requirements of the UNHCR, may actually make the 
detention of asylum seeker for risk of absconding impossible. If at the time of a notification 
                                                 
302  UNHCR, Comments on the European Commission’s Proposal for a recast of the Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the 
Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of 
the Member States by a third country national or a stateless person, p. 17 et 18. Hereafter: UNHCR, 
Comments Dublin proposal. 
303  The notion of significant risk of absconding was abolished by Parliament since the notion defined in 
Article 2, k of this     proposal is risk of absconding and not significant risk of absconding: see infra 
Title 4. 2. 
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of the decision of transfer there are objective and pertinent reasons to believe that the 
person will abscond - what is required by the text of the Dublin regulation Commission 
proposal – to compel the States to submit the asylum seeker to less coercive measures 
beforehand and see its failure before deprivation of liberty is likely to enable the person to 
actually abscond. In this, the parliamentary amendment devoid of meaning the reason 
justifying the detention (to avoid the risk of absconding) and therefore reduces the 
efficiency aimed at by the system of transfer. Article 27 of the text of Dublin regulation 
proposed by the Council is then similar to the text proposed by the Commission.  
 
In any case, the addition - by the Council - of risk of absconding as a fifth reason for 
detention in article 8 § 2 of the reception directive proposal makes article 27 § 2 of the 
Dublin regulation proposal – ground for detention based on a risk of absconding -  
unnecessary. Indeed, the mention of the fifth ground of detention in the reception directive 
proposal is worded in a general and not limiting way. Therefore the Council addition should 
be maintained as such in the reception directive (which is not recommended: see below 
Title 4. 2) but maintaining the specific and autonomous ground for risk of absconding in the 
Dublin regulation proposal has no reason to be (since the ground, as it is formulated in the 
text of the reception directive of the Council, is relating to the same circumstances)  
4.2. The question of the merits of the fifth ground added by the 
Council in respect of the concern about a proper balance to be 
found between the right for the States to fight illegal 
immigration and the asylum seekers' right to freedom. The 
extension of the scope of the ground for detention based on a 
risk of absconding proposed by the Council modifies the 
balance in favour of the States. The issue is to determine 
whether this modification is excessive or not 
 
The texts proposed by the Commission (reception directive proposal and Dublin regulation 
proposal), limit the scope of detention for risk of absconding to the only case of an asylum-
seeker subject to Dublin procedure) and to a decision of transfer. It is obvious that the 
introduction by the Council - in the reception directive proposal – of a reason for detention 
related to a risk of absconding, worded in a general and not limiting way, modifies the 
balance to be found between the right for the States to fight illegal immigration and the 
asylum seekers' right to freedom in favour of the States. The extension of the scope of the 
ground for detention based on risk of absconding is not the only factor. This balance also 
depends in part on the content and the definition given to the concept of risk of 
absconding. 
 
Article 27 was given a good reception by the UNHCR (comments related to the Dublin 
regulation Commission proposal304). UNHCR is nevertheless concerned that the possibility 
remains that Member States take a wide view of what constitutes such a risk despite the 
fact that the Commission proposal gives a definition of it. However, UNHCR considers that it 
should not be possible under such a formulation to determine that the mere fact of being 
subject to the Dublin regulation creates a risk of absconding that justifies detaining the 
applicant. 
 
It is Article 2, l) of the Dublin regulation Commission proposal which defines the risk of 
absconding: it means the existence of reasons in an individual case, which are based on 
                                                 
304  UNHCR, Comments Dublin proposal, p. 17 et 18. 
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objective criteria defined by law, to believe that an applicant or a third-country national or 
a stateless person who is subject to a transfer decision may abscond. The Parliament has 
not amended this definition. In the text of the Dublin regulation proposed by the Council, 
no definition of the concept is given even though, as mentioned before, this ground for 
detention is maintained. The definition of risk of absconding given by the Commission in its 
Dublin regulation proposal is identical to that given to this same concept in the return 
directive, article 3, 7):  it means the existence of reasons in an individual case which are 
based on objective criteria defined by law to believe that a third-country national who is the 
subject of return procedures may abscond305. 
 
One may wonder about the objective criteria to be defined by national law. A first indication 
is given in the comments on the Twenty Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe on Forced Return on 4th May 2005. These comments were drafted by Ad 
hoc Committee of Experts on Legal Aspects of Territorial Asylum, Refugees and Stateless 
Persons (CAHAR). The 6th Guideline on the forced return defines the conditions for 
detention of a person subject to an expulsion (removal order). The comment relating to this 
principle specifies that the use of detention can take place only when there are objective 
reasons to believe that the person will not comply with the order, for instance:  
 
– If the time limit for departing from the territory has passed and the person has 
changed her place of residence without notifying the authorities of a change of 
address, 
– If she has not complied with the measures adopted to ensure that she will not 
abscond,  
– If she has in the past already evaded removal. 
 
Of course these are examples related to the return of illegal third-country nationals and not 
of asylum seekers subject or not to a transfer decision to the responsible State depending 
on whether one takes into consideration the ground of risk of absconding under the text of 
the reception directive proposed by the Council, or under of Dublin regulation Commission 
proposal.  
 
However, with some adaptations, the examples could be retained as objective criteria in 
the case of detention of an asylum seeker for risk of absconding. Thus, if we consider the 
situation of an asylum seeker subject to a decision of transfer, one can argue that there are 
objective reasons to believe that the person will not comply with the transfer decision:  
 
– If the time limit to submit to authorities for his transfer has passed and the person 
has changed her place of residence without notifying the authorities of a change of 
address, 
– If she has not complied with the measures adopted to ensure that she will not 
abscond,  
– If she has in the past already absconded to a measure of transfer. 
 
Apart from the comments of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe it is 
interesting to focus on preliminary arrangements for the return directive. The text adopted 
                                                 
305   In the English version of the two texts (Dublin regulation Commission proposal and return directive) 
the terms are exactly the same when in the French version of the return directive we note the 
adjective particulier instead of the adjective individuel in the Dublin regulation Commission proposal,  
- in English individual -. These differences do not affect the scope of the definition.  
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by the LIBE306 Committee stated that the risk of absconding can not occur directly from the 
mere fact that a third country national is staying illegally on the territory of a Member 
State.  
 
This last point has not been maintained in the return directive finally adopted. The principle 
is stated in general terms, however, in recital (6) of the Directive preamble: according to 
general principles of EU law, decisions taken under this Directive should be adopted on a 
case-by-case basis and based on objective criteria, implying that consideration should go 
beyond the mere fact of an illegal stay. 
 
As part of the return directive this clause is intended to prevent states to apply the 
following equation:  illegal stay = risk of absconding = detention. Illegal stay is an 
objective criterion but in this case it is not considered relevant by itself. It is this kind of 
equation that UNHCR is likely to fear in the context of the Dublin regulation: decision of 
transfer = risk of absconding = detention.  
 
Even if the elements above provide guidance on what may be an objective relevant 
objective or what is not, the concept of risk of absconding remains open to interpretation. 
It allows States discretion in the qualification of risk of absconding. This could maintain or 
generate widespread practice of administrative detention based on that ground (subject to 
judicial review a posteriori: see below Title 5.2). 
 
It should also be stressed that the Council while introducing the risk of absconding in the 
reception directive - under the grounds for the detention of an asylum seeker - has not 
given any definition of it. Is this intentional or is it an oversight? It would not be not 
surprising that this be desired insofar, as mentioned before; the Council has also deleted 
the definition of risk of absconding in text of the Dublin regulation Proposal without deleting 
the provision of article 27 above. This lack of definition gives a little more power to the 
States.  
 
Therefore as it stands, the texts of the reception directive and of the Dublin regulation as 
proposed by the Council leave a significant margin of discretion to the States about the 
possibility of placing an asylum seeker in detention because of risk of absconding. Even if 
the detention is subject to judicial review on legality and lawfulness and even if a definition 
of risk of absconding similar to that found in the Dublin regulation original proposal is made 
in the reception directive proposal, allowing for a widely accepted and non limiting 
detention of asylum seekers for risk of absconding, as proposed by the Council, can 
maintain or generate excessive administrative practices which are likely to undermine a 
proper balance to be found between the right of states to fight against illegal immigration 
and the asylum seekers’ right to freedom. 
 
On the other hand, it appears that there could be a legal gap in some situations if only the 
four detention grounds of the reception directive Commission proposal are accepted and 
the ground for risk of absconding, as provided in the Dublin regulation Commission 
proposal (the detention for risk of absconding can no be applied until the time a decision of 
transfer to the responsible Member State has been notified to the person concerned). Thus, 
it is in the following situations among others:  
 
1° An asylum seeker has been notified in first instance a decision  considering  his/her 
application inadmissible under article 29 § 2, indent d) of the asylum procedure directive 
                                                 
306 Report 20 September 2007, document A6-0339/2007. 
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Commission proposal ("subsequent" application) or a decision taken in the  accelerated 
procedure  under article 27 § 6 of the same text. He/she lodges an appeal against the 
decision under article 41 of the asylum procedure directive Commission proposal. According 
to domestic law, he/she is allowed to remain on the territory of the State during the appeal 
procedure (the assumption is rather theoretical, but not legally excluded).  
 
In this case, besides the fact that the aforementioned grounds for detention may be 
ineffective in this event, it appears that detention for the purpose of removal in accordance 
with the return directive nor can apply, asylum seekers being still allowed to remain on the 
territory of the Member States despite the refusal of his application in first instance (see 
above the Title 2. 2. 3. 2°). Then the Member States could not legally justify the detention 
of the asylum seeker in such circumstances. However, in view of finding a proper balance 
to be found between the right for the States to fight illegal immigration and the asylum 
seekers' right to freedom it seems legitimate in this case to allow States to detain the 
applicant for asylum if necessary. 
  
In fact, it is reasonable to consider that since it is an inadmissibility decision of a claim after 
a final decision or a decision of refusal taken in the accelerated procedure the probability 
that the State is facing an illegal migrant is greater than in other situations. Therefore the 
risk that the person lodges an appeal in a single purpose of delay with the intent to 
abscond is greater too.  
 
2 ° An applicant for asylum has been notified in first instance a decision considering his/her 
application inadmissible under article 29 § 2, d) above of the asylum procedure directive 
Commission proposal or a decision taken in the accelerated procedure under article 27 § 6 
of the same text. He/she lodges an appeal against the decision under article 41 of the 
asylum procedure directive Commission proposal. According to the domestic law, he/she is 
not allowed to remain in the territory of the State during the appeal procedure. 
 
However, under  §§ 6 and 7 of article 41 above, the applicant has the right to remain in the 
Member State until a court has ruled (on its own initiative or at the applicant's request) on 
his right to remain on the territory pending the outcome of the remedy. In this case as 
well, the grounds for detention may be ineffective in this event and detention for the 
purpose of removal in accordance with the return directive does not apply either since the 
asylum seekers is allowed to remain on the territory of the Member States while the court 
referred to in § 6 of article 41 rules on the case. However, for the same reason as stated 
for the previous hypothesis, it seems legitimate in this case to allow MS to detain the 
asylum seeker when needed.  
 
3 ° Concerning the event of judicial review in case of accelerated procedure or  
"subsequent" application (an assumption which may not be provided for by the legislation 
as has just been described above) it is worth mentioning that in the Saadi case, the ECtHR 
upheld the detention of an asylum seeker subject to an accelerated procedure  (§ 76 of the 
decision). The hypothesis of an accelerated procedure (before the introduction of possible 
judicial review) is in itself, in principle, covered by article 5 § 1, indent f), first branch of the 
ECHR and therefore the article 8 § 2, indent c) of the reception directive Commission 
proposal. 
 
But one might wonder what happens if the assumption mentioned in article 5 § 1, indent f), 
first branch of the ECHR should not be applicable and therefore neither article 8 § 2, c) 
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above307. Are the three other grounds of the reception directive Commission proposal 
sufficient enough to rule this hypothesis if necessary? In particular, would the ground - 
mentioned in indent b) of article 8 § 1 of the Commission proposal that is : clarifying the 
facts and the essential elements on which the asylum application is based - be sufficient for 
the detention to be based on  considering  that, given the circumstances of the case,  on 
one hand the asylum seeker's detention can not be justified for reasons of public order or 
national security  - exclusion of  the ground of article 8 § 2, indent d) of the reception 
directive Commission proposal - and on the other hand  the identity and nationality of the 
applicant do not raise a problem – exclusion of  the ground of Article 8 § 2, indent a) of the 
same text?  
 
It seems that an affirmative answer may be given since the grounds justifying the 
application of the accelerated procedure  - indent a) to  f) of article 27 § 6 of the  
procedure  directive Commission proposal- are reasons that inherently may be considered 
as essential elements and  must in principle lead to a expedited decision as well. The 
answer may however be negative if one takes into account the ground of indent b) of 
article 8 § 2 of the proposal as formulated by the Commission: to determine the elements 
on which his application for asylum is based which in other circumstances could be lost. 
This last assertion is unclear and could be interpreted so as to prevent the application of 
indent b) in the event described above. In this case, the detention of the person would be 
legally impossible which seems politically delicate since it concerns situations justifying an 
accelerated procedure. The same scenario seems possible for subsequent application. 
 
Given these considerations it is necessary to find a compromise between the text of the 
Council and the Commission proposal: 
 
SOLUTION:  
- Title 4. 1. above:  
If the ground for risk of absconding added by the Council was to be maintained as such in 
the text of the reception directive (which is not recommended: see below Title 4. 2) 
keeping the specific ground of autonomous risk of absconding in the Dublin regulation 
proposal would be useless (since it is covered by the ground as stated in the text of the 
reception directive). Therefore it would be necessary to remove this specific autonomous 
ground from the text of the Dublin regulation.  
 
If the ground for risk of absconding added by the Council in the text of the reception 
directive is replaced by the recommendations set out below in Title 4. 2 or is not 
maintained at all, the risk of absconding as formulated in article 27 § 2 of the Dublin 
regulation proposal can be maintained subject to delete the words “significant” from the 
concept of risk of absconding and to reintroduce a definition of the risk of absconding.  
 
- Title 4. 2. above:  
Finding a proper balance between the right for the states to fight illegal immigration and 
the asylum seekers' right to freedom do not seem affected by the Council proposal. At the 
same time the texts of the Commission (article 8 § 2 of the reception directive and article 
27 § 2 of the Dublin regulation) are insufficient to cover some situations. Therefore a 
                                                 
307  See supra Title 2. 2. 3, 3° which refers to the case of a person who is illegally on the territory when 
she applies for asylum while she had lawfully entered the territory. It is unclear whether this case falls 
within the scope of article 5 § 1, indent f), first branch of the ECHR and therefore within the scope of 
article 8 § 2, indent c) of the reception directive Commission proposal.  
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compromise solution is recommended. It is to add the following ground for detention to the 
reception directive : 
 
"When a judicial review is lodged against a decision taken under article 27 § 6 or 7 or 
article 29 § 2, indent d) of the directive XXX [asylum procedure directive Commission 
proposal] and there is a  risk of absconding “. 
  
The addition of this ground can refer to situations not covered by the texts of the 
Commission. This ground does not seem excessive, since it merely refers to the assumption 
of a judicial review lodged against an inadmissibility decision against an identical 
application after a final decision - article 29 § 2, indent d) - or to a decision taken in the 
accelerated procedure - article 27 § 6; these applications can be described as manifestly 
unfounded application under article 27 § 7 -. Therefore this ground does not include cases 
in which the remedy has legitimately a suspension effect. In addition maintaining the 
criterion of risk of absconding ensures consistency with the Dublin regulation Commission 
proposal (article 27 § 2). It also allows both to objectify the deprivation of freedom (even if 
the concept of risk of absconding is subject to interpretation) and to strengthen the control 
of the court required to rule on the legality and lawfulness of this measure.  
 
This compromise solution might be insufficient if the reason for detention based on indent 
b) of article 8 § 2 as enacted in the directive Commission proposal should be maintained in 
its original wording that is: determine the elements on which his application for asylum is 
based which in other circumstances could be lost. In this case the compromise should not 
only refer to the assumption of a judicial review brought against a decision taken in the 
accelerated procedure and/or a subsequent application but it should directly refer to the 
accelerated procedure (article 27 §§ 6 and 7) and to the subsequent application (article 35 
§ 3).  
 
 Whatever the compromise solution adopted, since the risk of absconding is maintained it is 
necessary to define it in both texts: reception directive and Dublin regulation (since the 
texts of the Council does not include a definition: in the Dublin regulation proposal the 
Council has deleted the definition in article 2 and in the reception directive proposal it has 
not provided for a definition).  
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5. ARTICLE 9 OF THE RECEPTION DIRECTIVE PROPOSAL 
(TEXTS OF THE COMMISSION, PARLIAMENT AND 
COUNCIL) 
 
PROBLEM: the guarantees offered to asylum seekers in detention are generally consistent 
with international law, under the exception – depending on the text taken into account (the 
text of the Commission, the text of Parliament or the text of the Council) - of one or 
another aspect that requires adjustments in order to fully satisfy the guarantees of article 5 
ECHR and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.   
 
Article 9 of the reception directive Commission proposal (and of the text of this proposal 
such as amended by the Parliament and as the one proposed by the Council) recognizes a 
number of safeguards for asylum seekers who are subject to a deprivation of liberty. These 
guarantees reflect the provisions of article 5 of the ECHR and the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR. These guarantees are generally in accordance with article 5 and the jurisprudence 
of the Court, subject to:  
 
 - Title 5. 1. below:  The applicant's right to be informed of the reasons for his detention in 
a language he understands (article 5 § 2 ECHR). Under the text of article 9 § 4 of the 
reception directive proposal (texts of the Commission, the Parliament and the Council) the 
possibility to inform the person in a language that he/she is reasonably expected to be able 
to understand is always an alternative. This alternative does not meet the requirement of 
the ECHR. 
 
- Title 5. 2. below: The judicial review of the administrative decision of detention that must 
take place "speedily" (article 5 § 4 of the ECHR). Under article 9 § 2 of the Commission 
proposal (not amended on this point by the Parliament) the review must occur "within 72 
hours from the beginning of the detention". This wording could be considered inconsistent 
with the requirement of article 5 § 4, as interpreted by the ECtHR. 
 
- Title 5. 3. below: The right to legal assistance in the absence of adequate resources for 
ensuring the effectiveness of the remedy (article 9, last §). The texts of the Parliament and 
the Council could undermine the "effective access to justice” as required by article 47, last 
indent of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights by allowing states to provide that 
« as regards fees and other costs, the treatment of detained applicants shall not be more 
favourable than the treatment generally accorded to nationals in similar circumstances ». 
 
Two other questions must be raised as well even if they do not pose a problem under 
Article 5 ECHR: 
 
- Title 5. 4. below: Providing for a maximum duration of the detention: neither the 
reception directive Commission proposal nor the text of the Parliament or the text of the 
Council (or the texts of Dublin regulation in force) lay down a maximum duration of the 
detention. The issue of a possible setting of a maximum duration of the detention has legal 
and political aspects.  
 
- Title 5. 5. below:  The authority in charge of ordering the detention: the text of the 
Commission - not amended on this point by the Parliament - provides that detention shall 
be ordered by judicial authorities but in urgent cases it may be ordered by administrative 
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authorities without mentioning which administrative authorities it may be. As for the 
Council text it enacts that detention shall be ordered by judicial or administrative 
authorities but does not specify which authorities it may be (article 9 § 2 of the proposal).  
 
5.1. The right to be informed of the reasons for detention 
 
According to article 5 § 2 ECHR this information should be given to the person « promptly, 
in a language which he understands ». According to article 9 § 4 of the reception directive 
proposal (texts of the Commission, the Parliament and the Council) the possibility to inform 
the person in a language that he/she is reasonably expected to be able to understand is 
always an alternative. This alternative does not meet the requirement of the ECHR.  
 
The right to information has been stated in Title 1.3.1 above.  According to article 9 § 4 of 
the reception directive Commission proposal detained asylum seekers are informed of the 
reasons for detention immediately and in a language they are reasonably supposed to 
understand. This wording does not meet the requirement of article 5 § 2 ECHR. The texts of 
the Parliament and of the Council (identical on this point) provide that detained asylum 
seekers shall be informed in a language they understand or may reasonably be presumed 
to understand. If the mention of “the language they understand” meet the requirement of 
article 5 § 2 ECHR, the alternative given by these texts implies that information can be 
given as well in a language [the asylum seekers] are reasonably supposed to understand. 
This possibility does not comply with article 5 § 2 ECHR. The text should provide the first 
part of the alternative only that is the language the asylum seekers understand.  
The requirement of article 5 § 2 ECHR is met however when asylum seekers receive a 
notification in a language they do not understand, but receive the assistance of an 
interpreter mastering their language, who explains the content of oral and written 
communications that have been made to them, particularly document informing the aliens 
of the content of the verbal and written communications which they received, in particular, 
the document ordering their arrest308. 
5.2. The judicial review of the administrative decision of detention 
 
According to article 5 § 4 ECHR this review must take place "speedily”. When the text 
proposed by the Council meets this requirement for speed, the Commission proposal (not 
amended on this point by the Parliament) could be considered inconsistent with the 
requirement of article 5 § 4, as interpreted by the ECtHR, since it provides that the judicial 
review must take place within 72 hours.  
 
The right to judicial protection has been explained above, in Title 1. 3. 2.  According to 
article 9 § 2 of the reception directive Commission proposal, when the detention has been 
ordered by administrative authorities, the detention order shall be confirmed by judicial 
authorities within 72 hours from the beginning of the detention. 
 
This period of 72 hours is neither in conformity with article 5 § 4 of the ECHR requiring the 
court to rule “speedily” nor with  the Court view stating that this concept cannot be defined 
in the abstract and the matter must be determined in the light of the circumstances of each 
case309. Concerning article 5 § 2 a 76 hours period was not considered satisfactory310. 
                                                 
308    ECtHr, Conka,, § 52. 
309 ECtHR Sanchez-Reisse, § 55. 
310  ECtHR, Saadi, §§ 84 et 85. 
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Therefore the Commission provision (which has not been amended on this point by the 
Parliament) should be amended. This change can follow the meaning of the text of the 
Council (article 9 § 2) which requires a speedy judicial review to be decided on as speedily 
as possible from the beginning of detention or after the launch of the relevant proceedings: 
see the two hypothesis of the Council text whose wording is similar to that of the judicial 
review provided in the return directive, article 15 § 2, indent 3, a) and b).  
5.3. The right of being advised, defended and represented and the 
right to legal aid in the absence of adequate resources for 
ensuring the effectiveness of the remedy 
 
Article 47 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights states that everyone whose 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an 
effective remedy before a tribunal. This right includes the right of being advised, defended 
and represented and the right to legal aid when the person has no adequate resources at 
his/her disposal and this aid is needed to ensure effective access to justice (article 47, last 
indent). The text of the directive Commission proposal satisfies the requirement to provide 
legal aid in these circumstances but the enactment of the Parliament and the Council could 
undermine article 47 of the Charter by allowing States to provide that « as regards fees 
and other costs, the treatment of detained applicants shall not be more favourable than the 
treatment generally accorded to nationals in similar circumstances » (article 9, last §). 
 
The explanations given by the Praesidium of the Convention311 refer to the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR relating to article 6 according to which a legal aid should be granted where the 
absence of such aid would make it impossible to ensure an effective remedy. 
 
In the case mentioned312 the Court considers that the rights stated in article 6 are not 
respected if considering the circumstances pertaining to the case, it is "unlikely" that 
without free legal aid, the person " would be able to present her case properly and 
satisfactorily" and that given the complexity of the case and the « complicated points of 
law » it entails. The less advantageous position of a person can also require legal 
assistance313. 
 
The text of the Commission proposal does not violate this provision. However the text 
amended by the Parliament and the Council proposal could be problematic.  These texts 
allow the States - either explicitly (the text of the Council) or indirectly (the text of the 
Parliament that incorporates provisions of the asylum procedure directive relating to legal 
assistance and representation) – to provide that, as regards fees and other costs, the 
treatment of detained applicants shall not be more favourable than the treatment generally 
accorded to nationals in similar circumstances. This assertion is acceptable provided that 
the treatment accorded to nationals does not violate the principle of “effective access to 
justice” as described above:  jurisprudence of the ECtHR, CJEU and article 47 of the 
Charter.  
                                                 
311 Praesidium 's explanations, article 47. 
312 ECtHR, Airey, § 24. 
313    CJEU, Evans, Case n° 63/01, § 77 
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5.4. Providing for a maximum duration of the detention 
 
Neither the reception directive Commission proposal nor the text of the Parliament or the 
text of the Council (or the texts of the Dublin regulation) lay down a maximum period of 
detention. The issue of a possible setting of a maximum duration of the detention has legal 
and political aspects.  
 
They specify however that detention shall be ordered for the shortest period possible, that 
this period shall not exceed the time reasonably needed to fulfil the administrative 
procedures pursuant to article 8 (2) (a), (b) and (c) and that delays in the administrative 
procedure that cannot be attributed to the asylum seeker shall not justify a continuation of 
detention (article 9 § 1). The text of the Dublin regulation of the Commission has the same 
meaning as the text of the reception directive of the Commission but it does not stipulate 
that delays in the administrative procedure that cannot be attributed to the asylum seeker 
shall not justify a continuation of detention (article 27 § 5). Finally the text of the reception 
directive proposed by the Council also establishes the principle that detention shall be 
ordered for the shortest period possible and that delays in the administrative procedure 
that cannot be attributed to the asylum seeker shall not justify a continuation of detention. 
 
All these provisions reflect the jurisprudence of the ECtHR which, relating to lawfulness of 
the detention, verifies the duration of the detention and appreciates in concreto, according 
to the circumstances of the case, if it does not exceed that reasonably required for the 
purpose aimed at314. 
 
Furthermore, article 9 § 4 of the text of the reception directive Commission proposal states 
that the decision to detain shall specify the maximum duration of the detention while the 
text of the Dublin regulation Commission proposal simply states that the written order of 
detention shall specify the intended duration of the detention (in this respect the text of the 
Dublin Regulation has not been amended by the Parliament or the Council).  
 
The reference to the maximum duration of the detention has been maintained in the text of 
the reception directive of the Parliament when it has been removed in the Council proposal. 
This provision does not set itself the maximum duration but indirectly requires the States to 
lay it down in their national legislation. One may question the choice of the Commission to 
refer to national norms of implementation for an element so essential. On the legal aspect 
a last statement should be outlined: what about the implementation of some provisions of 
the reception directive proposal if an asylum seeker is detained for a longer duration than 
the one according to which in principle he/she must be able to benefit from the rights set in 
the aforementioned provisions and the detention prevents him from doing so? This issue 
requires considering as established the fact that the reception directive proposal applies to 
detained asylum seekers in principle: see infra Title 9.  
 
The question can be illustrated by an example: what about the application of article 15 of 
reception directive Commission proposal relating to "Employment" if the detention last over 
6 months? According to article 15 applicants have access to the labour market no later than 
6 months following the date when the application for international protection was lodged. 
While article 15 of the reception directive proposal allows the Member States to decide the 
conditions for granting access to the labour market for the applicant, no exemption is given 
                                                 
314   See supra Title 1. 2 and ECtHR Saadi, §§ 70 et 74. 
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for the granting of the right itself. When the detention of an asylum seeker lasts over 6 
months, the implementation of this provision may be difficult since access to the labour 
market cannot be effective unless asylum seekers are granted permission to leave the 
detention centre in order to work or are given access to work in detention facilities 
(implying that work and working conditions provided in the detention centre are considered 
as "access to the labour market” in conformity with article 15).  
 
In its report of 26 November 2007315 the Commission considers that: « …the length of 
detention, except in duly justified cases (e.g. public order), which prevents detained 
asylum seekers from enjoying the rights guaranteed under the Directive, is contrary to its 
provisions ».  Shall we conclude that duration of detention lasting over 6 months cannot 
deprive an asylum seeker of his right to access to the labour market provided for in article 
15? The Commission thinks so « except in duly justified cases (e.g. public order)» and this 
mention is of paramount importance. 
 
Another position (which always implies to take for granted the fact that the reception 
directive proposal as a principle applies to asylum seekers held in detention: see infra Title 
9) may be to argue that a reasonable interpretation of the  principle according to which the 
reception directive apply to asylum seeker in detention must be given : when because of 
their detention it is reasonably not  possible to implement  a provision  of the directive then 
the directive gets  beyond the scope of  application as a  principle  of the directive to 
asylum seeker in detention. This issue needs to be clarified explicitly316.  
 
Apart from these legal issues, the following elements should be considered on a political 
point of view: nowadays the detention may last many of months or be of unlimited duration 
in some Member States. Failing to set a maximum duration of the detention at EU level and 
subject to legal review of the lawfulness of the detention, the latter could last as long that 
the asylum procedure. 
Moreover it follows from the decision of the CJEU in the case Kadzoef (see supra 
Title 1.1.4317) that the detention of an asylum seeker as defined in Title 1. 1. 4318 shall be 
based on the specific legal regime for asylum and not on the legal regime for removal.  
 
Consequently, the duration of the detention of asylum seekers in the framework of the 
special regime for asylum is not taken into account for the determination of the maximum 
duration of the detention authorized by the return directive. 
 
Therefore the duration of the detention of asylum seekers in the framework of the special 
regime for asylum comes as an addition to the maximum duration provided for by the 
return directive. This legal aspect should encourage the EU legislator to consider setting a 
maximum duration of detention subjected to the special regime for asylum even if, given 
the diversity of national legal frameworks on the subject, a consensus on this issue will not 
be easy to find. A maximum duration of detention be fixed or not, other avenues should be 
explored to prevent asylum seekers from being detained for the duration of the asylum 
procedure or for many months: see below Title 5. 4 Box SOLUTION. 
                                                 
315   Report from the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament on the application of 
Directive 2003/9/Ec of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum 
seekers, COM (2007) 745 final. Hereafter: Commission Report, RCD. 
316   See infra Title 9 which highlights the current differences of point of view in the MS on the application 
of principle of the directive in force to asylum seekers in detention. In the absence of explicit 
clarification, such differences may persist - as for instance on article 15.  
317 Odysseus Report, Q. 33 L. 
318    Asylum seekers until a negative decision on the application, or a decision ending his or her right of 
stay as asylum seeker has entered into force. 
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5.5. The authority in charge of ordering the detention 
 
The text of the Commission - not amended on this point by the Parliament - provides that 
detention shall be ordered by judicial authorities but in urgent cases it may be ordered by 
administrative authorities without mentioning which administrative authorities it may be. As 
for the Council text it enacts that detention shall be ordered by judicial or administrative 
authorities but does not specify which authorities it may be (article 9 § 2 the proposal). 
This lack of clarity shall be overcome to ensure transparency and legal certainty for the 
decisions of detention.  
 
SOLUTION: 
- Title 5. 1. above: article 9 § 4 of the reception directive proposal (texts of the 
Commission, the Parliament and the Council)  
The written indication “in a language they [the asylum seekers] understand” to the 
exclusion of any other one should be retained.  
 
- Title 5. 2. above: article 9 § 2 of the reception directive proposal (texts of the 
Commission and of the Parliament)  
Keep the wording of the text of the Council (article 9 § 2) requiring a speedy judicial review 
to be decided on as speedily as possible from the beginning of the detention or after the 
launch of the relevant proceedings. 
 
- Title 5. 3. above: article 9 last § of the reception directive proposal (texts of the 
Parliament -§ 6- and of the Council -§ 5- )  
The attention of the States should be drawn to the fact that the assertion « as regards fees 
and other costs, the treatment of detained applicants shall not be more favourable than the 
treatment generally accorded to national in similar circumstances » is only acceptable if the 
treatment given to their nationals does not itself violate the principle of the effectiveness of 
the remedy as it emerges from the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the CJEU and Article 47, 
last indent of the Charter 
 
- Title 5. 4. above: the issue of the setting a maximum duration of the detention. 
This issue should be discussed within the decision-making institutions. During this 
discussion the principle of a maximum duration for a "normal" asylum procedure should be 
considered (article 27 § 3 of the asylum procedure directive Commission proposal319). 
 
It is also advocated to: 
Strengthen the judicial review of detention so that the length of detention should not 
exceed that reasonably required for the purpose aimed at320 by giving this control not to 
ordinary courts generally not familiar with the characteristics of asylum law but to 
specialized courts in the asylum field. 
 
Make a provision requiring that detained asylum seekers should - like vulnerable asylum 
seekers with special needs - qualify for a priority procedure instead of an accelerated 
procedure. However, contrary to what is provided for in article 27 § 5 of the asylum 
procedure directive Commission proposal, the application of a priority procedure to asylum 
seekers in detention should not be left to the discretion of the MS, but should be 
mandatory.  
                                                 
319 See Chapter IV: Section IV, Title 2. 
320 Such an appeal court specialised in asylum provided that the national constitutional framework allows 
it. 
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- Title 5. 5. above: article 9 § 2 of the reception directive proposal (texts of the 
Commission, the Parliament and the Council)  
Indicate in the directive which administrative authority is responsible for ordering the 
detention: determining authority within the meaning of Article 2, indent f) of the asylum 
procedure directive proposal and/or other authority (in charge of the registration of the 
application for international protection for example).  
6. ARTICLE 10 OF THE RECEPTION DIRECTIVE PRO-
POSAL (TEXT OF THE COUNCIL) 
 
PROBLEM: conditions of detention of asylum seekers: exception on accommodation 
conditions that might come into conflict with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and not 
recommended exception on information required at the border posts or transit zone. Article 
10 of the reception directive proposal sets out the conditions of detention of asylum 
seekers. As the text of the Council these guarantees are consistent with the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR, provided that:  
 
- Title 6. 1.below: an exception which allows Member States to put asylum seekers in 
prison accommodation. This exception is not consistent with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
relating to the requirement of a relationship between the ground of permitted deprivation 
of liberty relied on the place and conditions of detention (article 10 § 4, indent a) of the 
text of the reception directive proposed by the Council). 
 
- Title 6. 2.below: another exemption allows Member States not to immediately inform  
detained asylum seekers in border posts or transit zones about the rules that apply to the 
detention centre and that set out their rights and obligations  and that in duly justified 
cases and for a reasonable period which shall be as short as possible. This exemption is not 
recommended (article 10 § 4, indent b) of the text of the reception directive proposed by 
the Council). 
6.1. Exception on accommodation conditions 
 
The possibility for Member States to put asylum seekers in prison accommodation is not 
consistent with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR concerning the relationship between the 
ground of permitted deprivation of liberty relied on the place and conditions of detention 
(article 10 § 4, indent a) of the text of the reception directive proposed by the Council. 
 
Article 10 § 1 of the text proposed by the Council states that the detention must be carried 
out in specialised detention facilities. However, § 4, indent a) of the same article allows the 
Member States - in duly justified cases and for a reasonable period which shall be as short 
as possible – to make an exception to § 1 if this solution is not possible. 
 
In this case the Member States can put asylum seekers in prison accommodation, provided 
that asylum seekers in detention are separated from ordinary prisoners. 
 
Minors (including unaccompanied minors whose detention is authorized in terms of article 
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11 § 1 of the text proposed by the Council321) can also be placed in prison accommodation 
in the same conditions. Although article 11 § 2 of the Council text provides that detained 
minors shall have the possibility to engage in leisure activities, including play and 
recreational activities appropriate to their age and to have access to open-air activities, it is 
not clear that the exemption clause of article 10 § 4 meets the requirement of relationship 
between the ground of permitted deprivation of liberty relied on the place and conditions of 
detention enunciated by the ECtHR being in particular the detention of asylum seekers and 
unaccompanied minors or minors accompanied by their parents asylum seekers 
themselves.  
 
In the case Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium322, the ECtHR ruled that the 
detention of a five year old-child, a non accompanied asylum seeker, was contrary to article 
5 § 1 ECHR because of the lack of sufficient relationship between the ground of permitted 
deprivation of liberty relied on the place and conditions of detention. The Court notes that 
the child was detained in a closed centre intended for illegal immigrants in the same 
conditions as adults; these conditions were consequently not adapted to the position of 
extreme vulnerability in which she found herself as a result of her position as an 
unaccompanied foreign minor (§ 103).  
 
The Court has recently reiterated these conclusions in the case Muskhadzhiyeva v. 
Belgium323. In this case it was not the detention of unaccompanied minors, but the 
deprivation of freedom for a mother with four children aged seven months, three and a half 
years, five years and seven years at investment. The Court ruled that it sees no reason to 
depart from the above mentioned findings324 on the mere fact that the children were with 
their mother (§ 74). It is interesting to note that the detention centre is considered as an 
inappropriate place even though it is found that: 
 
– it has a wing specifically for single women and couples with or without children and 
has its own outdoor space.  
– it has two large bedrooms combined and consecrated to children reception with an 
abundance of educational materials, games and crafts and a classroom as well.  
– five educators are dealing exclusively with children.  
– a class is organized in the morning for the children while in the afternoon 
educational and outdoor activities are organized in the outdoor spaces (§§ 25-28).  
 
Therefore the exception in article 10 § 4, paragraph a) of the text proposed by the Council 
cannot be maintained.  
6.2. Derogatory conditions for information in border posts or 
transit zones  
 
Article 10 § 3 of the text proposed by the Council states that detained asylum seekers are 
immediately provided with updated information on the rules which apply in the facility and 
                                                 
321 The terms of § 1 of article 11 are similar to those of article 37, indent b) of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child which stipulates that the detention of a child must be a measure of last resort and  
as short as possible. 
322 ECtHR, Mubilanzila Mayeke and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, Application n° 13178/03, Judgment 12 
October 2006. Hereafter: ECtHR, Mubilanzila Mayeke and Kaniki Mitunga. 
323 ECtHR, Muskhadzhiyeva v. Belgium, Application n°41442/07, Judgment 19 January 2010. Hereafter: 
ECtHR, Muskhadzhiyeva 
324 The detention took place in the same detention center as in the case Mubilanzila Mayeke and Kaniki 
Mitunga. 
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set out their rights and obligations in a language they are reasonably supposed to 
understand. 
 
This provision supplements the general provision relating to information to be provided to 
asylum seekers (article 5: Information). However, § 4, indent b) of article 10 allows 
Member States, in duly justified cases and for a reasonable period which shall be as short 
as possible to derogate to § 3 when the asylum seeker is detained in border posts or transit 
zones. 
 
It is first necessary to outline the importance to any person detained to be informed 
promptly of their rights and obligations, including those in force in the place of detention 
especially if the detention takes place in areas where the possibility of contact with others 
may be more difficult. The Court decision in the case Amuur v. France325 must be recalled. 
Furthermore it should be noted that article 16 § 5 of the return directive sets out that third-
country nationals kept in detention shall be systematically provided with information which 
explains the rules applied in the facility and sets out their rights and obligations, without 
any exception or possible limitation. It is true that article 16 § 5 of the return directive aims 
at a systematic communication of information without enacting that it should be immediate. 
It is also true that the exemption of § 4, indent b) has a limited scope (duly justified cases, 
reasonable period as short as possible) and  cannot lead to   waive the communication of 
information but only to create a (short) delay of this communication. However, it is not 
recommended to keep this exemption.  
 
SOLUTION: 
- Title 6. 1. above:  
Remove the possibility for Member States to derogate from article 10 § 1 by deleting indent 
a) in article 10, § 4 of the text of the Council. 
 
- Title 6. 2. above:  
Remove the possibility for MS to derogate from article 10 § 3 by deleting indent b) in article 
10, § 4 of the text of the Council. 
7. ARTICLE 27 OF THE DUBLIN REGULATION PROPOS-
AL: THE PROVISION RELATED TO DETENTION OF 
ASYLUM SEEKERS (TEXTS OF THE COMMISSION, THE 
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL) 
 
 
PROBLEM: subject to the inclusion of the considerations of Title 8 below, and provided that 
the risk of absconding is held in Dublin Regulation, some problems described in Title 5 for 
the reception directive proposal apply to article 27 of the Dublin regulation proposal (Texts 
of the Commission, the Parliament and the Council). 
 
- Title 7. 1. below: Identical reservations as the one made for the texts of the reception 
directive proposal. 
 
                                                 
325 ECtHR, Amuur: asylum seekers have been detained for 20 days in the transit area of Orly 
international airport in Paris for most of their stay without  any legal or social assistance. 
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- Title 7. 1. 1. below: The asylum seeker’s right to be informed of the reasons for detention 
in a language he/she understands according to article 5 § 2 ECHR (article 27 § 7, indent 2 
of the Dublin regulation proposal). 
 
- Title 7. 1. 2. below: The judicial review of the administrative decision of detention shall 
occur   speedily according to article 5 § 4 ECHR (article 27 § 6 of the Dublin regulation 
proposal). 
 
- Title 7. 1. 3. below: Setting out a maximum duration of the detention. 
 
And also: 
- Title 7. 2. below:  Article 27 § 12 of the Dublin regulation proposal refers to the reception 
conditions in a very ambiguous way. 
7.1. The reservations are identical to those made for the texts of 
the reception directive proposal 
Some issues outlined in Title 5, relating to the texts of the reception directive proposal, 
apply to article 27 of the Dublin regulation proposal as well. Thus: 
7.1.1. The asylum seeker’s right to be informed of the reasons for detention 
Article 27 § 7, indent 2 of the Dublin regulation (texts of Council and the Parliament similar 
on this point to the Dublin regulation Commission proposal) provides that detained asylum 
seekers shall be informed of the reasons for detention in a language they are reasonably 
supposed to understand. This provision does not comply with article 5 § 2 ECHR which 
states that information must be given in a language they understand. 
7.1.2. The judicial review of the administrative decision of detention 
Article 27 § 6 of the Dublin regulation (texts of Council and the Parliament similar on this 
point to the Dublin regulation Commission proposal) provides that the detention order shall 
be confirmed by judicial authorities within 72 hours from the beginning of the detention. 
This provision could be found in breach of article 5 § 4 of the ECHR, which requires a 
judicial review made speedily and of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR stating that the time 
limit cannot be defined in the abstract; the matter must be determined in the light of the 
circumstances of each case. 
7.1.3. Setting out a maximum duration of the detention 
This issue must also be considered within the framework of article 27 of the Dublin 
regulation. 
7.2. A reference to the reception conditions formulated in an 
ambiguous way (article 27, § 12 of the Dublin regulation 
proposal) 
 
Article 27 § 12 of the Dublin regulation Commission proposal (not amended by the texts 
proposed by the Parliament and the Council) states that Member States shall ensure that 
asylum-seekers detained in accordance with article 27326 enjoy the same level of reception 
conditions for detained applicants as those laid down in particular in articles 10 and 11 of 
Directive [reception conditions directive, new text].  
 
                                                 
326 Detention for purposes of transfer. 
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Since the reception directive applies to asylum seekers subject to Dublin procedure327  a 
reference to the same level of reception conditions do not seem adequate. A reference to 
the same reception conditions as those provided in the reception directive makes more 
sense. Moreover, why is there only a specific reference to articles 10 and 11 rather than a 
general reference to the directive followed by a specific reference to articles 10 and 11? No 
doubt can be left on the application of the other minimum standards of the reception 
directive to asylum seekers subject to a Dublin procedure and detained on the basis of a 
risk of absconding328.  
 
SOLUTION:  
- Title7. 1. above: Identical reservations as the one made for the texts of the reception 
directive proposal. 
 
- Title 7. 1. 1. above: Article 27, § 2, indent 2 
Only the wording in a language they [the asylum seekers] understand must be accepted to 
the exclusion of any other.  
 
- Title 7. 1. 2. above: Article 27 § 6  
Retain the wording of the text of the reception directive proposed by the Council which 
requires a speedy judicial review to be decided on as speedily as possible from the 
beginning of detention or after the launch of the relevant proceedings 
 
- Title 7. 1. 3. above: the setting out of a maximum duration of the detention  
This issue must be discussed.  
It is also recommended to: 
 
Strengthen the judicial review of the detention (see above Title 5. 4). 
 
Provide for asylum seekers in detention a priority procedure (see above Title 5. 4). 
 
- Title 7. 2. above: Article 27 § 12  
Replace the reference to the same level (of reception conditions) with a reference to the 
same reception conditions. 
 
Replace the reference in particular in articles 10 and 11 of the reception directive with a 
general reference to the reception directive followed by a specific reference to articles 9, 10 
and 11 (adding the specific reference to article 9 to articles 10 and 11) 
8. RECEPTION AND PROCEDURE DIRECTIVES PROPOS-
ALS AND DUBLIN REGULATION PROPOSAL 
 
PROBLEM: dispersion of the provisions related to the detention of asylum seekers 
 
The reception directive proposal enacts a new regime of detention of asylum seekers 
(article 8 to 11). The Dublin regulation and the procedure directive proposals partially re-
enact some provisions of the regime. This is inadequate insofar as it might bring doubts as 
                                                 
327 It results from recital (8) of the preamble to the reception directive Commission proposal and recital 
(9) of the preamble of the Dublin regulation Commission proposal. 
328 See also infra Title 9 concerning the issue of the application of principle of the reception directive 
proposal to asylum seekers in detention. 
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to the implementation of the provisions of the reception directive not explicitly re-enacted 
in both other texts.  This is particularly true for the Dublin regulation. 
8.1. A new regime of detention of asylum seekers set out in the 
reception directive 
 
The new article 8 to 11 of the reception directive proposal enacts a new regime of detention 
of asylum seekers (reasons to detain, guarantees for detained asylum seekers, conditions 
of detention…). 
8.2. Repetition in the Dublin regulation 
 
Article 27 of the Dublin regulation proposal states the specific reason for detention for risk 
of absconding in case of transfer decision. In this, article 27 is not a repetition as the 
reception directive Commission proposal does not mention the risk of absconding. 
 
Therefore to maintain the ground in the Dublin regulation proposal can be justified if the 
risk of absconding is not included in a general and not limiting way in the text of the 
reception directive329. In this context, the first 4 paragraphs of article 27 can be 
maintained. 
 
Nevertheless article 27 repeats a number of provisions of the regime of detention set out in 
the reception directive proposal without referring to all the provisions. These partial 
references are inadequate insofar as they may bring doubts about the implementation of 
other provisions of the reception conditions directive that are not specifically listed. 
Moreover, if the reason for detention based on a risk of absconding in case of decision of 
transfer is maintained specifically in the Dublin regulation - § 12 of article 27 (maintained 
and amended as recommended by the Title 7.2 above) - it is sufficient to ensure that 
asylum seekers detained for this reason benefit from the detention regime set out in the 
reception directive proposal. This application follows from the recital (8) of the preamble to 
the reception directive Commission proposal and recital (9) of the preamble to the Dublin 
regulation Commission proposal.  
8.3. Repetition in the asylum procedure directive 
 
Article 22 of the asylum procedure directive Commission proposal: 
 
§ 1 reiterates the principle that Member States shall not hold a person in detention for the 
sole reason that he/she is an applicant for international protection and states that grounds 
and conditions of detention as well as guarantees available to detained applicants for 
international protection shall be in accordance with the one laid down in the reception 
directive proposal. 
 
§ 2 repeats that where an applicant for international protection is held in detention, 
Member States shall ensure that there is a possibility of speedy judicial review in 
accordance with the reception directive. 
 
                                                 
329  See supra Chapter 4 with the result that the Council proposes to introduce the risk of absconding in 
article 8 § 2 of the reception directive.  
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The § 1 can be maintained. The § 2 is unnecessary in light of § 1 which refers, inter alia, to 
the guarantees of the reception directive.  
 
 
SOLUTION: 
Delete §§ 5 to 11 of article 27 of the Dublin regulation proposal. Amendment of § 12 of the 
same article according to the recommendations of Title 7, Box SOLUTION, Title 7. 2. 
Delete article 22 § 2 of the asylum procedure directive proposal. 
9. THE RECEPTION DIRECTIVE PROPOSAL (TEXTS OF 
THE COMMISSION, THE PARLIAMENT AND THE 
COUNCIL) 
 
PROBLEM: the issue of the application of principle330 of the reception directive proposal to 
asylum seekers in detention.  
 
The Odysseus report331 and the report of the Commission332 related to the evaluation of the 
transposition in the MS of the reception directive have noted that many states consider that 
the reception directive in force does not apply to asylum seekers in detention. If the 
reception directive Commission proposal is less uncertain regarding its application of 
principle to asylum seekers in detention, this proposal does not completely dispel the 
doubt.  
 
The application of principle of the reception condition in force to asylum seekers in 
detention is not reached by consensus. Some defend the application of principle while 
others believe that this position is not valid333. Whatever the relevance of the legal 
arguments of the two theses334, this conclusion must lead the EU Legislator to remove this 
uncertainty. 
 
If provisions in the reception directive Commission proposal (and the texts proposed by the 
Parliament and the Council) make the issue less uncertain, these texts do not completely 
dispel the doubt even if the objective sought by the Commission is the application of 
principle of the reception directive to applicants in detention335. 
 
The explanatory Memorandum of the reception directive Commission proposal states that 
« …in view of adequately clarifying the rationae materiae of the directive, the proposal 
stipulates that it is applicable to all types of asylum procedures and to all geographic areas 
and facilities hosting asylum seekers ».  Recital (8) of the preamble states that « …this 
Directive should apply during all stages and types of procedures concerning applications for 
international protection and in all locations and facilities hosting asylum seekers ». 
According to Article 2, indent i), detention shall means confinement of an asylum seeker by 
a Member State within a particular place, where the applicant is deprived of his or her 
freedom of movement while according to indent j) accommodation centre shall means any 
place used for collective housing of asylum seekers. 
                                                 
330 Unless otherwise specified, such as Article 6 § 2 relating to the documents. 
331 Odysseus Report, Q. 33. I, p. 108 et 109. 
332 Commission Report, RCD, p. 3. 
333  9 MS do not apply the directive to asylum seekers in detention. In three other MS the situation is 
unclear: Odysseus Report, Q. 33 I, p. 108 and 109. 
334  It seems useless to enter into the details of legal arguments – those of the proponents of the 
application and those of his detractors.  
335   Commission Report, RCD, p. 3. 
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As follows from the development of Titles 2-5 above, the directive proposal contains new 
articles (articles 8 to11) that define the conditions of detention of asylum seekers. These 
articles include a set of rules relating to material reception conditions or other reception 
conditions of asylum seekers in detention. All reception conditions contained in the directive 
are not however included in these articles 8 to 11336. Can we therefore consider that legally 
the changes made by the Commission (in particular the contents of the Explanatory 
Memorandum and the preamble above mentioned) are sufficient to ensure legal certainty 
regarding the application of principle of the directive to asylum seekers in detention as 
sought by the Commission?  
 
According to the relevant departments of the Commission the wording « all …facilities 
hosting » in the Explanatory Memorandum and of « all locations and facilities hosting » in 
the preamble (recital 8) are general and include not only open reception centres, but also 
closed reception centres, that is detention centres. The Commission also supports the idea 
that the term accommodation centres (see above: article 2. j) refers to open centres as 
well as to detention centres given the broad definition of « centre…used for collective 
housing of asylum seekers ». The argument of the Commission is legally defensible.  
 
Finally, the Commission recalls the rationae personae scope of the directive which «…shall 
apply to all third country nationals and stateless persons who make an application for 
international protection » (article 3). On this last point it should be noted that the reception 
directive in force also provides that it shall apply to all third country nationals and stateless 
persons who make an application for asylum.  This provision does not prevent MS to 
consider that the directive in force does not apply to asylum seekers in detention.  
 
SOLUTION: given the discussions the reception directive in force raised about the issue on 
the one hand and on the second hand given the fact that even if the wording of the 
Commission proposal has reduced the risk of conflicting interpretations it has not 
completely lifted it. It is recommended to add a provision explicitly stating the application 
of principle of the directive to asylum seekers in detention337. Some further clarification 
should also be made as has been pointed out in Title 5. 4 in connection with article 15 
(access to employment) for instance.  
 
SECTION II: TAKING INTO ACCOUNT OF THE SITUATION 
OF VULNERABLE ASYLUM SEEKERS WITH SPECIAL NEEDS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The reception conditions directive in force is the only EU instrument of first generation to 
give attention in a specific way to the situation of vulnerable asylum seekers with special 
needs. Indeed the Dublin regulation in force does not mention it and the asylum procedure 
                                                 
336  As an example: article 2, h) : reception material conditions : reception conditions that include 
housing, food and clothing,   provided in kind, or as financial allowances or vouchers, or combination 
of the three, and a daily allowance. Assuming that in detention centres asylum seekers are housed 
and fed, what about their clothing and payment of daily allowance? 
337 Unless otherwise specified, such as article 6 § 2 relating to the documents. 
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directive only touches the subject of the possible vulnerability of asylum seekers338 in an 
extremely marginal way. The situation of the recognized refugees or the beneficiaries of 
subsidiary protection is quite different since provisions partly identical to the reception 
conditions directive in force can be found in the qualification directive.  
 
The asylum procedure directive Commission proposal and the Dublin regulation proposal 
clear up this problem. In the draft, specific provisions devoted to vulnerable asylums 
seekers are now envisaged. This change is essential if one keeps in mind the situation of 
the children or of people having important mental health problems or victims of torture 
among others. The European Council was asking for such a change: the Stockholm 
Program puts at the centre of the priorities of the Union a better protection of the 
vulnerable people.  
 
As regards the taking into account of the situation of vulnerable asylum seekers in the 
reception directive in force, it aims at providing reception conditions appropriate to their 
particular needs (especially adapted health care). Specific provisions are given in Chapter 
IV of the directive (articles 17-20), entitled « Provisions for persons with special needs ». 
Article 17 is central, as it states the general principle of the consideration of the situation of 
vulnerable asylum seekers with special needs and that of their identification by the States. 
  
In 2007, The Odysseus Academic Network did a study339 on the transposition of the 
reception directive.  This study underlined that a great number of Member States have no 
procedure to identify asylum seekers with special needs despite article 17 of the directive. 
This will obviously deprive those persons of the special reception conditions that they 
should normally benefit from and leave their special needs unsatisfied. The identification of 
asylum seekers with special needs is indeed of paramount importance. In some cases, 
evidence of the vulnerable situation is more obvious than in others where traumas might be 
difficult to detect (especially traumas related to acts of torture or other serious forms of 
physical, psychological or sexual abuse: acts of violence which do not necessarily leave 
visible traces but which often stops the victim from talking about his experiences).  
 
The lack of identification procedure in many Member States is partly due to the fact that 
article 17 of the reception directive does not expressly oblige the Member States to set up 
a procedure of identification for these applicants even if one can consider that this 
procedure is logically required by article 17 as the European Commission has underlined it 
with relevance in its  November 26th 2007 report340: “Identification of vulnerable asylum 
seekers is a core element without which the provisions of the Directive aimed at special 
treatment of these persons will loose any meaning”. 
 
In any event, the reception conditions directive Commission proposal gives an adequate 
answer to the problem. Indeed, with the new article 21 the Member States are very clearly 
compelled to bring in procedures of identification in order to assess the individual situation 
of any asylum seeker aiming at identifying whether or not he/she has special needs. 
 
It is worth mentioning that in 2009 the Odysseus Academic Network decided to launch a 
second study related to the issue of the identification of vulnerable asylum seekers in the 
                                                 
338 See article 13, § 3, paragraph a) according to which the States shall ensure that the person who 
conducts the interview is sufficiently competent to take account of the personal situation or general 
circumstances surrounding the application, including cultural origin or vulnerability of the applicant, 
provided it is practicable and article 17 relating to on guarantees granted to unaccompanied minors - 
found to be insufficient however: see Chapter IV. 
339   Odysseus Report. 
340  Commission Report, RCD, point 3.5.1., page 9. 
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framework of the reception directive. This comparative study analysed the rare more or 
less formalised procedures of identification in place at national level. The legal rules of the 
few Member States341 concerned have been analysed together with their practices of 
identification in a comparative way in order to identify the good practices and disseminate 
them to all Member States. Legal and practical recommendations were also made.  
 
The members of the Parliament are invited to consult this study if they want a detailed 
overview of the issue in the specific context of the reception directive. 
 
The general context being laid down it is now required to conduct the analysis on the taking 
into account of the situation of vulnerable asylum seekers with special needs in the 
different instruments of the second generation proposed by the Commission. This analysis 
will be conducted in the following order: 
 
1. The reception directive proposal (SUB SECTION I) 
2. The Dublin regulation proposal (SUB SECTION II) 
3. The asylum procedure directive proposal (SUB SECTION III) 
4. The qualification directive proposal (SUB SECTION IV) 
 
Where appropriate the texts proposed by the Parliament and/or the Council will be 
examined together with the initial Commission proposal. 
 
SUB SECTION I: THE RECEPTION DIRECTIVE PROPOSAL (TEXTS OF 
THE COMMISSION, THE PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL) 
1. THE PROCEDURAL DIMENSION OF ARTICLE 21 § 2 OF 
THE RECEPTION DIRECTIVE PROPOSAL (TEXTS OF 
THE COMMISSION AND PARLIAMENT) 
 
PROBLEM: the obligation for the States to establish a procedure of identification of 
vulnerable asylum seekers with special needs: a clear obligation that is definitely in the 
right direction.  However the temporal dimension must be better defined to allow the 
identification of vulnerable people throughout the asylum procedure. 
 
Article 21 § 2 of the reception directive Commission proposal (and of the text of the 
Parliament unamended on this point) explicitly sets out the States obligation to establish 
procedures in national legislation with a view to identifying (…) whether the applicant has 
special needs. 
 
§ 2 also imposes on the States the obligation to indicate the nature of the particular needs 
identified in the context of these procedures. The reception directive Commission proposal 
met the need to clarify the wordings of article 17 of the reception directive into force. 
 
§ 2 also specifies that these procedures should be imposed as soon as an application for 
international protection is lodged. This temporal precision is insufficient. It does not 
guarantee that the procedures set out by the States will allow the identification of 
                                                 
341  Member States covered by the study are Belgium, Spain, Finland, Malta, The Netherlands and Poland. 
Norway took also part to the study. The study was funded by the ERF. Final reports have been 
addressed to the Commission in February 2010. This study will be subject to an official publication 
end 2010. 
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vulnerable persons throughout the asylum procedure. In the absence of monitored 
individual assessment the objective assigned to article 21 may not be reached.  
 
The determination of the moment when the assessment of the situation of the asylum 
seeker must take place is a key issue. If it seems important to conduct an individual 
assessment of the situation of every asylum seeker soon after the lodging of the application 
for international protection, at the same time carrying this assessment only seems 
insufficient. 
 
Indeed, some traumas can be difficult to detect (especially traumas related to acts of 
torture or other serious forms of physical, psychological or sexual abuse: acts of violence 
which do not necessarily leave visible traces but which often stops the victim from talking 
about his experiences). In these cases, to create a trustful atmosphere is essential for the 
asylum seeker to be able to express his/her painful experiences. Creating a trustful 
atmosphere takes time. In addition, some asylum seekers may not be vulnerable people 
with special needs upon arrival in the country of reception, but they may, later on, for one 
reason or another become vulnerable people with special needs.  
 
It is therefore important not to restrict identification (assessment) at a unique moment but 
to conceive it as a long term project carried out as long as an applicant is, as such, allowed 
to remain on the territory of the State.  
 
SOLUTION: stipulate the obligation for the States to conduct an individual assessment of 
the situation of asylum seekers once an application for international protection has been 
lodged and that on an ongoing basis (see below Title 4 of this SUB SECTION I, where an 
amendment proposal is given).  
2. THE CONCEPTUAL DIMENSION OF ARTICLE 21 OF 
THE RECEPTION DIRECTIVE PROPOSAL OR WHO 
IDENTIFY AND/OR WHAT IDENTIFY (TEXTS OF THE 
COMMISSION AND THE PARLIAMENT) 
 
PROBLEM: The States are compelled to take into account the situation of persons with 
special needs without requiring a causal link between the special needs and a state of 
vulnerability of the person making the conceptual dimension of article 21 uncertain. In 
other respects, when it comes to vulnerable persons, they are always regarded as persons 
with special needs in the texts of the Commission and Parliament. This does not necessarily 
correspond to reality. 
 
The conceptual dimension raises the following fundamental question: Who should be 
identified and/or what is to be identified under the legal norm at issue (article 21 of the 
draft text or article 17 of the reception directive in force) in order to ensure the purpose of 
this standard that is to provide to some asylum seekers adapted reception conditions.  
 
Under article 17 of the reception directive in force aim is to identify vulnerable persons with 
special needs. Article 17 establishes a causal link between the notion of special needs and a 
state of vulnerability of the asylum seeker.  
 
This causal link is not necessarily required by article 21 of the text proposed by the 
Commission and not amended on this point by the Parliament. The core idea of article 21 is 
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based exclusively on the notion of special needs without any requirement of connection 
with a state of vulnerability of the asylum seeker. This amendment raises a question about 
the appropriateness of applying the standard mostly since it makes the conceptual 
dimension of article 21 uncertain.  
 
To address the question of the conceptual dimension of article 21 proposed by the 
Commission is crucial. As has been stated, the issue is to determine who should be 
identified and / or what should be identified under this standard aiming at providing 
adapted reception conditions. The answer given, following the analysis of article 21 
proposed by the Commission revealed a problem regarding the appropriateness of applying 
this standard. To understand the issue at stake the terms of article 17 of the reception 
directive in force must be analysed at first to give an answer to the same questions: who 
should be identified and/or what must be identified under article 17 in order to provide for 
adapted reception conditions.  
2.1. Who should be identified and/or what must be identified 
according to article 17 of the reception directive in force? 
2.1.1. Article 17, § 1 
The analysis of the terms of article 17 § 1 reveals that the notion of vulnerable persons is 
the central and exclusive notion of this §. Indeed no other notion other than that of 
vulnerable persons is mentioned in this §. It does not give any abstract definition of the 
notion of vulnerable persons. Nevertheless a non-exhaustive list of people considered as 
vulnerable is given. This list, as formulated, refers to categories of persons. This list is not 
limiting considering the terms "such as". Therefore it allows adding other categories of 
individuals. Moreover, the notion does not require that the person necessarily belongs to a 
category to be regarded as vulnerable. Any person may, individually, fit in the scope of § 1 
and be considered vulnerable regardless of his belonging or not to any category. 
 
In the absence of legal definition of the notion of vulnerable person, it is useful to refer to 
the common definition of vulnerable or synonyms that are given: : 
«insecure»342, « defenceless»343, «exposed»344, « unsafe, threatened»345, «likely to be 
hurt»346, «unprotected»347, «unsafe»348, « fragile »349,  «weak»350, « undefended »351.  
 
These common definitions or synonyms shed light on the persons the provision intends to 
address. The list of categories of persons listed as examples also gives an indication on the 
notion of vulnerable persons that seem to be in the same direction as the common 
definitions or synonyms of the word vulnerable. Looking at the list we see through the 
different categories mentioned, that these persons given their age, their health, their family 
situation or their experiences have or may have352 a certain fragility, insecurity, weakness, 
... requiring assistance, protection, special attention.  
                                                 
342  http://www.synonym.com/synonyms/vulnerable/ 
343  As above 
344  As above 
345   As above 
346   As above 
347    As above 
348  As above 
349   As above 
350    As above 
351   As above 
352  The difference between "present" or "may present" is important - see below in Section 2. 2. 4, 2nd 
question. 
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2.1.2. Article 17 § 2  
Article 17 § 2 refers to the notion of special needs. This notion is not defined. § 2 
establishes also - and this is a fundamental point - a causal link between the two notions: 
the notion of vulnerable persons and the notion of special needs. § 2 is headed: 
 
“2. Paragraph 1 shall apply only to persons found to have special needs after an individual 
evaluation of their situation ». 
By stating that § 1 shall apply only to persons whose special needs were identified after an 
individual assessment of their situation, § 2 establishes a causal link between the notion of 
special needs and the notion of vulnerable persons. Indeed, § 1 relates to the vulnerable 
persons and only them and requires Member States to take into account their particular 
situation.  
2.1.3. Conclusion regarding the conceptual dimension of article 17: Who is to be 
identified and/or what has to be identified according to article 17 §§ 1 and 2? 
It follows from the previous explanations that vulnerable persons with special needs  are to 
be identified or stated differently that special needs related to and/or caused by a condition 
of vulnerability of the person and/or a vulnerable situation in which a person is353 are to be 
identified.  
 
Article 17 therefore refers to one and only one concept that takes into consideration two 
notions (the notion of vulnerable persons or vulnerability and the notion of special needs) 
linked by a causal relationship.  
 
In the absence of definition of the notion of special needs and even if the notion of 
vulnerable persons is not defined in the abstract, the requirement of a causal link between 
the two notions give a strong indication of the nature of the situations that article 17 refers 
given the common definition of the word vulnerable on one hand and the categories of 
vulnerable persons listed as examples in § 1 on the other hand. 
 
Finally, considering the wording of § 2 ("Paragraph 1 shall apply only to persons ...") all 
vulnerable persons as defined in § 1 are not always regarded as having special needs. It is 
the very purpose of the individual assessment mentioned in § 2 to identify whether or not 
they have special needs. 
2.2. Who is to be identified and/or what has to be identified 
according to article 21 proposed by the Commission and the 
Parliament? 
2.2.1. Article 21, § 1 
A first major amendment concerns the choice of the notions themselves regarding article 
17 § 1 of the reception directive in force: the notion of vulnerable persons is no longer the 
central and exclusive notion of § 1: beside the notion of vulnerable persons the notion of 
persons with special need emerges. The notion of special needs is not defined as in article 
17. The notion of vulnerable persons is presented in the same way as in article 17. 
However, in the non-exhaustive list of persons considered as vulnerable persons two 
categories were added: victims of trafficking and persons with mental health problems. 
 
                                                 
353  A distinction seems to be made between a state of vulnerability and a situation of vulnerability. The 
loss of the use of the legs, impaired mental health are states of vulnerability. The fact for a woman to 
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A second fundamental amendment is provided for by article 21 § 1 is relating to connection 
between the notion of vulnerable persons and the notion of special needs.  On the one hand 
it follows from § 1, in fine, that the vulnerable persons « …shall always be considered as 
persons with special needs ». On the other hand, on the contrary to what has been said 
about the meaning to be given to the wording persons with special need mentioned in the 
directive in force354 it appears that these terms must, under the new article 21 be 
understood independently from the concept of vulnerable persons with special needs. This 
statement follows from the first sentence of article 21 § 1 which constitutes the general 
principle of the provision: it is « …take into account the specific situation of persons with 
special needs…» without the requirement of a causal link between these special needs and 
a state and/or a situation of vulnerability. The wording of § 2 confirms this interpretation 
(see below Title 2. 2. 2).  
2.2.2. Article 21 § 2 
According to § 2 « Member States shall establish procedures in national legislation with a 
view to identifying…whether the applicant has special needs and indicating the nature of 
such needs… ». Here the notion of special needs is not linked to a state of vulnerability of 
the asylum seeker. The § 2 does not refer to § 1 anyway.  
2.2.3. Conclusion regarding the conceptual dimension of article 21 
It follows from the previous explanations that the identification of persons with special 
needs - without those needs to be necessarily linked by a causal relationship to a state of 
vulnerability – is the concern. However, vulnerable persons as defined in § 1 of article 21 
are necessarily included in the "primary target group" and these vulnerable persons are still 
regarded as having special needs: see above under the § 1 in fine. 
 
Therefore the central notion referred to in article 21 is based only on the notion of special 
needs without such a notion to be linked to the notion of vulnerability. So, according to 
article 17 of the Directive into force major modifications on the conceptual dimension 
originate in article 21 of the directive Commission proposal.  
 
These modifications raise questions about the appropriateness of their application.  
2.2.4. Questions regarding the modifications made by article 21 of the texts of the 
Commission and Parliament to the conceptual dimension under article 17 in force 
 
Two questions can be raised. 
 
– Firstly, which special needs must be considered in the context of article 21 proposed 
by the Commission and the Parliament since a causal link between these special 
needs and a state of vulnerability of the person is not established nor required any 
longer? 
 
This question can be asked in the context of article 17 of the directive in force since the 
latter, nor the Commission directive proposal, defines the notion of special needs. However 
if the current directive does not define the notion of special needs this notion is framed by 
the notion of vulnerability as has been stated in Title 2.1 above. This limit is a strong 
                                                                                                                                                            
be alone in a dormitory with men exclusively is a situation that may make her vulnerable. The 
condition is more intrinsic to the person, the situation more extrinsic to the person. 
354   The fact that the wordings of persons with special needs must necessarily be understood as the 
general principle stated in Article 17 that is: vulnerable people with special needs.  
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indication that allows to better identify the special needs the provision is intended to 
address. 
 
This first point can be illustrated by an example. This example shows that the answer is 
more obvious under article 17 than under article 21: how to assess the situation of a 
person who has lost a tooth and requires the replacement of it (however considering that 
the lack of replacement of this tooth has no impact on chewing and therefore on the 
possibility of the person to eat normally)?  
 
One must first recall that in the case of health care, under the minimum standard laid down 
in article 15 § 1 in force, the Member States is only obliged to provide emergency care and 
essential treatment of illness. It seems fairly clear that a replacement of a tooth will not be 
taken care of by the minimum standard. Could it be then based on the notion of special 
needs? If one refers to article 21, one can support the idea that this request may have to 
be taken into account insofar as the notion of special needs is neither defined, nor framed 
by the notion of vulnerability. However under article 17, it is reasonable to consider that 
this request is not a special need due to a state of vulnerability and is therefore not to be 
taken into account. The issue of special needs in the field of health care is a particularly 
important issue given the special provision of article 15 above, which became article 19 in 
the directive Commission proposal. This article 19 incorporates the principle of article 15 (a 
minimum standard and a higher standard for persons with special needs) with some 
modifications. The wording is:  
 
Article 19: Health Care 
 
« § 1 Member States shall ensure that applicants receive the necessary health care which 
shall include, at least, emergency care and essential treatment of illness or mental 
disorders. 
 
§ 2. Member States shall provide necessary medical or other assistance to applicants who 
have special needs, including appropriate mental health care when needed, under the same 
conditions as nationals ». 
 
Under the changes one must note in particular that  the directive Commission Proposal 
introduces a higher standard  referring to health care under the same conditions as national 
in favour of  persons with special needs mentioned in § 2 – higher standard which is not 
provided for in § 2 of article 15 in force. This amendment was deleted in the text amended 
by the Parliament. In any event, whether or not one takes into account the reference to 
nationals, the principle of a higher standard than the minimum standard laid down in § 1 
still applies to persons with special needs.  
 
The terms of persons with special needs mentioned in article 19 § 2 of the directive 
Commission proposal must be understood in the light of article 21 of the proposal which 
states the general principle of « Chapter IV: Provisions for persons with special needs ». 
But the general principle enacted in article 21 has been amended regarding the conceptual 
dimension. Besides the concept of "vulnerable persons with special needs" which can still 
be applied, the autonomous concept of persons with special needs - without the 
requirement of a causal link with a state of vulnerability - becomes the essential concept of 
this general principle. It follows that the terms of persons with special needs of article 19 § 
2 must be understood in the same way: they may correspond to the concept of vulnerable 
persons with special needs but not necessarily. If they correspond to the concept of 
autonomous persons with special needs the issue about the special needs covered by the 
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standard of § 2 appears since in this case the undefined notion of special needs is not 
framed by a causal link with a state of vulnerability. This hypothesis may imply that any 
health problem can potentially be considered as a special need and that therefore any 
person expressing a need in the health field may require to benefit from the specific 
standard of § 2, which would accordingly become the minimum standard applicable .  
 
Relating to this first issue, it is interesting to briefly discuss the legal system and the 
practice in force in Belgium. In this Member State the law requires an individual evaluation 
of each applicant to determine whether the reception meets the asylum seeker's special 
needs. The law called for the identification of each asylum seeker's special needs without 
requiring a causal link between those needs and a state or situation of vulnerability. In 
doing so, the Belgium legislation is not in keeping with the general pattern of article 17 of 
the directive into force but that of article 21 of the directive Commission proposal: the 
central and autonomous concept of persons with special needs is not framed by the notion 
of vulnerability. 
 
Two important elements relating to the implementation of the Belgian law must be 
addressed. The first element is that the Belgian law poses the question of how far to go in 
the interpretation of the notion of special needs? This matter is the subject of litigation. 
Thus, a judicial review was brought by an asylum seeker who required under a special need 
to be able to attend language courses. He asked for this special need to be taken into 
account regarding the reception centre so that it would not be located too far from the 
place where he attended his course355. This situation illustrates the problem of the 
applicability of article 21. The second element is that unless a frame is given to the notion 
of special needs in the legislation, people in charge of the assessment in practice provide 
an important "filtering" of the needs: needs are taken into account only to a reasonable 
extent and provided they are not foolish or unrealistic. This "filtering" operated in the 
practice makes the legal situation uncertain as the judicial review above mentioned proves 
it. The risk of litigation is real356. Beyond this legal risk, this example should lead the EU 
legislator to wonder about the situations to which it intends to give greater protection.  
 
– Secondly, are the vulnerable persons as defined by article 21 § 1 always persons 
with special needs as this provision enacts?  
 
It seems appropriate to argue that being a vulnerable person as defined in article 21 § 1 
does not always mean one has special needs. This reserve relates specifically to the list of 
the categories of persons considered vulnerable. An example is that of the elderly. A senior 
in good physical and mental health does not necessarily have special needs. However, all 
the categories mentioned in article 21 shall not be considered the same way: when the 
objection about the elderly seems relevant, nevertheless with minors or unaccompanied 
minors we must instead consider that because of the mere fact of their minority minors 
have special needs necessarily (compared with adults). Therefore, it appears that the 
nature of the link between the notion of vulnerable persons and the notion of special needs 
set forth in article 17 of the current directive appears more judicious with specific regard to 
the categories listed.  
                                                 
355 The plaintiff had been subject to disciplinary action which had involved a change of centre. The 
plaintiff does not dispute the merits of the disciplinary action itself, but he argued that his transfer to 
another centre imposed on him a ride too long to get to its language courses. 
356 These elements have been put forward as part of the study conducted by the Odysseus Network for 
the FER on the issue of the identification of vulnerable asylum seekers with special needs: a study 
submitted to the Commission in February 2010 and to be published in September 2010. 
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SOLUTION: 
Remove the assertion that vulnerable persons as defined in § 1 of article 21 have always 
special needs  
3. THE CONCEPTUAL DIMENSION AND THE PROCEDUR-
AL DIMENSION OF ARTICLE 21 OF THE RECEPTION 
DIRECTIVE PROPOSAL (TEXT OF THE COUNCIL) 
 
PROBLEM: article 21 of the text of the Council raises a real problem insofar as regarding 
the obligation to take into account the specific situation of  asylum seekers that is 
obligation to provide adapted reception conditions it refers only to vulnerable persons and 
as regarding the obligation to establish a procedure of identification it refers only to 
persons with special needs without requiring any causal link between the notion of special 
needs and a state or condition of vulnerability  Moreover, the wording of article 21 § 2 puts 
in doubt the obligation of the States to set out identification systems that apply to all 
asylum seekers.  
 
- Title 3. 1.below: The parallel use of two concepts that of vulnerable asylum seekers and 
asylum seekers with special needs without any established link between the notion of 
special needs and the notion of vulnerability creates a legal uncertainty as to the 
interpretation and application of article 21. 
 
The §§ 1 and 2 of the text of the Council uses each a different concept (the first § the 
concept of vulnerable persons, and § 2 the concept of persons with special needs) and no 
link is established between these two concepts. This approach can lead to the identification 
of special needs, under § 2 of article 21, which states should disregard when adapting the 
reception conditions under § 1 of article 21. Indeed the autonomous concept of persons 
with special needs - without any reference to a state of vulnerability - is wider than that of 
vulnerable persons with special needs, or in other words persons with special needs due to 
a condition or situation of vulnerability. In this the Council text is extremely confusing. It 
might lead to legal uncertainty as to its interpretation and application.  
 
- Title 3. 2.below: The doubt regarding the States obligation to put in place systems of 
identification which apply to all asylum seekers. 
 
Under § 2 of the Council text there is no question of whether the applicant has special 
needs or not  (the wording of the Commission leaves no doubt as to the  states' obligation 
to assess the individual situation of each asylum seeker with the view to identify, whether 
he/she has special needs or not) but to identify applicants with special needs (a more 
general wording that could give rise to different interpretations and lead to identification 
systems that would not apply to all asylum seekers). 
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3.1. The parallel use of two concepts that of vulnerable asylum 
seekers and asylum seekers with special needs without any 
established link between the notion of special needs and the 
vulnerability creates legal uncertainty as to the interpretation 
and application of article 21 
 
Article 21 § 1 of the text of the Council is keeping with the  general pattern of article 17 § 1 
of the reception directive in force : the central and exclusive notion is that of vulnerable 
persons whom States have to take into account the specific situation by providing adapted 
reception conditions. Unlike § 1, § 2 does not fall in line with article 17 of the reception 
directive in force. If it is indeed relating to persons with special needs, in the second § no 
link is established between the § 1 and the § 2 and thus between the notion of special 
needs and the notion of vulnerability. Therefore § 2 aims at identifying asylum seekers with 
special needs while § 1 aims at considering the situation of vulnerable asylum seekers. 
 
Beside this point, the title itself of Chapter IV of the text of the Council, article 21 being 
part of it, seems to give credence to the idea that there are two independent concepts: a 
concept using only the notion of special needs  and another  using only the notion of 
vulnerability without any link between these two concepts. Indeed, the Chapter IV is 
entitled Provisions for vulnerable persons and persons with special needs. The parallel use 
of these two concepts creates legal uncertainty as to the interpretation and application to 
be given to article 21.  
3.2. The doubt regarding the States obligation to put in place 
systems of identification that apply to all asylum seekers 
 
The § 2 of the text of the Council is close to the provision of the Commission directive 
proposal but is not identical. According to the text of the Council the aim is to identify 
persons with special needs as provided in the Commission text. The wording is different, 
however, since it is stipulated in the Council text that Member States shall establish 
mechanisms with a view to identifying applicants with special needs and not as required by 
the text of the Commission procedures…with a view to identifying…whether the applicant 
has special needs. 
 
The wording of the Commission does not allow doubting about the States obligation to 
submit all asylum seekers to the identification procedure which is obviously fundamental in 
terms of spirit and purpose of the provision. The wording of the Council is more general. It 
could give rise to different interpretations and lead to the development of systems of 
identification that do not apply to all asylum seekers.  
 
Incidentally, it may be noted that the text of the Council replaced the term procedures used 
by the Commission with the term mechanisms. The term mechanism seems both less 
formal and wider. If it seems less formal that does not mean that exempts states from the 
obligation placed upon them to set out "means", " methods " for identification in their 
national legislation and to take a decision as to whether or not the applicant has special 
needs or not, after the implementation of these " means ", these "methods". The term 
appears in the same time broader than the term procedures in that it could cover more 
informal methods of identification such as observation of asylum seekers in their daily life, 
activities or during recreational, educational, artistic or other activities ... In some Member 
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States more informal methods have a central role in the process of identifying vulnerable 
asylum seekers as well more formal methods as an interview with a social worker and/or 
examination. In the opinion of professionals in the field these methods are particularly 
effective and positive to identify vulnerabilities difficult to detect at first sight. This is the 
case when traumas are caused by torture or other serious forms of physical, psychological 
or sexual violence: acts or violence that do not necessarily leave visible traces but which 
often stops the victim from spontaneously talking about his/her experiences357. In this 
sense the term mechanisms is more suitable that the term procedures.  
 
SOLUTION: 
- Titles 3. 1. and 3. 2 above: 
The text of the Council shall in no case be accepted. 
 
The substitution of the term mechanisms instead of procedures is relevant, however. (See 
below Title 4 of this SUB SECTION I where a proposed amendment of article 21 is 
formulated).  
4. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RECEPTION 
DIRECTIVE COMMISSION PROPOSAL AS REGARDS 
THE STATEMENT OF GENERAL PRINCIPLE THAT THE 
MEMBER STATES MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE 
SPECIFIC SITUATION OF VULNERABLE ASYLUM 
SEEKERS 
 
On sight of the in depth study conducted by the Odysseus network as part of the study on 
articles 17 (reception directive in force) and 21 (reception directive proposal) – to the 
attention of ERF - a proposed amendment to the text of the Commission is made for 
integrating the solutions to the problems identified above, especially that of the conceptual 
dimension of article 21 and that of the temporal dimension of the identification process.  
 
It is thus recommended:  
 
– To add in article 2 « Definitions » of the reception directive Commission proposal the 
definition of a « person with special needs »: 
– « Person with special needs means an asylum seeker who due to a state or a 
situation of vulnerability needs attention, assistance or cares, acute or specific ». 
 
This definition maintains a very clear causal link between the notion of special needs and 
the notion of vulnerability. It also highlights what - in the context of adapted reception 
conditions - shall be provided to the persons that article 2 mentions: attention, assistance 
and/or cares, acute or specific:  
 
To draft the new article 21 as follows: 
 
                                                 
357   These elements have been put forward as part of the study conducted by the Odysseus Network for 
the FER on the issue of the identification of vulnerable asylum seekers with special needs: a study 
submitted to the Commission in February 2010 and to be published end 2010. 
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– “§1. For all of the provisions of this directive, the Members States shall take into 
account the situation of persons with special needs and ensure proper monitoring of 
their situation. Persons with special needs shall receive attention, assistance or 
cares, acute or specific, according to their situation as long as it requires it”. 
– § 2. As soon as an application for international protection is lodged and then on an 
ongoing basis, Member States shall conduct an individual assessment of the 
situation of each asylum seeker in order to verify if he/she is a person with special 
needs and to determine the adapted attention, assistance or cares, acute or specific, 
he/she needs. For the purposes of conducting an individual assessment followed, 
States shall establish appropriate mechanisms. 
– § 3. When assessing the individual situation of asylum seekers, special attention is 
paid in particular to minors, unaccompanied minors, disabled persons, elderly 
persons, pregnant women, single parents with minor children, victims of trafficking 
in human beings, people with mental health problems and people who have been 
subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual 
abuse”.  
 
– The § 1 stresses the fact that the attention, the assistance and/or the cares, acute or 
specific, adapted to the situation of the applicant must be provided as long as his/her 
situation required it. 
– The § 2 states clearly that the individual evaluation of the applicant’s situation must 
be done on an ongoing basis: in that the reservation relating to the temporal 
dimension identified in Title 1 is dealt with. Moreover, the term “procedures” is 
substituted for the broader term mechanisms in the sense explained in Title 3.  
– The § 3 draws attention to the categories of persons who may easily show evidence of 
vulnerability. This § 3 acts as an alarm. However it clearly does not exclude that each 
applicant may individually be identified as a person with special needs as defined in 
Title 2, regardless of his/her belonging to on of these categories of persons. In 
addition, § 3 does not state that these categories of people have always special needs 
which is not necessary the case as pointed out in Title 2. 2. 4, 2nd question.  
5. CONCLUSIONS  
 
Beyond the legal consideration, it is necessary to ensure in practice compliance with the 
obligation of Member States to provide appropriate care to vulnerable people particularly 
victims of torture or violence as well as minors who have been victims of any form of 
abuse, neglect, exploitation, torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, or who 
have suffered from armed conflicts (as prescribed articles 18 § 2 and 20 of the reception 
directive in force and articles 22 § 4 and 24 of the Commission proposal). 
 
The improvement of the legal framework and the clarifications above mentioned are 
prerequisite for the consideration of the situation of vulnerable persons in the context of 
the reception conditions. These legal improvement and clarifications are not sufficient 
however. Beyond the legal dimension of the issue, the problem persists of the effective 
implementation of the provisions protecting vulnerable persons. In his 2007 study on the 
assessment of the transposition of the directive in force358, the Odysseus Academic Network 
has noted that the implementation of these provisions was problematic in practice in many 
countries (lack of financial resources, lack of medical structures ...). An adequate national 
and EU legal framework is not sufficient enough to protect vulnerable persons. It is 
                                                 
358 Odysseus Report, Q. 30 D, p.89 et 90 ; Q. 31 F, p. 94 et 95. 
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therefore essential that, beyond identification, the States comply with the obligations to 
provide cares and adequate reception conditions in an efficient way.  
 
SUB SECTION II. THE ASYLUM PROCEDURE DIRECTIVE PROPOSAL 
(TEXT OF THE COMMISSION) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
One must underline the lack of coordination between the various instruments of second 
generation proposed by the Commission (reception, asylum procedure and qualification 
directives and Dublin regulation) regarding the issue of vulnerable asylum seekers. 
 
The asylum procedure directive Commission proposal contrasts with the asylum procedure 
directive in force since in the draft, specific provisions devoted to vulnerable asylums 
seekers are now envisaged which is not the case with the current directive359. For a full 
discussion on these provisions see Chapter IV Part II. 7: Applicants with Special Needs. 
These new provisions are undeniably common sense even if subject to some uncertainties 
(see below Title 2).  
 
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning the lack (or the insufficiency) of coordination between 
the various instruments of second generation proposed by the Commission (reception, 
asylum procedure and qualification directives and Dublin regulation) regarding the issue of 
vulnerable applicants. If the set of problems can partly be seen in a different perspective 
according to the specific framework of instrument you are looking at, some links and/or 
similarity must be considered. This is the case particularly between the reception directive 
and the asylum procedure directive on the one hand and between the reception directive 
and the qualification directive on the other.  
2. THE ASYLUM PROCEDURE DIRECTIVE PROPOSAL 
(TEXT OF THE COMMISSION) 
 
PROBLEM: the definition of applicants with special needs is not accurate enough. There is a 
lack of obligation to establish a procedure of identification of applicants with special needs. 
A cross-reference to article 21 of the reception directive Commission proposal that raises 
questions. 
 
Articles 2 and 20 of the asylum procedure directive Commission proposal include provisions 
for protecting vulnerable asylum seekers but these provisions pose the following problems:  
 
- Title 2. 1.below: The definition of applicants with special needs given in article 2, indent 
d) of the proposition lacks acuteness.  
 
- Title 2. 2.below: The text of the proposal does not oblige States to establish a procedure 
of identification of applicants with special needs. This lack of obligation could result in the 
                                                 
359 Subject to article 13, § 3, paragraph a) according to which States shall ensure that the person who 
conducts the interview is sufficiently competent to take account of the personal situation or general 
circumstances surrounding the application including cultural origin or vulnerability of the applicant, 
provided it is practicable and article 17 on guarantees granted to unaccompanied minors found to be 
insufficient: see Chapter IV. 
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failure to apply the protective provisions of article 20 of the proposal. Anyhow this lack of 
provision creates legal uncertainty.  
 
- Title 2. 3.below: Article 20 § 2 makes reference to Article 21 of the reception directive 
Commission proposal that raises questions about the links that could or should be drawn 
between on the one hand the people responsible for reception and/or persons responsible 
for assessment under article 21 and other determining authorities. 
2.1. The definition of applicants with special needs given in article 
2, indent d) of the proposition lacks acuteness 
 
The article 20 § 1 of the asylum procedure directive Commission proposal compels the 
Member States to take appropriate measures in favour of applicants with special needs so 
that where needed, they shall be granted time extensions to enable them to submit 
evidence or take other necessary steps in the procedure - among other things -. 
 
According to § 3 of the same article these applicants cannot be subjected to an accelerated 
procedure (article 27 § 6 of the proposal) and the clause relative to manifestly unfounded 
applications can not be applied to them (article 27 § 7 of the proposal). In addition, these 
applicants may be given the benefit of priority procedure (article 27 § 5, indent b):  
optional provision for the Member States). Article 2, indent d) of the proposal defines the 
notion of applicant with special needs as “an applicant who due to age, gender, disability, 
mental health problems or consequences of torture, rape or other serious forms of 
psychological, physical or sexual violence is in need of special guarantees in order to 
benefit from the rights and comply with the obligations in accordance with this Directive”. 
 
It should be noted that while article 21 of the reception directive Commission proposal 
mentions applicants with special needs, it gives no definition of this category. But, to recall, 
article 21 provides categories of persons who are considered vulnerable persons - as 
examples. This list is a non-exhaustive list unlike the one given in article 2, indent d) of the 
asylum procedure proposal. The asylum procedure directive proposal mentions an 
exhaustive list of "states", "causes" that can lead to consider a person as an applicant with 
special needs: age, gender, disability, a mental health problem or consequences of torture, 
rape or other serious forms of violence. 
 
The fact that the definitions are not the same in both texts may be justified given the 
different context and objectives of each one360.  
 
However the definition of article 2, indent d) is unclear, both not restrictive (for age, sex, 
mental health problems) and restrictive: what about the consideration of a person suffering 
from a chronic disease like diabetes or a serious illness such as cancer, diseases that 
medical treatment could justify an extension  of time allowed? It seems that these people 
are not covered by the definition of article 2, indent d) except to interpret the concept of 
disability broadly. 
 
Even if the definition is imprecise, we must highlight the positive aspects however: the fact 
that the applicant's mental health is taken into consideration (knowing how this factor may 
negatively influence the ability of the person to tell his story) and the consequences of acts 
                                                 
360  It should be noted that it is recommended not to keep the text of article 21 of the reception directive 
Commission proposal with regard to its conceptual dimension that is to say the definition of the 
applicants meant to be  provided with adequate reception conditions: see supra Titles  2 and 4 of SUB 
SECTION I. 
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of torture or other serious forms of violence as well. It is nevertheless essential to compel 
the States to set out mechanisms with the view to identify applicants with disabilities, with 
mental health problems or victims of torture or violence.  
2.2. The lack of the States obligation to establish a procedure of 
identification of applicants with special needs 
 
The article 20 § 1 of the asylum procedure directive Commission proposal does not specify 
when, how and by whom the identification of applicants with special needs must be carried 
out. As such, article 20 can be compared with article 17 of the reception directive in force. 
Indeed, article 17 of the reception directive in force as article 20 of the asylum procedure 
directive Commission proposal provides protective provisions in favour of asylum seekers 
with special need (the States should take appropriate measures - the accelerated procedure 
cannot be applied to them nor the clause relative to manifestly unfounded applications- 
without however compelling the States to set out the mechanism with the view to identify 
these applicants in an efficient way.  
 
Of course it can always be argued, as the Commission has done for article 17, that this 
mechanism is logically required by article 20 in so far as this mechanism is « … is a core 
element without which the provisions of the Directive aimed at special treatment of these 
persons [who are here applicants with special needs in the sense of article 2, indent d)] will 
lose all meaning”361.  
 
The fact remains that the absence of express provision leads - regarding the application of 
article 17 - to numerous drawbacks362. This absence of express provision also creates a 
legal uncertainty. The problem is particularly acute in relation to persons with mental 
health problems or persons victim of torture or violence. Indeed, these vulnerabilities are 
not always easily detectable. At the same time, acknowledgement is essential both to take 
them into account during the asylum procedure itself (see below Title 2. 3.) but also 
because of a possible link between these states of vulnerability and evidences on which 
international protection can be granted.  
2.3. A reference to article 21 of the reception directive 
Commission proposal that raises questions  
 
The § 2 of article 20 states that: « In cases where the determining authority consider that 
an applicant has been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of (…) violence as 
described in article 21 [of the reception directive proposal], the applicant shall be granted 
sufficient time and relevant support to prepare for a personal interview on the substance of 
his/her application ». 
 
The formulation as described in article 21 is unclear. The term considers is not clear either. 
Is  § 2 intended or not to establish an implicit link between the individuals responsible for 
the reception and/or the individuals responsible for the assessment under article 21 on the 
one hand and determining authority on the second hand? In other words, are the findings - 
identified during the individual evaluation of the situation of the applicant which must be 
                                                 
361  Commission Report, RCD, point 3.5.1.related to article 17, page 9. 
362 It is also necessary to emphasize that article 17 - in contrast with article 20 of the asylum procedure 
directive procedure which mentions absolutely nothing - suggests at least an individual assessment of 
the asylum seeker's situation. This statement has not yet convinced the Member States they should 
establish a procedure of identification. 
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conducted in the framework of the reception directive - intended to "help "or to be 
forwarded to the determining authority? Formally the answer is negative. 
 
On the one hand, article 21 of the reception directive Commission proposal assigns - to the 
individual evaluation of the situation of the applicant - no other purpose than to adapt the 
reception conditions to the particular needs identified. It is not stipulated that this 
assessment must also "help" to determine whether the applicant must benefit from 
appropriate procedural modalities. On the other hand, article 21 of the reception directive 
Commission proposal (along with the recommended amendment) does not aim to reach a 
decision that would "label" the applicant as a person who has suffered of torture for 
instance. The decision to intervene - after the identification procedure of article 21 of the 
text of the Commission - shall rule on the question of "whether the applicant has special 
needs and indicating the nature of those needs” or in the case of the amendment above 
mentioned shall “determine the attention, assistance or cares, acute or specific, [the 
applicant] needs”. Of course, if the asylum seeker is a victim of torture or violence it is 
possible that in his file concerning the evaluation mentioned in article 21 explicit 
information is to be found suggesting these acts of torture or violence. However, this can 
also not be the case. The person in charge of the assessment may have identified 
symptoms that require specific psychological assistance (sleep disorders, memory 
disorders, concentration disorders, anxiety, isolation ...) even if he has not necessarily 
spotted that the asylum has experienced acts of torture or violence or even if the asylum 
himself has not referred to such facts. In itself, the idea that the assessment carried out in 
the context of article 21 "serve" a purpose other than adaptation of reception conditions is, 
at least formally, not convincing.  
 
As part of the study for ERF the workers on the ground in charge of the identification of 
vulnerable asylum seekers have strongly emphasized the fact they should not be invested 
of another charge than identifying special needs in order to adapt reception conditions 
according to them. In most countries, where the study has been carried out, social 
assistants and other staff of the reception centres are on the front line and primarily 
responsible for the individual evaluation of the applicants. It is often their daily and on an 
ongoing basis contacts with applicants which help identify particular needs and 
difficult/painful situations. If the special need relates to physical or mental health then they 
refer the applicant (with his consent) to a qualified professional. They exercise their duties 
independently without being concerned about the fact that their evaluation will help or not 
the applicant during the asylum procedure (whether on substantive matter or for the 
modalities of the procedure itself).  
 
It therefore seems inappropriate to expand the aim assigned to the assessment provided 
for in article 21 by stating that such assessment should also determine if the applicant is a 
victim of torture knowing that this finding will serve during the asylum procedure. This does 
not prevent an asylum seeker (or his counsel) to be able - in the framework of the asylum 
procedure - to assert his rights to benefit of modifications of the conditions of reception he 
receives if such adjustments are of a nature to justify such communication (the 
identification of certain needs in the context of reception conditions may have no impact on 
the asylum procedure). If adapted reception conditions provided to the applicant as a result 
of the evaluation of article 21 relate to his/her physical and/or mental health this 
information may be disclosed to determining authority - with the applicant's consent. The 
communication would not then be in connection with a decision labelling the individual but 
on the adapted reception conditions he/she receives and possibly on the symptoms that led 
to such care. The determining authority would have his attention drawn to a state of 
vulnerability that could have an impact on the asylum procedure. 
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SOLUTION: 
 
- Title 2. 1. above: definition of applicants with special needs in article 2, indent d) of the 
proposal: 
The categories of persons protected must be defined more precisely.  
 
- Title 2. 2. above: lack of a procedure of identification of asylum seekers with special 
needs 
The States should be compelled to set out a procedure of identification. The identification 
must be carried out as soon as the application has been lodged.  
 
A statement - as described in Title 2. 3 in fine above - between those responsible for the 
reception and/or persons responsible for the evaluation of article 21 on the one hand and 
other determining authority on the other hand could be formalized.  
 
- Title 2. 3. above: article 20 § 2 of the asylum procedure directive Commission proposal  
§ 2 of Article 20 shall be cleared according to the exact purpose and content that the 
Commission intended to give and in view of the developments in title 2. 3.  
 
SUB SECTION III: THE DUBLIN REGULATION PROPOSAL (TEXTS OF 
THE COMMISSION, THE PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Dublin regulation Commission proposal contrasts with the Dublin regulation in force 
since the proposal includes new provisions for protecting vulnerable asylum seekers, which 
is not the case in the current regulation. For a full discussion of these provisions refer to 
Chapter I, Section III: Protection of Vulnerable Persons in the Dublin System. These new 
provisions are undoubtedly directed at the right object. In addition, it is important to 
remember that these specific provisions are "completed" by the protective provisions of the 
reception directive proposal since that directive applies to asylum-seekers submitted to the 
Dublin procedure363. It follows that both the transferring and the receiving state are bound 
by the protective provisions of the reception directive. The Member States that hears a 
Dublin procedure will then proceed to the individual evaluation of the asylum seeker 
submitted to this procedure. Depending on the duration of the Dublin procedure, it could 
also be required to ensure an ongoing assessment of the applicant's situation (if the 
procedure for determining the State responsible is lengthy).  
 
If the assessment reveals that the applicant is a person with special needs, the State 
investigating the Dublin procedure shall provide the applicant with adequate reception 
conditions according to his/her its needs. It shall also pass on information relative to the 
applicant's special needs to the receiving Member States and this pursuant to article 30 § 
3, indent d) of Dublin procedure Commission proposal364. As emphasized in the introduction 
to the previous SUB SECTION, it would be appropriate to create a link between the needs 
mentioned in article 30 § 3, paragraph d) of the draft Dublin regulation and article 21 of 
the reception directive proposal.  
                                                 
363 This results explicitly from the explanatory memorandum to the reception directive Commission 
proposal (Part 3.1 devoted to the scope of the Directive), recital (8) of the same proposal and recital 
(9) of the Dublin Regulation Commission proposal. 
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The receiving Member States will be required to carry out the assessment of the situation 
of the asylum seeker who has been transferred when, for one reason or another, the 
transferring Member States has not carried it out. In any event the State of reception will 
be required to ensure the ongoing assessment of the applicant. It may also be required to 
provide adequate reception conditions if the assessment revealed a state vulnerability of 
the applicant.  
2. THE ARTICLE 30, § 1 IN FINE OF THE DUBLIN 
REGULATION PROPOSAL (TEXTS OF THE 
COMMISSION, THE PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL) 
 
PROBLEM: lack of medical examination to assess whether the applicant is fit or not for the 
transfer 
 
Article 30, § 1 in fine of the Dublin regulation proposed by the Commission and the 
Parliament, provides that only persons fit for the transfer can be transferred. However, 
there is no provision   specifying how this finding of incapacity is established or how and by 
whom the decision not to transfer the asylum seeker is taken. The text of the Council, 
meanwhile, removed this provision.  
 
Article 30 § 1 in fine of the Dublin regulation Commission proposal may, in the same way 
as article 20 of the asylum procedure directive Commission proposal, be compared with 
article 17 of the reception directive in force. Indeed - as article 17 of the reception directive 
in force - article 30, § 1 in fine states a protective provision for the benefit of asylum 
seekers (the fact that States may not transfer them when they are not fit for the transfer) 
without however compelling the States to establish the mechanism that can allow to 
identify those unable to transfer efficiently. Of course it can always be argued, as the 
Commission has done for article 17, that this mechanism is logically required by article 20 
in so far as this mechanism is « … is a core element without which the provisions of the 
Directive aimed at special treatment of these persons [who are here applicants with special 
needs in the sense of article 2, indent d)] will lose all meaning”365.  
The fact remains that the absence of express provision leads - regarding the application of 
article 17 - to numerous drawbacks366. This absence of express provision also creates a 
legal uncertainty. It should be noted that the text of the Dublin regulation proposed by the 
Council deleted the provision of article 30, § 1, in fine of the Commission proposal.  
 
SOLUTION: 
 
The article 30, § 1, in fine of the Dublin regulation as proposed by the Commission and the 
Parliament shall be maintained. 
 
This provision must also be complemented by the recognition of the applicant's right to 
request the benefit of a medical examination to assess his/her possible inability to be 
transferred. This examination should take place following the notification of the decision to 
                                                                                                                                                            
364 This obligation to transmit information poses significant practical problem relating to the language in 
which the communication should take place. 
365  Commission Report, RCD, point 3.5.1.related to article 17, page 9. 
366  It is also necessary to emphasize that article 17, in contrast with article 20 of the asylum procedure 
directive proposal which mentions absolutely nothing, suggests at least an individual assessment of 
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transfer since it is at the time of transfer that this potential incapacity needs to be 
assessed.  
 
The Dublin Regulation proposal must also be completed to determine the consequences of a 
decision of incapacity to be transferred on the decision on the substantive merits of the 
application for international protection and on the decision to transfer. 
 
SUB SECTION IV. QUALIFICATION DIRECTIVE PROPOSAL (TEXT OF 
THE COMMISSION) 
 
PROBLEM:  the provision stating the general principle of taking into account the specific 
situation of vulnerable persons is drafted as article 17 of the reception directive in force 
 
It was pointed out in Title 1 of Section II that article 17 of the reception directive does not 
expressly oblige the Member States to set up a procedure of identification for vulnerable 
persons with special needs and that this partly explains why there is no procedure in place 
in many states. The article 20 §§ 3 and 4 of the qualification directive Commission proposal  
whose wording is identical to article 17 of the reception directive in force reproduces the 
same problem  and has not considered the solution proposed by the Commission under 
article 21 of the reception directive proposal. 
 
Chapter VII headed «Content of International Protection" of the qualification directive 
proposal contains a provision (article 20 §§ 3 and 4) "equivalent" to article 21 of the 
reception directive Commission proposal as for its purpose (but no its wording). Indeed, the 
purpose of article 20 §§ 3 and 4 of the qualification directive proposal is to oblige the 
Member States to give special treatment to vulnerable persons with special needs in the 
field of health care, access to employment, access to education, right to information,... 
since these persons are recognized refugees or persons granted subsidiary protection, 
whereas under article 21 of the reception directive proposal they are asylum seekers. 
 
Accordingly, the wording of article 20 § 3 and 4 should have been quite similar to that of 
article 21 and at least different to that of article 17 of the reception directive in force  since 
the wording of this article is currently posing problems of transposition and implementation. 
 
SOLUTION: 
 
The article 20 §§ 3 and 4 of the qualification directive proposal must be modified. 
 
Since article 21 of the reception directive Commission proposal creates a conceptual 
problem (SUB SECTION I, Title 2. 2) it is not recommended to follow this article to rewrite 
article 20 §§ 3 and 4, but to build on the proposed amendments recommended in Box 4 of 
SUB SECTION I. The new wording of article 20 §§ 3 and 4 shall however be adapted since 
the persons mentioned are not asylum seekers but recognized refugees and beneficiaries of 
subsidiary protection. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
the asylum seeker's situation. This statement has not yet convinced the Member States they should  
establish a procedure of identification. 
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SECTION 3: DETENTION OF VULNERABLE ASYLUM SEEK-
ERS WITH SPECIAL NEEDS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
None of the first generation instruments preclude to the principle itself of the detention of 
vulnerable asylum seekers. The aspect of EU law is not contrary to international standards. 
Moreover, when the reception directive in force applies in principle to asylum seekers in 
detention, we are force to conclude that 9 MS have conflicting opinion. Asylum seekers 
detained in these countries do not benefit from the application of minimum standards of the 
reception directive including protective provisions in favour of vulnerable persons.  
The state of EU law does not oppose the principle itself of detention of vulnerable asylum 
seekers that is not contrary to international law. Indeed, no international standard prohibits 
the very principle of detention of vulnerable persons such as children, the disabled, 
families, ... Concerning children, it should be noted that the International Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (hereafter CICR) does not prohibit the detention of minors, including 
unaccompanied minors. Converging on this point with article 5 § 1 of the ECHR and article 
9 of the ICCPR it states that no child shall be deprived of liberty unlawfully and arbitrarily 
and moreover specifies that this measure shall be used only in last resort and for the 
shortest appropriate period of time (article 37 indent b). 
 
The absence of prohibition of the principle itself of the detention of vulnerable persons does 
not mean that their detention shall be considered legal and not arbitrary in all 
circumstances. More likely than for other asylum seekers, the judge will draw his attention 
to the fact that the detention is not arbitrary and the conditions of detention do not violate 
international standards. Thus the two judgments of the ECtHR discussed in Title 6.1 of 
SECTION I367 must be recalled in relation to detention of unaccompanied minors or of 
accompanied minors. In both cases the detention of children was deemed contrary to 
article 3 and article 5 § 1 ECHR on the basis of the conditions of detention and a lack of 
relationship between the ground for deprivation of liberty and the place and conditions of 
detention. 
 
Regarding the conditions of the detention, detained asylum seekers should in principle 
benefit from the application of minimum standards of the reception directive including 
protective standards for vulnerable asylum seekers. This is not the case in many MS. The 
reason is twofold: on the one hand 9 Member States consider that the reception directive in 
force does not apply to detained asylum seekers, on the other hand, many MS have not 
implemented the procedure of identification of vulnerable asylum seekers. 
 
The reception directive Commission proposal substantially improves the consideration of 
these issues even if it raises a question. However the text of the Council operates a setback 
in his consideration of these issues. 
                                                 
367 ECtHR, Mubilanzila Mayeke et Kaniki Mitunga. 
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2. THE ARTICLE 11 § 5 OF THE RECEPTION DIRECTIVE 
PROPOSAL (TEXTS OF THE COMMISSION AND THE 
PARLIAMENT) 
 
PROBLEM: the putting in place of an individual examination whose modalities for 
implementation must be defined differently.  
 
Article 11 § 5 of the reception directive Commission proposal states that "Persons with 
special needs shall not be detained unless an individual examination of their situation by a 
qualified professional certifies that their health, including their mental health, and well-
being will not significantly deteriorate as a result of detention”. 
 
The wording of § 5 implies that only will be subject to individual examination asylum 
seekers who have previously been identified as having special needs pursuant to article 21 
of the proposal. To subject the implementation of this individual examination to the 
implementation of another procedure is not in conformity with the objective pursued by 
article 11 § 5.  
 
Insofar as the objective of article 11 § 5 is to prevent the detention of people whose health 
could be seriously affected as a result of this detention it seems important that this 
individual examination  can be carried out quickly following the detention. Therefore, to 
subject   the implementation of this individual examination to the implementation of 
another procedure does not seem wise. Indeed, although article 21 provides that States 
should set out procedures of identification to verify whether the asylum seeker has special 
needs or not soon after the application has been lodged, shorter or longer laps of time can 
potentially occur between the detention and the assessment referred to in article 21, 
depending on the circumstances.  
 
SOLUTION: 
 
The article 11 § 5 of the reception directive proposal shall be amended. 
 
It is recommended not to subject the implementation of individual examination provided for 
in article 21 to the implementation of another procedure and to put any person in detention 
through this individual examination.  
3. THE ARTICLE 11 § 5 OF THE RECEPTION DIRECTIVE 
PROPOSAL (TEXTS OF THE COUNCIL) 
 
PROBLEM: the principle of the protective provision of the Commission has been maintained 
but the implementation of the individual examination has been deleted  
 
The text of the Council maintains the principle that applicants with special needs cannot be 
held if the detention is likely to seriously damage their health including their mental health 
(the reference to the well being has been suppressed). The text of the Council has deleted 
the individual examination by a qualified and independent professional to assess the 
asylum seeker's state of health. Failing to set up an examination to assess the asylum 
Setting up a Common European Asylum System:  
Report on the application of existing instruments and proposals for the new system 
 271 
seeker's health, the protective provision is likely to remain a dead letter, as has been 
repeatedly stressed about article 17 of the reception directive in force.  
 
SOLUTION: 
 
The principle of the implementation of an individual assessment must be maintained.  
 
As stated in Section 2, Box SOLUTION above, it is recommended not to subject the 
implementation of individual examination provided for in article 21 to the implementation of 
another procedure and to put any person in detention through this individual examination.  
4. THE RECEPTION DIRECTIVE PROPOSAL (TEXTS OF 
THE COMMISSION, OF THE PARLIAMENT, OF THE 
COUNCIL) 
 
PROBLEM: the issue relative to the application of principle of the reception directive 
proposal to detained asylum seekers. 
 
The problem has been stated in Title 9 of SECTION I. Whenever a doubt may remain 
regarding the application of principle of the directive to asylum seekers in detention, 
detained applicants may be deprived of the minimum standards of the directive which 
include provisions for protecting vulnerable people. In particular, article 21 could not be 
applied to them and therefore they could be deprived of adequate reception conditions.  
 
SOLUTION: 
 
See Title 9, Box SOLUTION, SECTION I: it is recommended to add a provision explicitly 
stating the application of principle of the directive to asylum seekers in detention368. Some 
further clarification should also be made as has been pointed out in Title 5. 4 of SECTION I 
in connection with article 15 (access to employment) for instance.  
5. CONCLUSIONS RELATED TO SECTIONS 2 AND 3 
 
The second generation of instruments proposed by the Commission contain new protecting 
provisions in favour of vulnerable asylum seekers. This is definitely positive. However, the 
above developments have highlighted the fact that the Commission did not often 
accompany these protective provisions by the means ensuring legal certainty. Ensuring 
legal certainty of these provisions inescapably involves the establishment of procedures. 
This raises the problem of the proliferation of tests, procedures, mechanisms … of 
assessment. 
 
The various actors working on the ground should be approached to consider the relevant 
ways of establishing links between these different procedures or between some them369. 
Thus if one consider article 20 of the asylum procedure directive of the Commission 
proposal on the other hand and article 11 § 5 of the reception directive of the Commission 
proposal one can wonder if a common medical examination could not be established for the 
purpose of serving the objectives of each of these two provisions. In both cases it is to rule 
                                                 
368  Unless otherwise specified, such as article 6 § 2 relating to the documents. 
369 Considering that it not always pertinent to establish links between certain procedures taking into 
account their specificities : see Title 2.3 (SECTION II, SUB SECTION II). 
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on the health of the applicant. In both cases the evaluation must take place soon after the 
application for international protection has been lodged. The medical examination may 
consist of two parts, one during which health state is examined for the purposes of article 
20 of the asylum procedure directive Commission proposal and another one for the 
purposes of article 11 § 5 of the reception directive Commission proposal. Such reflection 
seems essential for the sustainability of the CEAS. 
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KEY FINDINGS 
1. THE DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS 
 
– The very principle of detention of asylum seekers is not in itself contrary to 
international law.  
 
– The legal debate relating to the detention of asylum seekers does not question the 
principle of the detention itself but the substantive conditions of the detention 
(including the reasons for detention), the procedural guarantees and the framing of 
the conditions of detention. 
 
– The provisions relating to detention of asylum seekers currently in force are 
inadequate. They leave considerable discretion to Member States and lead to a large 
disparity of practices within the Union. Such a diversity of practices does not meet 
the objective to harmonize national legal frameworks through minimum standards, 
as part of the first phase of the CEAS.  
 
– The new detention regime proposed by the European Commission in the second-
generation instruments, in particular the reception proposal, beyond all doubt 
contributes to improve EU harmonization.  
 
– The principle of an exhaustive list of grounds for detention proposed by the 
Commission in the second-generation instruments should be followed. It is likely to 
ensure a fair balance between the right of states to fight against illegal immigration 
and the right to freedom of asylum seekers subject to some adjustment.  
 
– The fifth ground of detention proposed by the Council in the reception directive 
proposal cannot be accepted in that it does not strike a fair balance between the 
right of states to fight against illegal immigration and the right to freedom of asylum 
seekers.  
 
– Regarding the choice of grounds for detention a compromise between the text of the 
Council and the European Commission must be considered and is recommended.  
 
– The procedural safeguards and conditions of detention proposed by the reception 
directive Commission of the second generation are generally consistent with 
international law subject to one or another aspect requiring an amendment. 
 
– Detention of asylum seekers is based on the specific legal framework for asylum and 
not on the legal regime of detention for removal. Consequently, the duration of the 
detention of asylum seekers under the special scheme for asylum falls outside the 
calculation of the maximum period of detention permitted by the return directive. 
The duration of the detention of asylum seekers under the special scheme for 
asylum is therefore added to the maximum term provided for the return directive. 
This legal consideration should encourage the EU legislator to consider setting a 
maximum period of detention subject to special rules for asylum even if, given the 
diversity of national legal frameworks in the field, a consensus on this question will 
not be easy to find.  
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– The application of the principle of the reception directive proposal to asylum seekers 
in detention remains debatable. Currently a number of States consider the reception 
directive in force does not apply to detained asylum seekers. Even if the drafting of 
the reception directive Commission proposal has lowered down the risk of divergent 
interpretations it has not completely lifted it.  
2. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT OF THE VULNERABLE 
ASYLUM SEEKERS WITH SPECIAL NEEDS 
 
– The reception directive in force is the only EU first generation instrument focusing 
specifically on taking into account the situation of vulnerable asylum seekers with 
special needs.  
 
– The Dublin regulation in force is silent on the subject and the procedure directive 
mentions the taking into account the potential vulnerability of the asylum seeker 
only very marginally.  
 
– The asylum procedure directive Commission proposal and the Dublin regulation 
Commission proposal contrast with this inventory. In both drafts, specific provisions 
devoted to vulnerable asylum seekers are now mentioned. 
 
– When the reception directive in force includes several provisions relating to the 
taking into account of the situation of vulnerable asylum seekers several reports370 
however highlighted the failure of many Member States to transpose and/or 
implement those provisions. This is explained partly by the fact that the provision 
that states the general principle of taking into account the situation of vulnerable 
asylum seekers and identifying them (article 17) is written in such a way that this 
provision does not expressly comply the Member States to establish a procedure of 
identification of these applicants. 
 
– The reception directive Commission proposal solves the problem since the new 
article 21 lays down very clearly the obligation of the States to establish 
identification procedures to assess the individual situation of every applicant for 
asylum in order to ascertain whether he has special needs or not.  
 
– The temporal dimension of article 21 of the reception directive Commission 
proposal, however, must be better defined to allow the identification of vulnerable 
people throughout the procedure.  
 
– The reception directive Commission proposal also raises a conceptual problem. This 
conceptual problem is the issue of the identification of persons and special needs 
that is meant to be aimed at. As formulated, the conceptual dimension of article 21 
makes its interpretation and its application uncertain. 
 
– The text of the reception directive Council proposal may in no case be accepted in 
relation to article 21. This text adopts two distinct concepts without establishing any 
link between them, which makes the interpretation and application of this provision 
more than ambiguous.  
                                                 
370  Among other: Commission Report, RCD, Title 3. 5, pages 9 and 10 and Odysseus Report, Q. 30 et Q. 
31,   pages 84 à 98. Déjà cité dans la Section I relative à la détention.  
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– The texts of the asylum procedure directive Commission proposal and the Dublin 
regulation Commission proposal include new protecting provisions for the benefit of 
vulnerable people with special needs. These proposals should, as such, be fully 
approved. 
 
– Two major shortcomings must however be noted. First the absence (or inadequacy) 
of coordination between the different instruments of the second generation when 
they approach the problem of vulnerable asylum seekers. Regarding the second 
shortcoming, the new provisions of the asylum procedure directive Commission 
proposal and the Dublin regulation Commission proposal can be compared with 
article 17 of the reception directive into force. Indeed, as article 17 of the reception 
directive into force these provisions provide protective measures for the benefit of 
asylum seekers with special needs without, however, complying the States to 
establish the mechanism of identification of these people. This absence of express 
provision creates a legal uncertainty.  
 
– The qualification directive Commission proposal contains a protecting provision for 
the benefit of the vulnerable asylum seekers. Its wording is identical to article 17 of 
the reception directive in force. This formulation raises the problem of the absence 
of an explicit obligation imposed on States to establish of an identification 
procedure. 
3. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT OF THE VULNERABLE 
ASYLUM SEEKERS WITH SPECIAL NEEDS IN 
DETENTION 
 
– The state of EU law does not oppose the principle of detention of vulnerable asylum 
seekers that is not contrary to international law. 
 
– The absence of prohibition of the principle of the detention of vulnerable persons 
does not mean that their detention will be deemed legal and not arbitrary in all 
circumstances. More likely than for other persons, the judge will draw his attention 
on the fact that the detention is not illegal or arbitrary and that the conditions of 
detention do not violate international standards. 
 
– Regarding the conditions of detention, the detained asylum seekers should in 
principle benefit from the application of the minimum standards of the reception 
directive including protecting standards in favour of vulnerable applicants. This is 
not the case in many Member States. The reason is twofold: On the one hand, some 
Member States consider that the reception directive in force does not apply to 
asylum seekers in detention and on the other hand, many Member States have not 
implemented the procedure of the identification of vulnerable asylum seekers. 
 
– The reception directive Commission proposal significantly improves the 
consideration of these issues. 
 
– In addition, a specific provision has been made by the Commission in the reception 
directive. This provision aims to prevent the deprivation of liberty of persons whose 
mental or physical health state could be seriously affected as a result of a detention. 
This provision provides for the establishment of an individual examination to assess 
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to what extent the applicant's health condition could be seriously affected as a result 
of detention. In this proposal the Commission must be followed. One of the 
modalities of the individual examination must be reformulated. 
 
– The text of the Council operates a decline since it has deleted the reference to 
individual examination provided by the Commission. This change may undermine 
the effective implementation of the principle. The text of the Council cannot 
therefore be upheld. 
4. ELEMENTS RELATING TO VULNERABLE ASYLUM 
SEEKERS WITH SPECIAL NEEDS COMMON TO TITLES 
2 AND 3 
 
– The instruments of second generation proposed by the Commission contain new 
protecting provisions for the benefit of vulnerable asylum seekers. This is definitely 
positive. However, the Commission has not often matched those protective 
provisions with the means to ensure legal certainty. Ensuring legal certainty of these 
provisions inescapably involves the establishment of procedures. 
 
– This raises the problem of the proliferation of tests, procedures, mechanisms ... of 
evaluation. The various actors on the ground must be approached to consider the 
possibilities of establishing relevant links between these different procedures or 
between some of them. Such reflection seems essential for the sustainability of the 
CEAS.  
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. THE DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS 
 
– Article 8 § 2 of the reception directive Commission proposal: three of the four 
grounds of detention must be reformulated. A fifth reason for detention must be 
added to ensure a compromise between the text of the Commission and the text of 
the Council that cannot be accepted. An amendment is recommended to keep a fair 
balance between the right of states to fight against illegal immigration and the right 
to freedom of asylum seekers.  
 
– Article 9 of the reception directive proposal, texts of the Commission, of the 
Parliament and the Council: some safeguards for detained asylum seekers should be 
amended: 
 
o Article 9 § 2: The administrative authority responsible for ordering the detention 
must be clearly defined 
o Article 9 § 2: The judicial review of the administrative decision of detention must 
take place speedily.  
o Article 9 § 4: The applicant's right to be informed of the reasons for his detention "in 
a language he understands" must be adopted. 
 
– Article 9 § 4 of the reception directive proposal, texts of the Commission, of the 
Parliament and the Council: the question of the possible setting of a maximum 
duration of detention should be discussed. In any event, it is recommended to: 
 
o Strengthen the judicial review of detention by giving its monitoring not to ordinary 
courts generally unfamiliar with the specifications of asylum but the specialized 
courts in the field of asylum371.  
o Provide that asylum seekers in detention should always benefit from a priority 
procedure and not even an accelerated procedure. 
 
– Article 10 § 4 of the reception directive proposal, text of the Council: remove the § 
4, indent a) and b) allowing the derogatory accommodation conditions which may 
come into conflict with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the derogatory conditions 
relating to information at the border or transit zones.  
 
– The reception directive proposal, texts of the Commission, the Parliament and the 
Council: it is recommended to add a provision explicitly stating the application of 
principle of the reception directive Commission proposal to asylum seekers in 
detention372. Some further clarification should also be made in connection with 
Article 15 (access to employment).  
 
– Article 27 §§ 5 to 12 of the Dublin regulation proposal, texts of the Commission, the 
Parliament and the Council: to prevent the scattering of provisions relating to 
detention of asylum seekers in instruments of the second generation it shall be 
                                                 
371  Such an appeal court specialised in asylum provided that the national constitutional framework allows 
it. 
372  Unless otherwise specified, such as Article 6 § 2 relating to the documents. 
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referred to the safeguards provided in article 9 of the reception directive 
Commission proposal and §§ 5-11 of article 27 shall be deleted. In addition § 12 of 
article 27 should be reworded.  
 
– Article 22 § 2 the procedure directive proposal, texts of the Commission and of the 
Parliament: to prevent the spread of provisions relating to detention of asylum 
seekers in the various instruments second generation, § 2 of article 22 shall be 
deleted.  
2. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT OF THE SITUATION OF 
VULNERABLE ASYLUM SEEKERS WITH SPECIAL 
NEEDS  
 
– Article 21 § 2 of the reception directive proposal, texts of the Commission and the 
Parliament: the obligation for the States to establish a procedure for identifying 
vulnerable asylum seekers: the temporal dimension for assessing the situation of 
the asylum seeker must be better defined to allow the identification of vulnerable 
people throughout the asylum procedure.  
 
– Article 21 of the reception directive proposal, texts of the Commission and the 
Parliament: the conceptual dimension - or who is to be defined and/or what is to be 
defined) as formulated in article 21 creates an uncertainty as to its interpretation 
and its application. This text should be amended.  
 
– Article 21 of the reception directive proposal, text of the Council: the wording of the 
conceptual and procedural dimension retains two separate concepts, without 
establishing any link between them which makes the interpretation and application 
of this provision more than ambiguous. This section shall in no case be accepted.  
 
– Article 2, indent d) of the asylum procedure directive Commission proposal: the 
definition of applicants with special needs is unclear. The categories of persons to be 
protected must be defined more precisely.  
 
– Article 20 of the asylum procedure directive proposal, text of the Commission: the 
provision does not require States to establish a procedure for identifying applicants 
with special needs. This lack of obligation could result in the inapplicability of the 
protective provisions contained therein. The states should be complied to set out an 
identification procedure.  
 
– Article 20 § 2 of the asylum procedure directive proposal, text of the 
Commission makes an unclear reference to the article 21 of the reception directive 
Commission proposal: this § 2 must be clarified to fit the exact purpose and content 
that the Commission intends to give.  
 
– Article 30, § 1, in fine of the Dublin regulation proposal, texts of the Commission, of 
the Parliament and the Council: the lack of implementation of a medical examination 
to assess whether the applicant is fit or not fit for transfer must be bridged.  
 
– Article 20 §§ 3 and 4 of the qualification directive proposal, text of the Commission: 
the provision stating the general principle of the taking into account of the specific 
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situation of vulnerable persons is drafted as article 17 of the reception directive into 
force. It should be modified.  
3. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT OF THE SITUATION OF 
VULNERABLE ASYLUM SEEKERS WITH SPECIAL 
NEEDS IN DETENTION  
 
– Article 11 § 5 of the reception directive proposal, texts of the Commission and the 
Parliament: the modalities of implementation of the new individual examination shall 
be defined differently.  
 
– Article 11 § 5 of the reception directive proposal, text of the Council: removal of 
individual examination by the Council cannot be accepted.  
 
– The reception directive proposal, texts of the Commission, the Parliament and of the 
Council: recall of the issue of the application of principle of the reception directive 
proposal to asylum seekers in detention: it is recommended to add a provision 
explicitly stating the application of principle of the reception directive proposal to 
asylum seekers in detention373. Some further clarification should also be made in 
connection with Article 15 (access to employment) as instance.  
4. FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS COMMON TO PARTS 2 
AND 3 RELATING TO VULNERABLE ASYLUM SEEKERS 
WITH SPECIAL NEEDS 
 
– Relating to the problem of the proliferation of tests, procedures, mechanisms ... of 
evaluation, the various actors on the ground must be approached to consider the 
possibilities of establishing relevant links between these different procedures or 
between some of them. Such reflection seems essential for the sustainability of the 
CEAS 
 
                                                 
373  Unless otherwise specified, such as article 6 § 2 relating to the documents. 
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LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 
 
– Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for 
the reception of asylum seekers (reception directive in force) 
 
– Proposal of 3 December 2008 for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers 
(Recast), COM (2008) 815 final (reception directive Commission proposal or 
reception directive proposal/Text of the Commission) 
 
– European Parliament legislative resolution of 7 May 2009 on the proposal for a 
directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down minimum 
standards for the reception of asylum seekers (recast), COM (2008) 815 final 
(reception directive proposal amended by the Parliament or reception directive 
proposal/Text of the Parliament) 
 
– Text of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union addressed to the 
Asylum Working Party, 6 November 2009, 1595/0 (reception directive proposed by 
the Council or reception directive proposal/Text of the Council) 
 
– Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or 
as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the 
protection granted (qualification directive in force) 
 
– Proposal of 21 October 2009 for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country 
nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection and the 
content of the protection granted, COM (2009) 551 final, (qualification directive 
Commission proposal or qualification directive proposal/Text of the Commission) 
 
– Council Directive 2005/85/CE of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on 
procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing international protection 
(asylum procedure directive in force) 
 
– Proposal of 21 October 2009 for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and 
withdrawing international protection, (Recast), COM (2009) 554 final (asylum 
procedure directive Commission proposal or asylum procedure directive 
proposal/Text of the Commission) 
 
– Proposal of 1 September 2005 for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning 
illegally staying third-country nationals, COM (2005) 391 (return directive 
Commission proposal) 
 
– Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for 
returning illegally staying third-country nationals (return directive) 
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– Council Dublin Regulation EC/343/2003 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria 
and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an 
application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a 
third-country national or a stateless person (Dublin regulation in force) 
 
– Proposal of 3 December 2008 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member 
State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in 
one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, 
(Recast), COM (2008) 820 final (Dublin regulation Commission proposal or Dublin 
regulation proposal/Text of the Commission) 
 
– European Parliament legislative resolution of 7 May 2009 on the proposal for a 
Proposal of 3 December 2008 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member 
State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in 
one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, (Recast) 
(Dublin regulation proposal amended by the Parliament or Dublin regulation 
proposal/Text of the Parliament) 
 
– Text of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union addressed to the 
Asylum Working Party, 16 December 2009, 16929/08 (Dublin regulation 
proposal/Text of the Council). 
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CHAPTER 4: THE ASYLUM PROCEDURES DIRECTIVE (APD) 
SECTION 1: GENERAL REMARKS ON THE CONTEXT OF THE APD AND 
THE RECAST PROPOSAL 
 
The first part of this study is dedicated to general remarks on the political and the juridical 
context of the APD. It explains the specificity of the context of the APD (1.) and of the 
recast proposal (2.), while underlining their potential interaction with other current and 
recast European instruments (3.). The legal basis of the directive (4.) and the issues 
relating to its conformity with general international human rights law are also mentioned 
(5.). 
1. SPECIFICITY OF THE CONTEXT OF THE APD 
 
The option retained by the Commission374 and, it seems, also approved by the European 
Council375 and by the European Parliament376, is the maintenance of “national asylum 
systems” (at administrative level and at judicial level) that will be obliged to apply “a single 
asylum procedure comprising common obligatory guarantees”377, under the control of the 
European Court of Justice. An impact assessment has been done by the Commission378. A 
general study of the implementation of the Directive has also been carried out by the 
UNHCR379. The analysis here concerns only 12 Members States380, however, this large panel 
may be considered as representative of the general trends in all Member States. First of all, 
this study reveals the great diversity in the national legislation of the Member States which 
have transposed the directive, as well in the practices of the different competent authorities 
in the MS. This could be explained by the low level of the minimum common standards 
provided by the directive and by the weaknesses of these standards. The second part of the 
study contains numerous recommendations. Some of these relate to opportunity issues; 
which will not be dealt with here, as we are trying to put the emphasis on legal issues. We 
also refer to analyses provided by NGOs, experts, groups of administrative judges, and we 
have listed these documents at the end of this draft. 
                                                 
374  COM(2009) 262/4, par. 5.2., page 27 ; COM(2008) 360 final, par. 2, page 4. 
375  Document 13440/08, point IV(b).  
376  P6_TA(2009)0087), par. 4. 
377  In comparison with the concept of a ‘single procedure’ (which is an examination of both refugee and 
subsidiary protection status), it was provided in the Tampere conclusions (October 2009) to 
implement, in the longer term, a “common” asylum procedure in the European Community. It is not 
sure if these two concepts are equivalent. 
378  Such as was recalled by the Commission in the Expl. Memo. of its proposal to recast the “Asylum 
Procedures” Directive (COM(2009)554, p. 3), this Impact Assessment contains a detailed analysis of 
the problems identified in relation to this Directive and concerning the preparation carried out for its 
adoption, the identification and assessment of policy options and the identification and assessment of 
the preferred policy option. The Commission has also emphasized that it had a large amount of 
information at its disposal regarding the implementation of the Directive, including extensive 
information on the deficiencies concerning the terms of the Directive and the manner in which it is 
applied in practice. With the exception of the Green Paper and of the 89 contributions received during 
the public consultations, we have had no access to the large amount of information collected by the 
European Commission regarding the implementation of the current Directive (reports of the several(6) 
experts’ meetings organized by the Commission; transposition measures notified by States Members; 
external study conducted on behalf of the Commission; detailed questionnaires addressed by the 
Commission to all members States and to civil society stakeholders). 
379  UNHCR Study 2010. 
380  Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
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2. GENERAL COMMENTS: APD AND THE RECAST PRO-
POSAL 
 
In addition to the general authorization for each Member State (hereinafter: “MS”) to 
introduce or maintain “more favourable standards” (Article 5, APD), the number of 
available opportunities for each State to derogate from the ordinary procedure, the degree 
of the intensity of permissible derogations, which may be subject to challenge before the 
courts of law of the other Member States - and the variety of options for the Member 
States (Member State “may require”, “may provide”, “may determine”) results in a 
complex framework which allows Member States a wide margin of discretion and which 
may increase the suitability of the system to prolong the procedures regardless of the merit 
of a claim for international protection.  
 
As already observed, e.g. by the European Commission itself, the “Procedures Directive” 
provides for a variety of procedural standards rather than for a “standard procedure.” Thus, 
the regular procedure, which would normally be the common (unaccelerated) procedure, 
seems to be the exception, rather than the rule. 
 
This is due to the fact that during the torturous negotiations on the directive, Member 
States  successfully managed to include a large number of provisions which took into 
account their specific national rules and practices, and were also inspired by previous 
resolutions taken by the Council, such as the resolutions of London(1992) (“manifestly 
unfounded asylum applications” / “safe third countries” concept / ”safe country of origin 
concept”/....).This has led to a specific technique of the Procedures Directive leaving 
Member States a large amount of interpretative discretion and options to maintain their 
current national regulations. Therefore, the existing procedures of the Member States were 
maintained to a substantial degree381.  
 
The Directive provides ONE obligatory procedure (for which the basic principles and 
guarantees of Chapter II of the Directive are obligatory) and SEVEN discretionary 
procedures (for which it is possible to derogate from all/some of these principles and 
guarantees and for which some specific principles or guarantees may be applicable). The 
complexity of this system is evident. 
 
The Commission came to the conclusion that the Directive, as it is currently stands, lacks 
the potential to support adequately the Qualification Directive and to ensure a rigorous 
examination of applications for international protection in line with the international and 
community obligations of Member States regarding the principle of non-refoulement382.   
 
In recital (11) of the APD, the need for “prioritized” or “accelerated” procedures, in the 
context of a regular procedure, has been justified as follows: 
 
“It is in the interest of both Member States and applicants for asylum to decide as soon as 
possible on applications for asylum. The organization of the processing of applications for 
asylum should be left to the discretion of Member States, so that may, in accordance with 
their national needs, prioritize or accelerate the processing of any application, taking into 
account the standards in this Directive.”. 
 
                                                 
381  SEC(2009) 1377, No. 1 – p. 2. 
382  COM (2009) 554 final (Expl. Memo.), p. 2. 
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Whether “national needs” of Member States justify a proliferation of disparate procedural 
arrangements at national level is increasingly questioned. The consultation of government 
experts as well as practitioners providing legal advice to asylum applicants in national 
procedures organized by the Commission in preparation of its amended proposal indicated 
“a general consensus to achieving further harmonization of procedural arrangements and 
providing applicants for international protection with adequate guarantees thus insuring an 
efficient and fair examination of their claims, in line with the Qualification Directive”383.  
 
Member States, however, do not agree on the amount of changes necessary to achieve this 
purpose. While some Member States, in line with the Commission, plead for a substantial 
reduction of options to derogate from provisions of the Directive and for more consistent 
and uniform procedural rights of asylum seekers, other Member States emphasize the need 
to retain a certain degree of flexibility regarding the organization of asylum procedures and 
to maintain procedural arrangements by different procedures aimed at preventing abuse. 
Some Member States have also expressed their preference for increased cooperation rather 
than legislative amendments in order to address deficiencies of the present framework384.  
 
The survey of the existing proposals indicates the following basic options: 
 
– One option adopted by certain NGOs385, is to plead for the adoption of just one 
common examination procedure for all categories of applicants to which all 
procedural safeguards and guarantees envisaged in Chapter II of the Directive 
would apply equally. To achieve consensus on their option would seem to be 
unrealistic. There may indeed be a public interest which would justify the use of 
accelerated or specific procedures.  
 
– A second option is to revise the present procedural disparity by establishing a 
regular procedure which would be applicable to the large majority of all asylum 
applications. Derogations by way of special procedures would only be possible in 
particular situations which justify a deviation from the regular procedure due to 
clearly identifiable public and/or private interests involved. Such a public interest 
may be identified, for instance, in the case of repeated or multiple asylum 
applications, in the case of arrival of asylum seekers at airports, as well as in the 
case of (manifestly) unfounded applications in order to avoid the use of asylum 
procedures as a backdoor to immigration. 
 
It is assumed that the very fact that a large diversity in procedural rules exists, as well as 
the non-transparency and complexity of the existing procedural system leads to a delay in 
the examination of an asylum seeker’s claim for international protection. An improvement 
of the quality and speed of procedures may be achieved by the reduction of the number of 
accelerated or special procedures and the expedition of the ordinary asylum procedure, 
rather than the maintenance of a complex system of prioritized or accelerated procedure, 
specific procedures, procedures in case of inadmissible applications, etc.  although in recent 
years the average length of asylum procedures has clearly been reduced386. A simplification 
of procedural rules as well as a reduction of the availability of special procedures may 
contribute to a more transparent procedural system and thus to an acceleration of the 
asylum procedure. 
                                                 
383  COM (2009) 554 final (Expl. Memo.), p. 4. 
384  COM (2009) 554 final (Expl. Memo.), p. 4. 
385  ECRE, Information note 2006, p. 21. 
386  The Commission assumes an average duration of procedures at first instance in Member States of six 
months (COM (2009) 554 Annex, p. 13).  
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The UNHCR and various human rights organizations have criticized the APD as an 
instrument for downgrading protection levels. Although the argument that the APD has in 
fact resulted in a “race to the bottom” rather than setting standards reflecting best 
practices could not be confirmed in the evaluation of the Directive’s transposition by 
Member States387, it is largely acknowledged that the provisions currently in force do not 
exhaust the potential to ensure fair and efficient examination, instrumental in ensuring 
reliable determinations in line with the Qualification Directive. Frequently, the vagueness of 
procedural guarantees for asylum seekers and the many opportunities to deviate from 
procedural standards in connection with substantial gaps on the precise amount of 
procedural rights, present barriers to the creation of a Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS) based upon a uniform refugee status valid throughout the European Union. A larger 
uniformity in procedural standards, however, is also required to improve the efficiency of 
the procedural systems and to prevent abuse. In addition, the evaluation process has 
identified a serious deficiency in the absence of more precise procedural guarantees for 
vulnerable applicants.  
 
Some of the procedural instruments used by Member States have provoked particular 
criticism. Frequent criticisms are aimed at the abandonment or, at least, the restriction of 
concepts like the “internal protection alternative”, “safe country of origin” and “safe third 
country”388. A “culture of disbelief” in the regular procedure is particularly denounced, as 
MS should seek to provide fair and efficient determinations which render justice to the 
protection principles. A more moderate approach by the UNHCR also criticizes the lack of a 
coherent approach in achieving a common procedure of high quality and guaranteeing 
proper access to protection systems. Subjects most frequently mentioned in this context 
are access of decision-makers to objective and reliable countries of origin-information, 
improvement of the quality of procedural systems by better training, giving particular 
attention to vulnerable asylum applicants and providing for special rules in case of 
particular pressures389. NGOs frequently urge for further harmonization by restricting 
Member States’ discretion at the second stage of EU legislation on procedures. In their 
view, standards should be raised, including such rights as a right to legal assistance, a 
suspensive right of appeal, sufficiently staffed and trained decision-making authorities and 
an emphasis on high quality first-instance decisions with negative decisions being fully 
reasoned so as to reduce the need for appeals390. 
 
The guiding principles of the recast proposal are: 
 
1. The European Commission, after having emphasized the fact that the current 
minimum standards are insufficient and vague – thus lacking the potential to 
ensure fair and efficient examination391, has indicated that its amendments to the 
APD are primarily aimed at: 
 
– the setting up of a single asylum procedure for both forms of international 
protection provided by the qualification directive; 
– establishing obligatory procedural safeguards; 
– accommodating the particular system of mixed arrivals; 
– enhancing gender equality in the asylum process; 
                                                 
387  Impact assessment, p. 23. It has recently been referred to as a “downward harmonization” (V. TURK, “The 
CEAS”, p. 3). 
388  ECRE, Information note 2006, p. 5, 22, 24, 27 and 28; ECRE, Green Paper 2007, p. 10; ECRE, 
Memorandum 2010, No. 2.4. – p.7. 
389  See COM (2006) 67 final. 
390  See for instance ECRE, June 2001. 
391  COM (2009) 554 final (Expl. Memo.), p. 4. 
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– and providing for additional safeguards for vulnerable applicants392.  
 
2. In its recast proposal393, the Commission has made the following suggestions to 
ensure higher and more coherent standards and to deliver robust determinations 
at first instance: to facilitate a consistent application of the asylum acquis and to 
simplify applicable arrangements; to clarify the scope of the Directive the 
proposal provides for a single procedure, thus making clear that applications 
should be considered in the light of both forms of international protection(refugee 
status and subsidiary protection status) set out in the “Qualification Directive”;. 
the Commission also suggests that the procedural principles and guarantees set 
out in the APD should apply to applicants who are subject to procedures pursuant 
to the Dublin Regulation in the second Member State394.  
 
3. With regard to access to procedures, the proposal should include territorial waters 
in the scope of the Directive and specify the obligations of border guards, police 
and personnel of detention facilities. The Commission also suggests a time limit 
for completing formalities related to the lodging of an application and introducing 
guarantees enabling de facto asylum seekers to articulate their request. 
 
4. Special emphasis is put on an increase of the procedural rights in asylum 
procedures reducing exceptions to procedural principles and guarantees such as 
the possibility of omitting a personal interview, the right to free legal assistance 
and special guarantees for vulnerable asylum applicants. The Commission has 
observed that this would reduce the risk of the annulment of decisions of first 
instance by the appeal bodies395.  
 
5. In order to achieve higher consistency and simplification, the Commission 
suggests the deletion or modification of a number of notions and devices hitherto 
contained in the Directive such as the notion of a minimum common list of safe 
countries of origin, as well as the consolidation of the common objective criteria 
for the national designation of third countries as safe countries of origin. The 
present arrangements for accelerated procedures are to be replaced by a limited 
and exhaustive list of grounds for an accelerated examination of manifestly 
unfounded applications. At the same time, the proposal intends to safeguard 
special rules on the processing of abusive or fraudulent claims by introducing an 
obligation for applicants to cooperate with the competent authorities. With regard 
to procedures at first instance, the Commission suggests time limits of six months 
to improve the efficiency of examinations and the obligatory introduction of a 
single determining authority.  
 
6. With regard to access to an effective remedy, the proposal provides for a full and 
ex-nunc-review of first instance decisions by a court or tribunal in connection with 
automatic suspensive effect of appeals against first instance decisions, subject to 
limited exceptions396. 
 
                                                 
392  COM (2008) 360/3, at p. 5. 
393  COM (2009) 554 final (Expl. Memo.). 
394 This means that the notion of implicit withdrawal of applications should not be an obstacle for applicants to 
re-access asylum procedures in the responsible Member State. 
395  In a recent study, the UNHCR has also observed that the quality of the first instance procedures would  
contribute to avoiding the current situation where many refugees in Europe are recognized only following 
an appeal process (UNHCR Study 2010, p. 88). 
396  COM (2009) 554 final (Expl. Memo.), p. 6-8. 
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3. POSSIBLE INTERACTION BETWEEN APD AND OTHER 
EUROPEAN INSTRUMENTS OF THE FIRST GENERA-
TION OF CEAS 
 
When making proposals of amendments on the APD or making a proposition for a new 
Directive, it is also necessary: 
 
– to emphasize the possible inconsistencies between the “Dublin Regulation” and APD 
as well as with the “Reception Conditions Directive” “Qualification Directive” and the 
“Return Directive”397; 
– to take into account what has already been proposed by the Commission, by the 
Parliament or by the Council regarding some procedural provisions of the above-
mentioned Directives or Regulations398. 
 
Some provisions of the recast proposal refer also to provisions of the other redrafted 
instruments. This reinforces the necessity to examine the recast program as a whole to 
avoid disparities in standards, notions or devices. 
 
Indeed in this regard, the European Commission has recently observed, in its explanatory 
memorandum of the recast proposal of the Directive,399 that the APD lacks the potential to 
support adequately the “Qualification Directive”. It has therefore, decided to propose the 
procedural guarantees and notions which are instrumental in ensuring reliable 
determinations in line with the “Qualification Directive”400 and with the “Dublin 
Regulation”401. Thus, with the aim of facilitating consistent application of the different 
asylum instruments, the proposal of the Commission: 
 
– provides for a single procedure for both forms of international protection set out in 
(the recast proposal of) the “Qualification Directive”  with a view to ensure 
consistency with the “Qualification Directive”402; 
– adapts some provisions to ensure consistency with the “Qualification Directive”403 
and with the “Reception Conditions Directive”404; 
                                                 
397  In the same sense: UNHCR, Green Paper, 2007, p. 20. For instance: 
 some provisions of the “Qualification Directive”  also concern procedural rules and the failure of the 
applicant to comply with the obligations provided by these provisions without good reasons (articles 
4(1) and (2), 11 (2) (a) and 20 (1) of the directive) which can lead to the application of a prioritized or 
accelerated procedure (article 23 (4) (k) APD);  
 another example is provided by article 13 (4) of the “Return Directive” which concerns the right to 
(free) legal assistance and/or representation to the conditions as set out in article 15 (3) to (6) APD; 
 concerning the “STC” concept and the requirement of a connection with the country concerned based on 
“close family relations”, compare article 27 (2) (a), APD and article 32 (2) (e), recast proposal with 
article 11, Dublin Regulation II. 
398  For a presentation of the different proposals of the Commission to amend the legislative instruments of the 
first stage of the CEAS, see Commission Press release, October 2009. 
399  COM (2009) 554 final – Expl. Memo., No. 1.1. – p. 2. 
400  COM(2009) 554 final – Expl. Memo., No. 2 – p. 4. 
401  COM(2009) 554 final – Expl. Memo., No. 3.1.1. – p. 5. 
402  It also expressly referred to the “Qualification Directive” in several recitals of the recast proposal (see, for 
an example, new recital (11) (current recital (6).    
403  See, for example, the amended definition of an “unaccompanied minor” , envisaged in Article 2 (m), recast 
proposal, which was expressly modified to ensure consistency with the “Qualification Directive” (COM(2009) 
554 Annex (Det. Expl.), Article 2 (m) – p. 2) or the prohibition on extraditing an applicant for asylum to 
his/her country of origin, to ensure coherence with the provisions of the Qualification Directive concerning 
the exclusion clauses (Ibidem, Article 8 – p. 6). 
404  For example, the exemption of unaccompanied minors from the border procedure (Article 21 (6), recast 
proposal) is justified by the Commission’s proposal for the “Reception conditions Directive” which maintains 
that those minors must not be detained (COM(2009) 554 Annex (Det. Expl.), Article 21 – p. 12). 
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– and makes it clear that the procedural principles and guarantees set out in the APD 
also apply to applicants who are subject to procedures pursuant to the “Dublin 
Regulation” in the second Member State405. Furthermore, even if the APD does not 
deal with procedures between Member States governed by the “Dublin Regulation”, 
applicants to whom this Regulation applies should enjoy access to the basic 
principles and guarantees set out in the APD and to the special guarantees pursuant 
to the Regulation406. The application of the suspensive effect of the judicial review, 
such as was foreseen by Article 41 (5) to (7), recast proposal is also made with 
Article 26 of the recast “Dublin Regulation”407. 
 
The Commission has also stated that higher and more harmonized standards on asylum 
procedures are necessary in order to ensure that asylum seekers who are subject to the 
Dublin procedures have their applications examined under equivalent conditions in different 
Member States408. In the view of the Commission, this should limit the phenomenon of 
secondary movements of asylum seekers amongst Member States, “to the degree that such 
movements are generated form divergent procedural arrangements”409. 
4. LEGAL BASIS OF THE PROPOSAL OF THE 
COMMISSION 
 
The Commission’s proposal relating to asylum status has been based upon Art. 63, par. 1, 
point (1)(d), of the EC Treaty, while the amendments dealing with procedural standards 
relating to subsidiary protection status were based on Art. 63, par. 1, point (2)(a) of the EC 
Treaty. As a consequence, the Commission has not proposed the modification of the title of 
the APD which deals with “minimum” standards on procedure410. Since the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty, the Parliament and the Council are no longer limited to enacting 
“minimum” standards, but may adopt measures with respect to a CEAS including common 
procedures for granting and withdrawing refugee status. It is suggested that the notion of 
“common procedures” in comparison to “minimum” standards implies a higher degree of 
regulatory power of the Union. Therefore, in principle, no legal objection can be raised 
against the introduction of uniform rules in certain respects, provided that the principle of 
subsidiarity is complied with411. Whether the wording of Art. 78, par. 2, lit. e, would also 
include the transfer of responsibility of the Member States to a European asylum processing 
agency, is questionable. Considering the political realities, the option of a European 
processing system seems highly unlikely (see proposals long term). 
                                                 
405  It is underlined (COM(2009) 554 final – Expl. Memo., No. 3.1.1. – p. 5) that the notion of implicit 
withdrawal of applications should not be an obstacle for applicants to re-access asylum procedures in the 
responsible Member State and that the proposal makes it clear that the procedural principles and 
guarantees  set out in the “Asylum Procedures Directive” also apply to applicants who are the subject to 
procedures pursuant to the Dublin Regulation in the second Member State. 
406  Recital (36) (current recital (29), APD adapted) and recital (37) (new), recast proposal.  
407  Article 41 (8), recast proposal. 
408  COM(2009) 554 final – Expl. Memo., No. 3.3 – p. 9. 
409   COM(2009) 554 final – Expl. Memo., No. 3.1. – p. 5. See also: recital (11) and (31), recast proposal ; 
Impact assessment, p. 8. 
410  See also new recital (10) recast proposal (current recital (5), APD) and article 1, recast proposal. 
411  This principle is expressly reaffirmed in recital (39) (new), recast proposal and means that some proposed 
provisions of the Commission are limited to require Member States to make “relevant” arrangements rather 
than introduce additional rights for third country nationals or stateless persons who have lodged an 
application for international protection(COM(2009) 554 annex(Det. Expl.), Article 7. 
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5. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK: COMPATIBIL-
ITY WITH CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
AND CJ AND ECTHR CASE LAW 
5.1. Control of the compatibility of the proposal with fundamental 
rights and general principles of EU Law. 
 
The explanatory memorandum412 mentions that the proposal has been subject to in-depth 
scrutiny with a view to ensuring that its provisions are fully compatible with fundamental 
rights flowing from general principles of Community law, which, themselves, are the result 
of constitutional traditions common to the Member States and the ECHR. They are also 
enshrined, moreover, in the EU Charter413, and include obligations stemming from 
international law, (in particular from the Geneva Convention, the European Convention on 
Human Rights and from the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,) such as, among 
others: better respect for the principle of non-refoulement; better access to protection and 
justice; enhancing gender equality; promoting the best interest of the child principle in 
national asylum procedures. 
 
It is also suggested that the proposed amendments of the Commission are, to a large 
extent, informed by evolving case law of the European Court of Justice (CJ)414, which has 
developed principles such as the right to defence and to be heard415, the principle of 
equality of arms416 and the right to effective judicial protection417, and that the 
                                                 
412  COM(2009) 554 final - Expl. Memo., p. 9. 
413  In this sense, recital (13) (recital (8), APD), recast proposal: “In particular this Directive seeks to promote 
the application of Articles 1[right to human dignity], 18[right to asylum], 19[protection in the event of 
removal, expulsion or extradition], 21[non-discrimination principle], 24[right of the child] and 47[right to 
effective remedy and fair trial] of the Charter and has to be implemented accordingly”. It has to be noted 
that it does not refer to Article 41 of the Charter[right to good administration]. 
414  COM(2009) 554 final – Expl. Memo., p. 6. In the comments on Article 6 (recast proposal), it is also 
mentioned that several sets of guarantees are introduced with a view to enhancing access to examination 
procedures and to take into account the considerations of the CJ (Panayatova), which indicate that a 
procedural system for exercising a right to residence permit provided for in Community Law should be 
“easily accessible and capable of ensuring that the persons concerned will have their applications dealt with 
objectively and within a reasonable time”(COM(2009) 554 annex (Det. Expl.), Article 6). The proposal to 
set out a time limit for taking a decision (Article 27 (3) and (4), recast proposal is justified by the CJ 
findings (Panayatova) that decisions on residence permits taken on the basis of Community Law require a 
procedural system which makes it possible to take a decision within a reasonable period of time 
(COM(2009) 554 annex(Det. Expl.), Article 27). 
415  For this reason, the proposal of the Commission reduces the current opportunities for Member States to 
omit a personal interview by (qualified) personnel of the determining authority, “with the view to align the 
Directive with evolving case law of the European Court of Justice regarding the right to be heard” 
(COM(2009) 554 annex (Det. Expl.), Article 13), provides also the right to a personal interview before a 
decision is taken to consider an application as inadmissible (Article 30, recast proposal – See COM(2009) 
Annex (Det. Expl.), Article 30 – p. 14) and enables the person concerned, before the withdrawal of 
international protection status, to put forward his/her view with regard to the applicability of the cessation 
clauses in his/her particular circumstances (Ibidem, Article 39 – p. 18). 
416  The amendment to ensure that country of origin information must be made accessible to the applicant or 
his/her legal advisor “to the extent it has been used by the determining authority for the purpose of taking 
a decision on the application” is indeed considered necessary in the light of evolving jurisprudence of the CJ 
with regard to the right of defense (to be heard) and the principle of equality of arms (COM(2009) 
annex (Det. Expl.), Article 9). 
417  The amendment expressly specifies that the determining authority must state reasons in fact and in law in 
a decision rejecting the application’s refugee status, even if the subsidiary protection status has been 
recognized. This has been justified by the necessity to ensure that the applicant has access to an effective 
remedy in the context of a single examination procedure, in conformity with the principle of effective 
judicial protection of rights guaranteed by Community Law(COM(2009) 554 annex(Det. Expl.), Article 10). 
It has also to be recalled that, by virtue of Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, the administration has the obligation to give reasons for its decisions and that this obligation is 
considered as a guarantee for a more effective right to appeal. The amendment introducing access, without 
any limitations, to the information or sources in question available to the appeal authorities, is also justified 
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jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: “ECtHR”) was another 
key source of inspiration for developing further procedural safeguards for asylum 
applicants418. 
 
In this study we will ascertain if the proposed amendments of the Commission are, or are 
not, in conformity with the minimum standards set out by the case law of these Courts and 
try to emphasize what is required to be in conformity with those minimum standards. We 
will then look at what is already proposed or which may be proposed (which would be 
higher than those minimum standards) and which would, as a consequence, depend on a 
political decision of the Member States. As has already been observed in the comments on 
the Geneva Convention, it is fundamental to distinguish clearly between, on the one hand, 
arguments based on the existing state of public international law and EU Law leaving no 
discretion in legislative policy, and, on the other hand, between de lege ferenda and de lege 
lata suggestions419.  
 
As part of primary community law, the international legal framework for EU legislation in 
the area of asylum procedures includes the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 
1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 on the legal status of refugees, as well as the 
compliance with human rights as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and other human rights treaties to which the EU Member States have 
adhered to and to the common constitutional traditions of EU Member States420. In 
addition, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU will be obliged to 
comply with the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
 
We will consider the most relevant instruments which are as follows: the Geneva 
Convention; European Convention on Human Rights; Charter of the Fundamental rights and 
International Convention on the rights of the Child (CRC)421. 
5.2. The Geneva Convention (GC) 
 
The Geneva Convention does not contain any provisions on procedures nor does it establish 
an individual right to be granted asylum. The obligations of the contracting States, 
however, require under the principle of good faith, that States party to the Convention 
institute a formal procedure which allows for a fair and effective procedure, in order to 
determine who is entitled to the guarantees of the Convention422. This conclusion has found 
general acceptance, in particular with regard to the principle of non-refoulement as laid 
down in Art. 33 GC. It is undisputed that efficient protection against refoulement to a State 
persecuting a person for the reasons mentioned in Art. 1 A GC must involve a fair and 
efficient procedure. Fairness can generally be interpreted as meaning a procedure which 
provides a reasonable chance to an applicant for international protection to enforce his/her 
                                                                                                                                                            
by the necessity to take account of the evolving jurisprudence of both the CJ and the ECtHR regarding 
access to an effective remedy(COM(2009) 554 annex(Det. Expl.), Article 19). 
418  For an example, Article 8 recast proposal (current Article 7, APD) was modified to take into account the 
case law of the ECtHR(COM (2009) 554 annex(Det. Expl.), Article 8 – p. 6) and to expressly provide that an 
applicant for international protection cannot be surrendered or extradited to his/her country of origin as 
long as the determining authorities and, where applicable, a court or a tribunal has examined, in the first 
place, whether this applicant  qualifies for international protection pursuant to the “Qualification Directive”.   
419  In this regard we referred to a working document we completed to analyze and list –on the basis of the 
case law of the ECtHR and of the CJ among others - the possible criteria regarding fair procedures and an 
effective remedy.  
420  See Art. 6(3) TEU and article 78 (1) TFEU. 
421  Not analyzed here; see Section II, point 7. 
422  G.-S., GOODWIN-GILL, p. 165. 
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claim to protection. Fairness also implies that the asylum seeker within the procedure is 
given sufficient opportunity to present and to pursue a claim in the procedure.  
 
In the past few decades, numerous international and non-governmental agencies have 
analyzed and formulated general principles on asylum procedures. Prominent among them 
is the UNHCR with its handbook on procedures and criteria for determining refugee status 
of 1979 and a series of Executive Committee recommendations on the determination of 
refugee status (EXCOM Conclusions)423. These recommendations have set forth a basic 
agenda, comprising of guidance to applicants, the provision of competent interpreters, a 
reasonable time to appeal for formal reconsideration of a negative decision either to the 
same or different authority whether administrative or judicial, according to the prevailing 
system424. The UNHCR Executive Committee has also considered problems arising from 
manifestly unfounded or abusive applications and considered that special provision might 
be made for dealing with them in an expeditious manner. However, it also recognizes the 
substantive character of such decisions, the serious consequences of error, and the 
consequential need for appropriate procedural guarantees. It is recommended that the 
individuals affected receive a complete personal interview, that the decision has to be taken 
by an authority competent in asylum matters and that there should be always a review of 
negative decisions (possibly simplified) before rejection at the border or enforceable 
removal425. 
5.3. The European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) 
 
The ECHR does not contain any provisions on the examination of asylum claims. However, 
Art. 3 is interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR) as a 
prohibition on removing a person to a country in which he/she is facing a serious risk of 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In addition, Art. 13 grants a 
right to an effective remedy before a national authority to anyone whose rights and 
freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated426. 
 
On several occasions, the ECtHR therefore, has had to pronounce on the procedural 
relevance of these provisions relating to refugee procedures. Although the ECHR does not 
refer to refugee procedures in the sense of the Geneva Convention, the implications drawn 
by Art. 3 are relevant in practice to refugee procedures in the light of the aim of a single 
asylum procedure.  
 
From the ECtHR’s jurisprudence the following conclusions can be drawn: 
 
1. The prohibition of refoulement requires procedural precautions to assure a 
“meaningful assessment of the applicant’s claim, including its arguability”. In the 
case of Jabari, the Court had to decide on a Turkish regulation whereby 
applicants had to submit their asylum application to the police within five days of 
their arrival in Turkey. Persons entering Turkey illegally who did not apply to the 
Turkish authorities within five days of entry could not be accepted as a refugee. 
The Court came to the conclusion, that the applicant’s failure to comply with the 
five-day registration requirement denied her any scrutiny of the factual basis of 
her fears about being removed to Iran. The Court stated: “The automatic and 
mechanical application of such a short time limit for submitting an asylum 
                                                 
423  See UNHCR thematic compilation and Manual 2003. 
424  See EXCOM No. 8 (1977). 
425  See EXCOM No. 30 (1983). 
426  No comparable judicial mechanism exists for the application of the 1951 Geneva Convention. 
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application must be considered at variance with the protection of the fundamental 
value embodied in Art. 3 of the Convention”. 
 
2. Although all asylum seekers do not plead a risk of torture or bad treatment, the 
majority invoke such a risk in their applications. Since Article 3 enshrines one of 
the most fundamental values of a democratic society and prohibits in absolute 
terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, this 
necessitates the rigorous scrutiny of an individual’s claim that his or her 
deportation to a third country will expose that individual to treatment prohibited 
by Art. 3427. It is to be noted that the reasoning of the Court is based on the 
absolute nature of Art. 3, ECHR and its character as a fundamental value of a 
democratic society. 
 
This obligation is also grounded on article 3 of the Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)428, and 
article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights (ICPPR)429. 
 
3. These considerations cannot be referred to as refugee protection in the sense of 
the Geneva Convention. The details of whether different procedural standards 
relating to the required amount of scrutiny according to different legal bases for 
international protection may be legally admissible or feasible, do not need to be 
discussed in this context. The Court has basically applied similar standards of 
examination with regard to claims for protection under Art. 3, ECHR as Member 
States have applied with regard to refugee status. The responsibility of States is 
engaged if substantial grounds have been shown for believing that a person, if 
rejected or expelled, would face a real risk of either being persecuted for political 
reasons or subjected to treatment contrary to Art. 3, ECHR. For that reason, 
national authorities must make all reasonable efforts to examine a claim, while it 
is the responsibility of the applicant to show “substantial grounds” indicating a 
serious risk of persecution.  
 
4. When a violation of a provision of the ECHR is invoked, namely article 3 in the 
asylum context, and if an applicant can show an arguable claim, Art. 13, ECHR 
requires that an effective remedy is in place to challenge a decision whereby the 
application for international protection has been rejected. According to the Court’s 
jurisprudence, Art. 13 guarantees the availability at national level of a remedy to 
enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form 
they might happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. The effect of this 
Article is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy allowing the 
competent national authority both to deal with the substance of the relevant 
convention complained and to grant appropriate relief, although contracting 
States are afforded some discretion as to the manner in which they conform to 
their obligations under this provision. Moreover, in certain circumstances the 
aggregate of remedies provided by national law may satisfy the requirements of 
Art. 13430. 
 
                                                 
427  See judgment in the case ECtHR, Chahal, par. 73-74. 
428  CAT is expressly referred to in Annex II of the APD and in the recast proposal concerning the criteria 
to apply for the designation of “safe countries of origin”. 
429  ICCPR is expressly referred to in Annex II of the APD and in the recast proposal concerning the criteria 
to apply for the designation of “safe countries of origin”. 
430  ECtHR, Jabari, par. 43; Chahal, par. 145. 
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5. The national authority in charge of deciding the appropriate remedy must be 
able to deal with the substance of a convention complaint and to grant 
appropriate relief. In Jabari the Court seems to have connected this competence 
with a right to suspend the implementation of a decision and to have an 
examination of the merits of a claim431. The question of the efficiency of a 
remedy and suspensive effect was further developed in the Court’s judgment, 
Gebremedhin. In this case, the Court had to deal with a French rule whereby an 
applicant arriving at an airport, whose application had been rejected as 
manifestly ill-founded, could be removed without having had the opportunity to 
apply to OFPRA for asylum. An application to the administrative courts had no 
suspensive effect and was not subject to any time limits. The ECtHR notes that 
it was a requirement of Art. 13 that where a State party decided to remove a 
foreign national to a country where there was real reason to believe that he/she 
ran a risk of this nature, the person concerned must have access to a remedy 
with automatic suspensive effect (a remedy with such effect “in practice” was 
not considered as sufficient). However, this decision cannot be interpreted as 
implying a requirement of suspensive effect until a final determination of the 
case by an administrative court. It is clearly limited to an automatic suspensive 
effect for the time of the examination of a request for interim protection. Thus, 
an applicant cannot be removed until a court has had the opportunity to decide, 
at least under the form of an interim measure, on an application for protection. 
5.4. Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) of the European Union 
 
The most relevant articles referring to procedural issues are the following432: 
 
Article 18 of the Charter states that “The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due 
respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 
January 1967 relating to the status of refugees and in accordance with the Treaty 
establishing the European Community”. 
 
However, the legislative history of the provision as well as its wording indicate that the 
provision was drafted as a compromise in order to accommodate the concerns of some 
members of the Union who were afraid that the clause could be interpreted as an individual 
right to asylum. Therefore, the provision does not impose an obligation to grant asylum or 
a reciprocal individual right. The provision merely obliges Member States to “guarantee” a 
right of asylum. One has to distinguish between a refugee’s claim to asylum, which is 
recognized by Art. 18, and the obligation to grant asylum, that the CFR does not impose433. 
Therefore, it is at least doubtful whether Art. 18 implies further procedural implications as 
may be drawn from the Geneva Convention and Art. 13 ECHR.  
 
The clause, nevertheless, has the potential to produce diverse interpretations. In the 
academic discussion it is generally assumed that Art.18 implies a right of access to asylum, 
                                                 
431  ECtHR, Jabari, par. 49. 
432  The Charter will, however, not be applicable internally within the United Kingdom or Poland and will 
not establish individual rights in these countries according to the Protocol of the application of the 
Charter for Poland and the United Kingdom. It has also to be recalled that the provisions of the 
Charter also address _ the MS when they are implementing Union law (article 51.1.). In its Action Plan 
Implementing the Stockholm Program, the Commission has expressly highlighted that the CFR should 
become the compass for all EU law and policies and that the Commission will apply a “Zero Tolerance 
Policy” (Action Plan, p. 3). 
433  H. BATTJES, n° 150, p. 113. 
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that is, to a durable solution and appropriate secondary rights434. Other commentators 
imply from Art. 18 an obligation to grant protection ensuring that asylum may be 
effectively claimed and used435. 
 
Whether procedural implications regarding the application of the “safe third country” 
exception exist may be a matter of different interpretation. It is argued that Art. 18, 
guaranteeing a refugee’s right to asylum, implies the possibility of getting asylum and 
entitlement to the rights granted under the Geneva Convention. Therefore, since the 
existing procedural rules would allow for expulsion to a third country that may in turn expel 
an applicant to a fourth country, this would not be fully compatible with Art. 18436. 
 
It also has to be noted that the Commission has invoked the right to asylum enshrined in 
Article 18 CFR and the general principles of Community Law437, to justify its proposal to 
delete the current provisions of the APD allowing Member States to consider an application 
“inadmissible” where the applicant is allowed to remain in the Member State on some other 
grounds and consequently is granted a status equivalent to the rights and benefits of the 
refugee status by virtue of the “Qualification Directive”, or is allowed to remain in the 
territory pending the outcome of a procedure for the determination of such a status438.  
 
The CFR in Art. 19 (2) also prohibits removal, expulsion or extradition to a State where 
there is a serious risk that the person concerned would be subject to the death penalty, 
torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It is suggested that this 
provision basically incorporates the relevant case law from the ECtHR regarding Art. 3439. 
Therefore, procedural implications going beyond the existing state of public international 
law cannot be derived from this provision. 
 
Article 41 CFR, concerning the right to good administration, states that: 
 
“1. Every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, 
fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions and the bodies of the Union. 
2. This right includes: 
- the right of every person to be heard, before any individual measure which would affect 
him or her adversely is taken; 
- the right of every person to have access to his or her file, while respecting the legitimate 
interests of confidentiality and of professional and business secrecy; 
- the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its decisions”. 
 
If this right is to be considered, with regard to the case law of the CJ, as a fundamental 
right enshrined in the general principles of EU Law and protected by the Court, it will imply  
an obligation to provide for, or to respect, minimal procedural safeguards for the asylum 
procedures at first instance on the EU and  Member States440, even if such guarantees are 
                                                 
434  H. BATTJES, n° 152, p. 114.  
435  BERNSDORFF, in: MEYER (ed.), p. 253. 
436  H., BATTJES, n° 540, p. 435. 
437  COM(2009) 554 annex(Det. Expl.), Article 29 – p. 14. 
438  Compare Article 25, APD and Article 29, recast proposal. On this occasion, the Commission also 
recalled that “refugee status is a right conferred to individuals by the Community acquis” (COM(2009) 
554 annex(Det. Expl.), Article 29 – p. 14). 
439  See Explanatory Comments, Official Journal (2004), C 310, p. 437; see ECtHR, Soering; Cruz Varas, 
par. 69. 
440  See Article 51(1) CFR: “The provision of this Charter are addressed […] to the Member States […] 
when they are implementing Union law”. See. for some minimal requirements applicable to 
administrative procedures in general: CJ, Smits and Peerbooms, par. 90; CJ, Panayatova, par. 26-27 
(residence permit). 
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not, as such, required, de lege ferenda, by the GC, the ECHR and the case law of the 
ECtHR, or by other international Conventions, such as the CRC. In this regard, it can 
already be observed that the European Commission has expressly justified some of the 
provisions of its recast proposal on this basis441. 
 
Article 47 CFR provides also that anyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law 
of the Union have been violated, has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in 
compliance with the following conditions: 
 
1. each person is entitled to a fair and public hearing,  
2. within a reasonable time,  
3. by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law, 
4. each person shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented; 
5. and legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far 
as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice. 
 
Therefore, procedural guarantees providing for appeals procedures going beyond these 
minimal requirements cannot be adopted442. It also has to be noted that these conditions 
do not provide for an automatic suspensive effect during the examination of the request by 
the tribunal. This question has however, to be examined taking into account the evolving 
case law of the CJ and of the ECtHR, already mentioned above. 
 
Regarding the position adopted by the CJ443 and Article 47, CFR, the consequence is that 
Article 6, §1, ECtHR444 also has to be taken into account by the CJ, as a general principle of 
Community law, within its judicial scrutiny of the decisions of national authorities taken 
pursuant to the application of provisions of Community law, even in administrative 
proceedings, among other decisions regarding asylum or immigration claims. 
                                                 
441  For an example, the amendment of the Commission to reduce the current possibilities that exist for 
Member States to omit an applicant’s personal interview by the determining authority during 
procedures at first instance, has been expressly justified by the necessity to align the Directive with 
the evolving case law of the European Court of Justice regarding the right to be heard(COM(2009) 554 
annex(Det. Expl.), Article 13). In the same sense, the new provision concerning special rules on an 
admissibility interview has also been justified by the aim to guarantee the right to be heard, “in line 
with the general principles of Community Law”(COM(2009) 554 annex(Det. Expl.), Article 30). 
442  It is, for an example, affirmed in the Det. Expl. of the Articles of the recast proposal that the purpose 
of enabling Member States to apply a “test” before granting free legal assistance in appeal procedure 
before a court or a tribunal, is in line with Article 47 of the Charter (COM(2009) annex, Article 18). 
This has nevertheless, to be verified. 
443  H., BATTJES, Nos. 111, 159, 410 and 417-420.  
444  This provision has also inspired Article 47 CFR. 
Setting up a Common European Asylum System:  
Report on the application of existing instruments and proposals for the new system 
 299 
 
SECTION 2: WHAT BASIC PRINCIPLES AND GUARANTEES HAVE TO 
BE PROVIDED IN TERMS OF ACCESS TO THE PROCEDURES AND 
DURING THE COURSE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES? 
(ANALYSIS OF THE APD AND OF THE RECAST PROPOSAL) 
1. WHY OPT FOR A SINGLE PROCEDURE ENCOMPASS-
ING BOTH REFUGEE STATUS AND SUBSIDIARY 
PROTECTION? 
 
The recast proposal provides for the establishment of a single asylum procedure for both 
forms of protection445. The most obvious advantages of a single asylum procedure include: 
 
– such a procedure would make it easier for applicants to apply for protection.  
– higher efficiency in terms of saving both money and time.  
– an important deterrent to the practice of making abusive asylum claims ; 
– finally, a major advantage of a single procedure is its ability to promote a common 
European asylum system (CEAS) and a better application of the Dublin Regulation. 
An extension of the Dublin system would require not only a harmonization of the 
material standards on granting subsidiary protection, but also the harmonization of 
procedure, by way of introducing a single asylum procedure, which would enable 
every State to recognize (positive) decisions based upon a comprehensive 
assessment of protection grounds common to all EU Member States. 
 
In spite of the obvious advantages, there may be, on the other hand, some disadvantages 
such as the potential for a dilution of Convention refugee status446. To avoid this, one 
solution could be: 
 
– a predetermined sequence of examination, either based upon legal prescription or 
administrative rules, whereby a claim for protection on other humanitarian grounds 
is only examined in the case of a negative assessment of Geneva Convention 
grounds; and 
– giving precise reasons for rejecting a claim for Geneva Convention protection while 
granting another reason of protection, thereby enabling an appeal based upon the 
rejection of Convention status. 
 
These are precisely the proposals made by the Commission in its recast proposal447. 
                                                 
445  New Articles 2, (b), and 3, par. 1, recast proposal (with the deletion of current Article 3 (3), APD). 
446  The Commission has published statistics in its “Policy Plan on Asylum”, which suggest that Member 
States applying a single procedure have increasingly granted subsidiary protection status since the 
entry into force of the “Qualification Directive”.  
447  See: 1°) Article 9 (2), recast proposal in relation to a mandatory sequence for the examination of the 
claim; 2°) Article 10 (2), recast proposal in relation to the obligation to state the reasons to reject the 
recognition of refugee status and/or subsidiary protection status. 
 By virtue of current Article 9 (2), APD, Member States do not have to state the reasons for not 
granting refugee status where the applicant is granted a status which offers the same rights and 
benefits under national and Community law as the refugee status, but those reasons have to be 
stated in the applicant’s file and the applicant must have, upon request, access to his/her file. 
Moreover, by virtue of current Article 39 (5), APD, the applicant may be considered, in such a case, as 
having an effective remedy where a court or tribunal decides that the judicial remedy introduced by 
the applicant is inadmissible or unlikely to succeed on the basis of “insufficient interest” on the part of 
the applicant in maintaining the proceedings. This latest provision is not, as such, modified by the 
Commission in its recast proposal (Article 41 (10)).  
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For Member States who have provided other forms of protection, the question raised seems 
to be whether it is necessary or not to make clear the difference between both forms of 
international protection in the scope of the “Asylum Procedures Directive” and the other 
form of humanitarian (temporary or permanent) protection under national law with specific 
procedural guarantees: should these other “protection statutes” be examined or not in the 
scope of the Directive  and should it be mandatory or, should it be optional for Member 
States as is the case in the APD448 and in the recast proposal449 concerning other kinds of 
international protection,? 
2. RIGHT TO STAY DURING THE PROCEDURE AT FIRST 
INSTANCE (ARTICLE 7 (2) APD – ARTICLE 8 RECAST 
PROPOSAL) 
 
The exception to the right to remain during the first instance procedure, namely in case of 
extradition by a Member State, does not contain any safeguards to ensure the respect of 
principle of non-refoulement and the absolute protection against removal guaranteed by 
article 3 of the ECHR450. The case law of the ECtHR on this issue affirms this absolute 
character without any exception451. 
 
The recast proposal answers this criticism by adding a paragraph 3 referring to the 
international obligations of the Members States452. It states “A Member State may extradite 
an applicant to a third country pursuant to paragraph 2 only where the competent 
authorities are satisfied that an extradition decision will not result in direct or indirect 
refoulement in violation of international obligations of the Member State”. 
3. RIGHT TO BE INFORMED 
 
PROBLEM: in order to avoid refoulement of asylum seekers in situation of mixed arrivals453, 
border guards and immigration officials would benefit from training and clear instructions 
on how to respond to asylum application and how to handle the needs of vulnerable groups 
 
To avoid the applications being dealt with by unspecialized or incompetent authorities, the 
recast proposal aims to redraft article 4 identifying the responsible authorities. While 
current article 4 refers essentially to procedural safeguards, the new text adds guarantees 
of qualitative and quantitative capacities to those authorities. Article 4 of the recast 
proposal indeed obliges MS to provide initial and follow-up training programs for the people 
in charge of the examination of the applications and taking decisions on international 
protection. 
 
                                                 
448  Article 3, (4). 
449  Article 3, par. 3. 
450  The same obligation is deduced from article 3 CAT. 
451  ECtHR: Daoudi, par. 64; Al Saadoon and Mufhdi, par. 123; Saadi, par. 127 ; Ben Khemais, par. 53 ; 
O., par. 36 ; Sellem, par. 35 ; Soering ; Chahal. 
452  One exception remains in the recast proposal: the possibility to deprive the applicant of the right to 
remain when a new application is lodged after a final decision to reject a (first) subsequent application 
as “unfounded”; it means in case of third, fourth, …, application. On the procedural consequences of 
this exception, see infra. 
453  The accessibility of the asylum procedures, in particular at the borders or in transit zones, is indeed 
considered as a key pre-condition for ensuring respect of this principle (ECtHR, Gebrehmedin, par. 59-
67). 
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An exception remains for Dublin cases. This exception should be abolished because the 
application of the Dublin Regulation leads the determining authority to decide on the 
efficacy of the protection in another EU country. It is not only a technical and mechanical 
analysis but also an analysis of the compatibility of the decision of removal with 
international obligations like the Geneva Convention and the principle of non-refoulement, 
the compatibility of the reception conditions and human rights provisions… 
 
SOLUTION: Right of information of the applicant 
 
Article 7, recast proposal is a new provision dedicated to the applicant’s right of 
information, namely in critical zones like transit zones. The effective access to the 
procedure requires available and complete information from this right,. The most important 
point is the territorial applicability of this obligation of information. It has to be provided at 
the “(a) border crossing points, including transit zones, at external borders” and in “(b) 
detention facilities”. Article 7 also provides for interpretation arrangements in order to 
ensure communication between persons who wish to make an application for international 
protection and border guards or personnel of detention facilities. Organizations providing 
advice and counselling to applicants for international protection have to have access to the 
border crossing points, including transit zones. 
4. DETERMINING AUTHORITY – COMPETENT AUTHOR-
ITY: RISK OF CONFUSION IN THE APPLICATION OF 
THESE CONCEPTS. 
 
By virtue of the current APD, Member States shall, as a principle, designate a “determining 
authority”454 for all procedures provided for by the Directive. This authority will be 
responsible for the appropriate examination of all applications for asylum in accordance 
with the Directive455. An authority other than the “determining authority” may however, be 
designated by Member States in some situations456. In these cases, decisions, which may 
concern the examination of the substance of the application for asylum, will be taken by 
“competent authorities” (border guards or immigration authorities) which are not the 
normally “determining authority”. 
 
                                                 
454  In the sense of Article 2 (e), APD. 
455  Article 4 (1) APD. 
456  These are : 1°) cases where the transfer of the applicant to another State is being considered 
according  to the rules establishing criteria and mechanisms for determining which State is responsible 
for considering an application for asylum, until the transfer takes place or the requested State has 
refused to take charge or to take back the applicant (the so called “Dublin decisions”)(Article 4 (2) (a) 
APD); 2°) decisions taken on the application in the light of national security provisions, provided the 
determining authority is consulted prior to this decision as to whether the applicant qualifies as a 
refugee by virtue of the “Qualification Directive”(Article 4 (2) (b), APD); 3°) decisions not to further 
examine a subsequent application for asylum when it has been decided by a Member State to apply 
the specific procedure of “preliminary examination” for such an application456 or for an application 
filed by an applicant who, either intentionally or owing to gross negligence, fails to go to a reception 
center or appear before the competent authorities at a specified time(Articles 2 (c), 24 (1) (a), and 32 
to 34, APD); 4°) decisions taken on applications for asylum by virtue of a specific procedure organised 
by a Member State at the border or in transit zones, in accordance with the basic principles and 
guarantees envisaged by the Directive (Articles 4 (2) (d), 24 (1) (b) and 32 (1) and (5), APD); 5°) 
decisions taken on applications for asylum by virtue of a specific procedure organised by a Member 
State at the border or in transit zones, in accordance with nationals laws or regulations in force on 1 
December 2005, provided those laws or regulations respect certain specific guarantees(Articles 4 (2) 
(e), 24 (1) (b) and 32 (2) to (5), APD); and, 6°) decisions  not to examine or not to examine fully an 
asylum application when it is established, on the basis of the facts, that the applicant for asylum is 
seeking to enter, or has entered, illegally on the territory of the Member State concerned from a 
(European) safe third country(ESTC concept)( Articles 4 (2) (f), 24 (2) and 36 APD). 
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Even if there are no international requirements for the designation of the authority 
responsible for examining asylum claims in the framework of the Geneva Convention, 
concerns have already been expressed about the fact that the access to the asylum 
procedures may be denied by an authority other than the one designated for the “regular” 
procedure, including border guards or police officers who may not necessarily be qualified 
to assess international protection needs457. 
 
Article 4 (3) of the recast proposal, which permits the designation of an authority other 
than the determining authority for the sole purpose of processing cases pursuant to the 
Dublin Regulation, constitutes, in this regard, a good step forwards458. This new provision 
expresses the aim of the European Commission to underline in the recast proposal the 
principle of a “single determining authority” in order to reinforce the quality decision 
making at first instance459. 
 
Notwithstanding this, Article 8 (1) of the recast proposal expressly confirms the power of 
the “determining authority” to decide in accordance with (all) the procedures at first 
instance set out in Chapter III recast proposal. Attention must however, be drawn to the 
fact that some provisions of the recast proposal460, or some explanations accompanying 
this proposal461, maintain some confusion between the two notions of “determining 
authority”, which would normally be the rule, and “competent authority”, which would 
normally be the exception462. 
 
It is therefore, proposed to re-examine the provisions of the recast proposal and/or the 
comments on some of those provisions to ensure coherence in the application of these two 
concepts463 or to define clearly464 the situations in which a decision can be taken by a 
                                                 
457  UNHCR, EXCOM Conclusions No. 8(XXVIII) on the Determination of Refugee Status of 12 October 
1977, No. e), i); UNHCR APD Comments 2005, Article 3A – p. 7; UNHCR Global Consultations 2001, 
par. 32; ECRE, Information Note 2006, p. 7. 
458  See, in this regard, UNHCR Study 2010, p. 53 and 75. 
459  COM(2009) 554 final (Expl. Memo.), p. 7; COM(2009) 554 Annex(Det. Expl.), Article 4 – p. 3. 
460  See, for example : 
 - Article 8 (3), recast proposal which refers to the “competent authority” regarding the possibility of 
surrendering or extraditing an applicant for asylum to a third country; 
 - Article 13 (2) (b), recast proposal which refers to the “competent authority” although this provision 
concerns the possibility to omit a personal interview on the substance of the application, which has to 
be conducted by personnel of the “determining authority”, such as is provided for by Article 13 (1), 
recast proposal (compare with the Det. Expl.(COM(2009) 554 Annex, Article 13 – p. 7), which refers 
to the “determining authority”); 
 -Article 32 (2) (b), recast proposal which refers to the “ competent authority”  for examining if the 
safe third country concept may or not be applied to a particular country or to a particular applicant, by 
a case-by-case consideration of the safety of the country(see also: COM(2009) 554 Annex, Article 32 
– p. 15); 
 - Article 35 (1), recast proposal, which refers to “the competent authorities” and Article 36 (3) (b) 
recast proposal, which refers to “the determining authority”, concerning the application of the 
“subsequent application” procedure(compare also with (new) Article 35 (8) (a), which, concerning the 
possibility of making an exception to the right to remain in some circumstances, refers to the position 
adopted by the “determining authority”); 
 - Article 38 (1) which seems to confer the power of decision to a “competent authority” for the 
application of the European safe third countries (ESTC) concept; 
 - Article 40, recast proposal which refers to the “competent authority” to take the decision to 
withdraw the recognized status. 
461  See for example : 
 - COM(2009) 554 final (Expl. Memo.), No. 3.1.2. – p. 6; 
 - COM(2009) 554 Annex(Det. Expl.), Article 35 – p. 16; 
 - (new) recital (24) recast proposal. 
462  Article 6, recast proposal also refers to the notion of a « competent authority »  concerning the receipt 
and the registration of applications for international protection. 
463  For example, what should the requirements for a decision taken by a competent authority be within 
the meaning of Articles 32 (2) (b), 35 (1) or 38 (1), recast proposal (compare with Article 10 recast 
proposal)? 
464  Including, among others, in Article 4 (3) recast proposal. 
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“competent authority” other than the “determining authority”. It would also be envisaged 
to introduce a definition of the notion and the competences of the “competent authority” in 
Article 2 recast proposal, such as has already been provided for in the notion of 
“determining authority”465. 
5. PERSONAL INTERVIEW: THE RIGHT AND THE EXCEP-
TIONS 
 
PROBLEM: the APD lists many exceptions to the right to a personal interview (in case of 
accelerated, prioritized…  procedures), despite the fact that an oral hearing is important to 
an asylum seeker even if an application seems inadmissible or grounded on undue reasons; 
even to rebut a presumption of safety in case of application of FCA, (E)STC, SCO. 
Moreover, the right to be heard is guaranteed by CJ case law and required by the UNHCR. 
Finally, even when a personal interview is provided, its requirements are too vaguely 
formulated. 
 
If the current APD considers that the right to a personal interview has to be granted (Art 12 
(1)), there are so many exceptions that it does not remain the main rule.   
 
Some of the grounds are vaguely formulated in the APD, such as “when it is not reasonably 
practicable”, or “when the competent authority has already had a meeting with the 
applicant for the purpose of assisting him/her with completing his/her application”. The 
recast proposal removes these vague grounds. Although some exceptions remain, the 
proposition tries to objectify them. For instance, the inability of the applicant to be 
interviewed will lead, in case of doubt, to medical expertise determining whether the 
condition is temporary or permanent.  
 
An exception to the right of personal466 interview is authorized by the APD in “prioritized” or 
“accelerated” procedures (based on the concepts of  “safe third country” or “safe country of 
origin”, irrelevant facts invoked or inconsistent, contradictory, improbable or insufficient 
representations)467. However, how can this be known or evaluated without a personal 
interview? Moreover, in such cases, the procedural guarantees at the level of appeal are 
also limited. Those exceptions could lead to a whole procedure without interview in most of 
the cases, in contradiction to the Executive Committee Conclusions n° 30 of the 
UNHCR468. The right to a personal interview was also required by article 14 of the Council 
Resolution on Minimum Guarantees for Asylum procedures. 
 
Under the recast proposal, it is no longer possible to omit the personal interview either 
because a previous meeting occurred, or in the case of accelerated or prioritized 
procedures. Even in the case of the application of the inadmissibility procedure, a personal 
interview has to be conducted (articles 29-30), even if its purpose is limited for instance to 
rebutting the presumption that the safe third country is in fact safe.  
 
                                                 
465  See Article 2 (f), recast proposal. 
466  « Personal » means that each dependent adult should be given the opportunity to invoke independent 
grounds to qualify. This guarantee is provided by the recast proposal which deletes the sentence 
“Member States may also give the opportunity of a personal interview to each dependant adult 
referred to in Article 6 (3)” APD” 
467  Article 12, par. 2, APD refers to article 23, par. 4. 
468  THEMATIC COMPILATION OF EXCOMS, p. 401, par. (e) (i). See also the Handbook on procedures, par. 
200.  
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This new solution is compatible with CJ case law which stresses that the right to be heard is 
a general principle of EU Law (see also Article 41 CFR). The personal interview must be 
considered as an essential element to assess the credibility of an asylum seeker. Since the 
assessment of credibility is an indispensable part of asylum procedure, exceptions must be 
limited to very specific conditions469. 
 
Article 14 of the recast proposal concerns the requirements for the personal interview. 
While some guarantees are vaguely formulated in the current text, the recast proposal tries 
to clarify them. The Member States shall ensure that the person who conducts the 
interview is competent (deleting the previous standard of “sufficiently competent”) to take 
account of the personal or general circumstances surrounding the application, including the 
applicant’s cultural origin, gender, or vulnerability. The reference to the gender is new and 
the recast proposal removes the words “insofar as it is possible to do so”, making this 
guarantee compulsory. The proposal also includes a right, albeit remaining vague, that 
“whenever possible” the interview will be conducted by a person of the same sex. The 
proposal further specifies that the person who conducts the interview must not wear a 
uniform. 
 
The recast proposal also improves the guarantees in terms of translation services provided: 
 
– if possible,  the translator must be competent in the same language as the 
applicant; 
– the proposition replaces the words “language which he/she may reasonably be 
supposed to understand” with the expression “language which he/she understands 
and in which he/she is able to communicate clearly“. 
 
Although the APD ensures that a written report will be made of the interview, it contains no 
rule authorizing the applicant to correct the written report or to contest it. It is merely 
discretionary for each Member State (Article 14, par. 3, APD). The recast proposal provides 
this guarantee, requiring/demanding of the Member States to “request the applicant’s 
approval on the contents of the transcript at the end of the personal interview. To that end, 
Member States shall ensure that the applicant has the opportunity to make comments 
and/or provide clarifications with regard to any mistranslations or misconceptions 
appearing in the transcript”. This guarantee can also be put in relation to article 8 (2), CFR 
which guarantees that personal data “must be processed fairly for specified purposes” and 
that “everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or 
her, and the right to have it rectified.” 
 
On this subject, the recast proposal replaces article 14, APD (“Status of the report of a 
personal interview in the procedure”) with three new provisions, articles 15, 16 and 17: 
“Content of a personal interview”; “Transcript and report of personal interviews” and 
“Medico-legal reports” 
 
Article 15 aims to guarantee that the applicant will have “an adequate opportunity to 
present elements needed to substantiate his/her application”. The questions have to be 
relevant and the applicant has to receive “the opportunity to give an explanation regarding 
elements needed to substantiate the application which may be missing and/or any 
inconsistencies or contradictions in his/her statements”. Article 16 obliges Member States 
to request the applicant’s approval of the content of the transcript and to give him/her the 
opportunity to make comments and/or provide clarifications. A new article 17, entitled 
                                                 
469  UNHCR Study 2010, p. 26. 
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“Medico-legal reports”, also contributes to a more objective treatment of applications. It 
ensures: 
 
– that the applicant receives a sufficient period of time to get the report and to submit 
it; 
– that the authorities will ask for a medical examination in case of post-traumatic 
stress disorder, carried out by an impartial and qualified team of medical experts; 
– that the authorities will provide identification and documentation of symptoms of 
torture and other forms of physical, sexual or psychological violence. 
 
SOLUTION: The right to a personal interview has to be guaranteed to each asylum seeker. 
This solution is adopted by the recast proposal470. The new procedural safeguards provided 
by the recast proposal contribute to the effectiveness of a fair and efficient procedure and 
can reduce the possibility of challenging a negative decision on appeal. 
6. THE RIGHT TO LEGAL ASSISTANCE (ARTICLES 15-16 
APD) 
 
PROBLEM: The right to legal assistance is guaranteed by the APD but is limited in nature. 
On the one hand, its scope is problematic since the legal adviser could not have access to 
all the information contained in the applicant’s file. On the other hand, this right is 
guaranteed at the asylum seeker’s own expense as the right to free legal assistance is 
limited to the second stage of the procedure, after a negative decision at first instance has 
been taken.  
The recast proposal enlarges this right to free legal assistance. On the one hand, this right 
is not yet limited to the procedures on appeal. On the other hand, the proposition removes 
the possibility of refusing to grant free legal assistance to procedures other than judicial 
procedures or limiting such assistance to the sole circumstance where it is granted only if 
the appeal or review is likely to succeed. Nevertheless, free legal assistance could be 
conditioned in situations where it is necessary to ensure effective access to justice, without 
precise criteria. The recast proposal also allows MS to limit free legal assistance at the 
administrative stage to the provision of information about the procedure and of a negative 
decision. 
 
One has to distinguish between two separate issues – the right to legal assistance and the 
right to free legal assistance.   Each of these, in turn, has two separate levels: first instance 
and the appeal stage.  
6.1. The current situation 
 
– The right to legal assistance is guaranteed by the APD as article 15 (1) provides that 
the asylum seeker is allowed to consult a legal or other adviser in an effective 
manner. However, the scope of the legal assistance seems problematic since the 
legal adviser or counsellor will not have access to all the information contained in 
the applicant’s file.  
 
o On the one hand, Member States can make an exception for national security 
reasons.  
                                                 
470  And is in line with the case law of the ECtHR which required an effective investigation of the case 
(Aydin, par. 107), even regarding the situation of aliens (Chamaïev, par. 407; Muminov, par. 99). 
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o On the other hand, the same reasons could lead to a prohibition on access to closed 
areas, such as detention facilities and transit zones.  
o Article 16 (2), APD adds that this refusal could be justified in order to “ensure an 
efficient examination of the application, provided that access by the legal adviser or 
other counsellor is not thereby severely limited or rendered impossible”. The first 
part of this sentence deprives its second part of any sense.  
o Finally, article 16 (3), APD does not guarantee the presence of the legal advisers or 
other counsellors at all interviews in the procedure. 
 
– Free legal assistance: The right to legal assistance is guaranteed at the own expense 
of the asylum seeker. The right to free legal assistance is limited to the second stage 
of the procedure, after a negative decision at first instance has been taken. Even in 
this case, others limits appear (Article 15 (2) and (3), APD), the right applies:  
 
o only in the context of the procedure at first (judicial) instance,  
o only to those who lack sufficient resources;  
o and/or only if the appeal or review is likely to succeed….  
o Moreover, the Member States are authorized to add additional limits: including 
monetary and/or time-restrictions or to provide that the treatment of applicants 
shall not be more favourable than the treatment generally accorded to their 
nationals in matters pertaining to legal assistance. 
6.2. The recast proposal  
 
It improves the system and extends the right to free legal assistance. 
6.2.1. Right to legal assistance 
The new article 19 would also guarantee the right of the legal adviser to be present during 
the personal interview and ensure access to the file even where issues of  national security 
arise, although this may include the requirement of imposing a security check on the legal 
adviser. 
6.2.2. Right to free legal assistance 
The recast proposal expands the right to free legal assistance, as it is proposed in the 
recast proposal on “Reception conditions Directive471 472 473". The same proposals are 
present in the recast Dublin regulation. Article 26 guarantees the right to an effective 
                                                 
471  Concerning the legal assistance, article 25 should provide that “Member States shall ensure access to 
legal assistance and/or representation in the cases referred to in paragraph 1. Such legal assistance 
and/or representation shall be free of charge where the asylum seeker cannot afford the costs 
involved”.  
 On this issue, the EP proposes this amendment: “the necessary legal assistance and/or representation 
is granted on request free of charge in accordance with Article 15(3) to (6) of Directive 2005/85/EC” 
(now Article 18 recast proposal). 
472  EP justifies this guarantee stating that “From the first moment, the asylum-seeker has to have the 
right to enjoy maximum legal guarantees; they need to be able to count on high-quality legal 
assistance which will help them to understand their rights. Legal assistance needs to be guaranteed in 
less than the 72 hours envisaged, as the European Council of Human Rights notes in its much-quoted 
ruling on Saadi v UK, deeming any period longer than 48 hours a violation of Article 5(2) of the 
ECTHR. The UNHCR and other specialist NGOs should have the right to visit the facilities where 
persons in provisional detention are being held, and the latter should never be mixed in with ordinary 
prisoners”. 
473  See also the “Return Directive”, article 13 (4) (which also refers to current article 15 (3) to (6) APD) 
and article 18, recast proposal. 
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judicial remedy, specifying that it includes access to legal assistance and/or representation 
free of charge where the person concerned cannot afford the costs involved474. 
 
On the one hand, this right is not yet limited to the procedures on appeal. The new Article 
18 should guarantee that Member States provide for free legal assistance in procedures in 
accordance with Chapter III (administrative procedures at first instance) and with Chapter 
V (appeals). Moreover, free legal assistance is automatically granted to unaccompanied 
minors475. 
 
On the other hand, the proposition removes the possibility of refusing to grant free legal 
assistance to procedures other than procedures before a court or tribunal in accordance 
with Chapter V and the possibility of limiting this to the sole circumstance where the appeal 
or review is likely to succeed. At the same time, the recast proposal specifies that “Member 
States may choose to only make free legal assistance and/or representation available to 
applicants insofar as such assistance is necessary to ensure their effective access to 
justice”476, without specifying criteria which could be used to answer this question. It is also 
specified that “Member States may allow non-governmental organizations to provide free 
legal assistance and/or representation to applicants for international protection in 
procedures provided for in Chapter III and/or Chapter V”. The recast proposal also allows 
the MS to limit this free legal assistance at the administrative stage to the provision of 
information about the procedure (article 18 (2) (a) and (b)) and to explanations about the 
factual and legal reasons of a negative decision.  
6.3. Analysis 
 
A distinction must be made between what is merely ‘desirable’ and what is legally binding.  
 
The right to legal assistance is no longer open to discussion. It is protected both in EU law 
(article 47, CFR) and in the ECHR. For instance, in the recent decision Abdholkani (par. 57), 
the ECtHR ruled that “A remedy must be effective in practice as well as in law in order to 
fulfil the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention. In the present case, by failing to 
consider the applicants' requests for temporary asylum, to notify them of the reasons for 
not taking their asylum requests into consideration and to authorize them to have access to 
legal assistance while in Hasköy police headquarters, the national authorities prevented the 
applicants from raising their allegations under Article 3 within the framework of the 
temporary asylum procedure provided for by the 1994 Regulation and Circular no. 57”. The 
effectiveness of a judicial remedy is conditioned by the right to legal assistance. 
 
It is also clear that the right to free legal assistance at the second stage (judicial review) of 
the procedure is compulsory. Article 47, CFR states that “Legal aid shall be made available 
to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective 
access to justice”. Neither in article 47 nor in  the case-law of the ECtHR is this right 
absolute. It depends on the complexity of the procedure and on the rights which are at 
stake. One can consider that in asylum cases, most of the time, the rights at stake are 
sufficiently important to justify free legal aid (the risk of violating Articles 2 or 3, ECHR is 
                                                 
474  LIBE Committee: “6. Member States shall ensure that the necessary legal assistance and/or 
representation is granted on request free of charge in accordance with Article 15(3) to (6) of Directive 
2005/85/EC” (even if the texts here studied do not guarantee the right to free legal assistance 
because of the several exceptions and limitations provided). 
 This amendment is  also present in the European Parliament legislative resolution of 7 May 2009. 
475  Article 21 (4), recast proposal. This has been justified by some conclusions of the UN Child Rights 
Committee (COM(2009) Annex (Det. Expl.), Article 21 – p. 11). 
476  Compare with Article 47 CFR. 
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usually invoked); the great majority of the applicants belong to a  lower-income group and 
are particularly vulnerable vis-à-vis the complexity of the procedures. 
 
At the first stage of the procedure (administrative procedure), although the texts and the 
case law are not overly explicit, one can deduce from the CJ case law and from the 
necessity of the practice that a right to free legal assistance at the first stage is to be 
recommended. 
 
The CJ case law highlights that the grant of free legal assistance may be necessary to a 
person in a less advantageous position in a pre-judicial procedure to safeguard rights 
guaranteed by Community Law477.  
 
Recent case-law of the ECtHR regarding positive obligations of Member States of the 
Council of Europe under article 3 could also ground a right to free legal assistance at the 
first stage of the procedure. Even if no decisions of the ECtHR are clearly dedicated to this 
specific issue, one could discern from decisions on article 3478 and from a recent decision 
concerning articles 8 and 14, that the lack of free legal aid could potentially violate the 
Convention479.  
 
The UNHCR highlights the limitations to legal aid noting that unlike citizens, “asylum 
seekers are largely unfamiliar with procedures in countries, and are therefore generally 
unable to have effective access to justice without legal assistance”480. Similar reservations 
were expressed by ECRE481. At the very least, the principles of equality and non-
discrimination request that free legal assistance has to be provided to asylum seekers 
under the same conditions that it is provided to citizens. However, those principles have to 
be understood to be taking into account: 
 
– the particular weakness of asylum seekers facing difficult procedures to which 
they are not accustomed482 and  
– the crucial character of the rights at stake (possible violations of articles 2 and or 
3 of the ECHR483), whose violation can be irreversible. The ECtHR takes into 
consideration this kind of specific context when it has to analyze the effectiveness 
of a remedy; 
– the absolute character of article 18 CFR. 
 
Even if one cannot conclude from the case law that free legal aid is clearly compulsory at all 
stages of the procedures, one must however, consider that the lack of free legal assistance 
at the first administrative stage and the possibility of limiting this right at the jurisdictional 
                                                 
477  CJ, Evans, par. 77 and 78 (cited in Impact assessment); Unibet, par. 44. 
478  ECTHR, Secic, par. 53; Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, par. 102; Such a positive obligation cannot, in 
principle, be considered to be limited solely to cases of ill-treatment by State agents (M.C., par. 151). 
479  ECTHR, Anakomba Yula. In this case, the Court concludes that Belgium has violated articles 8 and 14 
because the domestic law does not provide free legal aid to an applicant staying  in Belgium illegally. 
The applicant wanted to introduce a procedure which would establish a Belgian man’s paternity of his 
young child. This procedure was intended to enable him to obtain a residence permit on the basis of 
this family tie. The Court estimates that the issues the domestic courts faced were serious questions 
related to family law. The decisions which the courts were going to pronounce would mark the private 
life and family life, not only of applicant itself but of several other people, in a final way. There should 
thus be particularly pressing reasons to justify a difference in treatment between people having a 
residence permit and people not having such a permit, 
480  UNCHR Comments June 2002, p. 12. 
481  ECRE, Information Note, 2006, p. 15-16. See also S., PEERS, p. 103. 
482  This particular weakness was underlined by the ECtHR Bahaddar, par. 46; the necessity to provide 
social and legal assistance was also underlined in the case Amuur, par 45. 
483  Concerning the obligation to take into consideration the risk at stake while analyzing the effectiveness 
of a remedy, see the leading case Chahal, par. 150. 
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stage leads to the fact that, in practice, there is no effective right to free legal assistance 
for most of the applicants: 
 
– the first stage of the procedure is clearly the most important as this is the stage 
where the applicant will convey the reasons for his application; he needs to be 
assisted in order to highlight the important points of his application; moreover, 
principles, like the benefit of the doubt and the duty to cooperate, reinforce the 
importance of a high quality administrative procedure; this is the stage where 
grounds of inadmissibility could appear; some of them are complex and the 
assistance of a lawyer at this stage could help avoid a decision of inadmissibility 
caused by an insufficient explanation of the situation; the working document of the 
Commission adopts the position that in the long term, providing free  legal 
assistance from the beginning of the process is economically and administratively 
advantageous and contributes to the effectiveness of the asylum procedure484; 
 
– the possibility of limiting free legal assistance during the administrative procedure to 
information should be abolished since it is precisely the assistance of a lawyer 
during the interview which guarantees due respect of the procedure and effective 
protection for the asylum seeker. The specificity of the procedure, the rights at 
stake, the importance of the oral hearing make this stage of the procedure one of 
the most crucial. 
 
– even if the right to free legal assistance is recognized at this stage of the procedure, 
the fact that the appeal will not automatically have a suspensive effect could still 
deprive this second stage of the procedure of its effectiveness;  
 
– the Commission has also previously considered the availability of free legal 
assistance in the first instance procedure as a possible way of improving access to 
an effective remedy485. 
 
SOLUTION: The right to legal assistance is not subject to discussion under EU law and the 
ECHR. This position implies that the effectiveness of a judicial remedy is conditioned by the 
right to legal assistance. Even if this right is not absolute as such ( see Article 47, CFR), the 
same principles apply to the right to free legal assistance at the second stage (judicial 
review) of the procedure.  
At the first stage of the procedure (administrative procedure), although the texts and case 
law are not quite as explicit, one can deduce from the CJ case law and from the necessity 
of the practice that a right to free legal assistance at the first stage is also to be 
recommended.  
7. APPLICANTS WITH SPECIAL NEEDS 
 
PROBLEM: One of the criticisms of the APD is the lack of protection for an applicant with 
special needs. Only minors benefited from a specific protection, which in itself was 
considered insufficient. Procedural rules have to be adapted to allow vulnerable applicants 
to be heard in the right conditions. Otherwise, the possibility of allowing the qualification of 
a (manifestly) unfounded application in cases where inconsistent, contradictory, 
representations exist, may lead to irrevocable errors in practice. Moreover, the application 
                                                 
484  Impact assessment, p. 32. 
485  Impact assessment, p. 43. At least, 11 MS provide free legal assistance in the initial stage of the asylum 
process (p. 47). 
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of the same rules to significantly different situations violates the principle of non-
discrimination486. 
 
Two different categories of applicants with special needs may be distinguished: minors and 
other vulnerable applicants. 
7.1. Minors 
 
The necessity to take into account the “best interests of the child” has also been reaffirmed 
in the recast proposal487 and the definitions of a “minor” and of a “representative” have 
been introduced or clarified in Article 2 (l) and (n) of the recast proposal, with a view to 
align the Directive with the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)488 or with 
a specific interpretation of the UN Child Rights Committee489. The Spanish presidency has 
announced that this will be a priority490, in accordance with the Stockholm program (No. 
6.1.7.). With the aim of aligning the Directive with Article 22 (1) CRD, Article 6 (5) of the 
recast proposal explicitly stipulates the right of a minor to make an application for 
international protection, either on his/her own behalf, or through his/her parents or other 
adult family members. The requirements of the CRC and some conclusions of the UN Child 
Rights Committee are also invoked to justify several additional safeguards for 
unaccompanied minors491. Moreover, minors should not be subjected to accelerated 
procedures, unfounded applications’ procedures, safe third country procedures or border 
procedures (article 21 (6)). 
7.2. Other applicants with special needs 
 
The recast proposal introduces a new article 20 dedicated to applicants with special needs 
(who are defined in article 2, d as any “applicant who due to age, gender, disability, mental 
health problems or consequences of torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, 
physical or sexual violence is in need of special guarantees in order to benefit from the 
rights and comply with the obligations in accordance with this directive”). This new article 
provides that the accelerated procedure and the manifestly unfounded clause cannot be 
used (Article 20 (3), recast proposal) when dealing with such applicants (Article 20 (3), 
recast proposal) as well as making other changes. 
 
One also has to consider Article 10 (4) of the recast proposal as it guarantees an 
autonomous examination for any person alleging gender and/or age-based persecution492. 
It is however, regretted that the diffuse character of provided protection considerably 
decreases its effectiveness. The new text should: 
 
1. Define the protected groups more precisely;  
 
                                                 
486  ECtHR, Thlimmenos, par. 44 (“Persons whose situations are significantly different should be treated 
significantly differently”).  
487  Recital (23) recast proposal (compare with current recital (15), APD) and Article 2 (n), recast 
proposal). 
488  COM(2009) 554 Annex(Det. Expl.), Article 2 (l) and (n). 
489  COM(2009) 554 Annex (Det. Expl.), Article 2 (n)). 
490  http://www.tt.mtin.es/eu2010/fr/noticias/empleo/201003/EMP20100309-001.html. It has to be 
recalled that the primary consideration to take into account the child’s best interests in all actions 
relating to children is also now recognized as a fundamental right of the European Union (Article 24 
(2) CFR). 
491  Article 21 (Article 17, APD), recast proposal and comments on this Article(COM(2009) annex(Det. 
Expl.), Article 21). 
492  See also article 9 (3) (d) and 4 (2) (b), recast proposal. 
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2. Oblige MS to identify those protected groups from the time the application is 
introduced; oblige MS to introduce a systematic monitoring mechanism from the 
time an application is made to identify those protected applicants; one should 
avoid establishing “procedures in existing procedures” and overcomplicate the 
existing procedure. Therefore, a solution could be to insert a first stage before the 
examination on grounds which are composed of two successive questions: the 
Geneva Convention and the subsidiary protection. The determining authority 
would then have to answer three questions:  
 
3. Is this person an applicant with special needs? A positive answer to this question 
should lead to the adapting of the pending procedure to the specificity of the 
situation. For instance, the designation, as soon as possible, of a legal guardian 
for a minor493; or the fact that some specific procedures such as 
accelerated/inadmissibility/border procedures494 cannot be applied to vulnerable 
groups. The identification of an applicant with special needs may also have an 
influence on the manner in which the personal interview may be pursued (by 
personnel of the determining authority with specialist knowledge and training)495. 
A link could be established with the “Reception Conditions Directive”  which 
obliges an identification of persons with special needs. For instance, an 
identification of such a characteristic by the reception social services could serve 
as a presumption that special needs are to be taken into consideration for the 
asylum procedure. 
a. Do we have to grant refugee status under the GC?  
b. If not, do we have to grant subsidiary protection under the same convention? 
 
4. Clarify the guarantees provided to each sub-group of applicants with special 
needs: 
– minors;  
– gender based persecution; 
– victims of torture etc 
– and determine for each of these categories what exact 
complementary guarantees are provided for. 
 
SOLUTION: Even if the recast proposal contains a new provision specifically dedicated to 
applicants with special needs, in order to guarantee effective protection, the new text 
should:  
- define the protected groups more precisely; 
- oblige MS to introduce a systematic monitoring mechanism to identify those protected 
groups from the time the application is submitted; a link with the initial monitoring 
organized by the reception directive could be established;  
- clarify the guarantees provided to each sub-group of applicants with special needs. 
                                                 
493  Article 21 (1) (a), recast proposal. 
494  See articles 20 (3), 21 (6) and 27 (6) and (7), recast proposal. 
495  See, for instance, Article 21 (3) (concerning minors) or Article 17 (2) (concerning medico-legal 
reports), recast proposal. 
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8. STANDARDS OF EXAMINATION 
 
PROBLEM: In addition to mere procedural provisions, the APD also contains some rules on 
the examination of asylum applications (“standards of examination”). The question arises 
whether there is any need to define those standards better and if, in fact, it would or would 
not be possible to make concrete proposals in an amended Directive. 
 
The APD nevertheless, does not specify rules on matters of evidence and proof. It has 
however, to be remembered that under the “Qualification Directive”, Member States have 
the duty to assess, in cooperation with the applicant, all relevant elements of the 
application (Article 4 (1)), to take into account all relevant country of origin information, 
statements and documentation presented by the applicant and the individual position and 
circumstances of the applicant (Article 4 (3)), as well as ascertaining whether the applicant 
has already been subject to persecution or serious harm (Article 4 (4)).   
 
However, such provisions do not seem not to be enough to avoid diverse interpretations of 
the “Qualification Directive” in the differing Member States, nor to guarantee a full and fair 
examination by the Member States of an asylum claim496. The question is therefore, if it will 
be possible to achieve a greater uniformity in Member States’ handling of asylum 
applications and if it would not be more useful to concentrate upon issues of fact-finding 
and cooperation between Member States  and on issues of assessing the situation of certain 
groups? In any case, it seems difficult to propose a (common) set of rules of evidence. 
 
In this context, a second possibility could be to give an important role to the future EASO 
(European asylum support office)497, whose creation has been presented as a solution to 
the problem of diverse interpretations of the Asylum Directive498. 
 
                                                 
496  In September 2005, the European Parliament had already emphasized the necessity of a full and fair 
individual processing of the applications for asylum (TA(2005)0349). 
 In its recent communication (COM(2009) 262/4), the European Commission has also emphasized 
(page 3) this weakness of a reinforced CEAS: “ Despite the existence of a common system of asylum, 
there is need for greater uniformity in Member State’s handling of asylum applications: the rates of 
acceptance of applications are currently very variable from Member State to Member State. In 2007, 
25% of first decisions granted protection in the form of either refugee status or subsidiary protection. 
Behind this average figure there are wide variations: some Member States allow protection in only 
very few cases, while others have a recognition rate close to 50%”. 
497  For instance:  
 - to establish agreements between the determining authorities of the different Member States 
whereby interpreters in other EU Member States can be used via video link, to develop EU guidelines 
on the attention of the interviewers and the interpreters, or to establish EU criteria and mechanisms 
for quality control and improvement among Member States (UNHCR Study 2010; p. 33, 37, 39 and 
40); 
 - to support the identification and collation of common information sources to be used by Member 
States for the purpose of designating safe countries of origin (Article 33 (3), recast proposal); 
 - or to play a role in the determination of the minimum requirements for the content of the training 
programs for the personnel of the determining authorities, programs which could be largely based on 
the EAC (COM(2009) 554 Annex (Det. Expl.), Article 4 – p. 3). 
498  European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2009 on the future of the Common European Asylum 
System(2008/2305(INI) (P6_TA(2009)0087), par. 23 to 29; European Parliament legislative 
resolution of 7 May 2009 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-
country national or a stateless person (recast) - P6_TA(2009)0377 - Amendment 2; Report of LIBE 
Committee on this proposal (A6-0284/2009 - p. 7/40: justification of this amendment); “The EU and 
Human Rights - Making the impact on people count”, Amnesty International, 2009, p. 16. 
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In the explanatory memorandum of its recast proposal, the Commission has expressly 
emphasized that this proposal is indeed linked to the Commission’s proposal for a 
regulation establishing a European Asylum Support Office(499), “which inter alia aims to 
provide practical assistance to Member States with the view to enhancing the quality of 
asylum decision making”. We can also highlight that this Office is expressly referred to in 
Article 9 (3) (b) of the recast proposal, in relation to the obligation of Member States to 
ensure that precise and up-to-date information is obtained from various sources as to the 
general situation prevailing in the countries of origin of applicants and, where necessary, in 
countries through which they have transited500. 
 
If some concrete provisions are required to be proposed on this subject, in the future it 
would be useful to look at what has already occurred in the framework of some EU-projects 
- such as the EAC (European Asylum Curriculum) project501, or what has recently been 
proposed by the UNHCR502. 
 
With the aim of laying down necessary conditions for ensuring quality and efficient decision 
making at first instance, the Commission has also proposed an amendment requiring that 
Member States shall provide adequate training for the specialized personnel at the disposal 
of the “determining authority.” This training shall, in particular, include, inter alia, “use of 
country of origin information”, “evidence assessment, including the principle of the benefit 
of the doubt” and “case law issues relevant to the examination of applications for 
international protection”503. Such an obligation is a good step forward as long as these 
programs have a very concrete and developed content504. 
 
SOLUTION:  
Another idea could be to authorize EASO to deal with issues of “recommended standards of 
examination” by issuing guidelines from which Member States may deviate. However, if 
they choose to deviate from these standards, the MS would be obliged to register the 
differences they adopted. Furthermore, the proposal could be amended to admit 
experimental procedures which, for instance, make it possible to use external processing or 
joint processing as an option for Member States to participate in projects (See proposal 
long term). 
Another question is whether it would be useful to incorporate Article 4 of the “Qualification 
Directive” in the APD, in order to ensure a better clarity of the rules on evidence and 
standards for the examination of the applications. 
 
SECTION 3: GUARANTEES CONCERNING A FULL EXAMINATION OF 
THE SUBSTANCE 
 
The concrete application by each Member State of concepts like “first country of asylum”, 
“safe third country”, “(European) safe third country”, “safe country of origin,” could lead to 
depriving an asylum seeker access to effective protection because he/she will not benefit 
                                                 
499  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European 
Asylum Support Office(COM(2009) 66).  
500  See also (new) recital (8), recast proposal. 
501  The EAC project has the task to produce an EU-common training program aimed at officials within the 
migration services in Europe. Some of the modules that have already been produced in 2009 were 
“Evidence Assessment”, “Interviewing Children”, “interviewing Traumatized Persons”, “Drafting and 
Decision-making” and “Asylum Procedures”. 
502  UNHCR Study 2010, p. 39. 
503  Article 4, par. 2, recast proposal. 
504  In the Det. Expl. (COM(2009) 554 Annex – Article 4), the Commission has expressly made the link 
with the European Asylum Curriculum (EAC) and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). 
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from a full examination of the substance of his application. One has to analyze how this 
access is secured, what criteria could be used in this perspective and what are the 
procedural consequences of the recourse to these specific concepts (Articles 26, 27, 29 and 
31, and 36, APD). 
 
PROBLEM: 
The APD and the recast proposal make use of some concepts allowing the MS to decide not 
to proceed with the application at all or not to proceed to a full examination of the 
substance of a claim. Those concepts are based on the “safe countries” concept. The APD 
indeed enshrines: 
- three forms of the “safe third countries” concept (“first country of asylum”[FCA]; “safe 
third country”[STC] (national lists or case by case application of the concept); “European 
safe third country”[ESTC](common EU list or national lists)), which do not address the 
“qualification” (the substance) of the claim; 
- and one specific concept of “safe country of origin” (SCO) (common EU list or national 
lists), which addresses the “qualification” of the claim, which supposes an individual 
examination of the substance of the claim and which is based on the (rebuttable) 
presumption that a country is a “SCO” for a particular applicant. 
All of the specific uses of the different forms of the “safe countries” concept raise similar 
concerns: the question of the illegal entry and/or of the individual examination of the claim; 
the criteria for the determination of countries as “safe”; the determination of the authorities 
that should be responsible in “(E)STC” cases; the meaning of “effective protection” in the 
country considered as safe; the question of the “necessary link” between the applicant and 
the third country concerned; the specific treatment of minors or vulnerable persons when 
applying those concepts. 
 
The substantial and the procedural obligations of the Member States in such situations have 
to be analysed mainly with regards to the case law of the ECtHR. Some common principles 
have to be underlined. Their application to each of those concepts depends on the risk in 
the country of destination: 
 
– risk of ineffective protection in case of removal to a first country of asylum; 
– risk of ineffective access to a protection in case of removal to a safe third country; 
the level of protection has to be, at a minimum, higher than in Dublin cases because 
the country of destination is normally not bound by European common texts 
(procedures ; qualification, …);  
– risk of persecution or of violation of human rights in case of removal to a safe 
country of origin; the risk is higher here since no State will examine the application 
for protection as in the first two cases it usually has to be conducted elsewhere. 
1. INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES  
 
Art. 3, ECHR, as interpreted by the ECtHR, and article 3 of the CAT contain a prohibition on 
the refoulement of a person to a country in which he/she is facing a serious risk of torture 
or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In addition, Art. 13, ECHR grants a 
right to an effective remedy before a national authority to anyone whose rights and 
freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated. This case-law applies in the case of 
removal of an applicant to his/her country of origin [even where that country is classified as 
‘safe’].  
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The possibility of receiving effective protection in the third country was underlined by the 
ECtHR, namely in the Amuur case:  
 
“The mere fact that it is possible for asylum-seekers to leave voluntarily the country where 
they wish to take refuge cannot exclude a restriction on liberty, the right to leave any 
country, including one's own, being guaranteed, moreover, by Protocol No. 4 to the 
Convention (P4).  Furthermore, this possibility becomes theoretical if no other country 
offering protection comparable to the protection they expect to find in the country where 
they are seeking asylum is inclined or prepared to take them in. Sending the applicants 
back to Syria only became possible, apart from the practical problems of the journey, 
following negotiations between the French and Syrian authorities.  The assurances of the 
latter were dependent on the vagaries of diplomatic relations, in view of the fact that Syria 
was not bound by the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees”. 
 
Namely505 within the scope of application of the Dublin Regulation the ECtHR has, in 
principle, relied upon the general principles on contracting States’ obligations under Art. 3 
and 13 of the Convention. In its ruling in T.I., the Court held that removal to a competent 
EU country does not affect the responsibility of the country of residence of an asylum 
seeker to ensure that the applicant is not, as a result of the decision to expel, exposed to 
treatment contrary to Art. 3 of the Convention: 
 
“The indirect removal of an alien to an intermediary country does not affect the 
responsibility of the expelling Contracting State to ensure that he or she is not, as a result 
of its decision to expel, exposed to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention506”.  
 
This case law is interesting in the case of removal of an applicant to a third country on the 
basis of the concepts of FCA, STC and ESTC. 
 
Recently, in the KRS case, although the Court finally judged the application inadmissible, 
the Court did consider that the claim in itself was arguable. The Court recalled the 
principles of the TI case and after a concrete analysis507 of the situation in Greece 
considered that there were no reasons to judge that Greece would remove the applicant to 
a third country without a due analysis of the situation. In many cases other than KRS, the 
Court had decided to make use of Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court in case of removal to 
Greece on the basis of the Dublin Regulation508. This case illustrates the growing role 
                                                 
505  But not only - See for instance in case of extradition, Muhammet Metin Kaplan. 
506  ECtHR, Salah Sheekh, par. 141; Abdolhani and Karimnia par. 88. 
507  « On the evidence before it, Greece does not currently remove people to Iran…”; “In concrete terms, 
Greece is required to make the right of any returnee to lodge an application with this Court under 
Article 34 of the Convention (and request interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court) both 
practical and effective. In the absence of any proof to the contrary, it must be presumed that Greece 
will comply with that obligation in respect of returnees including the applicant.” 
508  For instance, on 24 March 2009 the President of the Chamber to which the case had been allocated 
decided, “in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before the Court, to 
indicate to the Government of Belgium, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that the applicants should 
not be expelled to Greece until further notice. (…)In regard to article 3 of the Convention and in the 
light of the recent reports of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr Hammarberg, 
of 4 February 2009 and the Report of November 2008 of Human Rights Watch, the question rises 
which guarantees your Government has that the applicants will have access to a procedure in Greece 
and will not have to fear for being kept under circumstances that can be described as inhuman or 
degrading.” (Appl. 15605/09 (24/03/2009)). 
 On the 22 of January 2009, the Court suspended a transfer to Greece. The Somalian asylum seeker 
was removed to Turkey after an initial short stay in Greece. The French government was invited to 
provide the Court  « des informations portant sur l’accès à la procédure d’asile et sur les recours 
disponibles pour les personnes renvoyées vers la Grèce. En particulier, eu égard à l'affaire KRS c. 
Royaume-Uni (n° 32733/08), votre Gouvernement est invité à faire savoir à la Cour si le requérant, 
en cas de renvoi vers la Grèce, aurait la possibilité en Grèce, s'il le souhaite, de soumettre à la Cour 
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played by the ECtHR in urgent cases, since the Court judged that provisional measures are 
compulsory on the basis of Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court509.  
 
It must also be noted that removals to a third country risk violating, not just article 3, but 
also articles 5 and/or 8 of the ECHR.510The ECtHR has already condemned Greece because 
the conditions of detention of the asylum seekers violated article 5. In the S.D. case511, the 
Court judged that the conditions of detention in Greece were such that they violated 
articles 3 and 5 of the Convention. 
 
Due to the large number of applications submitted to the ECtHR on this issue, the 
Commissioner for Human Rights was invited by the Court on 9 November 2009 to intervene 
as a third-party in the Court’s proceedings, and to submit written observations. He did so 
on the 10 March 2010512. The analysis of the Commissioner highlights several issues with 
regards to the ECHR513.  
2. FIRST COUNTRY OF ASYLUM (ARTICLE 26, APD AND 
31, RECAST PROPOSAL) 
 
Following the APD and the recast proposal, a country can be considered to be a first 
country of asylum if: 
(a) the applicant was recognized there as a refugee and still benefits from this protection; 
OR 
(b) he enjoys “sufficient”514 protection in that country, including benefiting from the 
principle of non-refoulement, and the right to be re-admitted to that country. 
 
Recommendation: The terms “sufficient protection” are too weak and could be replaced by 
“effective protection”515. The availability of the protection should also be mentioned.  
                                                                                                                                                            
une demande d'application de l'article 39 dans l'hypothèse où les autorités grecques décideraient de 
l'expulser vers la Somalie. A cette fin, votre Gouvernement peut notamment se prévaloir de tout 
accord bilatéral conclu en vertu de la Convention de Dublin. » (Ali Mohamed – France n°44989/08). 
 Numerous similar applications were brought to the ECtHR during those last two years. 
509  ECtHR, Mamatkulov and Askarov; Aoulmi; Ben Khemais; Muminov. On this subject, see for instance 
M. BOSSUYT, p. 86-96. 
510  Article 8 could also be at stake because decisions of removal under the Dublin Regulation could lead to 
the separation of family members. One has to consider that an argument based on a violation of the 
right to family life is arguable. In that kind of situation, one cannot object that a remedy could be 
available in a Member State of the Council of Europe since the violation of the Convention results not 
from the final removal from this country but from the decision of the country who decides to separate 
the family members. 
511  See also: ECtHR, Tabesh. 
512  https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1595689&Site=CommDH 
513  - access to refugee protection remains highly problematic, notably due to the non-functioning of the 
first instance Advisory Refugee Committees, lack of proper information on asylum procedures and 
legal aid that should be available to potential or actual asylum seekers, widely reported instances of 
refoulement or non-registration of asylum claims;  
- the quality of asylum decisions at first instance is inadequate, notably because of structural 
deficiencies and lack of procedural safeguards, in particular concerning the provision of legal aid and 
interpretation;  
- existing domestic remedy against negative asylum applications is not effective;  
- asylum seekers, including persons transferred under the Dublin Regulation, face extremely harsh 
living conditions in Greece. 
514  Article 31 (b) recast proposal. 
515  This was proposed by the UNHCR in its first critical comments of the APD and this suggestion is 
maintained in the UNHCR Study 2010 (p. 58 – 60: the protection in the third country should be 
effective and available in practice; UNHCR proposes also to draw up an annex to the APD setting out 
the criteria for “effective” protection). See also Recommendation  R (97) 22, of the Committee of 
Ministers containing guidelines on the application of the Safe third country concept, par. 1.c. (“the 
third country will provide “effective” protection against refoulement”) and 1.d (“ the asylum-seeker 
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The second alternative (point (b)) does not give any guarantee concerning the protection in 
the third country. The mere fact of being re-admitted is not sufficient if the readmission 
does not give effective protection to the applicant. The legal status of the person, even if 
protected, is important to evaluate the level of protection: legal administrative status, 
duration of the protection, procedures available to challenge a decision of removal, social 
status, right to family unity. 
 
Those issues remain even if the FCA is a Member State of the European Union or of the 
Council of Europe (cfr T.I. case law). The recent K.R.S. case by the ECtHR regarding a 
Dublin transfer to Greece also illustrates that a theoretical right to non-refoulement is not 
sufficient. One has to take into consideration the effectiveness of the protection, the access 
to the protection and also the situation of the asylum seekers in the “first country of 
asylum” at the level of the reception conditions and social rights.  
 
SOLUTION: The right to rebut the presumption of safety has to be explicitly recognized by 
the directive, at both a procedural level and on a substantial level. This is not the case in 
the APD. At a procedural level, article 30, recast proposal guarantees the right to a 
personal interview. But on the substantial level, article 31 should also include the right to 
rebut the presumption as it is recognized in article 32, recast proposal concerning the “safe 
third country” concept (right to challenge the connection between the applicant and the 
STC).  
3. “SAFE THIRD COUNTRY” CONCEPT (ARTICLE 27, APD 
AND 32, RECAST PROPOSAL) 
 
The APD and the recast proposal authorize the Member States to use the notion of “Safe 
third country”516, but under the following conditions: ensuring the protection of human 
rights, respect of the principle of non-refoulement and the possibility of applying for 
international protection. Moreover, the domestic law has to provide rules: 
 
– requiring a connection517 between the person seeking asylum and the third country 
concerned;  
– on the methodology : case-by-case analysis and/or national designation of countries 
considered to be generally safe; 
– allowing an individual examination: this means the applicant at least has the 
possibility of challenging the safety of the third country and, moreover in the recast 
proposal, the connection between him and this country. 
 
The guarantees provided by the application of this concept by Member States could only be 
considered as consistent with the principle of non-refoulement, including chain refoulement, 
if the following cumulative conditions are fulfilled: 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
has already been granted effective protection in the third country or there is a clear evidence of the 
admissibility to the third country concerned”). 
 Concerning the minimum requirements for an “effective” protection, see inter alia: European 
Commission Communication, “Towards a more accessible, equitable, and managed international 
protection regime”, COM(2003) 315 final, 23 June 2003; UNHCR, Summary Conclusions on the 
Concept “Effective Protection” in the Context of Secondary Movements of Refugees and Asylum-
Seekers(Lisbon Expert Roundtable, 9-10 December 2002), February 2003. 
516  ECtHR, T.I (the use of the safe third country concept is admitted by the Court as a principle, p. 20). 
517  See Article 32 (2) (a), recast proposal. Recital (31), recast proposal refers however to « sufficient 
connection ». 
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– domestic laws have to provide an effective518 opportunity for the asylum seeker to 
rebut the presumption of safety in his/her particular case; that means: correct and 
complete information is given to the applicant; a personal interview; an effective 
opportunity to lodge an appeal in a reasonable time limit and suspensive effect of 
the appeal, or, at least, the possibility of asking for an interim measure; 
 
– the right to rebut the presumption of safety of the third country concerned, in the 
particular case of the applicant, has also to be explicitly recognized, at both the 
procedural and the substantial level. Although this is not the case in the APD, which 
does not expressly provide for a personal interview of the applicant, it is well 
provided for by the recast proposal: at a procedural level, article 30, recast proposal 
indeed guarantees the right to a personal interview of the applicant. On the 
substantial level, article 32 (2) (c), recast proposal provides also for an individual 
examination of whether the third country concerned is safe for a particular applicant 
which, as a minimum, shall permit the applicant, firstly, to challenge the application 
of the safe third country concept on the grounds that the third country is not safe in 
his/her particular circumstances, and, secondly, to challenge the existence of a 
(sufficient) connection between him/her and this third country; 
 
– a removal to such a safe third country could only occur on the basis of an 
agreement which clearly outlines the respective responsibility of the Member State 
and of the STC; this agreement should guarantee that the STC admits the applicant 
to its territory and will consider the asylum claim substantively in a fair procedure. 
This guarantee is required neither by the APD nor by the recast proposal. However, 
the TI case obliges the Member State concerned to guarantee it. It could also be 
deduced from the ruling of the ECtHR in the Amuur case, which underlines that the 
third country must as least have ratified and implemented in practice the Geneva 
Convention519; 
 
– the “sufficient” connection between the applicant and the STC also has to be 
analyzed on the basis of familial criteria and/or humanitarian criteria (as it is done in 
the Dublin system520); a presumption of prohibition of removal to a STC should be 
included in the Directive in case of family ties, unaccompanied minors or applicant 
with special needs. A separation between members of a family could potentially be a 
long term separation, since no guarantee exists of family reunification of foreigners 
living in a EU Member State and/or in a third country.  
 
In comparison with the possibility now provided for by the APD521, the use of the “Safe 
third country” concept in accelerated procedures should be excluded. The reason for this is 
that the application of an accelerated procedure relies on the supposition that there has 
been a full individual examination of the merits of an application for international 
protection, while the “Safe third country” concept implies that there has not been such an 
examination, because it can reasonably be assumed that another country would do this 
examination or provide protection. Indeed this is not envisaged in the recast proposal 
having regard to the accelerated procedures522, with the consequence that the STC-concept 
                                                 
518  See also Recommendation (97) 22 of the Committee of Ministers, 1, c. and d. 
519  UNHCR, Considerations on the "Safe Third Country" Concept, July 1996, p. 5. 
520 Article 15, Dublin II Regulation and Articles 11 and 17, recast proposal Dublin. See also UNHCR 
EXCOM conclusion No. 15(“country where an asylum-seeker has a significant connection especially 
close family relations”). 
521  Articles 23 (4) (c) (ii), 28 (2) and 27, APD. 
522  Compare Article 27 (6), recast proposal with former Article 23 (4) (c) (ii), APD. 
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would only be applied in “inadmissible applications”523( but by which “authorities”? – See 
supra Section II.4.). 
More fundamentally, the key issue to determine is whether it is admissible to maintain 
national lists of “Safe countries”, in the context of the realization of the second phase of a 
CEAS, even where more effective common standards and conditions exist for the 
establishment of those lists524. The position adopted in the recast proposal to refer only to 
national lists rather than the adoption of common lists525 at European level and the 
involvement of the EASO in the process of determining the assumption of safe third 
countries, seems to be inconsistent with the existence of a common policy based on a 
uniform procedure and common standards526. The reasons provided for this seem to be 
based on the difficulty of achieving consensus at European level. However, these reasons 
are only partly convincing. The practical difficulties of reaching agreement among the EU 
Member States lie frequently in the context of harmonization of asylum and immigration 
law. The deletion of the concept of European lists draws the wrong conclusions from the 
practical difficulties. Difficult processes of reaching agreement may also be overcome by 
introducing different legal techniques which would provide for a gradual harmonization 
rather than an immediate harmonization. Thus, in public international law, procedures are 
used providing for techniques of standard setting which are not necessarily obligatory but 
require Member States to explicitly file their deviation from standards and recommended 
practices if they are not able or willing to comply presently with such standards and 
practices. The establishment of the EASO should be used as an opportunity to introduce 
new instruments for gradual alignment of national practices and laws with regard to 
matters for which it may be practicable or suitable to adopt a binding decision by majority 
voting.  
 
The same analysis applies to the “European safe third country” concept, examined in the 
following section. The argument that it is difficult to reach this consensus is not a 
convincing one. It could be argued that everything is difficult in the area we are dealing 
with and it is not an adequate argument to abandon a concept simply because there are 
very different political, historical and geographical considerations. If one was to adopt that 
argument, one might as well give up on the whole idea of the CEAS on the same basis. 
 
SOLUTION: 
The principle of non-refoulement implies the respect of the following conditions: 
- domestic laws have to provide an effective opportunity for the asylum seeker to rebut the 
presumption of safety and the existence of a connection in his particular case, at both the 
procedural and the substantial level; 
- a removal to such a safe third country could only occur on the basis of an agreement 
which clearly outlines the respective responsibility of the Member State and of the STC;  
The concept of CEAS is not consistent with the option of referring merely to national lists 
rather than the adoption of common lists at European level involving the EASO. 
                                                 
523  Articles 29 and 32, recast proposal. 
524  COM (2009) 554 final (Expl. Memo.), p. 7. 
525  Of “safe third countries”, of “European safe third countries” or of “safe countries of origin”. 
526  See the proposition of the LIBE Committee in his Report on the initial proposal of the Directive to 
abolish the possibility of Member States establishing “national” lists of “Safe third countries” (page 
34). 
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4. “EUROPEAN SAFE THIRD COUNTRY“ CONCEPT 
(ARTICLE 36, APD AND ARTICLE 38, RECAST 
PROPOSAL) 
 
To this date, no common list has been adopted at European level, because Article 36 (3), 
APD was annulled by the CJ for procedural reasons527. As a consequence, this concept can 
only be used by Member States which had introduced this concept in their national 
legislation on or before 1 December 2005528. 
  
This specific procedure, which is not envisaged in Article 24, APD, is particularly criticized, 
because it allows Member States to designate authorities, other than the determining 
authority (Article 4 (4) (f), APD), to deny access to the procedure and to the territory 
altogether to any applicant who arrives “illegally” from “European designated countries”, 
unless the State concerned does not re-admit the applicant for asylum. The LIBE 
Committee, among others, has considered that this concept of the so-called “(European) 
super-safe country” is “far more unacceptable compared to the “safe country principle” 
because no minimum principles and guarantees apply to this procedure and access to the 
asylum procedure and territory may be denied altogether. Such denial risks being a 
violation of international refugee law. No category of applicant should be denied access to 
an asylum procedure completely. UNHCR also strongly recommends the deletion of this 
article, which was not foreseen in the Commission proposal”529. Moreover, in its recent 
report “on the practical operation of the methodology for a systematic and rigorous 
monitoring of compliance with the Charter of fundamental rights”530, the Commission has 
emphasized that it considers it inappropriate to table a proposal for the establishment of a 
list of third countries considered as safe for the purposes of the examination of an asylum 
application. Following an application of the above-mentioned methodology, it was 
considered that such a list would raise serious concerns infringing upon the “non-
refoulement” principle under both the Geneva Convention and Article 3 ECHR. 
 
Notwithstanding the strong criticisms by the LIBE Committee, the UNHCR531 and by several 
NGOs, and despite the initial intention to delete it532, this concept of “European safe third 
country” was maintained in the final recast proposal, but only at national level (national 
lists and no European “common” list)533.  
 
Moreover, the possibility of “national lists, which was only conceived as a temporary 
measure in the framework of the APD534 until the “European” list would have been adopted, 
would be the rule in the framework of the recast proposal. By the suppression of the stand-
still clause, this notion which was only used by Germany and which had fallen into disuse 
since the neighbouring States became Member States of the EU, will be available to all 
Member States in the future535.  
                                                 
527  CJ, Parliament v. Council. 
528  Stand-still clause provided by Article 36 (7), APD. 
529  Report LIBE Committee(FINAL A6_0222/2005), amendment No. 157 – p. 70. 
530  COM(2009) 205 final (29.4.2009), p. 6. 
531  The UNHCR has recently expressly pleaded for the abolition of this concept (Green Paper, 2007, p. 
17). 
532  Impact assessment (SEC(2009) 1377, p. 4. 
533  Article 38, recast proposal. 
534  Article 36 (7), APD. For the adoption of a common list, we have to take into account the fact that 
Article 36, (3), APD has been challenged by CJ (Parliament v. Council). 
535  Such as underlined, Article 38, recast proposal in reality revives the “European safe third countries” 
concept: “Member States on the eastern border of the EU may apply this concept to applicants for 
international protection from Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the Russian Federation with as a 
consequence “no, or no full examination of the asylum application”(Meijers Committee, p. 7). 
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If it had have been decided to maintain this concept, the recast proposal of the Commission 
at least should have been completed to foresee minimum principles and guarantees, such 
as those that exist for the similar concept of “inadmissible” applications: a right to a 
personal interview would have been recognized536 and the applicant would have had the 
possibility, during the interview, of challenging, on the one hand, the application of this 
concept on the grounds that the third country is not safe in his/her particular 
circumstances, and, on the other hand, the existence of a connection between him/her and 
the third country concerned537.  
 
It seems also that the decision does not necessarily have to be taken by the “determining 
authority”, but can be taken by another “competent authority”538 designated as such in 
conformity with the national law. This should be clarified and, if another authority may 
indeed take the decision in this procedure, it should be necessary to introduce in the recast 
proposal a provision to oblige Member States to ensure that the members of the personnel 
of this authority have the appropriate knowledge or receive the necessary training to fulfil 
their obligations when implementing the Directive539. We can also ask the question: what 
are the requirements for a decision taken by the “competent authority”540?  
 
If these conditions are indeed applied, there would no longer be any difference with the 
common concept of “safe third country” (STC), such as is defined in Articles 29 (1) (c) and 
32, recast proposal, with the consequence that the “European safe third country” (ESTC) 
concept might as well be abandoned541. 
5.  “SAFE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN” CONCEPT (ARTICLE 30, 
APD– NEW ARTICLE 33, RECAST PROPOSAL) 
 
Two categories of SCO exist: those listed by each Member State (national lists) and those 
included in a European common list. This second category never came into effect since the 
2008 CJ judgment annulling the procedure for composing the list at European level542. The 
procedural consequences of the use of this concept lead to severe criticisms given that for 
instance Article 12 (2) (c), APD permits Member States to omit a personal interview.  
 
The SCO must satisfy the following criteria543: the applicant must: 
 
a. have the nationality of that country; or 
b. be a stateless person and be formerly habitually resident in that country; 
c. have failed to submit any serious grounds for considering the country as an unsafe 
country of origin in his/her particular circumstances and in accordance with the 
“Qualification Directive”. 
 
                                                 
536  Compare with Article 30, recast proposal. 
537  Compare with Article 32 (2) (c), recast proposal. 
538  See Article 38 (1), recast proposal. 
539  Compare with Article 4 (4), recast proposal, concerning personnel of the competent authority for the 
“Dublin” cases. 
540  Compare with Article 10, recast proposal. 
541  The UNHCR has recently expressly pleaded for the abolition of this concept (Green Paper, 2007, p. 
17).The Meijers Committee has also recommended that Article 38, recast proposal be brought in line 
with Article 32 or to delete this concept as was originally envisaged (Meijers Committee, p. 2). 
542  CJ, Parliament v. Council. 
543  Article 31, APD. 
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The recast proposal544 allows the Member States to retain or to introduce legislation 
determining lists of third safe countries of origin, by national lists established in conformity 
with the criteria enumerated in Annex II of the Directive545. However, the Commission 
opted to  reinforce the guarantees and the conditions imposed on the Member States: 
 
– MS have to ensure a regular review of the situation in those countries; 
– MS are no longer authorized to designate a country safe where only a part of it is 
considered so, or if it is only safe for a certain group of persons (the proposition 
deletes current article 30 (3) APD); 
– the assessment of whether a country is a SCO has to be grounded on a range of 
sources of information, including from the EASO; 
– Member States shall notify the Commission the countries that are designated as 
SCO; 
– the applicant must be a national of that country or, if he is a stateless person, he 
has to be habitually resident in that country. 
 
Insofar as the “safe country of origin” concept is maintained for the establishment of 
“national” lists and for the application of a (regular) “accelerated” procedure546, it can be 
admitted that the procedural guarantees envisaged by the modified provisions of the recast 
proposal are acceptable:  
 
– the decision has to be taken by the determining authority547;  
– a personal interview of the applicant has to take place, unless he/she is unfit or 
unable to be interviewed548; during the personal interview, the applicant may 
challenge, on the basis of his/her individual circumstances549,  the presumption of 
safety of a country of origin in relation to both the refugee definition and the 
grounds of subsidiary protection550; 
– the application may only be considered as “unfounded” or “manifestly unfounded”, 
even in an accelerated procedure, when an adequate and complete examination of 
the claim has been conducted by the determining authority which has established 
that the applicant does not qualify for international protection pursuant to the 
“Qualification Directive”551;  
– even if the right to remain in the Member State, pending the outcome of the remedy 
against a negative decision taken in the accelerated procedure, is not foreseen 
under national legislation, it is expressly required that a court or a tribunal shall 
have the power to rule whether or not the applicant may remain on the territory of 
the Member State. This may occur either upon request by the concerned applicant 
or by the court/tribunal acting on its own motion, and the applicant is allowed to 
remain in the territory pending the outcome of this request552. 
 
                                                 
544  Article 33, recast proposal. 
545  The UNHCR has recently declared that the criteria laid down in this Annex are broadly adequate 
(UNHCR Study 2010, p. 67). 
546   Articles 27 (6) (b), 33 and 34, recast proposal. 
547  Article 4 (1), recast proposal. 
548  Article 13 (2) (b), recast proposal. 
549  This implies that the intention of the determining authority to apply the SCO-concept must be 
communicated during the first instance procedure and before the personal interview, and not at the 
same time as the notification of the negative decision in the first instance. The opportunity to 
challenge the application of the SCO-concept only during appeal procedure would not conform with 
the principle of fair and efficient procedure such as is provided for by case law of the CJ. 
550  COM(2009) 554 annex (Det. Expl.), Article 34. 
551  Articles 27 (7) and 28, recast proposal. 
552  Article 41 (6) and (7), recast proposal. 
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The UNHCR has declared that it is not opposed to this notion where it is used as a 
procedural tool for “accelerated” and “simplified” treatment of the claim and in carefully 
restricted situations. Thus, the use of this procedural tool may not increase the burden of 
proof for the asylum-seeker and it remains essential to assess each individual case fully on 
its merits553. The UNHCR also generally agrees with the criteria laid out in Annex II of the 
Directive554 555. 
 
The recast proposal deletes the notion of a “minimum common list of safe countries of 
origin” while consolidating the common objective criteria for the national designation of 
third countries as SCO. While one might argue that the “European safe third country” 
notion is – at least in the current situation – hardly of substantial practical importance, this 
cannot be argued generally with respect to a common list of safe countries of origin. Firstly, 
it is hardly convincing that a national concept of safe countries of origin should be upheld 
while the idea of establishing a European list of safe countries of origin is to be deleted. 
This clearly contradicts the very idea of a CEAS based on the possibilities of receiving 
international protection. Divergence in the application of the” safe country of origin” 
concept also contradicts the intention to reduce incentives, provided that such national 
concepts are applied in a consistent and transparent manner. A common European list may 
also be adopted by way of standards and recommended practices and would enhance the 
credibility of such a concept and increase the transparency of the system, thus reducing 
potential abuse of asylum procedures.  
 
SOLUTION: Providing that the use of national lists of SCO does not increase the burden of 
proof for the asylum-seeker, that each individual case will be examined fully on its merits, 
and that procedural guarantees are offered, the establishment of these lists could be 
acceptable. However, since the procedural guarantees required are the same as in the 
regular procedure, one may wonder, due to the complexity involved, if this concept is really 
necessary for the Member States. 
Moreover, the same criticism applies with respect to the deletion of the common list of 
“European safe third country” and, as we have already discussed, with respect to the use of 
national lists of “safe third countries”. It seems also not to conform with the aim of the 
CEAS to delete the notion of “common EU” lists and to refer only to “national” lists. 
                                                 
553  UNHCR Study 2010, p. 65, 66 and 71. 
554   UNHCR annotated comments June 2002, p. 22; UNHCR Study 2010, p. 67. 
555  K. Hailbronner, Reflexion Note, 2008, par. II.1., page 4. 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 324 
SECTION 4: ORGANIZATION OF THE DIFFERENT PROCED-
URES AT FIRST INSTANCE (ARTICLES 23 TO 34, APD -
ARTICLES 27 TO 38, RECAST PROPOSAL) 
1. COMPLEXITY OF THE PROCEDURES AT FIRST IN-
STANCE UNDER THE FRAMEWORK OF APD AND 
THEIR SIMPLIFICATION BY THE RECAST PROPOSAL 
(SEE COMPARATIVE DIAGRAM IN ANNEX) 
 
The various possibilities provided by the APD to derogate from the “regular” procedure, the 
extent of the derogations allowed by several of its provisions, the wide margin of discretion 
given to Member States to organize the different procedures at national level, and the 
different ‘stand-still’ clauses allowing Member States to maintain national procedures 
organized by national law before 1 December 2005, result in a complex framework of 
procedures organized by the APD. The least that can be said is that this complex framework 
does not reflect the aim of harmonization pursued by the purpose of creating a CEAS. 
 
The complexity of the different procedures provided by the APD is clearly demonstrated in 
the left-hand column of the diagram of procedures reproduced in the Annex: 
 
– the concepts of “prioritized” and “accelerated” procedures are mixed together556, 
although they do not necessarily cover the same situations557; 
– the concept of “specific” procedures, such as those provided by Article 24, APD, 
concerns different types of procedures which rely on totally different grounds; 
– some concepts are used in different procedures, although those procedures do not 
stem from the same background558; 
– the same procedure, such as the “border” procedure, simultaneously authorizes the 
application of a common procedure, such as is foreseen by the Directive, and the 
application of national procedures, with different guarantees, under the cover of 
stand-still clauses; 
– to apply the same concept, such as the “safe country of origin” concept, some 
stand-still clauses allow also the application of criteria other than those normally 
provided for by the Directive,  
– on the issue of the acceleration of proceedings and “manifestly” unfounded 
applications, the APD attempts to solve problems by a multitude of different 
methods to ensure a quick and fair procedure and to cope with “manifestly” 
unfounded or “abusive” claims, but the applications of all these methods has so far 
not produced significant results; 
– the complexity of the different procedures is moreover reinforced by the fact that 
the APD permits in several cases the designation of an authority other than the 
                                                 
556  Article 23 (3) and (4), APD. 
557  Where it is decided to examine an application for asylum as a priority because the claim is considered 
as well-founded or concerns an applicant with special needs, this does not imply that this claim will be 
examined under an “accelerated” procedure with, for example, the possibility of omitting the personal 
interview of the applicant concerned. 
558  For instance, the « Safe third country » concept is used, on the one hand, to permit an “accelerated” 
procedure (Article 23 (4) (c) (ii), APD), and, on the other hand, to apply the “inadmissible 
applications” procedure (Article 25 (2) (c), APD). These procedures are however, totally different: the 
first one supposes that there has been an examination of the substance of the asylum claim; the 
second implies on the contrary that such examination has not been done. 
Setting up a Common European Asylum System:  
Report on the application of existing instruments and proposals for the new system 
 325 
determining authority to take the decision559 and by the fact that, although the APD 
recognizes, as a principle, the application of “minimum basic principles and 
guarantees” during the administrative phase of the examination of an asylum claim, 
it contains numerous exceptions and possible ways to derogate from those minimum 
standards, according to the type of procedure that it has been decided to apply. 
 
SOLUTION: simplification of the procedures 
 
The Commission proposes to simplify, streamline and consolidate procedural arrangements 
across the Union, to put an end to the proliferation of disparate procedural arrangements at 
national level by the deletion of the current stand-still clauses, to lead to more robust 
determinations at first instance, with the aim of reducing potential annulments by the 
appeal bodies, and to simplify the organization of the different procedures at first instance. 
The Commission also envisages a review of the present arrangements for accelerated 
procedures, providing for a limited and exhaustive list of grounds for an accelerated 
examination of (manifestly) unfounded applications and for a rigorous examination of an 
application in such cases, with a personal interview of the applicant560. At the same time, 
the Commission has emphasized the need to safeguard the integrity of procedures, in 
particular regarding the processing of abusive or fraudulent claims. In that respect, it is 
suggested that an obligation for applicants to cooperate with the competent authorities in 
establishing their identity and other elements of the application in relation to Article 4 (2) of 
the “Qualification Directive”561 could be introduced. This proposal would operate in 
conjunction with the current standards which allow Member States to consider applications, 
based on false information or documents with respect to applicants’ identity or nationality, 
as manifestly unfounded and to accelerate their examination. According to the Commission, 
the envisaged measures on quality decision-making are also intended to enhance the 
preparedness of asylum personnel to identify fraudulent or abusive cases in a timely 
fashion. These measures are to be further strengthened by underlining the principle of a 
single determining authority. In sum, the recast proposal of the Commission aims to lay 
down the necessary conditions for making asylum procedures in the Union more accessible, 
efficient, fair and context-sensitive and to ensure higher and more coherent standards on 
asylum procedures that would guarantee an adequate examination of the protection needs 
of third country nationals or stateless persons in line with, in particular ,the case law of the 
CJ and of the ECtHR, but, at the same time, with the will to maintain procedural 
arrangements aimed at preventing abuse. 
 
In the following comments, we will examine, taking into account some aspects of the 
organization of the asylum procedures, whether the recast proposal correctly reflects, on 
the one hand, the aims pursued by the Commission and, on the other hand, the 
international and EU obligations of Members States regarding asylum seekers, among the 
other minimal requirements resulting from the case law of the CJ and of the ECtHR. 
However, if we look at the second column of the procedures’ diagram, we can already see 
that the new framework proposed by the recast proposal is, in fact, much more accessible 
and comprehensive than the one currently provided by the APD. 
                                                 
559  See the different possibilities provided for by Article 4 (2), APD. 
560  COM (2009) 554 final (Expl. Memo.), p. 7. 
561  Article 12 (1), recast proposal. 
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2. TIME LIMIT FOR CONDUCTING A NORMAL PROCED-
URE AT FIRST INSTANCE (ARTICLE 27 (3) AND (4), 
RECAST PROPOSAL) 
 
In contrast to Article 23 (2), APD, which does not expressly stipulate a maximal time limit 
to take a decision, by virtue of Article 27 (3) and (4) of the  recast proposal, Member 
States would have, 6 months to conclude the examination of an application for international 
protection from the time the application was lodged. The new provision contains only one 
possibility of extending that time limit, for a period not exceeding a further 6 months, in 
individual cases involving complex issues of fact and law562. The consequences of a failure 
to adopt a decision within those time limits shall be determined in accordance with national 
law. The question raised however is whether a better way of conforming with the aim of 
harmonization of the CEAS would be to provide the consequences of such a failure in the 
Directive itself. 
 
SOLUTION: Article 27 (4), recast proposal should be completed in order to determine the 
consequences of the failure to adopt a decision within the determined time limits: one 
possibility that could be introduced would be to permit the asylum seeker to request a 
decision of the first instance authority at the end of the period of 12 months but before the 
end of a determined time limit. This would open a right to an effective remedy within the 
meaning of Article 41, recast proposal in the absence of a decision at the end of this time 
limit. 
 
3. “PRIORITIZED” REGULAR PROCEDURE (ARTICLE 23 
(3) AND (4), APD – ARTICLE 27 (5), RECAST 
PROPOSAL) 
 
It is proposed in the recast proposal to clearly distinguish the “prioritized” procedures and 
the “accelerated” procedures. “Prioritized” procedures should be applied by Member States 
in order to process certain categories of cases more quickly, such as well founded cases or 
cases of applicants with special needs in line with Article 20, recast proposal. But this 
possibility is expressly subject to two limitations: 1°) such a prioritized examination must 
not be based on considerations that the case in question may be “unfounded” by virtue of 
Article 27 (6), recast proposal (which means cases in which “accelerated” procedures can 
be applied)563; 2°) the basic principles and guarantees as well as the requirement of an 
adequate and complete examination must be fully respected564. It is also expressly recalled 
that the characterization of applications made by applicants with special needs as ‘priority 
applications’ does not necessarily imply that such examinations will be proceeded with 
more quickly.  The option to extend the initial 6 month period of examination in cases 
involving complex issues of fact and law may indeed also be required in cases of applicants 
with special needs565. 
 
                                                 
562  Such as was emphasized in the Det. Expl. (COM (2009) 554 Annex, Article 27 – p. 13), this provision 
is influenced by the case law of the CJ concerning decisions on residence permits (CJ, Panayatova, 
par. 26 and 27). 
563  Article 27 (5) (c), recast proposal. 
564  Article 27 (5) (c), recast proposal. 
565  COM (2009) 554 Annex (Det. Expl.), Article 27 – p. 13. 
Setting up a Common European Asylum System:  
Report on the application of existing instruments and proposals for the new system 
 327 
In this context, it can be considered that the proposal of the Commission to clearly 
distinguish between the two types of procedures is a step forwards.  
4. “ACCELERATED” REGULAR PROCEDURE (INTER ALIA 
“(MANIFESTLY) UNFOUNDED APPLICATIONS”) 
(ARTICLE 23 (4), APD – ARTICLE 27 (6) AND (7), 
RECAST PROPOSAL) 
 
Having regard to the fact that it is in the interest both of the Member States and the 
applicant to know as soon as possible the decision that has been taken on an asylum 
application, without prejudice to an adequate and complete examination of the request566 
and in accordance with the basic principles and guarantees of Chapter II of the Directive, it 
is, as a principle, admissible that Member States organize “accelerated procedures” in 
respect of the provisions of the Directive. Even the UNHCR accepts the use of accelerated 
procedures, but only insofar as these procedures should only be applied in a very limited 
number of cases: only cases that are “clearly abusive” (i.e. clearly fraudulent) or 
“manifestly unfounded” (i.e. not related to the grounds for granting international 
protection)567. 
 
The main problems of the APD are threefold:  
 
i. the over-reliance on the significant scope of accelerated procedures for asylum 
applications568; (ii) the procedural consequences foreseen by Member States when 
using accelerated procedures (inter alia, the possibility of omitting in some 
circumstances a personal interview or the possibility of denying a suspensive effect 
of an appeal); 
ii. the existence of “national” lists of “safe countries of origin” and of “safe third 
countries”. 
 
Article 23 (4), APD expressly enumerates 22 scenarios of potentially (manifestly) 
unfounded applications and this enumeration is not exhaustive: the question that arises 
therefore is whether this can be considered reasonable569? Doubt is permitted for some of 
the enumerated possibilities570, even if Article 28 (1), APD reaffirms the obligation for the 
                                                 
566  Article 23 (2), APD. 
567  UNHCR EXCOM Conclusion No 30(XXXIV) on the Problem of Manifestly Unfounded or Abusive 
Applications for Refugee Status or Asylum, 20 October 1983; UNHCR’s Position on Manifestly 
Unfounded Applications for Asylum, 1 December 1992, 3 European Series 2, p. 397. See also the 
Resolution 1471(2005) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (Accelerated asylum 
procedures in Council of Europe Member States): the Parliamentary Assembly has invited the 
governments of the Member States to ensure, inter alia, that minimum procedural safeguards were 
met in accelerated asylum procedures including the right to an individual determination of one’s claim 
and the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 ECHR. 
568  All these cases are derived from the Council Resolution of 30 November 1992 on Manifestly 
Unfounded Applications for Asylum.  The notion of “(manifestly) unfounded claims” was introduced in 
asylum policies in Europe in the 1980s for two reasons: 1°) the perception that the asylum systems of 
western European States was overburdened by claims from people fleeing economic hardship and 
seeking a better life; 2°) the will to reduce the burden on full determination procedures (R. BYRNE, G. 
NOLL and J. VESTED-HANSEN, p. 403; S. OAKLEY, p. 9). 
569  Compare the initial proposal of Directive (September 2000) (6 possibilities) with the amended 
proposal of Directive (June 2002) (12 possibilities). 
570  LIBE Committee had suggested in its Report on the amended proposal of Directive ( A6 - 0222/2005 
FINAL) (Amendment 114) to delete Article 23(4)(g) of the Directive(Justification: article 23 permits 
prioritization or acceleration in a wide range of cases, the consequences of which are left largely to the 
Member States, and may lead to considerably reduced safeguards. Amongst others, the Directive 
permits States to dispense with personal interviews and other significant procedural requirements. 
Many such claims will not fall within the definition of “clearly abusive” or “manifestly unfounded” 
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determining authority to assess each individual case fully on its merits. At this point, it 
must also be remembered that a personal interview for an applicant is not required in some 
cases of “unfounded applications” (Article 12 (2) (c), APD). So, even if the proposal to re-
examine the list of Article 23 (4), APD is a sensible one571, the concept of “manifestly 
unfounded” applications would obviously have to be examined very closely for each 
individual application and one will have to examine critically whether in such cases a 
personal interview is or is not necessary. 
 
The first amendment provided by the Commission suggests the replacement of the current 
illustrative list of the APD with an exhaustive list of circumstances (6 instead of 22 where a 
Member State could apply an “accelerated” procedure572. The aim of the Commission is to 
limit the grounds of an accelerated examination of an application to grounds which are 
directly linked with the elements of the application as described in Article 4 (2) of the 
“Qualification Directive”. An accelerated examination of the application should only be 
possible where serious deficiencies appear in the application for international protection, 
which may relate to both the statements of the applicant and/or the documents he/she 
submits or is expected to submit in order to substantiate the claim573. The Commission 
considers that this approach is “in line with UNCHR EXCOM Conclusion No 30”574. Regarding 
the content of this conclusion, we can indeed consider575 that, with the exception of the use 
of the “safe country of origin” concept”576 – already examined in this draft, the limited 
cases provided for by the recast proposal to authorize an “accelerated” examination of an 
application are broadly in line with the notions of “clearly abusive” or “manifestly 
unfounded” applications in the meaning of this Conclusion577. 
 
It can furthermore, be considered that the procedural guarantees provided by the recast 
proposal for applying an “accelerated procedure”, are in line with those recommended by 
the UNHCR in the same Conclusion No. 30578: 1°) Member States have to lay down 
                                                                                                                                                            
claims, which could be dealt with through an accelerated procedure, according to the conclusions of 
states and international bodies” (See also the European Parliament legislative resolution on the 
amended proposal for a Council directive on minimum standards for procedure in Member States for 
granting and withdrawing refugee status (P6_TA(2005)0349 - Amendment 115). 
571  It would, in this regard, have been argued that the enumeration of a large number of reasons for 
accelerated proceedings is not the problem as such and that the essential point is, in reality, whether 
the reasons mentioned justify the dispensing, in those circumstances, with certain procedural 
requirements, such as the omitting of a personal interview or the right to remain during an appeal 
procedure. It is however, the case that are no reasons to accelerate the examination of, and to 
exclude from, a regular procedure, applications which are not “clearly abusive” or “manifestly 
unfounded”. As recently observed, consideration must be given on the fact that very short time-
frames render very difficult the exercise of rights and obligations by the applicant and the complete 
examination of the claim by the determining authority (UNHCR Study 2010, p. 53). 
572  Article 27 (6), recast proposal. 
573  COM (2009) 554 annex (Det. Expl.), Article 27 – p. 13. 
574  Ibid. In this conclusion, the “clearly abusive” or “manifestly unfounded” applications are defined as 
“those which are clearly fraudulent or not related to the criteria for the granting of refugee status (…) 
nor to any other criteria justifying the granting of asylum”. 
575  The same conclusion can also be made regarding the Resolution 1471(2005) of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe (Accelerated asylum procedures in Council of Europe Member 
States). 
576  Article 27 (6) (b) recast proposal. 
577  Even if the UNHCR considers that grounds for examining claims in accelerated procedure should be 
interpreted strictly and cautiously, and that, in particular, grounds which are unrelated to the merits 
of the application should not be included in the list of criteria for examining a claim in an accelerated 
procedure (UNHCR Study 2010, p. 57), we didn’t find any legal argument to condemn the new list 
provided by the recast proposal. 
578  The UNCHR considers in this Conclusion that the use of a special procedure for dealing in an 
expeditious manner with applications considered as “clearly abusive” or “manifestly unfounded” is 
admissible provided that such procedure is accompanied by the following appropriate procedural 
guarantees: 1°) a complete personal interview by an official of the determining authority; 2°) the 
establishment of the “manifestly unfounded” or “abusive” character of an application by the 
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reasonable time limits for the adoption of a decision579; 2°) the decision has to be taken by 
the determining authority580; 3°) a personal interview of the applicant has to take place, 
unless he/she is unfit or unable to be interviewed581; 4°) the application may only be 
considered as “unfounded” or “manifestly unfounded”, even in an accelerated procedure, 
where an adequate and complete examination of the claim has been conducted by the 
determining authority, which has established that the applicant does not qualify for 
international protection pursuant to the “Qualification Directive”582; 5°) even if the right to 
remain in the Member State pending the outcome of the remedy against a negative 
decision taken in the accelerated procedure is not provided under national legislation, it is 
expressly required that a court or a tribunal shall have the power to rule whether or not the 
applicant may remain on the territory of the Member State, either upon request of the 
applicant or by the court or tribunal acting on its own motion, and the applicant is allowed 
to remain in the territory pending the outcome of this request583. 
 
The emphasis can also be put on the fact that the “safe third country” concept is no longer 
envisaged in the proposed Article 27 (6), recast proposal584, but only in the provisions of 
the recast proposal concerning the “inadmissible applications”585. The confusion between 
“accelerated” procedure and “inadmissible applications” procedure is in this way avoided586. 
 
Taking into account the exhaustive list of possibilities allowing the acceleration of the 
examination of an application for international protection, the procedural guarantees 
accompanying the application of this procedure, such as the aim to preserve the integrity of 
the asylum system and to conserve the efforts and resources for dealing with cases which 
raise more complex issues of facts and law, the proposal of the Commission concerning the 
“accelerated” procedures appears to be an acceptable one. It has however, to be noted that 
time limits to conduct such procedures should not be too short and that the applicant has 
to be given a realistic opportunity to prove his/her claim587. 
5. “INADMISSIBLE APPLICATIONS” PROCEDURE (ART-
ICLES 25, 27, AND 23, (4), (C), (II) AND 28, (2), APD 
– ARTICLES 29 – 32, RECAST PROPOSAL) 
 
The discussion so far has already included an examination of the “inadmissible applications” 
procedure in the context of the concepts of “first country of asylum” and “safe third 
country”588, as well as the proposals of the Commission relating to the new procedural 
guarantees justified by the case law of the ECtHR and the CJ. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
determining authority; and 3°) a possibility for the unsuccessful applicant to ask for the review of a 
negative decision before rejection at the frontier or forcible removal from the territory. 
579  Article 27 (8), recast proposal. 
580  Article 4 (1), recast proposal. 
581  Article 13 (2) (b), recast proposal. 
582  Articles 27 (7) and 28, recast proposal. 
583  Article 41 (6) and (7), recast proposal. 
584  Compare with Article 23 (4) (c) (ii), APD. 
585  Article 29 (2) (c) and 32, recast proposal. 
586  ECRE disagrees however, with the inclusion of “safe third country cases” in the “admissibility” 
procedural stage, considering that the question whether a country can be considered safe for a 
particular applicant needs to be dealt with in the substantive determination procedure (ECRE 
Information Note 2006, p. 26). 
587  ECtHR, Bahaddar, par. 45. 
588  Supra sections III.2. and III.3. 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 330 
Risks of confusion in the recast proposal: “inadmissible applications” procedure or 
“preliminary examination” procedure(1.); rules applicable to an “admissibility 
interview”(2.); “competent” or “determining” authority(3.); “inadmissible applications” 
concept and “subsequent” applications or “(manifestly) unfounded” applications(4.); right 
to a judicial remedy in the “preliminary examination” procedure (5.). 
 
The possibility of declaring an application as “inadmissible” is also envisaged where “the 
applicant has lodged an identical application after a final decision”589 or where “a dependant 
of the applicant lodges an application, after he/she has, in accordance with Article 6 (4), 
recast proposal, consented to have his/her case be part of an application made on his/her 
behalf, and there are no facts relating to the dependant’s situation, which justify a separate 
application”590. However, we do not clearly see the difference between the two possibilities, 
provided by Article 29, recast proposal, of declaring a “new” application “inadmissible”, and 
the possibility provided by Article 35 (2)(b)591 and (7),592 recast proposal, of applying to the 
same applications the specific procedure of “preliminary examination” of a subsequent 
application. Where is the coherence between the two procedures? Or does it mean that 
Member States may examine subsequent applications in an “inadmissible” procedure where 
they have not organized the specific procedure of the “preliminary examination” of a 
subsequent application, by virtue of Article 35 (2) to (7), recast proposal?  
 
Having regard to the fact that Article 30 (2), recast proposal expressly refers to Article 5 of 
the “Dublin Regulation” (with its specific requirement of a personal interview), the question 
also raised is whether the requirements for a personal interview, such as provided by the 
basic principles and guarantees of Chapter II (Articles 13 to 16), recast proposal, apply or 
not to the “admissibility (personal) interview” provided by Article 30 (1), recast proposal. 
Taking into account the minimal requirements resulting from the case law of the ECtHR and 
of the CJ, we would give a positive answer, but this is not certain if we compare Article 29 
(1)593 with Article 27 (1)594 of the recast proposal. 
 
The use of the concept of “competent authorities”595 for taking an inadmissibility decision, 
has already been discussed596. If an authority other than the determining authority would 
indeed be able to take the decision regarding the admissibility of an application, the 
question raised is whether Article 4 (3), recast proposal could be modified to clarify this 
question. It should also be necessary to introduce in the recast proposal a provision to 
oblige Member States to ensure that the personnel of such an authority have the 
appropriate knowledge, or receive the necessary training, to fulfil their obligations when 
implementing the Directive597. 
 
The question arises also whether it would be possible to abandon the concept of 
“inadmissible applications” and to attribute such cases either to “subsequent applications” 
procedures or to “manifestly unfounded application” procedures. The former has been 
                                                 
589  Article 29 (2) (d), recast proposal. 
590  Article 29 (2) (e), recast proposal. 
591  The applicant has not presented “new elements or findings” relating to his/her new (identical) claim. 
592  The applicant has not presented “facts relating to the dependant’s situation which justify a separate 
application”. 
593  “Inadmissible” application means no examination of the substance of the claim. 
594  Basic principles and guarantees of Chapter II apply where there is an examination of the claim. 
595  Article 30 (2) (b), recast proposal (See also: COM (2009) 554 Annex (Det. Expl.), Article 32 – p. 15). 
It has to be recalled that the only possibility for Member States to designate an authority other than 
the “determining authority” is expressly limited to the “Dublin” cases by virtue of Article 4 (3), recast 
proposal. 
596  Supra, Section II.4. 
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discussed above. Regarding the latter aspect of the question, we think that it is necessary 
to keep “(manifestly) unfounded applications” distinct, which means that there has been an 
examination by the determining authority on the substance of the application, and the 
“inadmissible applications”, which have not been examined on their substance (by the 
determining authority?). 
 
Attention can also be focused on the fact that the possibility of challenging a negative 
decision taken in a “preliminary examination” procedure of a subsequent application (Article 
35 (2), recast proposal) does not appear to be mentioned more expressly in Article 41 (1), 
recast proposal598. Although the list mentioned in this Article is not exhaustive, it would be 
better to expressly refer to this type of decision. 
 
SOLUTION: further explanations would be given regarding the different risks of confusion 
and the recast proposal could be completed if needed. 
6. BORDER PROCEDURES (ARTICLES 4 (2) (D) AND (E), 
24 AND 35, APD – ARTICLE 37, RECAST PROPOSAL) 
 
There is a consensus on the fact that if a Member State decides to organize a “Border 
procedure”599, there is no reason for the requirements and guarantees for the examination 
of applications for international protection submitted at the border to be considerably 
different from those submitted within the territory, with certain exceptions strictly justified 
by the limited facilities “sur place”600. 
 
In accordance with this consensus and taking into account the case law of the ECtHR and of 
the CJ, the following questions have to be examined: 
 
– would the examination of the asylum claim, to decide that this claim is “unfounded” 
or “inadmissible”, be done by border guards or other control authorities or, on the 
other hand, by the determining authority?; 
– whether the procedural guarantees provided for in the procedure organized by 
Member States by virtue of Article 35 (1), APD are sufficient: is there a time-limit to 
decide on an application examined at the border? Is there a right for the applicant to 
enter the territory if the competent/determining authority considers that a further 
examination of the claim is necessary? Will there be a personal interview by the 
competent or determining authority? 
– in the framework of the second phase of the establishment of CEAS, are there 
specific reasons to maintain the specific “border procedure” foreseen by Article 35 
(2), APD?  
– is it justified to provide different procedurals guarantees for the two procedures 
(Article 35 (1), APD: basic principles and guarantees of Chapter II of the Directive, 
with several derogations, including, among others, the right to a personal interview 
/ Article 35 (2) and (3), APD: respect of the procedural guarantees envisaged by 
these specific provisions)? 
                                                                                                                                                            
597  Compare with Article 4 (3) and (4), recast proposal, concerning the personnel of the “competent 
authority” for the “Dublin” cases.  
598  Compare with Article 39 (1) (c), APD. 
599  It has also to be recalled that the possibility of examining an application for international protection at 
the border or in transit zone has expressly been admitted by the ECtHr (Gebremedhin – concerning 
the legal status of the transit zones: ECtHr, Amuur). 
600  Report LIBE Committee, p. 10 and 65; ECRE Information Note, 2006, p. 7 and 31; UNHCR annotated 
comments, 2002, p. 6. 
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– how is it possible to simultaneously take into account the problem of “mixed 
arrivals” and the necessity for the Member States to organize an efficient border 
control in order to avoid “uncontrolled” immigration? 
– Which directive is the most appropriate to determine the status of the asylum 
seekers expecting entry into the territory who are waiting at the border or in transit 
zones: the “Procedures Directive” or the “Reception Conditions’ Directive”? 
 
If we look at the recast proposal of the Commission, we can consider that most of these 
questions are correctly resolved: 
 
– the decision on the application for international protection has to be taken by the 
determining authority; 
– the basic principles and guarantees of Chapter II of the Directive apply to the 
examination of those applications601; 
– an application for international protection may only be rejected at the border or in 
transit zones where this application is considered as “inadmissible” or constitutes 
one of the six cases in which an “accelerated” procedure can be applied602; 
– the stand-still clause provided for by the former Article 35 (2) and (3), APD is 
deleted; 
– the “border” procedure is not applicable to unaccompanied minors603; 
– the appeal against a negative decision has an automatic suspensive effect604; 
– and the maintenance of a “border” procedure offers the Member States concerned 
the possibility of organising an efficient border control to avoid “uncontrolled” 
immigration. 
 
The remaining mains problems that have to be discussed are: 
 
– the very short time-frames which may be applied by Member States, to introduce an 
appeal, could render the exercise of rights and obligations by the applicant very 
difficult605;  
– the determination of the status of the applicants who are waiting at the border or in 
transit zones during the examination of their claim. 
                                                 
601  Article 37 (1), recast proposal. As was recalled by the Commission, the amendment aims at ensuring 
the availability of basic principles and guarantees for all applicants for international protection 
irrespective of where the application is lodged (COM (2009) 554 annex (Det. Expl.), Article 37 – p. 
17). 
602  Article 37 (1) (a) and (b), recast proposal. This implies that “admissible” cases which do not fall under 
the notion of “manifestly unfounded” applications are to be processed in “in-land procedures” 
(COM(2009) 554 annex(Det. Expl. ), Article 37 – p. 17). 
603  Article 21 (6), recast proposal.  
604  Article 41 (5) and (6), recast proposal 
605  It has also to be taken into consideration that the stay of an applicant at the border should be, as a 
principle, as short as possible. 
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7. SUBSEQUENT APPLICATIONS PROCEDURE (ARTICLES 
4 (2)(C), 32, 33 AND 34, APD – ARTICLES 35 AND 36, 
RECAST PROPOSAL) – RELATION WITH PROVISIONS 
ON IMPLICIT/EXPLICIT WITHDRAWAL OF A 
PREVIOUS APPLICATION (ARTICLES 19 AND 20, APD 
– ARTICLES 23 AND 24, RECAST PROPOSAL) 
 
Although the minimum procedural guarantees which are applicable in the framework of this 
“ specific inadmissibility procedure”606 are more limited than the basic guarantees set out in 
Chapter II of the Directive, it is, in principle, acceptable for  Member States to conduct a 
“preliminary examination” of a subsequent application for international protection 
introduced in the same Member State, in order to  determine whether new “relevant” facts 
and evidence have arisen or have been presented by the applicant in comparison with 
his/her previous application607. There are however, certain reservations about the fact that 
this specific procedure can also be applied in circumstances where the first application for 
international protection has not been examined on its substance. For instance, ECRE 
considers that this procedure should not be applied: 1°) in the case of  explicit or implicit 
withdrawal of a previous application; 2°) in cases where a Member State takes back an 
applicant under the “Dublin Regulation”; 3°) and to applicants who fail to go to a reception 
centre or to appear before the competent authorities at a specified time, with the 
consequence that they have not had the opportunity to expose the reasons of their claim608 
The UNHCR considers also that it is not appropriate to equate explicit or implicit withdrawal 
of an asylum application with the rejection of a claim609 and suggests therefore, that the 
requirements  for the resumption or re-opening of an asylum procedure should not be as 
stringent as they are for cases which are rejected in a final decision610. In the UNHCR’s 
view, Member States should not automatically refuse to examine a subsequent application 
on the grounds that the new elements or findings could have been raised in the previous 
procedure or on appeal611; such a procedural bar may indeed lead to a breach of Member 
State’s non-refoulement and human rights treaty obligations612. 
 
The Commission proposes in the recast the modification of the scope of the ‘preliminary 
examination’ procedure in order to achieve a number of aims most notably: the reduction 
of  the root causes of subsequent applications – with the consequent risk of violation of the 
principle of non refoulement;  the limitation of the number of successful appeals in such 
situations and;  in order to ensure that all necessary efforts will be taken, to guarantee at 
least one rigorous examination of the protection needs where a person lodges an 
                                                 
606  Recital (25), recast proposal. 
607  The UNHCR, in principle, agrees with such specific procedure (UNHCR Study 2010, p. 72). 
608  ECRE Information Note 2006, p. 29. 
609  UNHCR annotated comments 2002, p. 24. 
610  UNHCR Study 2010, p. 44 and 46. Articles 19 and 20, APD allow the competent authority to take a 
decision to either discontinue the examination or to reject the application. In the first case, the 
applicant who reappears is considered as requesting the re-opening of his initial claim; in the second 
case, he is considered as introducing a subsequent application, with the possibility for the Member 
State concerned to apply the specific “preliminary examination” procedure. 
611  Compare with the examination “ex nunc” expressly provided by Article 41, recast proposal. 
612  UNHCR Study 2010, p. 74.  The UNHCR observes moreover, that there is no specific procedure as 
such in six of the twelve Member States surveyed and that, in those States, the so called “preliminary 
examination” of a subsequent application is conducted by the determining authority as an initial phase 
of the examination of the claim in a (new) regular procedure (ibidem). 
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application for the first time613. This modified procedure would only be applicable where a 
person makes a subsequent application after a final decision has been taken on the 
previous application or where his/her previous application has been explicitly withdrawn by 
virtue of Article 23, recast proposal. Furthermore, Article 35 (9), recast proposal expressly 
provides that, where a person, with regard to whom a transfer decision is to be enforced 
pursuant to the “Dublin Regulation”, makes further representations or a subsequent 
application in the transferring Member State, those representations or subsequent 
application shall be examined by the responsible Member State, as defined in the “Dublin 
Regulation” in accordance with the “Asylum Procedures Directive”. It means in concrete 
terms that a “preliminary examination procedure” will only be possible where there has 
been an explicit withdrawal of the previous application or a final decision taken on the 
substance of this application by the Member State concerned614.  
 
In order to avoid a possible violation of the principle of non-refoulement and to be in line 
with the case law of the ECtHR, this proposal is a good step forward. On the contrary, the 
proposal of the UNHCR to extend this solution in cases of explicit withdrawal is not 
convincing, provided that the applicant has been fully informed in advance of the 
consequences of his/her decision to explicitly withdraw his/her claim. 
 
In cases where applicants abuse the asylum procedure with a view to inter alia delaying or 
frustrating the enforcement of a return decision, the Commission proposes, to introduce 
procedural devices615 aimed at dealing with multiple applications for international protection 
lodged in the same Member States. The aim of this proposal is to prevent abuse of asylum 
procedures and enable the “competent” authorities to deal effectively with repeated 
applications whilst ensuring necessary safeguards against refoulement616. if, following a 
final decision to consider a (first) subsequent application “inadmissible” or a final decision 
to reject a (first) subsequent application as “unfounded”, the person concerned lodges a 
new (second) (subsequent) application in the same Member State before a return decision 
has been enforced, this Member State can make an exception to the right to remain in the 
territory during the examination of his/her claim617, “provided the determining authority is 
satisfied that a return decision will not lead to direct or indirect refoulement in violation of 
international and Community obligations of that Member State”618. The Member State may 
also provide that this subsequent application will be subject to an ‘admissibility” procedure 
or to an “accelerated” procedure, by which it will be possible to derogate from the time 
limits normally applicable in those procedures619. By virtue of Article 8 (2), recast proposal, 
it is however, expressly provided that refoulement to the country of origin of the applicant 
concerned cannot take place when the decision to apply Article 35 (8), recast proposal has 
been made.  
 
                                                 
613  COM (2009) 554 Annex (Det. Expl.), Article 35 – p. 16. 
614  See also Article 24 (3), recast proposal, which provides that the application of the procedure in the 
case of implicit withdrawal or abandonment of the application will be without prejudice to the “Dublin 
Regulation”. This amendment is proposed by the Commission to make it clear “that the notion of 
implicit withdrawal or abandonment of the application is not applicable where the person concerned is 
transferred to the responsible Member State in accordance with the Dublin Regulation” (COM (2009) 
554 annex(Det. Expl.), Article 24 – p. 12). These comments seem to be a reaction to some problems 
caused when applicants were taken back by some Member States by virtue of the Dublin Regulation 
(see, for instance, ECtHR, T.I. and K.R.S.). 
615  Article 35 (8), recast proposal. 
616  COM (2009) 554 annex (Det. Expl.), Article 35 – p. 17. 
617  Article 8, recast proposal. 
618  Article 35 (8) (a), recast proposal. 
619  Article 35 (8) (b) and (c), recast proposal. 
Setting up a Common European Asylum System:  
Report on the application of existing instruments and proposals for the new system 
 335 
The question raised however,620 is whether it should be possible for the applicant to 
introduce a remedy before a court or a tribunal against an expulsion order taken in such 
circumstances, and whether this remedy should have suspensive effect, such as provided 
by Article 41 (5), recast proposal, or, at least, to ask for such a suspensive effect, by virtue 
of Article 41 (6) and (7), recast proposal621. Or will a remedy only be initiated against such 
a decision, by virtue of Article 13 (1) of the “Return Directive”622? 
 
It seems that the decision in such a preliminary examination of the subsequent application 
does not necessarily have to be taken by the determining authority, it can also be taken by 
another “competent authority” designated as such under national law623, provided that the 
determining authority has been consulted previously. This should be clarified and, if 
another authority may indeed take the decision in a preliminary examination procedure, it 
should be necessary to include in the recast proposal a provision obliging Member States to 
ensure that the personnel of this authority have the appropriate knowledge or receive the 
necessary training to fulfil their obligations when implementing the Directive624. A further 
question is also raised: what are the requirements for a decision taken by the “competent” 
authority in such circumstances625? 
 
SOLUTION: under the above-mentioned conditions, it has to be considered that this limited 
exception to the right to remain on the territory during the administrative examination of a 
(second or multiple) subsequent claim is admissible, considering the international 
obligations of the Member States and the case law of ECtHR and CJ. Further explanations 
have however, to be given concerning: 1°) the right to an effective remedy (should the 
“Return Directive” be applied or Article 41, recast proposal which would be completed in 
this sense?) and 2°) the relations between the “competent authority” and the “determining 
authority” before such an expulsion order should be decided. 
8. “NATIONAL SECURITY PROVISIONS” PROCEDURE 
(ARTICLE 4, (2) (B), APD) 
 
The only current provision of the APD that deals with this special procedure626 is Article 4 
(2) (b), which obliges the national authority to consult the determining authority prior to 
                                                 
620  It is indeed not expressly mentioned either in Article 41 (1), recast proposal (this provision does not 
expressly refer to such decision) nor in the “Det. Expl.” of the recast proposal (COM (2009)554 
annex). Compare this however, with Article 36 (3) (a), recast proposal, by virtue of which the 
applicant has to be informed of the possibilities of seeking an appeal or review of the decision. 
621  However, it is once again not expressly mentioned in Article 41 (6), recast proposal, which only refers 
to decisions taken in the accelerated procedure pursuant to Article 27 (6), recast proposal or to a 
decision to consider an application inadmissible pursuant to Article 29 (2) (d), recast proposal. 
622  The possibility of introducing an effective remedy to appeal against or to seek review of decisions 
related to return, before a competent judicial or administrative authority or a competent body 
composed of members who are impartial and who enjoy safeguards and independence, and who have 
the ability to temporarily suspend the enforcement, unless a temporary suspension is already 
applicable under national legislation. 
623  Regarding the risk of confusion between “competent” or “determining” authority, see Section II.4. 
624  Compare this with Article 4 (4), recast proposal, concerning the personnel of the competent authority 
for the “Dublin” cases. 
625  Article 36 (3) (a), recast proposal only provides that the applicant has to be informed “in a 
appropriate” manner (UNHCR suggests that the decision would be given “in writing” – UNHCR Study 
2010, p. 78). Compare with Article 10, recast proposal. 
626  See however Article 23 (4) (m), APD (where it is possible for the determining authority to accelerate 
the examination of the application if the applicant constitutes a danger to the national security or 
public order of the Member State concerned or has been forcibly expelled for serious reasons of public 
security and public order under national law) Such provision is not included in Article 27 (6), recast 
proposal. 
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taking a decision627. It has however, to be underlined that this provision no longer exists in 
the recast proposal. 
 
SOLUTION: it seems necessary to complete the recast proposal by including more “National 
security provision(s)”, for example to require a prioritized examination of the claim by the 
determining authority in such circumstances, or at least to ensure the respect of the 
principle of non refoulement, in line with the case law of the ECtHR628. 
9. WITHDRAWAL INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION STAT-
US PROCEDURE (ARTICLE 37 DIRECTIVE – ARTICLE 
39, RECAST PROPOSAL) 
 
In comparison with Article 37, APD, Article 39 (4) of the recast proposal no longer permits 
a Member State to decide, without respecting the procedural guarantees envisaged in this 
Article, to withdraw the recognized status by virtue of the “cessation clauses” provided for 
by the “Qualification Directive629". This modification is a step forward. 
 
SOLUTION:  
1. In contrast to the provisions of the recast proposal which introduce the right to (free) 
legal assistance at all stages of the procedures at first instance (Article 18 (1) and (2) (a)), 
this right is only recognized once the “competent authority”630 has taken the decision to 
withdraw the international protection status (Article 40 (3), recast proposal). We do not see 
how this difference in treatment can reasonably be justified. 
2. Concerning the right to be heard, Article 40 (1) (b), recast proposal allows Member 
States to replace the personal interview with a written statement of the reasons why it is 
justified to withdraw the status631; taking into account the proposals of the Commission 
with regard to the right to a personal interview for the examination of an application for 
international protection, we do not see why the person concerned would not have the right 
to a personal interview before the withdrawing of the status, at least when he/she 
expressly requests such an interview. 
10. FINAL REFLECTIONS ON THE COMPLEXITY OF THE 
PROCEDURES AT FIRST INSTANCE 
 
In its current version, the language of the APD is incoherent and sometime ambiguous; the 
Directive is unnecessarily overcomplicated and the aim of harmonization is severely 
undermined by the scope for multiple and different optional procedures and the large 
number of permissible derogations from the “minimum” standards the Directive is 
supposed to set. If a decision was taken to prohibit all the discretionary procedures 
currently envisaged by the Directive, it would eliminate many of the differences in the 
national procedures of the Member States.  
 
                                                 
627  It has to be recalled that the authority has to take into account the principle of non refoulement 
before taking the decision. What is, in this context, the value of the opinion given by the determining 
authority without any respect for a minimum of procedural safeguards? 
628  See, for instance: ECtHR, Chahal and Ahmed. 
629  This amendment is justified by the aim of enabling the person concerned to bring forward his/her 
views with regard to the applicability of the cessation clauses in his/her particular circumstances in 
line with the case law of the CJ regarding the right to be heard(COM (2009) 554 annex(Det. Expl.), 
Article 39). 
630  We suppose that this has to be understood as the “determining authority”. 
631  This possibility is already provided for by Article 38 (1) (b), APD. 
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It seems however, on the other hand, also unreasonable to abolish every kind of specific or 
accelerated procedure. Thus, the most realistic way to adopt such a procedure is to 
examine if it is possible to simplify the variety of procedural exceptions and derogations, to 
reduce the number of special accelerated or specific procedures as much as possible, and 
to give the power to decide on the merits of the claim as much as possible to the 
determining authority (and not to other national authorities such as border guards). It has 
also to be provided that the minimal guarantees laid down for the ordinary (regular) 
procedure would also apply to the accelerated or specific procedures, unless this appears 
completely incompatible with the specificity of those procedures and with the minimal 
condition that the derogations provided for by those procedures can be considered as 
conforming with the case law of both the ECtHR and the CJ. 
 
Most of the amendments of the Commission represent real progress in comparison to the 
level of “minimum” guarantees actually foreseen by the APD. We refer inter alia: 
 
– to the limitation of the “Dublin” cases, of the cases in which an authority other than 
the “determining authority” can be responsible for the examination of an asylum 
claim632, with the reservations that a risk of confusion exists, and that there is a 
need for clarification of some provisions of the recast proposal which expressly refer 
to “competent authorities”633; 
– to the distinction that is clearly made between the “determining authority”, 
responsible for the examination of the asylum claim, and the “competent 
authorities”, such as the border guards, police, immigration authorities and 
personnel of detention facilities, responsible for the receipt and registration of 
applications for international protection and the delivering of the required 
information at the de facto asylum seekers634; 
– to the additional guarantees introduced in order to ensure information and advice at 
border crossing points and detention facilities635; 
– to the additional provisions provided to ensure a better protection of vulnerable 
groups (such as medical, cultural, child, or gender issues)636; 
– to several obligations (“shall”) imposed on the Member States in some proposed 
amendments in the place of a mere option (“may”)637; 
– to the limitation of the possibilities of omitting a personal interview638 and to the 
additional requirements provided for the conducting of the interview639, the right for 
the legal adviser or other counsellor of the applicant to be present during the 
interview640; 
– to the abolition of the several stand-still clauses currently provided by the APD. 
 
This can be explained by the philosophy which underlies the recast proposal: that all 
necessary efforts are made to ensure a rigorous examination of the protection needs where 
a person lodges an application for the first time641. This means, in other words, ensuring 
                                                 
632  Article 4, (3), recast proposal. 
633  See Section II.4. 
634  Articles 4, (1) and 6, (1) and (8), recast proposal. 
635  Article 7, recast proposal. 
636  See, inter alia: Articles 9 (2) and 17, recast proposal. See Article 20 (3), recast proposal that provides 
that the specific “accelerated procedure”(Article 27 (6), recast proposal) and the specific “unfounded 
procedure”(Article 27  (7), recast proposal) cannot be applied to applicants with special needs. 
637  See, inter alia, Article 9 (5) recast proposal: obligation on the Member States to provide rules 
concerning the translation of documents relevant for the examination of applications for international 
protection. 
638  Article 13 (2), recast proposal. 
639  Articles 15 and 16, recast proposal. 
640  Article 19 (3) and (4), recast proposal. 
641  COM (2009) 554 annex (Det. Expl.), Article 35. 
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robust determinations at first instance and the reduction of the risk of annulment by appeal 
bodies of the decision taken at first instance642. 
 
SOLUTION: the recast proposal represents a good step forward in the harmonization of the 
procedures at first instance and is in line with the case law of the ECtHR and of the CJ that 
we have analyzed. We recommend that the Parliament should support this proposal and 
examine if each proposed amendment is at least in conformity with the above-mentioned 
case law. We also suggest the examination of the recommendations made in this draft. 
 
SECTION 5: JUDICIAL PROTECTION AND APPEAL 
PROCEEDINGS: EFFECTIVENESS OF JUDICIAL PROTECT-
ION (ARTICLE 39, APD – ARTICLE 41, RECAST PROPOSAL) 
1. GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE ORGANIZATION OF 
THE JUDICIAL PROTECTION AND THE INTEGRATION 
OF THE CASE LAW OF ECTHR AND CJ 
1.1. General comments on Article 39 APD: wide margin of 
discretion given to Member States 
 
The judicial protection of asylum seekers was one of the most discussed topics of the APD 
during the different stages of its drafting. Comparing the different drafts of the Directive 
(nine articles in the initial proposal; four articles in the amended proposal; one article in the 
APD) demonstrates clearly the restrictive position adopted in the final version concerning 
this matter and the wide margin of appreciation given to Member States, but “in 
accordance with their international obligations”643. This evolution, in the sense of a 
restrictive interpretation of the “minimum” common standards applicable to the judicial 
review, which is the result of the specificity of the judicial system of each Member State 
and of a sensitive political compromise644, is also apparent in each explanatory 
memorandum of the initial and amended proposals of the Directive, as well as in some 
recitals accompanying these proposals. 
 
At the end of this evolution and taking into account the different provisions of the APD, it is 
possible to conclude the following: 
 
– in the matter of international protection applications Article 39 (1), APD, constitutes 
the mere reaffirmation645 of the basic EU law principle of the right to an effective 
remedy before a court or a tribunal within the meaning of Article 267, EUT (former 
Article 234, ECT)646, insofar as it obliges Member States to provide an effective 
remedy before a court or a tribunal against a (negative) decision on an application 
for international protection and gives an (illustrative)647 list of such decisions. In 
                                                 
642  COM (2009) 554 final, Expl. Memo., No 3.1. – p. 5. 
643  Article 39 (3), APD. 
644  See, inter alia: D. ACKERS; J. JAUMOTTE, Nos. 48 and 49. 
645  See recital (27), APD (“It reflects a basic principle of Community law that […]). 
646  A right which is now expressly recognized as a fundamental right of the European Union (Article 47 
 (right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial) CFR. 
647  The attention can indeed be put on the fact that this provision does not mention all the possible 
decisions that can be taken by virtue of the APD(it is, for instance, the case for decisions taken in the 
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other words, a right to an effective remedy would already be available against each 
negative decision taken on an application for international protection, even if it was 
not expressly envisaged by the national legislation of a Member State. Any national 
provision which prohibited such an effective remedy would certainly be condemned 
by the CJ, either on request of the Commission or in the framework of a preliminary 
ruling648; 
 
– some provisions of the APD, which are normally applicable to the administrative 
procedures at first instance, also contain some procedural guarantees regarding the 
judicial procedures:  
 
1. right to information in writing649 and in reasonable time650, of the result of the 
decision taken by the “competent authority”, with the indication of the reasons in 
fact and in law that are stated in a negative decision651;  
2. right to information on how to challenge a negative decision in writing at the same 
time as the notification of that decision, unless such information has already been 
provided at an earlier stage of the procedure652;  
3. right of applicants to the services of an interpreter with equivalent guarantees as 
those provided for the procedures at first instance653;  
4. the opportunity to communicate with the UNHCR or with any other competent 
organization654; 
5. right to legal assistance and/or representation, and right to free legal assistance 
and/or representation under some conditions655; right for the court or the tribunal, 
if it is necessary for the fulfilment of their task, to have access to precise and up-
to-date information obtained and used for the examination of the application656; 
right for the legal adviser or other counsellor who assists or represents an 
applicant under the terms of national law, to enjoy access to such information in 
the applicant’s file as this information is liable to be examined by the court or the 
tribunal during the appeal procedure, but only insofar as the information is 
relevant to the examination of the application - this right does not apply under 
                                                                                                                                                            
framework of the “National security provisions”). It does not however, imply that there will be no 
judicial review against the decisions which are not expressly cited. 
648  The fact can also be emphasized that many Directives in immigration matters or in other matters of 
Community law contain, most of the time, only one provision simply referring to “the right for a 
remedy”, “the right to mount a legal challenge”, “the possibility of an appeal or a review before a 
judicial body”, the right to “ a judicial redress procedure”, the right to an “application for appeal 
against or judicial review of the expulsion decision”, the right to “ a judicial control”, or the right to 
“an effective remedy to appeal against or  seek review of decisions related to return, […], before a 
competent judicial or administrative authority or a competent body composed of members who are 
impartial and who enjoy safeguards of independence”, and that some Directives, notwithstanding the 
matter concerned, do not even contain any provision referring to the right to an effective remedy. 
This does not hinder the right for each person concerned to challenge, before a court or a tribunal 
within the meaning of Article 267, EUT, any negative decision regarding each right and/or freedom 
guaranteed by the law of the Union. 
649  Article 9 (1), APD (Article 10 (1), recast proposal). 
650  Article 10 (1) (d), APD (Article 11 (1) (d), recast proposal). 
651  Article 9 (2), APD (Article (10) (2), recast proposal). For a decision to withdraw the status: Article 38 
(2), APD (Article 40 (2), recast proposal). 
652  Article 9 (2), APD (Article (10) (2), recast proposal). For a decision to withdraw the status: Article 38 
(2), APD (Article 40 (2), recast proposal). 
653  Article 10 (1) (b) and (2), APD (Article 11 (1) (b) and (2), recast proposal (this means that the 
applicant shall receive those services for submitting his/her request “whenever necessary” and, at 
least, when he/she has to be interviewed by the judicial body and that appropriate communication 
cannot be ensured without such services; in such case, those services shall be paid for out of public 
funds). 
654  Article 10 (1) (c) and (2), APD (Article 11 (1) (c) and (2), recast proposal). 
655  Article 15, APD (Article 18, recast proposal). 
656  Article 8 (3), APD (Article 9 (4), recast proposal). 
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some exceptions provided by Member States657; right for the legal adviser or an 
other counsellor who assists or represents an applicant under the term of national 
law, to have access to closed areas (such as detention facilities and transit zones 
for the purpose of consulting the applicant658), unless some restrictions expressly 
provided for by Member States exist;  
 
– that Article 39 (3) APD, concerning the possibility of a suspensive effect of a judicial 
appeal, goes far in terms of giving an assurance, such as demonstrated by the 
recent case law of the ECtHR659, that the national law or regulation of the Member 
States will effectively be in accordance with their “international obligations”, 
including among others: 1°) respect of the principle of non refoulement, of Articles 2 
and 3, ECHR, and/or of Articles 2, 3, 18 or 19, CFR; 2°) and that each national 
judicial system will conform with the minimum required criteria for an “effective” 
remedy, within the meaning – dependent from the violation that is invoked in the 
request of appeal-, of Article 13 or of Article 6, ECHR, such as is recognized by 
virtue of the general principle of Community (now EU) law and, since the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon, of Article 47 CFR660. 
 
As has already been emphasized and such as has recently been exposed by the UNHCR661, 
regarding the practice of each Member State in the organization of the judicial review 
provided by Article 39, APD, there are multiple differences between Member States with 
regard to the level of protection standards and procedural guarantees provided by each 
national judicial system. This statement can be made notwithstanding the guarantees 
expressly foreseen by the APD, which give a wide margin of appreciation to the Member 
States. 
 
Even if it can be considered that the basis of the substantial differences lies in deeply 
rooted differing concepts of judicial protection, it must however be admitted that some of 
these divergences are not in line with the aim of a harmonized approach at EU level of the 
examination of applications for international protection which is being pursued with the 
construction of the CEAS662. 
 
The first question to resolve is whether or not it is acceptable to maintain the minimalist 
position adopted at the time of the adoption of the APD, bearing in mind the wide margin of 
discretion given to Member States to organize the “right to an effective remedy” within the 
framework of a reinforced CEAS? In this regard, it is explained in recital (27), APD that 
“The effectiveness of the remedy, also with regard to the examination of the relevant facts, 
                                                 
657  Article 16 (1), APD (Article 19 (1), recast proposal). 
658  Article 16 (2), APD (Article 19 (2), recast proposal). 
659  See, for instance: Conka, par. 79; Jabari, par. 50; Gebremedhin, par. 67; Abdolkhani and Karimnia, 
par. 116. 
660  In the explanations of the Presidium regarding Article 47 of the Charter, it has expressly been noted 
that the second paragraph of this Article corresponds to Article 6 (1), ECHR, but that, in Community 
law, the right to a fair hearing is not confined to disputes relating to civil law rights and obligations 
(Explanations CFR, p. 41). 
661  UNHCR Study 2010, p. 83 (Article 39 – Effective remedies) and CR-Rom attached to the study 
(Section 16 – The right to an effective remedy). 
662  As observed in the recent (29.4.2009) Report of the LIBE Committee on the proposal of the 
Commission for recasting the “Dublin” Regulation,“ From a political point of view, it is apparent that 
Member States find it difficult to effectively harmonize quality standards as well as to share 
responsibility. Standards agreed upon so far are in great contrast with the high ambitious as first 
expressed in 1999. In fact, the highest common denominator is the very minimum. As a consequence 
huge differences and divergences continue to exist in practice. The Asylum Procedures Directive, for 
example, is actually an enumerative description of all existing asylum policies in the EU Member 
States. So it provides for a number of procedural standards rather than for a standard procedure. In 
this respect, the desired harmonization clearly failed.” (A6-0284/2009, p. 34/40). 
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depends on the administrative and judicial system of each Member State seen as a whole”. 
It has also been asserted in the explanatory memorandum of the amended proposal 
(2002)663 that Member States, when they are implementing Community law, have to take 
into account the case law of the CJ, which establishes the requirements for a remedy to be 
effective. The ECtHR has also recently considered664 that the presumption must be that 
each Member State will abide by its obligations under the Council Directives 2005/85/EC 
(APD) and 2003/9/EC (Reception conditions) to adhere to minimum standards in asylum 
procedures and to provide for minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers and 
that each Member State, as a contracting state to the ECHR, has undertaken to abide by its 
Convention obligations and to secure for everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined therein, including those guaranteed by Article 3. However, this 
presumption, just like the presumption that remedies organized at EU level respect the 
requirements of ECHR665, is rebuttable, in the framework of a “case by case” examination 
by the ECtHR666. 
 
Taking the above-mentioned into account, it would be possible to consider that it is 
sufficient to assert in the Directive, without any further explanation, the right to an 
effective remedy before a court or a tribunal. It would even be possible to say nothing in 
the Directive, taking into account that the right to an effective remedy is already 
recognized by the CJ as a general principle of Community Law and is, now, expressly 
provided by Article 47, CFR. Within this approach, it would nevertheless, be useful to 
examine the case law of both CJ and ECtHR and to try to establish a list of the minimum 
criteria which consider whether a remedy is “effective” or not. We have attempted to 
establish such a list in a working document, but with the difficulty of determining if some of 
the criteria pointed in the case law of these courts have to be considered as “transversal” 
criteria or as criteria specific to the matter submitted to the Court. In other words, is the 
intensity of the effectiveness of a judicial review the same whatever (a)the matter 
concerned (for instance, a removal outside the EU (to another country of the Council of 
Europe or to a third country) or a “Dublin” decision (between Member States), (b) the right 
in question (right to stay; right to ask for international protection; violation of Articles 2 
and 3 ECHR; violation of the principle of non-refoulement;…) or (c)  the potentially 
irreversible character of the damage that may occur if the challenged decision, or the 
expulsion order taken on basis of this decision, was executed before the decision of the 
court or tribunal on the judicial review? At this stage, the difficulty in establishing such a 
list becomes apparent as neither the CJ nor the ECtHR really provides a general structure 
by which effectiveness of judicial protection must be determined, with the consequence 
that the statements of these two courts always have to be considered on the basis of the 
specific facts of the case and may not be, as a rule, easily generalized. But this does not 
constitute a reason to abandon the establishment of such minimal requirements for an 
effective remedy. 
 
It must however, be emphasized that such a minimal approach appears to conflict with the 
aim of realizing the second stage of implementation of the CEAS: 
 
– firstly, it has already been observed that the discussions concerning EU asylum 
legislation and the first stage of implementation of a CEAS have clearly shown that 
“setting standards in the area of asylum is very different from setting standards in 
                                                 
663  COM (2002) 326 final (commentary on Article 38). 
664  ECtHR, K.R.S., p. 18. 
665  ECtHR, Bosphorus, par. 156. 
666  ECtHR, K.R.S., p. 16. 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 342 
traditional areas of EU competence”667. If it seems, on the one hand, to be sufficient 
to provide for the principle of an effective remedy in those traditional areas, the 
experience and the case law of the CJ and of the ECtHR demonstrate, on the other 
hand, the necessity to be more explicit in asylum legislation; 
– secondly, if the eventual aim of the EU is to formally enshrine the principle of the 
mutual recognition of all668 individual decisions, both negative and positive, taken by 
all the competent or determining authorities of Member States ruling on applications 
for international protection, (which would imply that protection can be transferred 
between Member States without the adoption of specific mechanisms of recognition 
at European level), then there is no other solution than to determine the minimal 
criteria that are to be taken into account to ensure that each applicant has had the 
opportunity to exercise an effective remedy, at least at the first level of judicial 
review, whatever the Member State concerned669; 
– Thirdly, taking into account the proposals of the Commission to recast the “Dublin 
Regulation”670 and the “Reception Conditions Directive”671 on this matter, we do not 
see why it would not be possible to do the same for the APD. 
 
To conclude, it appears that Article 39, APD should be amended or, at least, reviewed, to 
specify, in addition to the guarantees already provided by some provisions of the Directive, 
the minimal criteria (such as: minimum (suspensive) time limit to introduce a review; 
examination by the court of both facts and points of law; rules on the suspensive effect of 
the appeal or the review; scope of examination by the court; etc) which ensure the 
effectiveness of the first level of judicial review in each Member State672. 
                                                 
667  Amnesty international, “The EU and Human Rights - Making the impact on people count”, 2009, p. 15. 
668  ECRE has however, recently stated its regret that the final version of the Stockholm Program does not 
include the principle of mutual recognition of positive decisions on asylum applications (Memorandum 
for Spanish Presidency, No. 4 – p. 8). The Commission has however, recalled that the establishment 
of the CEAS and the EASO should ensure […] high common standards of protection in the EU and a 
common asylum procedure with mutual recognition as the long term goal (Action Plan Stockholm 
Program, p. 7). 
669  In comparison, the European Council has recently recalled, in civil and criminal matters, that, in order 
for the principle of mutual recognition to become effective, mutual trust needs to be strengthened by 
progressively developing a European judicial culture based on the diversity of legal systems and unity 
through European law (Stockholm Program, p. 21). The Commission has also recently emphasized 
that the European judicial area and the proper functioning of the single market are built on the 
cornerstone principle of mutual recognition, which requires e.g. “minimum standards, among other on 
procedural rights” (Action Plan Stockholm Program, p. 8). 
670  See Article 26, recast “Dublin Regulation”. 
671  See Article 25, recast “Reception Conditions Directive”. 
672  This necessity to provide for clear and common criteria to ensure the effectiveness of the judicial 
remedy, at least at first level of instance, whatever the Member State concerned, has recently been 
emphasized by the recent announcement of Greece to modify, in a restrictive sense, the Presidential 
Decree 90/2008, which incorporates into Greek law the provisions of the APD. Regarding this 
modification, Amnesty International, among others, has expressed its concerns by the fact that 
asylum seekers, whose applications have been rejected at the first stage of the examination of their 
claim, would only have access to a review by the Council of State, which does not cover the substance 
of the request, but merely examines procedural aspects (Amnesty International Public Statement, 15 
May 2009 (EUR 25/005/2009):Greece: Proposed changes to asylum procedures flagrantly violate 
international law). See also: UNHCR Study 2010, p. 83-92 and CR-Rom attached at the study (Section 
16 – The right to an effective remedy). 
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1.2. Consequences of the entry into force of Article 47, CFR (and 
Article 19 (1) TEU) and interaction with the recent case law of 
the CJ and of the ECtHR 
 
The general principle of EU law of the right to an effective remedy, such as is recognized in 
the case law of the CJ673, is now expressly provided for by Article 47, CFR: “Everyone 
whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to 
an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this 
Article”674. These conditions, which were mostly already recognized by the case law of the 
CJ and/or of the ECtHR as minimal requirements for an effective remedy, are675:1°) a fair 
and public hearing; 2°) held within a reasonable time; 3°) by an independent and impartial 
tribunal previously established by law; 4°) with the possibility for everyone of being 
advised, defended and (/or) represented ( = right to legal assistance and/or 
representation); 5°) and with possible access to legal aid (= right to free legal assistance 
and/or representation) for those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is 
necessary to ensure effective access to justice676. 
 
Even if Article 18, CFR, concerning the right “to asylum”, only expressly refers to the 
Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967, Article 78, 
paragraph 1, TFEU requires the Union to develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary 
protection and temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any third-
country national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the 
principle of non-refoulement. This paragraph provides furthermore, that this common policy 
must be in accordance not only with the Geneva Convention and the Protocol of 31 January 
1967, but also with “other relevant treaties”. By virtue of paragraph 2 of this Article, 
measures shall be adopted for a common European asylum system (CEAS) comprising, 
among others, “(d) common procedures for the granting and withdrawing of uniform or 
subsidiary protection status”.  
 
By virtue of Article 15 of the “Qualification Directive”677, concerning the qualification for 
subsidiary protection, “serious harm” can consist of: “(a) death penalty or execution678; or 
(b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country 
of origin679; or (c) serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of 
indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflicts”. With the 
introduction, in the recast proposal of the APD, of a single procedure encompassing both 
                                                 
673  CJ, Johnston, par. 18 and 19; Panayatova, par. 27; CJ, Arcor AG & Co, par. 174. The Court has 
recently emphasized that this principle of effective judicial protection has also been “reaffirmed by 
Article 47 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union” (CJ, Unibet Ldt, par. 37, and 
Yassin Abdullah & Al Barakaat, par. 335). 
674  In the explanations of the Presidium relating to the text of the Charter, it has been expressly affirmed 
that the first paragraph of Article 47 is based on Article 13, ECHR, with the particularity that the 
protection is more extensive in Community law since it guarantees the right to an effective remedy 
before a court (and not only before “an independent body” within the meaning of Article 13 ECHR) 
(Explanations CFR, p. 41). 
675  We refer to the working document already mentioned. 
676  It is also affirmed in the explanations of the Presidium relating to the text of the Charter that these 
conditions are derived from the requirements of Article 6, par.1, ECHR, taking into account that, in 
Community law, the right to a fair hearing is not confined to disputes relating to civil law rights and 
obligations and that, in all respects other than their scope, the guarantees afforded by the ECHR apply 
in a similar way to the Union (Explanations CFR, p. 41). 
677  Article 15, recast proposal. 
678  Compare with Article 2 (2), CFR. 
679  Compare with Article 4, CFR. 
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forms of international protection680, the right for each applicant to make an application for 
international protection, with the correlative obligation for the “determining/competent” 
authority to examine such an application, has to be considered as a right guaranteed by the 
law of the Union and, as a right to which Article 47 of the Charter applies681, as well as 
Article 19 EUT682. 
 
The consequences683 are: 
 
– that the requirements to provide an effective remedy have to apply at the level of 
any appeal against a negative decision taken on an application for international 
protection by virtue of the (recast) APD, and not just when it is decided to execute a 
removal order or an expulsion measure taken in execution of the negative decision 
on the application for international protection. For such measures of execution, if 
can be considered that it is the “Return Directive” which would apply684; 
 
– that conditions expressly laid down in Article 47, CFR will have to be taken into 
account the, as well as the minimum requirements of the case law of the ECtHR 
regarding Article 13, ECHR685, and/or the minimum requirements of the case law of 
the CJ regarding the effectiveness of a remedy, under both Articles 6686 and 13, 
ECHR; 
 
– that the case law of the ECtHR regarding Article 13, ECHR will also be applicable to 
decisions adopted in the field of international protection; 
 
– that EU law may guarantee more extensive protection for applicants for international 
protection, with the consequence that the scope of the guaranteed rights are 
determined not only by the ECHR and the Protocols to it, but also by the case law of 
the ECtHR and by the case law of the CJ687; 
 
– that, where there is a divergence in the case law of these two courts (for instance, 
regarding the minimal requirements for the (automatic) suspensive effect of an 
appeal), the case-law that gives the most guarantees for the effectiveness of the 
judicial remedy will have to be applied.688’689 
                                                 
680  See, inter alia, Articles 2 (a), (b), (c), (g), (h), (i), (j) and (k), and Article 3 (1), recast proposal. 
681  H. BATTJES, Nos. 419 and 420 – p. 326. It has also to be recalled that the provisions of the Charter 
also apply to the Member States when they are implementing Union law (Article 51, par. 1, CFR). 
682  By virtue of which “Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal 
protection in the fields covered by Union law”. 
683  Which have been rightly applied by the Commission in the recast proposal APD. 
684  Inter alia, Articles 12 (procedural guarantees for the notification of the expulsion or removal orders) 
and 13(remedies against such decisions) “Return Directive”. 
685  The ECtHR has considered that Article 6 ECHR does not apply to asylum and immigration claims and 
that those claims, such as with any kind of decision adopted in the field of migration or asylum, are 
covered by Articles 2, 3 and 8 ECHR, in combination with Article 13 ECHR, and Protocol No. 7 to the 
Convention, concerning the right to an “effective remedy” before an independent and impartial 
body(Maaouia, par. 36; Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic, par. 80; Olaechea Cahuas, par. 59; Muminov, 
par. 126). 
686  Such as was recalled by H. BATTJES(Nos. 410 and 417), “The standards of Article 6 (1) ECHR 
however do apply as general  principles of Community law”  
687  Article 52, paragraph 3, CFR and comments of the Presidium relating to the text of the Charter 
(Explanation CFR, p. 48). 
688  As a consequence, we should have to take into account, in addition to the case law of the ECtHR, the 
case law of the CJ, not only in migration and asylum matters, but also in other matters insofar it 
concerns the criteria to ensure effective judicial protection. It is not surprising that the European 
Commission has justified several amendments to the current Directive, inter alia those regarding the 
appeal procedure, by the necessity to take into account the recent and evolving case law of the CJ 
(COM (2009) 554 Annex (Det. Expl.), Articles 6, 9, 13, 19, 27, and 41 – See also: SEC (2009) 
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To conclude, it is in light of these principles that we will now examine some of the 
procedural guarantees of the judicial remedy such as are provided in the recast proposal. 
2. TIME-LIMITS FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO 
AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY (ARTICLE 39 (2), APD – 
ARTICLE 41 (4), RECAST PROPOSAL) 
 
It is foreseen merely that Member States shall provide for “reasonable” time-limits for the 
applicant to exercise the right to an effective remedy. This formulation is maintained in the 
recast proposal. 
 
SOLUTION: taking into account the great variety of time-limits that have been determined 
by Member States690, it would be useful to introduce in the directive a minimum common 
time limit for all Member States to introduce an appeal. This time-limit could vary 
depending upon the procedure which has been applied in the specific case. 
3. RIGHT TO LEGAL ASSISTANCE AND REPRESENT-
ATION (ARTICLE 15 (3) TO (6), APD – ARTICLE 18 
(1) (B), AND (2) TO (7), RECAST PROPOSAL) 
 
This topic has already been examined in this report691. As we have seen, the right to legal 
assistance and/or representation in judicial procedures was already provided by Article 15, 
APD (now Article 18 (1), recast proposal) and is now expressly confirmed by Article 47, 
CFR. 
 
In terms of the right to free legal assistance and/or representation, the possible limitations 
to this right are enumerated in Article 18, recast proposal. It is available only to those who 
lack sufficient resources, and/or only to legal advisers or other counsellors specifically 
designated by national law to assist and/or represent applicants for international 
protection, and/or insofar as such assistance is necessary to ensure an effective access to 
justice.  
 
As is explained by the Commission692, this latest limitation, which enables Member States 
to apply a “test” before granting free legal assistance in appeal procedures, is indeed in line 
with Article 47 CFR, which does not expressly recognize an absolute right to free legal 
assistance693. But it has however, to be recalled that the ECtHR has considered that the 
absence of free legal aid cannot have the result that access to the court or tribunal may be 
jeopardized694 and that, to assess whether legal aid is or not necessary, the particular facts 
                                                                                                                                                            
1376(part II) - Impact Assessment, annex 21(Overview of international and community standards on 
access to effective remedy). 
689  As we have already seen, the same reasoning has to be applied regarding the case law of the ECtHR 
and, particularly, of the CJ, concerning the minimal requirements for a “fair and efficient” 
administrative procedure at the first instance. 
690  The Commission has mentioned variations from 3 to 75 days (SEC (2009) 1376(part II) – Impact 
Assessment, annex 21(Overview of international and community standards on access to effective 
remedy). 
691  Section II.6. 
692  COM (2009) 554 Annex (Det. Expl.), Article 18 – p. 10. 
693  We can come to the same conclusion after the examination of the case law of the CJ and of the ECtHR 
( including among others: ECtHr, Airey, par. 24-26). 
694  ECtHR, Kreuz, par. 59. 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 346 
and circumstances of each case must be taken into account and, in particular, the 
importance of what is at stake for the applicant in the proceedings695. This latest criteria is 
of importance in application for international protection. 
4. ACCESS TO INFORMATION BY THE COURT OR 
TRIBUNAL AND/OR BY THE APPLICANT AND/OR 
HIS/HER COUNSELOR AND/OR REPRESENTATIVE 
(ARTICLE 16 (1), APD – ARTICLE 19 (1), RECAST 
PROPOSAL) 
 
By virtue of Article 16 (1), APD, the court or tribunal has access to the information 
contained in the applicant’s file except where such access is precluded in cases of national 
security. By virtue of the same provision, the legal adviser or other counsellor who assists 
or represents an applicant shall also have access to such information, insofar as the 
information is relevant to the examination of the application. It is furthermore foreseen that 
Member States may make an exception to this access where disclosure of information or 
sources would jeopardize national security, the security of the person(s) to whom the 
information relates or where the investigative interests relating to the examination of 
applications for asylum by the competent authorities of the Member States or the 
international relations of the Member States would be compromised. 
 
It has however, been recognized by the CJ that the right to be heard by a court or a 
tribunal occupies an eminent position in the organization and conduct of a fair legal 
process696 and that, as a consequence, judicial authorities must be able to receive and 
examine the evidence alleged to be confidential or secret697. On the contrary, the 
adversarial principle does not mean that the parties are entitled to unlimited and absolute 
access to all of the information relating to the procedure concerned698. In terms of Article 3, 
ECHR, the ECtHR has also repeatedly insisted on the fact that legitimate national security 
concerns in expulsion cases must be balanced by arrangements which accord an individual 
a substantial measure of procedural justice: the judicial authority must, for instance, be 
competent to reject the executive’s assertion that there is a threat to national security 
where it finds it arbitrary or unreasonable, and there must be, in this case, some form of 
adversarial proceedings, if need be through a special representative after a security 
clearance699. 
 
Taking into account the case law of both the CJ and the ECtHR, we can agree with the 
considerations of the Commission that Article 19 (1) of the recast proposal is indeed in the 
line of the “evolving jurisprudence of respectively the European Court of Justice and the 
European Court of Human Rights regarding access to effective remedy”700.  
 
By virtue of this provision, the following guarantees are recognized: 1°) the legal adviser or 
other counsellor of the applicant will normally have access to the information in the 
applicant’s file unless some exceptions exist, but with the obligation for the Member States 
in such cases to grant access to the information to a legal advisor or counsellor who has 
                                                 
695  ECtHR, Steel and Morris, par. 61. 
696  CJ, Eurofood IFSC Ltd, par. 66. 
697  CJ, Varec SA, par. 53. 
698  Ibidem, par. 51. 
699  See, for instance: ECtHr, Al-Nashif, par. 44. 
700  COM (2009) 554 Annex (Det. Expl.), Article 19 – p. 10. 
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undergone a security check, insofar as the information is relevant to the examination of the 
application; 2°) the court or tribunal will in all cases have access to this information. 
5. (AUTOMATIC) SUSPENSIVE EFFECT OF THE JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (ARTICLE 39 (3), DIRECTIVE – ARTICLE 41 
(5) TO (8), RECAST PROPOSAL) 
 
If we examine the different drafts of the APD and the comments on those drafts, we can 
conclude that Article 39 (3), APD is the result of a sensitive political compromise, which 
means that the final text contains a lot of ambiguities and legislative gaps. The APD does 
not guarantee as such a (automatic) suspensive effect of an appeal and, by the use of 
terms such as “where appropriate” and “in accordance with their national obligations”, this 
provision refers indeed in a rather vague manner to the competence of each Member State 
to enact rules concerning the (automatic or not) suspensive effect of an appeal or a review 
to challenge a negative decision on an application for international protection701. 
 
In several judgments702, the ECtHR has however, considered that different national 
provisions were not in accordance with the Member State’s obligations under Article 13, 
ECHR; the Court, referring to its previous judgment in the case Conka703, has indeed 
considered that an effective remedy under Article 13, ECHR requires, at least, the 
possibility of stopping the execution of measures which may be contrary to the 
Convention704. In a recent decision of 2 December 2008705, declaring an application as 
inadmissible, the Court summarized the contracting States’ obligations under Articles 3 and 
13 of the Convention as the following: from the Court’s reasoning, when an applicant, 
invoking a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, asks for the suspension of a negative 
decision on its asylum claim or of the subsequent measure of expulsion,  such a decision or 
measure may not be executed until a court has passed a first decision on the arguability of 
this claim. In a judgment of 11 December 2008706, the Court insisted on “the provision of 
an effective possibility of suspending the enforcement of measures whose effect are 
potentially irreversible” and in a judgment of 22 September 2009707, the Court reiterated 
that “where an applicant seeks to prevent his or her removal from a Contracting State, a 
remedy will only be effective if it has automatic suspensive effect”. 
 
The key elements to justify, at least, giving the applicant the opportunity to ask for the 
suspension of the decision, with a suspensive effect of this request, are the invoked 
violation of Article 3, ECHR and the potentially irreversible damage that could occur if the 
expulsion takes place before a decision taken by the court or tribunal. 
                                                 
701  As has recently been observed by the UNHCR, this has lead to great divergences between the national 
law and practices of Member States (UNHCR Study, 2010, p. 88 [“the research has found that a 
significant number of the [twelve] Member States surveyed do not afford automatic suspensive effect 
to appeals against certain decisions, or decisions taken in certain procedures, or to applicants in 
certain circumstances. In two Member States, automatic suspensive effect is not afforded in any 
appeals”]). 
702  See, for instance: Jabari, par. 50 and Gebremedhin, par. 66. 
703  ECtHR, Conka, par. 75. 
704  As already observed, “The Court does not prescribe a right to remain until [a court or a tribunal] has 
decided in substance on an appeal against a negative asylum decision, [but she] requires, however, a 
suspensive effect until a judge has passed a decision on the lawfulness of the authorities’ decision to 
execute a decision due to its manifest unfoundedeness in a preliminary protection procedure” (Kay 
Hailbronner, Minimum Standards, par. 8). 
705  ECtHR, K.R.S., p. 15. 
706  ECtHR, Muminov, par. 102. 
707  ECtHR, Abdolkhani and Karimnia, par. 108 and 116. 
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The CJ has not yet had the opportunity to examine the question of the suspensive effect of 
a judicial review against a decision to reject an application for international protection or 
against a removal order or a decision of expulsion taken in execution of such a decision. 
From the case law of the CJ in other matters, it does not appear that Member States would 
be required to provide, in all circumstances, for a (automatic) suspensive effect of a judicial 
appeal708. However, in a case where an expulsion order was challenged, the Court has 
considered that the alien should at least be able, before the execution of this order, to 
lodge an appeal and potentially to obtain the suspension of this expulsion order709, which 
means that the alien must at least have the possibility of requiring, with automatic 
suspensive effect of this request during the examination by the court or tribunal, the 
national court to grant interim relief in order to ensure the full effectiveness of the rights 
claimed under Community law710.This can be explained by the fact that even if a Member 
State has no obligation to authorize an alien to remain within its territory for the duration 
of the proceedings, the alien must nevertheless be able to obtain a fair hearing and to 
present his defence in full711. With regard to interim relief, the Court has also held that the 
effectiveness of Community law may require the national court to grant interim relief in 
order to ensure the full effectiveness of the rights claimed under Community law712. 
 
The combination of the case law of ECtHR and of the CJ, and the fact that, as we have 
already explained, the right to ask for an international protection has to be recognized as a 
(fundamental) right guaranteed by the law of the Union, implies that article 39 (3), APD 
must be reviewed and that, within the framework of the second stage of implementation of 
the CEAS, the following minimal guarantees must be provided: 
 
1°) the time limit given to introduce a judicial review must have a suspensive effect;  
2°) if the appeal has no suspensive effect as such, a minimum time limit would be given to 
permit the applicant to request an interim measure before the court or the tribunal;  
3°) and the introduction of such a request would automatically have a suspensive effect 
until a court or a tribunal has examined whether substantial grounds for fearing a real risk 
of treatment contrary to Articles 2 or 3 ECHR exist: if yes, the suspension of the negative 
decision and/or of the expulsion measure would be ordered and the applicant would be 
authorized to remain on the territory, as a rule, until the decision of the court or of the 
tribunal on the substance of the claim is given; if not, it will be considered that there is no 
longer “an arguable claim” and the expulsion of the applicant will be possible before the 
final decision on the substance of the claim. 
 
Such a system, which is also laid down in Article 26, recast proposal of the “Dublin 
Regulation” and which implies that two assessments have to be carried out by the 
competent court or tribunal, has however, been criticized and qualified as the minimum 
required to ensure an effective protection of the fundamental rights of asylum-seekers713: 
                                                 
708  CJ, Commission, par. 52-56 (“the suspensory effect of actions brought  before national courts 
cannot be considered essential for ensuring effective protection in the light of Community law”). 
 The CJ has a well-developed and specific case law regarding the interpretation of the former Directive 
64/221 on the free movement of EU citizens. However, this can be explained by the specific provisions 
(Articles 8 and 9) of this Directive, so that it is not possible to consider that the case law of the CJ on 
this matter (CJ, Dorr, par. 51) would be the affirmation of a general principle of Community law. 
709  CJ, Royer, par. 57 and 62. 
710  CJ, The Queen, par. 21; CJ, Sipples Srl, par. 19. 
711  CJ, Pecastaing, par. 3(“ That requirement implies inter alia that the decision ordering expulsion may 
not be executed – save in cases of urgency – before the party concerned is able to complete the 
formalities necessary to avail himself of his remedy”). 
712  CJ, Siples Srl, par. 19 
713  Amnesty International, April 2009, par. 4 - p. 26. See also ECRE Information Note 2006, p. 9. 
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situations can arise whereby the court does not object to an expulsion pending the appeal 
or review but nevertheless finally annuls the negative decision taken on the asylum claim. 
 
To avoid such situations, another solution would be to recognize in all cases the right to 
appeal to a court or a review body, with suspensive effect at first level. This was one of the 
basic procedural requirements putting forward by the European Parliament in June 2000714. 
 
A compromise could also include mixing the two solutions: automatic suspensive effect of 
the appeal until the final decision of the court or the tribunal at first level has been taken, 
unless some exceptions exist, such as, for example, applications declared “manifestly 
unfounded” on strictly delimited grounds, with in this cases the possibility of asking for a 
suspensive effect and the right to remain on the territory until the decision of the court on 
this request.  
 
The Commission has proposed the following system in the recast proposal: 1°) as a 
principle, the introduction of a remedy against a negative decision shall have the effect of 
allowing the applicant to remain in the Member State pending its outcome715; 2°) where 
the right to remain in the Member State pending the outcome of the remedy against a 
decision taken in an “accelerated” procedure or against a decision of “inadmissibility” of a 
“subsequent application” is not foreseen under national legislation, a court or a tribunal 
shall have the power to rule whether or not the applicant may remain on the territory of 
the Member State, either upon request of the concerned applicant or acting on its own 
motion716; 3°) and the State shall allow the applicant to remain in the territory pending the 
outcome of this procedure717. 
 
It is furthermore expressly provided that when the negative decision has been taken at the 
border or in a transit zone, no expulsion may take place pending the outcome of the appeal 
procedure and that the court or the tribunal shall have the power to rule whether or not the 
applicant may remain on the territory of the Member State718.  
  
Although it can be criticized for not providing for a suspensive effect in all situations until 
the final decision taken by the court or the tribunal, such a proposal is acceptable in terms 
of the case law of the ECtHR and of the CJ mentioned above719, but with one exception:  
 
SOLUTION: the recast proposal should be amended in order to prevent enforcement of an 
expulsion order during the time-limit within which to lodge an appeal, (or at least the time-
limit to request an interim measure of suspension) has expired and the right to appeal or to 
the request for interim measure has not been exercised. 
 
                                                 
714  European Parliament resolution, June 2000. 
715  Article 41 (5), recast proposal. 
716  Article 41 (6), recast proposal. 
717  Article 41 (7), recast proposal. 
718  Article 41 (6), last subparagraph, recast proposal and COM (2009) 554 Annex (Det. Expl.), Article 41 
– p. 18. 
719  See, within this meaning: UNHCR Study 2010, p. 88. 
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6. THE AVAILABILITY OF THE OPTION FOR EACH 
MEMBER STATE TO PROVIDE TIME-LIMITS FOR THE 
COURT OR TRIBUNAL TO EXAMINE THE DECISION OF 
THE DETERMINING/COMPETENT AUTHORITY  
 
(Article 39 (4), APD – Article 41 (9), recast proposal) 
Article 39 (4), APD and Article 41 (9), recast proposal provide that Member States “may” 
lay down time limits for the court or tribunal to examine the decision of the determining 
authority. The question is: what are the consequences of contravening such time limits? 
7. SCOPE OF THE EXAMINATION BY THE COURT OR 
TRIBUNAL: FULL EXAMINATION/BOTH FACTS AND 
LAW/EXAMINATION “EX NUNC”/EXAMINATION 
“PROPRIO MOTU” 
  
The recast proposal contains some new provisions in this regard which are justified by the 
Commission720 by the respective case law of the CJ and of the ECtHR concerning this topic: 
examination of both facts and points of law; full examination and examination “ex nunc”. 
 
Taking into account that the right to ask for international protection is expressly recognized 
as a (fundamental) right of the Union and that this right also covers the protection under 
the “subsidiary protection status”, we can consider that the judicial appeal against a 
negative decision on such a request must comply with the same requirements as those 
provided, among others, by the case law of the ECtHR regarding the possible risk of 
violation of Articles 2 and 3, ECHR if an expulsion order or a removal decision is executed. 
In such cases, the ECtHR has indeed affirmed: 1°) the necessity of a full examination of the 
case721; 2°) the necessity of a “ex nunc” examination722; 3°) and the necessity to examine 
both the facts and the points of law of the case723. 
 
SECTION 6: CONCLUSIONS  
 
Taking into account the fact that the option retained by the Commission in the final 
analysis724 and, it seems, also approved by the European Council725 and by the European 
Parliament726, is to maintain “national asylum systems” (on administrative level and on 
judicial level) that will have to apply “a single asylum procedure, with common obligatory 
guarantees”727, further legislative reform of the APD is a crucial need and the recast 
proposal constitutes a good step forwards provided it is completed or amended on some 
                                                 
720  COM (2009) 554 Annex (Det. Expl.), Article 41 – p. 18, and SEC (2009) 1376 (Annexes to the Impact 
Assessment), Annex 21. 
721  NA, par. 112. 
722  NA., par. 112. This examination concerns as well material placed before the court or tribunal by the 
parties, as, if necessary, material obtained proprio motu (ibidem, par. 119; Abdolkhani and Karima, 
par. 90). 
723  CJ, Wilson, par. 62. 
724  Communication from the Commission (COM(2009) 262/4), par. 5.2., page 27. 
725  Pact on immigration and asylum, (point IV(b).  
726  EP resolution of 10 March 2009 on the future of the CEAS, par. 4. 
727  It is, in reality, better described as a single asylum procedure (for both forms of international 
protection) comprising reinforced common procedural guarantees, than a common asylum procedure 
(SEC(2010) 535 final, p. 33). 
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points in order to reinforce the compliance with compulsory international rights and/or case 
law of CJ and ECtHR.  
 
The EASO will have a crucial role to play in the future implementation of the recast 
proposal. As is provided in the Stockholm Program, this agency will be an important tool in 
the development and implementation of the CEAS and should further develop a common 
educational platform for national asylum officials, building in particular on the European 
Asylum Curriculum (EAC)728. It is thus not a surprise that the implementation of the EASO 
has been highlighted as one of the priorities of the European Commission729. 
 
The future role of the ECtHR and CJ will be essential in order to ensure a common 
interpretation and or application of some procedural rules. It will be important to follow the 
case law of these two courts in the future730. The procedure before the CJ will be a very 
interesting source of law through the mechanism of preliminary rulings, with the possibility 
in urgent cases to ask the Court to act with minimum delay. The Treaty of Lisbon extends 
the competence of the CJ in the fields of asylum and immigration, giving any court or 
tribunal of a Member State the opportunity to request the Court to give a ruling, if it 
considers that a decision on this question is necessary to enable it to give judgment. 
Several preliminary rulings were already brought to the Court on important issues, such as 
the interpretation of the concept of serious and individual threat to the life or person of an 
applicant for subsidiary protection731, or the detention of the asylum seekers732 733. 
                                                 
728  Stockholm Program, p. 70. 
729  Action Plan of the Stockholm Program, p. 45 (among others to develop a common methodology with a 
view to reduce the disparities of asylum decisions (ibidem, p. 55). 
730  It has, in this regard, been expressly recalled in the Stockholm Program that the case law of the two 
Courts will be able to continue to develop in tandem, reinforcing the creation of a uniform European 
Fundamental and Human Rights System based on the ECHR and those set out in the CFR (Stockholm 
program, p. 11).  
731  CJ, Elgafaji. 
732  CJ, Said Shamilovich Kadzoev (Huchbarov). 
733  CJ, Gataev, Khadizhat Gataeva; Brahim Samba Diouf. 
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ANNEX 1: “ASYLUM PROCEDURES”: COMPARISON BETWEEN APD 
AND RECAST PROPOSAL 
 
Diagram of the procedures in the current 
Directive (APD) (without taking into account the 
“Dublin procedure” which is not covered by the 
current APD - Articles 4 (2) (a) and 25 (1) and 
recital (29)). 
 
(1) The regular procedure (Article 23 APD) ( 
involves the adequate and complete 
examination of the asylum application by the 
determining authority and in accordance with 
the basic principles and procedural guarantees 
of Chapter II of the Directive, but with the 
exception of the right to a personal interview in 
several cases of “prioritized/accelerated” 
procedure[Articles 12 (2) (c) and 23, (4) (a), 
(c), (g), (h) and (i), Directive])  
 
(1)(a):”normal” regular procedure (obligatory 
procedure) (Article 23 (1) and (2) APD) : 
ordinary examination; 
 
 (1)(b):Accelerated ( or “prioritized”) regular 
procedure (discretionary procedure) (Article 23 
(3),APD: well-founded applications / special 
needs of the applicant / no relevance or not 
enough relevance to qualify as a refugee / 
clearly not a refugee / unfounded 
applications(Articles 23, (3), 28, (1), 29, 30 and 
31) / manifestly unfounded applications ( article 
28, (1) and Article 23 (4)) (among others: the  
“safe country of origin” concept734” when it is 
defined as such in national legislation of the 
Member State - if not: examined as” unfounded 
applications”). 
 
(2) “Inadmissible applications” procedure ( 
discretionary procedure) (Articles 25 and 27 
APD) (NO examination of the substance of the 
asylum application735) (among others: the “first 
country of asylum”(FCA) and the “ safe third 
country”(STC) concepts)  
 
Diagram of the procedures in the recast 
proposal of the Commission (without taking 
into account the “Dublin procedure” which is 
not covered by the recast proposal - Articles 4, 
(3), 24 (3) and 29 (1) and recitals (36) and 
(37)). 
 
(1) The regular procedure (Articles 27 and 28, 
recast proposal) ( involves the adequate and 
complete examination of the asylum 
application by the determining authority and in 
accordance with the basic principles and 
procedural guarantees of Chapter II of the 
Directive, with a personal interview of the 
applicant unless the two exceptions provided 
by Article 13 (2), recast proposal exist) 
  
 
          (1)(a):“normal” regular procedure 
(obligatory procedure) (Article 27, (1) recast 
proposal) : ordinary examination; 
 
          (1)(b):“prioritized” regular procedure 
(discretionary procedure) (Article 27 (5) recast 
proposal): same requirements as for the 
“normal” regular procedure, but priority is 
given in some situations (application 
considered to be well-founded) or for some 
specific groups (applicants with special needs)  
 
  (1)(c):“Accelerated” regular 
procedure (discretionary procedure) (Article 
27 (6) recast proposal): no relevance to 
qualifying as a refugee / “safe country of 
origin” concept / presenting false 
information/documents-withholding relevant 
information/documents / destruction, false 
identity given in bad faith/travel documents / 
application made merely in order to delay or 
frustrate the enforcement of an earlier or 
imminent decision). 
(2) “Inadmissible applications” procedure 
                                                 
734  With the rebuttable presumption: the applicant can show that there are “serious reasons” to consider the 
country of origin as being unsafe in his/her particular circumstances (recital (21), APD). 
735  Because it can be reasonably assumed that another country would do the examination or provide 
sufficient protection (recital (22), APD). 
736  It means some European third countries which are considered to observe particularly high human rights 
and refugee protection standards (recital (24), APD). 
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 (3) “Specific” procedures (three procedures – 
containing the  possibility of derogating, under 
certain conditions, from the basic principles and 
procedural guarantees of Chapter II of the 
Directive) (Article 24, APD) 
 
(3)(a): “Border (specific accelerated)” 
procedures (Article 35, APD) (procedure at the 
border, in transit zones or, in some 
circumstances, at locations in proximity to the 
border or transit zone- Article 35 (5) APD) 
 
(3)(a)(1): “Border regular ( specific 
accelerated)” procedure(facultative procedure) 
(Article 35 (1) APD)(examination of the asylum 
application - which may be made by an 
authority other than the determining authority 
(Article 4 (4) (d)) -, in accordance with the basic 
principles and guarantees of Chapter II of the 
Directive, unless another procedure is 
used[including “Inadmissible application”, 
“subsequent application”, “European safe third 
country application”]); 
 
(3)(a)(2): Procedure of ”preliminary 
examination” at the border ( discretionary 
procedure)(Article 35 (2)  to (4)) (by an 
authority other than the determining authority 
(Article 4, (4) (e)), which decides whether the 
applicant may or may not enter the territory - 
examination of the asylum application by the 
competent authority at the border, which can 
decide to consider the application for asylum 
“unfounded” or “inadmissible” and refuse entry 
on the territory). 
 
(3)(b) “European safe third country”736 
procedure  (discretionary procedure) (Article 36, 
APD - recital (24)) (no, or no full, examination 
of the asylum application if the competent 
authority (Article 4, APD) can establish that the 
applicant for asylum is seeking to enter or has 
entered illegally into its territory from such a 
country) 
 
(3)(c) “Subsequent application” procedure 
(discretionary procedure) (Articles 29 to 32, 
recast proposal) (NO examination of the 
substance of the asylum 
application737) (among other: the “First 
country of asylum”(FCA)(Article 31, recast 
proposal) and the “ Safe third 
country”(STC)(Article 32, recast proposal) 
concepts) (with the obligation of a personal 
interview – Article 30, recast proposal) 
 
 
 
(3) “Border (“inadmissible” or “accelerated)” 
procedures (Article 37 recast proposal) ( 
procedure at the border, in transit zones or, in 
some circumstances, at locations in proximity 
to the border of transit zone) (discretionary 
procedure: possible for the determining 
authority to apply, in accordance with the 
basic principles and guarantees of Chapter II, 
the “inadmissibility” procedure” or an 
“accelerated” procedure, in the same cases as 
foreseen by the Directive for the procedures 
“in-land”) (with a time-limit to take the 
decision, unless arrivals involving a large 
number of applicants – Article 37 (3), recast 
proposal) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4) “European safe third country”738 
procedure (discretionary procedure) (Article 
38, recast proposal) (no, or no full 
examination, of the asylum application if the 
competent authority can establish that the 
applicant for asylum is seeking to enter or has 
entered illegally into its territory from such a 
country) 
 
(5) “Subsequent application” procedure 
(discretionary procedure) (Articles 35 and 36, 
recast proposal) (applicable in case of “further 
                                                                                                                                                            
737  Because it can be reasonably assumed that another country would do the examination or provide 
sufficient  protection (recital (30), recast proposal). 
738  It means some European third countries which are considered to observe particularly high human 
rights and refugee protection standards (recital (24), of the Directive). 
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(discretionary procedure) (Articles 32 to 34, 
APD) (applicable in case of “further 
representation” or “ subsequent application” in 
the same Member State) (possibility of 
establishment of a “preliminary examination” of 
the asylum application - which can be conducted 
by an authority other than the determining 
authority - Article 4, (4) (c), APD -  to see if 
“new elements of finding” have arisen or have 
been presented by the applicant which 
significantly add to the likelihood of the 
applicant qualifying). 
(4) “Special procedure”: “national security 
provisions” procedure (discretionary procedure) 
(Article 4 (4) (b), APD) (decision taken by the 
competent authority in the light of national 
security provisions and after consultation with 
the determining authority). 
 
representation” or “subsequent application” in 
the same Member State) (possibility of 
establishment of a “preliminary examination” 
of the asylum application [which can be 
conducted by an authority other than the 
determining authority?] to control if “new 
elements of finding” have arisen or have been 
presented by the applicant which significantly 
add to the likelihood of the applicant 
qualifying. – If not, the identical application 
will be declared inadmissible in accordance 
with Article 29 (2) (d), recast proposal). 
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KEY FINDINGS 
 
1. When making proposals of amendments on the APD or making a proposition for a 
new Directive, it is necessary: 
 
a. to emphasize the possible inconsistencies between the “Dublin Regulation” 
and APD with the “Reception Directive”, the “Qualification Directive”, and the 
“Return Directive”; 
b. and to take into account what has already been proposed by the Commission 
or by the EP regarding some of the procedurals provisions of other Directives 
or Regulations mentioned above. 
 
2. In order to avoid refoulement of asylum seekers in situation of mixed arrivals, 
border guards and immigration officials would benefit from training and clear 
instructions on how to respond to asylum applications and how to handle the needs 
of vulnerable groups 
 
3. The APD lists many exceptions to the right to a personal interview (in case of 
accelerated, prioritized…  procedures), however, an oral hearing is of particular 
importance to an asylum seeker, even if his/her application seems inadmissible or 
grounded on undue reasons; even to rebut a presumption of safety in case of 
application of FCA, (E)STC, SCO. Moreover, the right to be heard is guaranteed by 
CJ case law and is required by the UNHCR. In this regard, the new procedural 
safeguards provided by the recast proposal contribute to the effectiveness of a fair 
and efficient procedure and can reduce the possibility of challenging a negative 
decision on appeal. 
 
4. The right to legal assistance is not subject to discussion under EU law and in the 
ECHR, which implies that the effectiveness of a judicial remedy is conditioned by the 
right to legal assistance. Even if this right is, as such, not absolute, the same 
principles apply to the right to free legal assistance at to the second stage (judicial 
review) of the procedure. At the first stage of the procedure (administrative 
procedure), even if the texts and the case law are not quite as explicit, one can 
deduce from the CJ case law and from the necessity of the practice that a right to 
free legal assistance at the first stage has to be recommended.  
 
5. One of the principal criticisms of the APD is the lack of protection of applicants with 
special needs. Only minors benefited from a specific protection, which in itself was 
considered insufficient. Procedural rules have to be adapted to allow weaker 
applicants to be heard in the right conditions. Applying the same rules to 
significantly different situations violates the principle of non-discrimination. 
 
6. The concrete application by each Member State of some concepts like “first country 
of asylum”, “safe third country”, “(European) safe third country”, “safe country of 
origin” could lead to depriving an asylum seeker access to an effective protection 
because he will not benefit from a full examination of the substance of his 
application. One has to analyze how this access is secured, what criteria could be 
used in this perspective and what are the procedural consequences of recourse to 
these specific concepts. 
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7. The new framework of asylum procedures proposed by the Commission in the recast 
proposal can be considered as much more accessible and comprehensible than the 
complex system of procedures currently provided by the APD. Although some 
recommendations are made in the report to ensure a higher level of uniformity and 
to eliminate some risks of confusion, the general conclusion is that the different 
procedures provided by the recast proposal are acceptable and in line with the 
international obligations of Member States and with the case law of the EC Court 
and of the ECtHR. 
 
8. In contrast to the wide margin of discretion given to Member States by the APD in 
order to organize the effectiveness of the domestic judicial remedies, with the 
consequence that some Member States have been condemned by the ECtHR and the 
differences in the national systems which does not conform with the aim pursued by 
the construction of the CEAS, the proposal of the Commission to introduce, in the 
recast proposal, the common minimal requirements for an effective remedy is a 
good step forwards. We also consider that these minimal requirements, in general 
(see some recommendations hereafter), conform with the minimal requirements 
provided by the case law of the EU Court and the ECtHR.  
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. There is a necessity to examine the recast program of the EU instruments of the 
first generation of the CEAS as a whole to avoid divergence in standards, notions 
and devices. 
 
2. When examining the proposals of the Commission and the amendments that 
could be suggested, there is a necessity to take into account the minimum 
standards set out by the case law of the EU Court or of the ECtHR concerning the 
minimal procedural guarantees during the administrative phase of the procedure 
and the phase of the judicial review, in order to clearly distinguish what is 
obligatory to conform with those minimal requirements and what would require 
more and would, as a consequence, depend on a political decision of the 
stakeholders. 
 
3. It is proposed to re-examine the provisions of the recast proposal and/or the 
comments on some of those provisions to ensure coherence in the application of 
the concepts of “determining authority” and “competent authority” or to clearly 
define the situations in which a decision can be taken by a “competent authority” 
other than the “determining authority”. It would also be envisaged to introduce a 
definition of the notion and of the competences of the “competent authority” in 
Article 2 recast proposal, such as has already been provided for the notion of a 
“determining authority”. 
 
4. Although the recast proposal contains a new provision (Article 20) specifically 
dedicated to applicants with special needs, in order to guarantee an effective 
protection, the new text should:  
 
a. define more precisely the protected groups ; 
b. oblige the MS to introduce systematic monitoring to identify those groups 
from the time that the application is made; in this regard a link with the first 
monitoring organized by the “Reception Directive” could be made;  
c. clarify the guarantees provided to each sub-group of applicants with special 
needs. 
 
5. EASO could be empowered to deal with issues of “recommended standards of 
examination” by issuing guidelines for which Member States may deviate from 
but may be obliged in that case to register their differences. Also, it could be 
permitted to admit experimental procedures which, for instance, make it possible 
to make use of external processing or joint processing by way of an option of 
Member States to participate in projects.  
 
6. Another question is whether it would be useful to incorporate Article 4 of the 
“Qualification Directive” in the APD, in order to ensure better clarity of the rules 
on evidence and standards for the examination of the applications. 
 
7. “First country of asylum (FCA)” concept (Article 31, recast proposal) : 
 
The terms “sufficient protection” are too weak and could be replaced by “effective 
protection”. The availability of the protection should also be mentioned.  
 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 358 
8. The right to rebut the presumption of safety has to be explicitly recognized by the 
Directive, at both the procedural level and the substantial level. This is not the 
case in the APD. At a procedural level, article 30, recast proposal guarantees the 
right to a personal interview. But on the substantial level, article 26 should also 
include the right to rebut the presumption as it is recognized in article 32, recast 
proposal (“safe third country (STC)” concept and the right to challenge the 
connection between the applicant and the STC). 
 
9. If we consider that the same procedural requirements have to apply to the 
“European safe third country (ESTC)” concept (Article 38, recast proposal) as to 
the application of the “STC” concept, the question raised is whether it would not 
be better to abandon this concept. 
 
10. Providing that the use of lists of “safe countries of origin” (SCO) (Articles 33 and 
34, recast proposal) does not increase the burden of proof on the asylum-seeker, 
that each individual case will be examined fully on its merits, and that procedural 
guarantees are offered, the establishment of such lists could be acceptable. 
However, since the procedural guarantees required are the same as in the regular 
procedure, one may wonder if the complexity introduced by this concept is really 
necessary for the Member States. Moreover it seems also not to conform with the 
aim of the CEAS to delete the notion of “common EU” lists and to only refer to 
“national” lists. 
 
11. Article 27 (4), recast proposal should be completed in order to determine the 
consequences of the failure to adopt a decision within determined time limits: one 
possibility could be, at the end of the period of 12 months, to permit the asylum 
seeker to request the decision of the first instance authority before the end of a 
determined time limit and to initiate a right to an effective remedy within the 
meaning of Article 41, recast proposal in the absence of a decision at the end of 
this time limit. 
 
12. The limited exception to the right to remain on the territory during the 
administrative examination of a (second or multiple) subsequent claim (Article 35 
(8) (a), recast proposal) is admissible taking into account the international 
obligations of the Member States and the case law of ECtHR and EU Court. 
13. Further explanations have however, to be given concerning: 1°) the right to an 
effective remedy (whether to apply the “Return Directive” or a completed Article 
41, recast proposal) and 2°) the relations between the “competent” authority and 
the “determining” authority before such an expulsion order should be decided. 
 
14. Further explanations should be given regarding the risks of confusion in 
provisions of the recast proposal concerning the “inadmissible applications” 
procedure (Articles 29 to 32, recast proposal): the differences between 
“inadmissible applications” and some cases of “preliminary examination” 
procedure of subsequent asylum claims; which rules are applicable to an 
“admissibility interview”?; decision has to be taken by the “determining” or by 
another “competent” authority?; is there a right to judicial remedy in the 
“preliminary examination” procedure? This is not expressly provided for in Article 
41 (1), recast proposal. 
 
15. It seems necessary to complete the recast proposal’s “National security 
provision(s)”, for example, to organize a prioritized examination of the claim by 
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the determining authority in such circumstances or, at a minimum, to ensure the 
respect of the principle of non-refoulement, in line with the case law of the 
ECtHR. 
 
16. In contrast to the provisions of the recast proposal which provide the right to 
(free) legal assistance at all stages of the procedures in first instance (Article 18 
(1) and (2) (a)), this right is only recognized once the “competent authority” has 
taken the decision to withdraw the international protection status (Article 40 (3), 
recast proposal). We do not see how this difference in treatment can reasonably 
be justified. 
 
17. Concerning the right to be heard during the procedure to withdraw refugee 
status, Article 40 (1) (b), recast proposal allows Member States to replace the 
personal interview by a written statement of the reasons why it is not justified to 
withdraw this status; taking into account the proposals of the Commission with 
regard the to right to a personal interview for the examination of an application 
for international protection, we do not see why the person concerned would not 
have the right to a personal interview before the withdrawing of the status, at 
least when he/she expressly requests such an interview. 
 
18. Taking into account the great variety of time-limits that have been determined by 
the Member States, it would be useful to introduce in the Directive a minimum 
common time-limit for all Member States to introduce an appeal. This time-limit 
could vary in accordance with the procedure which has been applied to the 
specific case. 
 
19. The recast proposal should be amended in order to prevent the enforcement of an 
expulsion order during the time-limit within which to lodge an appeal, (or at least 
the time-limit for asking for an interim measure of suspension before a court or a 
tribunal has expired) and the right to appeal or to the request for interim 
measure has not been exercised. 
 
20. The question arises as to what the consequences are of contravening time-limits 
imposed by Member States on the court or tribunal when examining the request 
against the decision of the determining or competent authority (Article 41 (9), 
recast proposal)? 
 
21. As a final recommendation, we can consider that the recast proposal represents a 
good step forward in the harmonization of the procedures at first instance and 
that the procedural guarantees provided during the administrative phase of the 
procedure and during the appeal procedure are in line with the case law of the 
ECtHR and of the EU Court that we have analyzed. We recommend that the 
Parliament should support this proposal and examine if any amendment which 
would be proposed is at least in conformity with the above-mentioned case law. 
We also suggest the examination of the recommendations made in this draft. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF THE ASYLUM 
POLICY 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The area of freedom, security and justice that the Union shall ‘offer to its citizens’739 is 
supposed to remain penetrable to ‘those whose circumstances lead them justifiably to seek 
access to our territory’740. The Tampere Conclusions established that ‘[t]he aim is an open 
and secure European Union, fully committed to the obligations of the Geneva Refugee 
Convention and other relevant human rights instruments […]’ (§4). The Stockholm 
Programme has set out precisely that ‘[p]eople in need of protection must be ensured 
access to legally safe and efficient asylum procedures’ (§1.1). At the same time, as recalled 
in the Tampere Conclusions (§3), ‘the need for a consistent control of external borders to 
stop illegal immigration and to combat those who organise it and commit related 
international crimes’ is to be taken into account. A proper balance is thus to be struck so 
that ‘the necessary strengthening of European border controls [does] not prevent access to 
protection systems by those people entitled to benefit under them’741. 
 
In an environment of extraterritorial border surveillance and migration control, several 
solutions have been posited to offer guarantees to those who seek protection in or access 
to the European Union with varying degrees of success, ranging from a predominantly 
collective perception of refugee flows to a more individualized approach. Some of these 
mechanisms focus on the regions of origin and transit of refugee flows, as vectors of the 
international system of protection, with the objective of enhancing their protection capacity 
to manage protracted situations. Other initiatives engage directly with the individual 
refugee and his physical access to the territory of the EU Member States in a safe and 
orderly way. Still other measures, particularly those concerned with border surveillance and 
migration control at large, appear to neglect their impact on asylum seekers’ and refugees’ 
rights altogether.  
 
This chapter constitutes the contribution on the external dimension of asylum to the debate 
regarding the future development of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Our 
purpose is to identify the main legal questions regarding the administration of access to 
international protection in the EU Member States and to advance possible solutions. The 
chapter has been divided into ten sections relating to the state of the art of the EU acquis 
on entry management with an impact on access to international protection, evaluating 
current shortcomings and putting forward short-term solutions. Future perspectives are 
assessed in Part III of the study, where medium- and long-term proposals are formulated 
concerning the ‘external dimension of asylum’742 stricto sensu. The rights that refugees and 
asylum seekers derive from the EU fundamental rights acquis are taken into account 
throughout the analysis, as are protection-related obligations of the EU Member States. 
 
After a preliminary review of the obligations of the EU Member States with an effect on 
access to international protection, Chapter 5 has been organised in six main divisions, 
                                                 
739  Article 3(2) TEU. 
740  Presidency Conclusions, European Council 15-16 October 1999 [Tampere Conclusions  hereinafter], § 
3.  
741  European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, Council doc. 13440/08, 24.09.2008, p. 11. 
742  The Hague Programme, Council doc. 16054/04, 13.12.2004, § 1.6. 
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equivalent to the different measures introduced to control the movement of persons across 
the external borders of the EU Member States with an impact on refugees’ and asylum 
seekers’ rights. On the one hand, the measures adopted to administer migration in general 
are dealt with first. On the other hand, the policy instruments implemented to manage 
refugee inflows in particular are subsequently assessed. Accordingly, the Schengen Borders 
Code is examined in section three.743 The fourth division deals with Schengen Visas. The 
fifth part scrutinizes the institution of carrier sanctions alongside that of immigration liaison 
officers posted abroad. Joint-patrolling operations conducted by the EU Member States at 
sea under the auspices of the FRONTEX agency are evaluated in section five. Finally, the 
measures aimed specifically at facilitating the orderly management of asylum arrivals are 
examined in turns: The EU Joint Resettlement Programme is appraised in section six, 
whereas Regional Protection Programmes are considered in section seven. The 
insufficiencies detected for each of the measures have been highlighted in boxes together 
with a brief explanation and corresponding short-term solutions. Key findings and 
recommendations are synthesised at the end.  
2. PROTECTION-RELATED OBLIGATIONS OF THE EU 
MEMBER STATES ACTING ABROAD 
 
Before embarking in the detailed analysis of each of the measures investigated, a general 
account of the main obligations binding upon the EU Member States vis-à-vis refugees and 
asylum seekers in transit, as enshrined in international instruments to which the EU 
Member States are parties and in EU law itself, is necessary. The principle of non-
refoulement, the right to leave any country including one’s own in order to seek asylum, in 
both their substantive and procedural components, deserve discussion at some length. For 
our purposes, special emphasis is placed on the extraterritorial dimension thereof.  
2.1. Non-Refoulement 
 
Maiani and Vevstad deal with the content of the principle of non-refoulement. Thus, this 
Chapter refers to Chapter 2 on this point. We will briefly elaborate on the extraterritorial 
applicability thereof under the main legal instruments binding upon the Member States in 
relation to international protection, i.e. the Geneva Convention (GC),744 the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)745 and EU law itself.  
2.1.1. International law 
In the framework of the Geneva Convention, the Sale decision of the US Supreme Court, 
refusing the extraterritorial applicability of article 33(1),746 has subsequently been rejected 
by the majority of the doctrine, by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights747 
and, partly, also by the English House of Lords in the Prague Airport case748.  
                                                 
743  Regulation (EC) No. 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders 
(Schengen Borders Code), OJ L 105/1 of 13.04.2006 [Schengen Borders Code or SBC hereinafter].  
744  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [Geneva Convention or 
GC hereinafter]. 
745  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221[European Convention on Human Rights or ECHR hereinafter]. 
746  Chris Sale, Acting Commissioner, I.N.S. et al. v Haitian Centers Council Inc. et al. [1993] 509 US 155. 
747  Inter-Am.C.H.R., The Haitian Centre for Human Rights et al. v United States, Case 10.675, Report No. 
51/96. 
748  Regina v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport and another (Respondents) ex parte European Roma 
Rights Centre and Others (Appellants), [2004] UKHL 55. 
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2.1.2. The European Convention on Human Rights 
Nevertheless, the applicability of the Geneva Convention is blocked if refugee qualification 
criteria are not met, which includes being outside the country of own nationality. In such 
cases, article 3 ECHR becomes relevant, as its personal and material scope of application is 
larger and may cover the situation of individuals in need of protection who are still within 
their countries of origin.  
 
Although on exceptional bases, the extraterritorial applicability of the ECHR has been 
recognized by the Strasbourg Court. Bankovic established that ‘from the standpoint of 
public international law, the jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily territorial’, 
stipulating that ‘only in exceptional cases […] acts of the Contracting States performed, or 
producing effects, outside their territories can constitute an exercise of jurisdiction within 
the meaning of article 1 [ECHR]’749. When States exert ‘effective control’ over an area 
outside national territory750 or over persons abroad751 their human rights obligations may 
be engaged. Issa has explained that ‘a State may be held accountable for a violation of the 
Convention rights and freedoms of persons who are in the territory of another State but 
who are found to be under the former State’s authority and control through its agents 
operating –whether lawfully or unlawfully- in the latter State […]’. In such situations, 
accountability stems from the fact that ‘article 1 [ECHR] cannot be interpreted so as to 
allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the Convention on the territory of another 
State, which it could not perpetrate on its own territory’752. 
 
Al-Saadoon, concerning the detention of two Iraqi nationals by the UK military forces in 
Iraq and their subsequent referral to the Iraqi authorities to face a trial upon which they 
risk the death penalty, has confirmed the applicability of the Convention to the actions and 
omissions of State agents exercising de jure or de facto control over individuals abroad753. 
Applying the Soering approach,754 the Court has established that ‘the respondent State was 
                                                 
749  ECtHR, Bankovic a. o.  v Belgium a. o. (Dec.), Appl. No. 52207/99, 12.12.2000, § 59 and 67. 
750  ECtHR, Loizidou v Turkey, Appl. No. 15318/89, (Preliminary Objections) 23.03.1995 and (Merits) 
18.12.1996, § 52: ‘As regards the question of imputability, the Court recalls in the first place that in its 
above-mentioned Loizidou judgment (preliminary objections) (pp. 23-24, § 62) it stressed that under 
its established case-law the concept of “jurisdiction” under Article 1 of the Convention is not restricted 
to the national territory of the Contracting States. Accordingly, the responsibility of Contracting States 
can be involved by acts and omissions of their authorities which produce effects outside their own 
territory. Of particular significance to the present case the Court held, in conformity with the relevant 
principles of international law governing State responsibility, that the responsibility of a Contracting 
Party could also arise when as a consequence of military action – whether lawful or unlawful – it 
exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory. The obligation to secure, in such an 
area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention, derives from the fact of such control whether it 
be exercised directly, through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local administration […]’. See 
also Cyprus v Turkey, Appl. No. 25781/94, 10.05.2001. 
751  ECtHR, Ocalan v Turkey, Appl. No. 46221/99, 12.05.2005, § 91: ‘The Court notes that the applicant 
was arrested by members of the Turkish security forces inside an aircraft registered in Turkey, in the 
international zone of Nairobi Airport. It is common ground that, directly after being handed over to the 
Turkish officials by the Kenyan officials, the applicant was effectively under Turkish authority and 
therefore within the “jurisdiction” of that State for the purposes of art. 1 ECHR, even though in this 
instance Turkey exercised its authority outside its territory. It is true that the applicant was physically 
forced to return to Turkey by Turkish officials and was under their authority and control following his 
arrest and return to Turkey’.  
752  ECtHR, Issa and Others v Turkey, Appl. No. 31821/96, 16.11.2004, § 71. 
753  ECtHR, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v UK (Dec.), Appl. No. 61498/08, 30.06.2009, § 88: ‘The Court 
considers that, given the total and exclusive de facto, and subsequently also de jure, control exercised 
by the UK authorities over the premises in question, the individuals detained there, including the 
applicants, were within the UK’s jurisdiction […]’.  
754  ECtHR, Soering v United Kingdom, Appl. No. 14038/88, 07.07.1989, § 88: ‘It would hardly be 
compatible with the underlying values of the Convention, that "common heritage of political traditions, 
ideals, freedom and the rule of law" to which the Preamble refers, were a Contracting State knowingly 
to surrender a fugitive to another State where there were substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture, however heinous the crime allegedly committed. 
Extradition in such circumstances, while not explicitly referred to in the brief and general wording of 
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under the paramount obligation to ensure that the arrest and detention did not end in a 
manner which would breach the applicants’ rights under articles 2 and 3 of the Convention 
and article 1 of Protocol 13’. By failing to secure a ‘binding assurance’ from the Iraqi 
authorities that the capital punishment will not be imposed, ‘the referral of the applicants’ 
cases to the Iraqi courts and their physical transfer to the custody of the Iraqi authorities 
failed to take proper account of the United Kingdom obligations’. The Court has thus 
determined that ‘through the actions and inaction of the United Kingdom authorities the 
applicants have been subjected […] to fear of execution by the Iraqi authorities […] causing 
the applicants psychological suffering [that] constituted inhuman treatment’, in breach of 
article 3 of the Convention755. 
 
According to § 73 of Bankovic, exceptional ‘recognised instances of the extra-territorial 
exercise of jurisdiction by a State’ include also ‘cases involving the activities of its 
diplomatic or consular agents abroad and on board craft and vessels registered in, or flying 
the flag of, that State. In these specific situations, customary international law and treaty 
provisions have recognised the extra-territorial exercise of jurisdiction by the relevant 
State’.  
 
With regard to the ‘flag State’ exception, Medvedyev, concerning a case of interception of a 
Cambodian boat sailing ‘through the waters off Cape Verde’ by the French military forces, 
constitutes a case in point. The Court determined that since the date the ship was 
intercepted and until it arrived to port in Brest ‘the Winner and its crew were under the 
control of French military forces, so that even though they were outside French territory, 
they were within the jurisdiction of France for the purposes of article 1 [ECHR]’756. Xhavara 
provides a further example of the extraterritorial applicability of the ECHR in the high seas. 
The case concerned the death of 58 Albanians aboard the Kater I Rades, which sunk 35 
miles off the Italian coast upon collision with the Italian warship Sibilla. The background to 
the claim is a naval blockade of the Italian navy conducted in the high seas and the 
territorial waters of Albania for migration control purposes, as authorized by Albania in a 
bilateral agreement concluded with Italy in 1997. Although the claim was dismissed for 
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Court made important observations. Because the 
shipwreck had been directly provoked by the Italian navy, the Court explicitly established 
that any complaint in this regard should be considered to be addressed exclusively against 
Italy. By virtue of the collision of the Sibilla with the Kater I Rades in open seas, Xhavara 
was considered to come within the jurisdiction of Italy in the sense of article 1 ECHR. On 
that account, the Court reminded Italy that article 2(1) ECHR enjoins the State not only to 
refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to 
safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction757. Thereafter, the UN Committee against 
Torture has developed a similar reasoning in a case concerning a search and rescue 
operation undertaken by Spain in the SAR Region of Senegal, off the Mauritanian coast. 
Although the complaint was declared inadmissible due to the lack of locus standi of the 
representative of the victims, the Committee considered that in any event the alleged 
victims were subject to Spanish jurisdiction on account of the control exerted by the 
Spanish authorities ‘over the persons on board the Marine I from the time the vessel was 
                                                                                                                                                            
Article 3 (art. 3), would plainly be contrary to the spirit and intendment of the Article, and in the Court’s 
view this inherent obligation not to extradite also extends to cases in which the fugitive would be faced 
in the receiving State by a real risk of exposure to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
proscribed by that Article (art. 3)’. 
755  ECtHR, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v UK, Appl. No. 61498/08, 02.03.2010, § 140, 143 and 144. 
756  ECtHR, Medvedyev and Others v France, Appl. No. 3394/03, 10.07.2008, § 50. 
757  ECtHR, Xhavara v Italy (Dec.), Appl. No. 39473/98, 11.01.2001, § 1 ‘En droit’.  
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rescued and throughout the identification and repatriation process’ that took place 
afterwards758.  
 
With regard to the ‘diplomatic exception’ and cases of demands of protection directed to 
consulates and embassies abroad, international jurisprudence is scarce. The only decision 
by the Strasbourg organs on the matter dates back to 1992. WM concerned the case of 18 
citizens from the DDR willing to travel to the West. As permission to emigrate was refused, 
the 18 entered the Danish Embassy to request its mediation with the German authorities. 
The ambassador, however, asked them to leave and, as they did not obey, he requested 
the DDR police to enter the embassy to remove them. At their hands they allegedly 
suffered arbitrary detention. In that connection, the European Commission noted that the 
complaints were ‘directed mainly against Danish diplomatic authorities in the former DDR’. 
It was clear ‘that authorized agents of the State, including diplomatic or consular agents, 
bring other persons or property within the jurisdiction of that State to the extent that they 
exercise authority over such persons or property. In so far as they affect such persons or 
property by their acts or omissions, the responsibility of the State is engaged […]’. The 
Commission was, indeed, ‘satisfied that the acts of the Danish ambassador complained of 
affected persons within the jurisdiction of the Danish authorities within the meaning of art. 
1 ECHR’. Using the language of Soering, it recalled that ‘an act or omission of a Party to the 
Convention may exceptionally engage the responsibility of that State for acts of a State not 
party to the Convention where the person in question had suffered or risks suffering a 
flagrant denial of the guarantees and rights secured to him under the Convention’. Yet, as 
no ‘substantial grounds’ were shown to believe that the applicant had run a ‘real risk’ of ill 
treatment in the DDR upon referral to the German authorities, the claim was eventually 
dismissed759.  
 
More recently, the decision by the HRC decision on Munaf has also adopted a Soering-like 
approach in an embassy case. The case concerns an Iraqi-American dual national who 
travelled from Romania to Iraq accompanying a group of Romanian citizens. The group was 
kidnapped and freed after a few days through the intervention of the Multi-National Forces 
operating in Iraq, subsequent to which they were taken to the Romanian embassy. On 
account of his dual citizenship, Munaf requested permission to go instead to the US 
embassy. There, he was charged with criminal offences and taken to a detention camp 
where he is presently detained and allegedly subject to mistreatment by the US forces. The 
applicant has complained to the HRC that the Romanian embassy should have protected 
him from these alleged violations of his rights under the Covenant by not letting him leave 
its diplomatic premises. On that account, the Committee has determined that ‘[t]he main 
issue to be considered […] is whether, by allowing the author to leave the premises of the 
Romanian Embassy in Baghdad, it exercised jurisdiction over him in a way that exposed 
him to a real risk of becoming a victim of violations of his rights under [the Covenant] 
which it could reasonably have anticipated’. Accepting that States have full legal jurisdiction 
over their diplomatic premises and over the persons found therein as a matter of 
international law, the Committee considered the engagement of Romania’s responsibility to 
be contingent on ‘a link in the causal chain that would make possible violations in another 
jurisdiction. Thus, the risk of an extra-territorial violation must be a necessary and 
foreseeable consequence and must be judged on the knowledge the State party had at the 
[relevant] time […]’. In view of the circumstances of the case, the Committee concluded 
that the violations of the Covenant complained of ‘were [not] a necessary and foreseeable 
consequence of his departure from the Embassy’760.  
                                                 
758  CAT, J.H.A. v Spain, Comm. No. 323/2007, 10.11.2008, § 8.2. 
759  ECommHR, WM v Denmark, Appl. No. 17392/90, 14.10.1992, § 1 ‘The law’. 
760  HRC, Munaf v Romania, Comm. No. 1539/2006, 30.07. 2009, § 14.2-14.4. 
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In light of this jurisprudence we infer that responsibility for human rights violations may be 
engaged extraterritorially under certain circumstances. Acts of refoulement by the agents 
of the State abroad may bring potential victims within the remit of the States’ obligations 
under the ECHR. In principle, the exercise of a certain degree of control over the persons 
concerned appears to be required, be it through acts of abduction, detention, referral to 
foreign authorities, shipping interdiction, collision or search and rescue at sea. If by their 
actions Contracting States expose persons to a ‘real risk’ of ill treatment, extraterritorial 
responsibility for non-refoulement may be engaged. The case-law is less developed with 
regard to the omission of State protection in embassy-like cases and instances of 
‘diplomatic asylum’ that may equally entail the exposure to a risk of refoulement. 
Nevertheless, the jurisprudence available appears to indicate that ‘the Soering principle […] 
would [also] apply where an individual sought and was refused refuge in a Contracting 
State’s embassy’761.  
2.1.3. EU Law 
In the EU legal framework, article 3 SBC holds that the Schengen Borders Code – and 
hence entry control activities in application thereof – is to be applied without prejudice to 
the rights of refugees, paying particular attention to non-refoulement. The scope of 
application ratione loci of the Code – and thus of its article 3 – does not coincide with the 
geographical confines of the EU Member States. Indeed, included as methods of 
surveillance explicitly provided for by the Code in its Annex VI are the checks performed ‘in 
stations in a third country where persons board the train’ (§ 1.2.2), ‘on the aircraft or at 
the gate’, even in ‘airports which do not hold the status of international airport’ (§ 2.1.3. 
and 2.2.1), and ‘in the [territorial sea] of a third country’ (§ 3.1.1). Therefore, any debate 
as for the extraterritorial applicability of the EU acquis on entry, in general, and of the 
Schengen Borders Code, in particular, is rendered unnecessary. It is the legal instrument 
itself which defines its territorial scope of application as exceeding the territories of the EU 
Member States762. 
 
Content-wise, what the reference to non-refoulement in article 3 SBC entails, in the 
absence of authoritative jurisprudence from the ECJ, is further clarified by article 19(2) 
EUCFR763. The provision ‘incorporates the relevant case-law from the European Court of 
Human Rights regarding article 3 ECHR’764 and, according to article 52(3) EUCFR, it should 
be given the same meaning.  
 
With the Lisbon Treaty in force, the EU Charter of fundamental rights produces the same 
effect as the texts of primary law. Article 19 EUCFR has become a separate source of 
individual rights, concurrent with article 3 SBC. It is hence pertinent to elucidate its scope 
of application ratione loci. Contrary to the Schengen Borders Code, article 19 EUCFR does 
not expressly define it. It may hence follow that it is governed by article 52 TEU765 and 
article 355 TFEU766 (ex article 299 EC), providing generally for the applicability of the EU 
Treaties to the territories of their Signatory Parties. However, this should not be read as to 
exclude the extraterritorial applicability of article 19 EUCFR. According to the ECJ in 
Boukhalfa ‘[t]he geographical application of the Treaty [as] defined in Article [52 TEU] […] 
                                                 
761  ECtHR, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v UK, Appl. No. 61498/08, 02.03.2010, § 139. 
762  The European Commission has developed a similar reasoning based on the scope ratione materiae of 
the SBC, considering that where the actions of a Member State match the definition of ‘border 
surveillance’ in article 12 SBC the Code becomes applicable. See the letter to the LIBE Committee of 
15.07.2009 in connection with the Italian push-backs to Libya.   
763  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 83/389, 30.03.2010 [EUCFR hereinafter]. 
764  Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ C 303/17, 14.12.2007, p. 24. 
765  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, OJ C 83/13, 30.03.2010 [TEU hereinafter]. 
766  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 83/47, 30.03.2010 
[TFEU hereinafter]. 
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does not […] preclude Community rules from having effects outside the territory of the 
Community’, provided that a sufficient link to EU law can be established767.     
2.2. The right to (leave to seek) asylum: 
 
Beside the principle of non-refoulement, the right to (leave to seek) asylum is also essential 
for our purposes, for the existence of statutory refugees fulfilling the Geneva Convention 
definition depends upon it. At the core of our reasoning rests the assumption that this right 
is legally opposable not only to countries of origin but also to destination States. This 
implies that the motives bringing a person to leave her country of origin in search of 
international protection ought to be taken into account not only by the former, but also by 
the latter, when designing and applying measures of migration control.  
2.2.1. International Law 
The right to leave has been codified in article 12(2) of the 1966 International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)768. Without being conceived of as an absolute entitlement, 
the right admits a series of limitations according to article 12(3) ICCPR, which ‘must not 
impair the essence of the right’769. The interpretation of these provisions has undergone a 
certain evolution. It has only been in recent times that emigration measures such as exit 
visas have been deemed disproportionate and the refusal to issue a passport considered 
inadmissible770. With regard to immigration control mechanisms introduced by countries of 
destination, the Human Rights Committee, while expressing concern about their potential 
to foreclose the right to leave in practice, has never openly condemned them. In Dixit v 
Australia, although the question of the proportionality of an entry visa denial was 
formulated, the communication was rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies771. 
This has allowed some doctrine to infer that ‘the Committee implicitly accepted that the 
grant of visas to aliens abroad comes under the ambit of the Covenant. Had it thought 
otherwise, the case [would have] been declared inadmissible ratione loci, and any 
reasoning on the exhaustion of domestic remedies would have been superfluous’772. Along 
these lines, if we can accept that ‘the right to leave is not a right which other States need 
to “complete” through a duty to admit; rather, it is simply a right each State must 
guarantee’773, it should be treated as any other right in the Covenant, opposable to each 
Contracting Party independently774. From this perspective, the absence of a right of entry in 
international law would not per se suffice to justify the elimination by destination States of 
the explicitly recognized right to leave in their regard. The right would produce autonomous 
effects vis-à-vis them. As a result, while restrictions would remain permitted, the essential 
content of the right would have to remain intact. The interference would need to be 
                                                 
767  ECJ, Ingrid Boukhalfa v Federal Republic of Germany, C-214/94, 1996 ECR I-2253, § 14-15. 
768  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [ICCPR hereinafter]. 
769  HRC, General Comment No. 27 (1999), § 13. 
770  HRC, Loubna El Ghar v Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Communication No. 1107/2002, § 
7.2. 
771  HRC, Dixit v. Australia, Communication No. 978/2001, 28.03.2003. 
772  G. Noll, ‘Seeking Asylum at Embassies: A Right to Entry under International Law?’, IJRL (2005), p. 
561. 
773  G. S. Goodwin-Gill and J. McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, OUP (2007), p. 382. The 
original argument has been extended. The authors appear to restrict its applicability to the country of 
departure that would police the requirements imposed by a third country of destination. Here we 
understand that the opposability of the right is not vis-à-vis the country of departure, but vis-à-vis the 
country of destination exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
774  Article 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties comes in support of this argument as 
it rules that: 'Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in 
good faith'. The French version is more telling: 'Tout traité en vigueur lie les parties et doit être 
exécuté par elles de bonne foi'. When it comes to consider the interplay between international 
obligations and domestic law, article 27 establishes that: 'a party may not invoke the provisions of its 
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty’.  
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provided by law, it would have to be necessary for the realization of the objective invoked, 
which, in turn, would have to serve one of the limitative motives that allows for the 
restriction of the right to leave in article 12(3) ICCPR. 
 
For those fleeing persecution, including refugees to-be, still inside their country of origin, to 
the right to leave any country there joins a right to seek asylum from persecution as a 
modulating factor775. While international law does not expressly recognize a right to seek 
asylum in any legally binding form and no literal allusion can be traced to article 14 UDHR 
in the letter of the Geneva Convention, its drafters seem to have considered it inherent. 
‘The right of asylum was implicit in the Convention, even if it was not explicitly proclaimed 
therein, for the very existence of refugees depended on it’. The French delegation 
suggested that ‘the right of asylum should be mentioned explicitly together with the 
reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ made in the Preamble and the Ad 
Hoc Committee accepted the proposition. Delegates from other countries felt that, then, 
the same should be done for other articles of the UDHR, since the object and purpose of 
the Convention was ‘to ensure the widest possible exercise of all fundamental rights and 
freedoms’. Plausibly, it was ultimately decided that any singling out of particular rights 
would have been done at the detriment of other rights not expressly referred to. 
Accordingly, a generally encompassing reference to the UDHR was preferred776.  
 
Article 14 UDHR does not establish any other limitation to the right to flee than those 
arising from legitimate prosecution in the country of origin. Consequently, the aggregate 
right to leave to seek asylum may impose a stricter principle of proportionality than the 
right to leave operating alone. Public order considerations ought to play a lesser role when 
constraining the right to leave, as the underlying motives of the person leaving to seek 
international protection need to be taken into account.  
2.2.2. The European Convention on Human Rights 
The Strasbourg Court appears to so understand. Although the right to leave (alone), as 
enshrined in article 2(2) of Protocol 4 ECHR, has been construed as implying ‘a right to 
leave for such a country of the person’s choice to which he may be admitted’777, when it 
concerns asylum seekers the Court seems to accept its opposability not only to the country 
of origin, but also vis-à-vis the country of destination. This appears to be because the 
person seeks asylum. Precisely, although the main focus in Amuur was on detention, the 
Court also asserted in obiter dicta that ‘the mere fact that it is possible for asylum-seekers 
to leave voluntarily the country where they wish to take refuge cannot exclude a restriction 
on […] the right to leave any country, including one’s own […]’. In close connection, the 
Court declared the existence of a ‘right to gain effective access to the procedure for 
determining refugee status’ that immigration controls could not disregard. The Court 
determined that ‘States’ legitimate concern to foil the increasingly frequent attempts to 
circumvent immigration restrictions must not deprive asylum seekers of the protection 
afforded by these [entitlements]’778. This implicit recognition of a right to leave to seek 
asylum, in both its substantive and procedural facets, makes it possible to assume that 
                                                 
775  Note that article 14(1) UDHR does not limit its scope of application ratione personae to Geneva 
Convention refugees: ‘everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from 
persecution’. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA Res. 217 (III), UN GAOR, 3rd Session, 
Supp. No. 13, 1948 UN Doc. A/810, [UDHR hereinafter]. 
776  P. Weis, The Refugee Convention 1951- The Travaux Préparatoires, CUP, Cambridge, 1995, pp. 6 and 
296. 
777  ECtHR, Peltonen v Finland (Dec.), Appl. No. 19583/92, 20.02.1995; K.S. v Finland (Dec.), Appl. No. 
21228/93, 24.05.1995; Napijalo v Croatia, Appl. No. 66485/01, 13.11.2003. 
778  ECtHR, Amuur v France, Appl. No. 19776/92, 25.06.1996, § 43 and 48. 
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departure to seek international protection constitutes a legitimate ground for one to leave 
his own country that destination States must take into account779.    
2.2.3. EU Law 
In the EU legal order, the precise confines of article 18 EUCFR have elicited profound 
debate. Some authors go so far as to proclaim the existence of a right to be granted 
asylum780. Others consider the right to seek asylum to be implicit therein781. Others opine 
that the right to asylum encloses a general principle of EU law782. Still others maintain that 
article 18 EUCFR does not seem to add anything to the Geneva Convention783. Ultimately, it 
will be for the ECJ to determine its precise meaning. Meanwhile, if any content is to be 
attached thereto, article 18 EUCFR shall reflect the right to seek asylum under discussion 
here, including a preliminary entitlement to leave the country of own nationality for that 
purpose. This is plausible if read together with the commentary of the Presidium holding 
that ‘the text of the article has been based on TEC article 63 [today’s article 78 TFEU], […] 
which requires the Union to respect the Geneva Convention on refugees’. If, as developed 
above, it is possible to ascertain the existence of a right to seek international protection as 
inhering in the Geneva Convention, EU law must be interpreted in consonance with that 
standard. This reading is reinforced by the fact that, pursuant to the Charter’s distinction 
between ‘rights’ and ‘principles’, article 18 EUCFR, according to the very wording of its title, 
is to be classified amid the ‘rights’. Therefore, as the Presidium has explained, it may ‘give 
rise to direct claims for positive action by the Union's institutions or Member States 
authorities’ and possibly produce direct effect784. In regard of its extraterritorial 
applicability, it is worth noting, that the wording of article 18 EUCFR – as happened to that 
of article 19 EUCFR– does not enclose any territorial limitation. Hence, in light of Boukhalfa, 
its eventual applicability beyond the borders of the EU Member States cannot be excluded, 
provided that a sufficient link to EU law can be established.  
2.3. Access to procedures, effective remedies and judicial 
protection 
 
The procedural side of the rights to be protected from refoulement and to seek asylum has 
also to be succinctly reviewed. A general reference to Chapter 4 of the study is appropriate 
in this context. 
 
It is usually submitted that in order to fully comply with the obligation of non-refoulement 
in article 33(1) GC, it is necessary to determine whether the person’s life or freedom would 
be threatened upon removal on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion. In reality, ‘to enable States parties to the 
                                                 
779  ECtHR, Ahmed Hussun a. o. v Italy, Appl. No. 10171/05, 11.05.2006. The case concerned a possible 
collective expulsion after maritime rescue of some 100 irregular immigrants to Libya from Lampedusa. 
The applicants claimed to have been summarily returned prior to having been able to access asylum 
procedures. The Court declared the claim admissible. However, subsequent to the irretraceability of 
the victims, he case has been struck out of the list of cases on 19.01.2010. A new case is pending in 
front of the Court on very similar grounds: Hirsi a. o. v Italy, Appl. No. 27765/09.  
780  M.-T. Gil-Bazo, ‘Refugee Status and Subsidiary Protection under EC Law: the Qualification Directive 
and the Right to be Granted Asylum’, A. Baldaccini, E. Guild and H. Toner (eds.), Whose Freedom, 
Security and Justice? EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, Hart Publishing (2007), pp. 236-
239 and ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Right to be Granted 
Asylum in the Union’s Law’, RSQ (2008), pp. 33-52.  
781  C. Harvey, ‘The Right to Seek Asylum in the European Union,’ EHRLR (2004), p. 17.  
782  S. Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs, 2nd Ed., OUP (2006), p. 315. 
783  G. Braibant, La Charte de droits fondamentaux de l’Union Européenne, Le Seuil (2001). 
784  F. Picod, ‘Champ d’application’, Commentaire article par article, Traité établissant une Constitution 
pour l'Europe, L. Burgorgue-Larsen, A. Levade, F. Picod (eds.), Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2005, p. 653. 
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Convention […] to implement their provisions, refugees have to be identified’785. Indirect 
references to status determination procedures can be traced in articles 9 and 31(2) GC, but 
the Convention does not indicate which procedures are to be adopted. It is left to each 
Contracting State to establish the procedure that it considers most appropriate. In 
principle, domestic procedures ought to be such as to enable the Convention to deploy its 
‘appropriate effects’786.  
 
In the framework of the ECHR, ‘arguable claims’787 based on articles 2 and/or 3 ECHR read 
together with article 13 ECHR have to be dealt with in a procedure that allows for 
independent and rigorous scrutiny788. With regard to the right to leave to seek asylum, as 
described above, the Strasbourg Court has acknowledged the existence of a ‘right to gain 
effective access to the procedure for determining refugee status’ that destination countries 
should take into account789. 
 
In the context of the EU legal order, the procedures to safeguard the rights individuals 
derive from EU law, in the absence of specific EU rules on the matter, are left to the 
domestic legal system of each Member State790. In such cases, EU law requires domestic 
norms not to ‘render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights 
conferred by Community law’791. National legislation shall not affect the concomitant ‘right 
to effective judicial protection’ developed hereunder792. 
 
If initial procedures lead to unsatisfactory results, the claimant must be provided with a 
means to appeal. The rights to an effective remedy and to judicial protection are tackled in 
detail in Chapter 4. For our purposes, suffice it to say that article 16(1) GC endows 
refugees with ‘free access to the courts of law on the territory of all Contracting Parties’ to 
enforce their rights as they ensue from the Geneva Convention. Doctrine and State 
jurisprudence have understood that article 16(1) GC includes an entitlement to judicial 
review of the initial determination procedure in order to avoid refoulement793.   
 
In the context of the European Convention on Human Rights, articles 2 and/or 3 read 
together with 13 ECHR grant access to an ‘effective remedy’ to challenge decisions on 
refoulement, allowing the competent national authority ‘to deal with the substance of the 
claim and to grant appropriate relief’794.  
 
Article 47(1) EUCFR reinstates the rights in the Geneva Convention and the ECHR within 
the EU legal framework, for access to effective judicial protection must be secured with 
regard to the rights individuals derive from EU law795. Article 47 EUCFR contemplates 
                                                 
785  UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, 1979 (reedited in 
1992), § 189.  
786  Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II, (1966), p. 219 on the principle of effectiveness 
of treaties.  
787  The term ‘arguable’ is not readily identifiable with the claim not being ‘manifestly ill-founded,’ since at 
times the Court has sustained the arguability of a claim rejecting its foundedness only afterwards. In 
T.I. v UK (Dec.), Appl. No. 43844/98, 07.03.2000, the Court considered the claim arguable because it 
raised concerns about the risks faced after expulsion, although it was declared inadmissible in the 
end.  
788  Inter alia, ECtHR, Jabari v Turkey, Appl. No. 40035/98, 11.07.2000, § 39 ff. 
789  ECtHR, Amuur v France, Appl. No. 19776/92, 25.06.1996, § 43. 
790  ECJ, Courage and Crehan, C-453/99 2001 ECR I-6297, § 29; Safalero, C-13/01 2003 ECR I-8679, § 
49. 
791  ECJ, Rewe, 158/80, 1981 ECR 1805, § 5; Peterbroeck, C-312/93, 1995 ECR I-4599, § 12. 
792  ECJ, Verholen and Others, C-87/90 and C-89/90, 1991 ECR I-3757, § 24. 
793  R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Jahangeer et al., [1993] Imm. AR 564 
(Eng. QBD), 11.06.1993. 
794 Inter alia, ECtHR, Jabari v Turkey, Appl. No. 40035/98, 11.07.2000, § 48. 
795  ECJ, Unibet Ltd, C-432/05, 2007 ECR I-02271, § 67, 77; Factortame, C-213/89, 1990 ECR I-2433. 
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supplementary procedural guarantees. In fact, according to the Charter explanations, ‘in 
Union law the protection is more extensive since it guarantees the right to an effective 
remedy before a court’. Thus, the ‘national authority’ to which article 13 ECHR refers has to 
be understood as a court of law within the EU legal framework. Moreover, according to 
article 47(2) EUCFR ‘[e]veryone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law [and] shall 
have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented’. According to the 
Presidium, the guarantees which in article 6 ECHR are reserved to civil and penal law 
proceedings are to be given a wider scope, since ‘[i]n Union law the right to a fair hearing 
is not confined to [this kind of] disputes’. As a result, the procedural rights enshrined in 
article 6 ECHR, which effects had been precluded in cases concerning immigration 
proceedings by the Strasbourg Court796, become generally applicable as a matter of EU law. 
Finally, the Charter grants also a right to legal aid in article 47(3) that must ‘be made 
available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure 
effective access to justice’. 
 
It follows from the foregoing that, to preserve their effet utile, entry and pre-entry controls 
shall be designed and applied in a way that does not deprive refugees and asylum seekers 
of the protection that the rights to non-refoulement and to (leave to seek) asylum afford 
them in both its facets, substantial and procedural.  
3. THE SCHENGEN BORDERS CODE 
The SBC constitutes the ‘common corpus of legislation’ governing the movement of persons 
across borders797. This includes entry into the EU Member States as well as pre-entry. In 
reality pre-entry checks, including visas, pre-boarding documentary control by private 
carriers and/or Immigration Liaison Officers (ILOs) as well as interception at sea, anticipate 
the entry check border controls are to ensure. They share a common rationale and are 
governed by the same prerequisites in the SBC. With regard to the free movement of 
persons, their equivalence has been acknowledged by the ECJ798.  
 
The Code unified previously scattered norms on the crossing of the Union borders. In article 
2 a harmonized definition of key concepts in relation to entry controls is provided. The 
conditions for entry are specified in articles 4 and 5. Articles 6 to 13 detail how external 
border checks are to be conducted. At the behest of the European Parliament, a right to 
appeal entry refusals has been introduced in article 13799. Rules relating to the staff, 
resources and cooperation between Member States carrying out controls are established in 
articles 14 to 17. Specific norms on checks at the various types of borders and on certain 
categories of persons are stipulated in articles 18 and 19 and Annexes VI and VII. Title III 
is entirely devoted to internal borders. 
 
As specified below, the Code introduces a clear subordination of entry controls to 
international obligations of the EU Member States vis-à-vis refugees and others in search of 
international protection. 
                                                 
796  ECtHR, Maaouia v France, Appl. No. 39652/98, 05.10.2000, § 40. 
797  Towards integrated management of the external borders of the Member States of the European Union, 
COM(2002) 233 final of 07.05.2002; Plan for the Management of the External Borders of the Member 
States of the European Union, Council doc. 10019/02 of 14.06.2002; EU Finnish Presidency, Council 
Conclusions of 04-05.12.2006, Press Release 15801/06. 
798  Mutatis mutandis, Pieck, 157/79, [1980] ECR-2171. 
799  Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a 
Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders, A6-0188/2005 of 
15.06.2005 and Legislative resolution on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and 
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3.1. No evaluation mechanism exists to check compliance with 
refugee rights 
 
PROBLEM: No evaluation mechanism exists to check compliance with refugee rights.  
Neither possible flaws of the legal system established by the Code, nor non-compliance 
with its rules by the EU Member States and FRONTEX can be promptly detected in the 
absence of a monitoring mechanism.  
 
With regard to refugees and asylum seekers, the Code introduces norms with which 
compliance should be checked periodically. In Recital 20 of the preamble the Code 
establishes that its provisions ‘should be applied in accordance with the Member States’ 
obligations as regards international protection and non-refoulement’. Article 3(b) SBC puts 
the rights of refugees and asylum seekers beyond the scope of application of the Code, 
making clear that rules on entry shall apply without prejudice to the ‘rights of refugees and 
persons requesting international protection, in particular as regards non-refoulement’. As a 
result, when examining entry requests, border guards have to consider international 
protection obligations binding upon EU Member States, pursuant to article 5(4)(c) SBC. 
Refusals of admission shall, in turn, be ‘without prejudice to the application of special 
provisions concerning the right of asylum and to international protection,’ according to 
article 13(1) SBC.  
 
SOLUTION: The introduction of a monitoring system to check compliance with refugees’ 
and asylum seekers’ rights when implementing entry (and pre-entry) controls is highly 
recommended. 
 
The observance of the standards established by articles 3(b), 5(4)(c) and 13(1) SBC would 
be better controlled, if a reporting obligation on the procedures used to accommodate the 
position of refugees and asylum seekers when carrying out entry controls is established.  
 
To date, however, there is only an obligation for the Member States to notify the 
Commission certain factual information to enable the harmonious functioning of the regime 
as established, according to articles 34 and 37 SBC, without questioning its validity or 
completeness. This is coupled with a duty of the Commission to report on the application of 
the internal borders Title, pursuant to article 38 SBC, which leaves the external borders 
Title unaffected. 
3.2. Clear entry requirements for refugees and asylum seekers are 
lacking 
 
PROBLEM: Clear entry requirements for refugees and asylum seekers are lacking 
Although the Schengen Borders Code indicates in article 13(1) SBC that ‘special 
provisions concerning the right of asylum and to international protection’ may apply 
when dealing with entry refusals, it remains silent as for what these ‘special provisions’ 
should concretely provide. 
The Handbook for Border Guards gives a sample of ‘special provisions’, but does not 
sufficiently clarify the procedures to be followed by the competent authorities for the 
identification and referral of asylum seekers. The Handbook, in addition, has no legally 
                                                                                                                                                            
of the Council establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across 
borders P6_ TA(2005)0247 of 23.06.2005. 
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binding effect800.  
This may lead to legal uncertainty and harm the uniformity of the EU acquis on entry.  
 
Prior to the incorporation of the Schengen acquis into EU law, the Common Manual, 
provided detailed instructions to border guards on border controls, including ‘special 
arrangements’ for border checks on certain categories of persons801. In regard of asylum 
seekers, § 6. 10 prescribed that ‘if an alien requests asylum at the border, the national 
laws of the Contracting Party concerned shall apply until it is determined who has 
responsibility for dealing with the application for asylum’. After communautarisation, 
whereas the ‘special arrangements’ relating to other particular categories of persons, such 
as pilots, seamen, minors, etc, have been incorporated in article 19 SBC and Annex VII into 
the body of the SBC itself, the rules on ‘asylum seekers and applicants for international 
protection’ have not. These have been listed in the Handbook for Border Guards compiled 
by the Commission.  
 
The Schengen Handbook establishes that applications for international protection lodged at 
the border must be examined on the basis of the criteria laid down in the Qualification 
Directive802, in accordance with the 1951 Geneva Convention. For the purpose, ‘[a] third-
country national must be considered as an applicant for asylum/international protection if 
he/she expresses – in any way – fear of suffering serious harm if he/she is returned […]. 
The wish to apply for protection does not need to be expressed in any particular form […]; 
the defining element is the expression of fear of what might happen upon return’ (§10). In 
that case, the application shall be transmitted to the competent authorities in the Member 
State and no decision to return the person shall be taken beforehand. Yet, these are only 
guidelines with which compliance when instructing border guards and implementing the 
rules of the Schengen Code is desirable, but they do not produce legally binding effects.  
However, in order to fulfil international protection obligations in practice ‘special provisions’ 
on the admission of refugees and asylum seekers should, indeed, be established. It is, 
thus, questionable whether the EU legislator has fulfilled its obligation to provide for all the 
necessary ‘measures on the crossing of the external borders of the Member States’, when 
the arrangements applicable to a whole category of addressees have been left 
unpronounced803.   
 
SOLUTION: For the sake of legal certainty and the uniformity of EU law, the ‘special 
provisions’ compiled in the Schengen Handbook concerning asylum seekers should be 
upgraded to the SBC itself.  
3.3. Entry refusals are not endowed with suspensive effect 
 
PROBLEM: Entry refusals are not endowed with suspensive effect. 
Generally, article 13 SBC contemplates appeals against entry refusals with no 
suspensive effect. 
At the same time, in cases in which refugees’ and asylum seekers’ rights are at stake, 
                                                                                                                                                            
800  Commission Recommendation establishing a common ‘Practical Handbook for Border Guards 
(Schengen Handbook)’ to be used by the Member States’ competent authorities when carrying out the 
border control of persons, C(2006) 5186 final of 06.11.2006, updated by C(2008) 2976 final of 
25.06.2008 [Schengen Handbook hereinafter]. 
801  Common Manual, OJ C 313/97 of 16.12.2002. 
802  Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status 
of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need 
international protection and the content of the protection granted, OJ L 304/12 of 30.09.2004 
[Qualification Directive or QD hereinafter]. 
803  Former article 62(2) EC, today replaced by article 78(2)(b) and (c) TFEU.  
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‘special provisions’ ought to be introduced to ensure compliance with Member States’ 
international obligations and with EU law itself.  
In particular, appeals ‘with automatic suspensive effect’ have to be introduced for those 
who claim a well-founded fear of persecution or a real risk of ill-treatment in the event 
of return804. 
 
Article 13(3) SBC allows challenges to entry refusals, which ‘shall not have suspensive 
effect’. On the other hand, ‘special provisions’ have to be foreseen with regard to refugees 
and others in search of international protection, so that the international obligations owed 
to them can be appropriately fulfilled. This may lead to confusion. An ‘arguable claim’ that a 
‘real risk’ of refoulement exists will render ‘inconsistent [with the notion of effective 
remedy] such measures [which are] executed before the national authorities have 
examined whether they are compatible with [human rights obligations]’805. In these cases, 
appeals ‘with automatic suspensive effect’ become inexcusable. An exercise of consistent 
interpretation becomes, hence, essential to assure that ‘[this] wording of secondary 
Community law, […] [is] render[ed] […] consistent with the EC Treaty’806. 
 
SOLUTION: The wording of article 13(3) SBC must be clarified, so that the position of 
refugees and asylum seekers with regard to appeals against entry refusals is brought in 
line with the requirements of an ‘effective remedy’ ex article 13 ECHR and article 47 EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR). 
 
While, in general, appeals against entry refusals may not require to entail automatic 
suspensive effect, in the particular case of asylum seekers and refugees this cannot be 
excluded. Concomitant to the notion of an effective remedy ex article 13 ECHR and 47 
EUCFR, as detailed in Chapter 4 of this study, is the suspensive effect it produces in the 
case irreversible damage would otherwise be caused. Therefore, in the case of asylum 
seekers and refugees, fearing for their life or freedom if returned, a remedy can only be 
characterised as being effective if it produces suspensive effect. This clarification should be 
introduced in the wording of article 13 SBC itself. 
4. SCHENGEN VISAS 
 
Schengen visas anticipate entry controls at the stage of departure. Therefore, the 
conditions for their obtainment reproduce those required for entry at the external borders, 
as we shall see. 
 
The acquis on visas is abundant, fragmented and dispersed. Current measures on visas can 
be grouped around four major areas, roughly corresponding to the four legal bases the 
former EC Treaty provided: visa lists807, visa format808, procedures and conditions for 
issuing visas809 and the Visa Information System (VIS)810. Although attempts are directed 
                                                                                                                                                            
804  ECtHR, Gebremedhin v France, Appl. No. 25389/05, 26.04.2007, § 66. 
805  ECtHR, Conka v Belgium, Appl. No. 51564/99, 05.02.2002, § 79. 
806  ECJ, Ordre des barreaux v Conseil de Ministres, C-305/05, [2007] ECR I-05305, § 28.  
807  Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose nationals 
must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are 
exempt from that requirement, OJ L 81/1 of 21.03.2001(as subsequently amended). 
808  Council Regulation (EC) No 1683/95 of 29 May 1995 laying down a uniform format for visas, OJ L 
164/1 of 14.07.1995 (as subsequently amended). 
809  Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code), OJ L 243/1 of 15.09.2009 [Community Code on 
Visa, Visa Code or CCV hereinafter]. 
810  Council Decision 2004/512/EC of 8 June 2004 establishing the Visa Information System (VIS), OJ L 
213/5 of 15.06.2004 and Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 of the European Parliament and the Council of 
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towards the clarification of the visa acquis, with a single Community Code on visa 
procedures and proposals for a codified version of the rules concerning visa requirements811 
and the uniform format for visas812, it has been recognized that, during the Amsterdam 
period, ‘due to the difference in legal bases, […] the maintenance of […] separate 
instruments [was] necessary’813. Under the Lisbon Treaty all aspects of the common policy 
share the same legal basis in Article 77(2)(a) TFEU, allowing for complete consolidation in a 
single instrument if so desired.  
 
Special attention will be drawn to the lists and the conditions to issue visas, as these are 
the rules with a particular effect on the situation of refugees and asylum seekers. 
4.1. No evaluations of the necessity and proportionality of the 
policy exist 
 
PROBLEM: No evaluations of the necessity and proportionality of the policy exist. 
No evaluation of the proportionality and necessity of the policy has ever been 
undertaken.  
 
Some impact assessments have been carried out and the majority of visa policy 
instruments integrates some form of review for each of the technicalities they contemplate. 
This, however, is no substitute for an overall assessment of the policy as a whole. 
 
SOLUTION: Only an open and thorough analysis of the visa policy as a whole will clarify 
its impact on refugees and asylum seekers, revealing the pros and cons of its 
furtherance as it stands today. 
 
Considering the financial implications of the VIS, the impact the visa policy has in a large 
proportion of third-country nationals and its uncertain efficacy to prevent illegal 
immigration814, an open debate on the substance of the policy is indispensable, if a right 
balance with human rights and other principles the Union aspires to protect is to be struck.  
 
As encouraged by the article 29 Working Party and the European Data Protection 
Supervisor (EDPS), a public debate on the widespread use of biometrics in relation, in 
particular, to the data protection principles of limited purpose and proportionality should be 
promoted. Particular disquiet produces the possibility that law enforcement authorities, 
including Europol, have been granted access to the database, as this is possibly in breach 
of the data protection principle of limited purpose815.  
 
The relationship between asylum and visas should be given a central space in both debates. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
9 July 2008 concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between Member 
States on short-stay visas, OJ L 218/60 of 13.08.2008. 
811  Proposal for a Council Regulation listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of 
visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that 
requirement (codified version), COM(2008) 761 final of 28.11.2008. 
812  Proposal for a Council Regulation laying down a uniform format for visas (codified version), 
COM(2008) 891 final of 19.12.2008. 
813  Draft proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a 
Community Code on Visas, COM(2006) 403 final of 19.07.2006, p. 3 [CCV Proposal hereinafter]. 
814  Study on the links between legal and illegal migration, COM(2004) 412 final of 04.06.2004. 
815  Article 29 WP, Opinion 2/2005, WP 110 of 23.06.2005 and Opinion of EDPS, 2005/C 181/06, OJ C 
181/13 of 23.07.2005. 
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4.2. All refugee-producing countries feature in the black list  
 
PROBLEM: All refugee-producing countries feature in the black list. 
All refugee-producing countries figured on the black list already before 
communautarisation. Such classification has remained unchanged ever since. The 
specific motives behind have not been spelled out beyond the generic criteria enshrined 
in Recital 5 of Regulation 539/2001. The duty to obtain visas puts a heavy burden on 
refugees. 
Airport Transit Visas (ATVs), as established in the CCV, entail a additional hurdle to 
access protection in the EU.   
 
‘Risks relating to security and illegal immigration’ appear to attract prominent consideration 
for inclusion in the black list816. Ecuador and Bolivia have been transferred to it on those 
grounds817. Kosovo too has been inserted therein ‘[…] in view of security concerns 
regarding in particular the potential for illegal migration’818. ATVs follow the same line, 
pursuing the harmonisation of airport transit arrangements ‘in order to combat illegal 
immigration’819. Identical rationale seems to underpin the rules contained in articles 22, 31 
and 47(1)(g) CCV on prior consultation or information in relation to specific nationalities or 
specific categories of persons before they are issued a visa. The ‘case-by-case assessment’ 
per country for the distribution in the visa lists, which the Preamble of Regulation 539/2001 
states that has been undertaken on the basis of a plurality of criteria, does not 
subsequently transpire in the text of the Regulation. Instead, the lists drafted during the 
Schengen period seem to have been inherited ‘en bloc’, without an assessment of the 
criteria used for inclusion in the black list in light of the relevant EU law rules and principles 
governing the policy after communautarisation. 
 
SOLUTION: Visa lists should be configured and periodically reviewed bearing in mind not 
only security and illegal immigration concerns, but also their possible human rights 
implications so as to enable the EU Member States to fulfil their obligations in light of 
the Munaf and WM jurisprudence. 
 
Despite the fact that international protection obligations are common to all the EU Member 
States, no attention seems to have been paid to the particular position of refugees and 
asylum seekers when dressing the visa lists. Although room is left to accord recognized 
refugees some special treatment, as expounded below, the position of refugees yet-to-be-
recognized has largely been neglected. As they can be considered to be encompassed in 
the wider notion of ‘third-country nationals’, they appear to be generally required to submit 
to visa requirements if they are the nationals of a blacklisted State. Airport Transit Visas 
further compound their situation, as all States on the ATV common list in Annex IV to the 
CCV are main source and transit countries of refugees820.  
 
The periodic revision of the lists in function of the specific circumstances of each of the 
countries concerned should be given priority, ‘in accordance with appropriate criteria’, 
considering not only security concerns but refugee-producing situations as well821. 
                                                 
816  Recital 5, Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001. 
817  Recital 1, Council Regulation (EC) No 453/2003 and Recital 1, Council Regulation (EC) No 1932/2006. 
818  Recital 4, Council Regulation (EC) No 1244/2009. 
819  Recital 5 CCV. 
820  UNHCR, Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized countries 2009 - Statistical Overview of Asylum 
Applications Lodged in Europe and selected Non-European Countries, 23 March 2010, retrievable 
from: http://www.unhcr.org/statistics.html.  
821  The Stockholm Programme, Council Doc. 17024/09, 02.12.2009, § 5.2, p. 58 [The Stockholm 
Programme hereinafter]. 
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4.3. No uniform visa requirements for recognised refugees 
 
PROBLEM: No uniform visa requirements for recognised refugees.  
Visa requirements for recognised refugees originating from white-listed countries can be 
freely decided by each Member State822.  
‘In urgent cases of mass influx of illegal immigrants’, national ATV lists may be 
maintained823. 
This may harm the uniformity of EU law as well as legal certainty. 
 
The residence criterion initially proposed by the Commission to determine the visa 
arrangements applicable to recognized refugees824, was unacceptable to the Council. 
Instead, a complex system has been put in place. Article 1(2) of Regulation 539/2001 
establishes an exemption from visa requirements for refugees living in a Member State 
holding travel papers issued by it. However, according to article 4(2)(b), if refugees reside 
and have documents from a country on the white list, no automatic exemption applies and 
the Member States are free to require visas from them if they see fit. Pursuant to article 
1(1), for those settled in a country on the black list, the visa requirement can generally not 
be excused.  
Regarding ATVs, article 3 CCV establishes that, in principle, only the ‘[n]ationals of the 
third countries listed in Annex IV shall be required to hold an airport transit visa when 
passing through the international transit areas of airports situated on the territory of the 
Member States’. But, ‘in urgent cases of massive inflow of illegal immigrants’, individual 
Member States may require nationals of third countries other than those listed in Annex IV 
to procure an ATV, the possibility to entertain national ATV ‘grey lists’ being thereby 
maintained. 
 
SOLUTION: In order to achieve the Treaty objective of a ‘common policy on visas’, the 
current discretion accorded to the EU Member State concerning the visa requirements of 
recognized refugees shall be eliminated. 
 
The freedom allowed to the Member States to determine the visa arrangements applicable 
to recognized refugees coming from white-listed countries and to dress national ATV lists 
hurdles the objective of harmonization of the visa policy that article 77(2)(a) TFEU pursues, 
thereby potentially harming the uniformity of EU law. The objective of legal certainty and 
the avoidance of ‘visa shopping’ that the Community Code on Visas aspires to attain cannot 
be fully realised under these conditions.  
4.4. The provisions on limited territorial validity visas (LTVs) seem 
insufficient to fully accommodate the obligations that might 
be owed to refugees in exceptional circumstances 
 
PROBLEM: The provisions on limited territorial validity visas (LTVs) seem insufficient to 
fully accommodate the obligations that might be owed to refugees in exceptional 
circumstances.  
Asylum seekers and refugees cannot fulfil the criteria to be granted ordinary short-term 
visas.  
Although their rights to non-refoulement and to seek international protection, both in 
their substantial and procedural facets, may be secured in certain cases through the 
                                                 
822  Article 4(2)(b) Regulation 539/2001 as amended by Regulation 1932/2006. 
823  Recital 5 and article 3(2) CCV. 
824  COM(2000) 27 final, p. 7 and 13, and COM(2000) 577 final, p. 9.  
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delivery of LTVs, it is questionable whether the discretionary language in which the LTV 
provisions have been formulated affords sufficient guarantees.  
Stronger language and clearer rules are necessary to ensure legal certainty and 
consistency with the Schengen Borders Code and to facilitate compliance with 
international protection obligations of the EU Member States, as appropriate. 
 
Because those in search of international protection cannot show readiness to return, they 
are unable to fulfil the visa issuing requirements.  
 
The Community Code on Visas, in articles 21 and 24, refers to article 5(1) SBC as the 
standard to consider when delivering visas. But that article should not be read in isolation, 
without taking into consideration the system within which that provision is located. Articles 
3(b), 5(4)(c) and 13(1) SBC, all crucial to the accommodation of the particular position of 
refugees and asylum seekers, have to be taken into account, since they constitute the legal 
context of article 5(1) SBC. Better articulation with the Schengen Borders Code should be 
introduced in the Community Code on Visas, so that the proper observance of asylum 
seekers’ and refugees’ entitlements can be guaranteed.  
 
In light of the existent case-law, as analysed above, where the action taken by a Member 
State, in the form of a visa refusal, would lead to the refoulement of a refugee, such course 
of action is banned by article 33 GC. Equally, if the denial of a visa entails the exposure to 
a ‘real risk’ of ill treatment, should it occur while the person concerned is still inside his 
country of origin, both the ECHR and EU law impose an obligation to avoid it. The form 
such prevention should take depends on the facts of each case. Where protection cannot be 
effectively provided in situ, the possibility to allow the person to travel to the EU, possibly 
by means of a LTV visa, cannot be excluded. In addition, the right to leave to seek asylum, 
as expounded earlier, may require that entry and pre-entry controls, including visas, be 
arranged in a way that asylum seekers are not deprived of the protection that right affords. 
If there are no other realistic prospects for a refugee to-be to leave his country of origin in 
search of asylum than by means of a visa, the country confronted with such a situation 
may be required to issue him a LTV.  
 
SOLUTION: The conditions and the procedure to issue LTV visas to refugees and asylum 
seekers shall be clarified, to enable the Member States to fulfil their international 
obligations, as appropriate. 
 
We do not contest the institution of visas generally. What we note, however, is that under 
certain exceptional circumstances, as in the cases of WM and Munaf above, EU Member 
States may be compelled to take positive action to fulfil their international obligations vis-à-
vis refugees and asylum seekers. If there is a choice with regard to the means the State 
concerned can use, the fulfilment of those obligations entail a duty of result. The issuance 
of an LTV is one possible means EU law puts at the disposal of the Member States to attain 
such a result, e. g. the avoidance of refoulement in the particular case. In this light, it 
would be desirable that both the conditions and the procedure to be followed to deliver LTV 
visas be spelled out clearly in the CCV. 
 
It is uncertain that the may terms and the language of exception in which the LTV visa 
provision in article 25 CCV has been drafted can warrant compliance with international 
human rights obligations. In our opinion, the CCV leaves excessive discretion to the 
Member States, determining that LTVs ‘shall be issued exceptionally’, provided that the 
Member State concerned ‘considers it necessary’ on humanitarian reasons, on grounds of 
national interest or ‘because of international obligations’. By contrast, article 5(4)(c) SBC, 
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on the basis of which article 25 CCV has been worded, allows for a lesser degree of 
discretion. Furthermore, there may be situations, especially when international obligations 
are involved, in which no margin of appreciation at all will be left to the Member State 
concerned to ‘consider’ whether or not to comply with these obligations825. Therefore, the 
wording of article 25 CCV should be clarified to state that where international obligations 
are engaged, if no other appropriate means are available to comply therewith, an LTV visa 
shall be delivered. 
4.5. Uncertain appeal rights against LTV visa denials 
 
PROBLEM: Uncertain appeal rights against LTV visa denials. 
- Linguistic inconsistencies between articles 19 and 25 CCV may lead to the 
inadmissibility of LTV applications, leaving refugee visa applicants without the rights of 
appeal that article 32 CCV reserves to those whose applications have been formally 
rejected.  
- Such deprivation of remedies may clash with refugees’/asylum-seekers’ rights to 
effective remedies and to judicial protection under the relevant international and EU law 
instruments.  
 
The CCV has introduced a right of appeal in article 32 against visa applications that have 
been formally refused. However, when visa applications do not fulfil the admissibility 
criteria established in article 19 CCV, the visa procedure may be discontinued without 
issuing a formal refusal, According to the Commission Proposal, the point is to introduce a 
‘clear distinction between those visa applications that have been formally refused after full 
examination of the file and cases where such in-depth examination was not carried out 
because the applicant failed to provide additional information’. The problem is that non-
admissibility entails a material refusal, which leaves the person without any judicial 
recourse. 
 
With regard to LTV visas, it is not clear whether LTV applications grounded in international 
protection obligations can be submitted and whether they will fail directly at the 
admissibility stage. Article 19(4) CCV stipulates that ‘[b]y way of derogation, an application 
that does not meet the requirements […] may be considered admissible on humanitarian 
grounds or for reasons of national interest’, omitting any reference to the international 
obligations that would require a Member State to issue a LTV visa according to article 25 
CCV, in light of article 5(4)(c) SBC. This inconsistency may lead to wrong inadmissibility 
decisions, depriving refugee visa applicants of their rights to appeal.  
 
Unclear appeal rights may, in turn, collide with the requirements of the rights to effective 
remedies and to judicial protection, as referred to in section 2.3 above. Indeed, if the denial 
of a LTV visa puts the person concerned at risk of refoulement or virtually prevents him 
from exiting his country of origin in view of seeking international protection, an effective 
remedy, in the form of effective judicial protection, has to be accorded, both on account of 
the international obligations of the EU Member States and as a matter of EU law itself. 
                                                 
825  Standing Committee of experts on international immigration, refugee and criminal law, Note on the 
draft proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a 
Community Code on Visas, COM(2006) 403 final, Utrecht, 08.02.2007, § c.  
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SOLUTION: The linguistic inconsistencies between articles 19 and 25 CCV shall be 
eliminated, so that refugee visa applicants do not see their applications truncated at the 
admissibility stage. This way, the appeal rights associated with formal visa refusals will 
be made available to them too. 
 
It is essential to recall that ‘Community law requires effective judicial scrutiny of the 
decisions of national authorities taken pursuant to the applicable provisions of Community 
law […]’826. Hence, it would be appropriate to adapt the wording of articles 19 and 25 CCV. 
The right of refugees and asylum seekers to an effective remedy should not be thwarted by 
defective visa issuing proceedings. 
4.6. Cooperation with private entities in the visa issuing procedure 
entails serious risks for refugees and asylum seekers 
 
PROBLEM: Cooperation with private entities in the visa issuing procedure entails serious 
risks for refugees and asylum seekers. 
Cooperation with honorary consuls, private service providers and commercial 
intermediaries, as practised already and codified in articles 42, 43 and 45 CCV, 
jeopardizes data protection and may put refugees’ and asylum seekers’ rights 
objectively at risk. 
 
Cooperation with honorary consuls, private service providers and commercial 
intermediaries in the visa issuing procedure is current practice. The Community Code on 
Visas provides for a legal framework with a view to ensuring compliance with EU data 
protection rules, making the Member States ultimately responsible for any breaches 
thereof. However, under the CCV honorary consuls, private service providers and 
commercial intermediaries may be entrusted with the very significant tasks of gathering the 
supporting documents to visa applications, retrieving biometric data, collecting the issuing 
fee and transmitting the files to the competent consular authority. Under such conditions, 
as noticed by the European Data Protection Supervisor himself, ‘[…] Member States will not 
be able to guarantee the protection of the outsourced data processing […]’. External service 
providers, commercial intermediaries and honorary consuls which are not civil servants of 
the State concerned ‘will, despite all other contractual provisions, be subjected to national 
law of the third country where they are established. […][T]his could involve a major risk for 
the individuals concerned in some third States who would be keen to know which of their 
citizens have applied for a visa (for political control on opponents and dissidents). [Private 
entities] […] would not be in a position to resist pressure from the government […] of the 
applicant countries requesting data from them’827.  
 
SOLUTION: To avoid abuse by host countries or by the private entities themselves direct 
access for refugee visa applicants to the Member States’ representations abroad shall be 
maintained in practice.  
 
As far as cooperation with private service providers is concerned, the provision in article 
17(5) CCV that ‘the Member States concerned shall maintain the possibility for all 
applicants to lodge their applications directly at its/their consulates’ should be duly 
observed not only in law, but also in actual practice. Against this background, the European 
                                                 
826  ECJ, Panayotova, C-327/02, ECR [2004] I-11055, § 27. 
827  Opinion of the EDPS on (COM (2006) 269 final) — 2006/0088 (COD), OJ C 321/38 of 29.12.2006, p. 
29. 
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Data Protection Supervisor’s suggestion to locate the service provider in a place protected 
under diplomatic inviolability deserves further consideration.  
 
4.7. Data transfers to third countries entail real risks for refugees 
and asylum seekers 
 
PROBLEM: Data transfers to third countries entail real risks for refugees and asylum 
seekers. 
Transfers of data concerning refugee visa applicants to third countries, as allowed by 
article 31 VIS Regulation, may seriously hinder compliance with international protection 
obligations.  
No procedures and no remedies have been introduced to ensure conformity therewith. 
 
According to article 31 of the VIS Regulation, substantial data on visa applicants may be 
transferred to a third country ‘if necessary in individual cases for the purpose of providing 
the identity of third-country nationals, including for the purpose of return, where the 
following conditions are satisfied: (a) the Commission has adopted a decision on the 
adequate protection of personal data in that third country in accordance with article 25(6) 
of Directive 95/46/EC, or a readmission agreement is in force between the Community and 
that third country, or the provisions of article 26(1)(d) of Directive 95/46/EC apply; (b) the 
third country […] agrees to use the data only for the purpose for which they were provided; 
(c) the data are transferred or made available in accordance with the relevant provisions of 
Community law, in particular readmission agreements, and the national law of the Member 
State which transferred or made the data available, including the legal provisions relevant 
to data security and data protection; (d) and the Member State(s) which entered the data 
in the VIS has given its consent.’ 
 
Although ‘[s]uch transfers of personal data to third countries […] shall not prejudice the 
rights of refugees and persons requesting international protection, in particular as regards 
non-refoulement’, no precise procedures have been established to so guarantee. In the 
case in which the rights of refugees may have been breached, no specific remedies have 
been made available in the VIS Regulation and its relationship to the Return Directive828 
and/or the Procedures Directive829 for that purpose is unclear. 
 
A closer look reveals additional inaccuracies: From the open-ended fashion in which the 
provision has been drafted, it appears that any exchange of information in order to make 
available the identity of the third-country national concerned would be allowed. The 
reference to ‘the purpose of return’ looks merely illustrative. This raises doubts of 
compatibility with the data protection principle of limited purpose of data use. Then, 
according to (a), it remains unclear why the existence of a readmission agreement in force 
between the Union and the third country concerned would per se guarantee data protection 
or non-refoulement, thereby exempting from an individual analysis in each case. As far as 
(b) is concerned, it seems inadequate to entrust the protection of human rights to a mere 
declaration by the data recipient which nature and legal effects remain unspecified. In 
regard of (d), finally, it appears insufficient to obtain the consent of the Member State that 
                                                 
828  Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on 
common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country 
nationals, OJ L 348/98 of 24.12.2008. 
829  Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member 
States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, OJ L 326/13 of 13.12.2005. 
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entered the data in the VIS, without informing the data subject first and considering his 
concerns too.  
 
 
 
SOLUTION: Specific safeguards must be introduced where refugees’/asylum seekers’ 
data are transferred to third countries, so that EU Member States’ protection obligations 
can be guaranteed. 
 
Taking into account that State persecution is the primary factor provoking the need for 
international protection, the necessity arises to develop a specific procedure matched with 
the necessary remedial safeguards to ensure that data transfers to third countries do not 
encroach upon refugees’ and asylum seekers’ rights in the context of return or other 
proceedings.  
4.8. Actual access to visas is not guaranteed in practice 
 
PROBLEM: Actual access to visas is not guaranteed in practice. 
EU Member States have no obligation to be neither present nor represented in all black-
listed countries. When absent, visas become inaccessible in practice.  
The coherence of the pre-entry/entry continuum is thereby imperilled.  
The inaccessibility of visas in practice combined with carrier sanctions, as elaborated 
below, renders compliance with refugee rights uncertain.  
 
EU law does not create an obligation for Member States of destination to open embassies 
around the world. It only recommends, in articles 8 and 40 CCV, the conclusion of 
representation agreements with other Member States present in a given country to avoid 
their absence becoming an impediment to obtain visas. Yet, there are several Member 
States that are currently neither present nor represented in some black-listed States. In 
addition, to date ‘[a]ll representations are […] closed in […] Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
Somalia’830. Visas have become inaccessible in those States as a result. Such inaccessibility 
may well call into question the necessary coherence between pre-entry and entry 
requirements for the EU system of admission to work properly. As we shall see, in the 
absence of visas, the incorporation of private carriers to the scene further highlights the 
need for consistency. 
 
SOLUTION: since visas are not always available in practice, as proposed bellow, the 
institution of carrier sanctions should be entirely re-thought, if not abandoned.  
 
As already stated, visas do not per se breach the rights of refugees and asylum seekers. 
Their inaccessibility, therefore, does not constitute in itself an obstacle for refugees or 
asylum seekers to reach, in practice, the external borders of the EU Member States in order 
to obtain international protection. As it will be further elaborated hereunder, it is the 
inaccessibility of visas, de jure or de facto, in combination with boarding rejections by 
private carriers fearing to be penalized for having transported unduly documented migrants 
into the EU that pose a problem. 
                                                 
830  Annex 18 to the former Consular Instructions on visas for the diplomatic missions and consular posts, 
OJ C 326/1 of 22.12.2005, today repealed by the CCV. 
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5. CARRIER SANCTIONS AND IMMIGRATION LIAISON 
OFFICERS (ILO):  
 
The enforcement of visa requirements is assisted by legislation passed on carriers’ 
liability831 and immigration liaison officers (ILOs)832, which offers the possibility to ensure 
that only passengers with the requisite travel documentation are able to reach the external 
border of the Schengen Member States.  
 
Because LTV visas cannot be expected to be granted to refugee visa applicants in every 
case, due to either legal or material obstacles as expounded above, the role played by 
these intermediate sheriffs in allowing access to international protection in the EU becomes 
key.  
5.1. No evaluations exist of carrier sanctions’ impact on asylum 
seekers’ rights 
 
PROBLEM: No evaluations exist of carrier sanctions’ impact on asylum seekers’ rights.  
The real impact of carrier decisions on refugees’ and asylum-seekers’ rights is unknown, 
since neither a monitoring system is in place nor a reporting obligation that would help 
to elucidate it. 
  
According to article 7(3), Member States have an obligation to communicate domestic 
provisions adopted for the implementation of Directive 2001/51 to the Commission. But no 
further mechanisms to monitor or to review the application of the instrument in practice 
and the policy itself have been contemplated. The necessity, legality and proportionality of 
this pre-entry mechanism seem to be taken for granted, without enquiring into its intrinsic 
unsuitability to accommodate the international protection obligations of the EU Member 
States, as it will be explained hereunder. 
 
SOLUTION: In order to understand the real implications of carrier sanctions for 
improperly documented refugees and asylum seekers, at a minimum, statistical data on 
the reasons for rejecting boarding as well as information on the handling of individual 
cases involving prospective passengers in search of international protection should be 
collected. In addition, a monitoring system by an independent body and/or an obligation 
on the Member States and the carriers themselves to report on the treatment accorded 
to refugees and asylum seekers at the boarding stage should be introduced. 
5.2. Unclear compatibility of carrier sanctions with international 
obligations 
 
PROBLEM: Unclear compatibility of carrier sanctions with international obligations. 
Although both article 26 CISA and Directive 2001/51 refer ‘to the obligations resulting 
from the Geneva Convention’, it is not clear what this reference entails and how exactly 
                                                 
831  Article 26 of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the 
Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, OJ L 239/19 of 
22.09.2000 [Schengen Convention or CISA hereinafter] and Council Directive 2001/51/EC of 28 June 
2001 supplementing the provisions of Article 26 of the Convention implementing the Schengen 
Agreement of 14 June 1985, OJ L 187/45 of 10.07.2001 [Directive 2001/51 hereinafter]. 
832  Council Regulation (EC) No 377/2004 of 19 February 2004 on the creation of an immigration liaison 
officers network, OJ L 64/1 of 02.03.2004 [ILOs Regulation hereinafter]. 
Setting up a Common European Asylum System:  
Report on the application of existing instruments and proposals for the new system 
 389 
refugee rights, both under international and EU law, should be protected. 
 
Article 4(2) Directive 2001/51 further establishes that fines on carriers transporting 
improperly documented migrants shall be ‘without prejudice to Member States’ obligations 
in cases where a third country national seeks international protection’. Does the reference 
to the Geneva Convention imply that penalties must not be imposed on carriers if the 
person seeking entry is in need of international protection or does it involve that sanctions 
may be imposed regardless of refugee entitlements? Half of the Member States has 
subsequently transposed this clause in a way that takes account of the particular position of 
those in search of international protection, introducing exculpatory provisions in national 
law, whereas the other half applies sanctions regardless of the passenger seeking 
asylum833. The second option presupposes the existence of a possibility of disconnecting 
the imposition of sanctions onto carriers from their effects upon refugees, treating each 
element as separable. However, practice shows that the threat of imposing penalties 
cannot be severed from its effects on the carrier’s behaviour in relation to undocumented 
migrants. Prudence has led carriers in several documented cases to deny boarding with no 
other consideration beyond documental accuracy834. Subordinating the rights of refugees 
and asylum seekers to the will of carriers to assume the risk of taking their plight into 
consideration has the potential to deprive those entitlements of any useful effect.  
 
The fact that carriers have only been entrusted with the verification of travel documents by 
article 26(1)(b) CISA leaves compliance with or exemption from other entry (and pre-
entry) requirements unchecked. Directive 2001/51, as it was adopted before the Schengen 
Borders Code, does not refer to articles 3(b), 5(4)(c) and 13(1) SBC. Nor does it provide 
for any particular procedure to be followed in the case improperly documented migrants are 
in search of international protection. This does not mean that the ‘international obligations’ 
owed to refugees, to which the Schengen Borders Code explicitly refers, vanish when 
carriers assume the functions of EU Member States’ officials with regard to entry. In reality, 
States cannot contract out their legal obligations under international law. Therefore, the 
actions or omissions of carriers that may expose their prospective passengers to 
refoulement or prevent them access to asylum procedures may be attributed to the EU 
Member State on behalf of which the conduct is carried out, thereby possibly engaging the 
State’s international responsibility on that account835.   
 
SOLUTION: If legally and materially possible, since visas are not always available for 
refugee applicants, carriers shall be enabled to carry out full entry checks on the basis of 
all the relevant SBC provisions, so that considerations beyond documental accuracy are 
properly taken into account.  
                                                 
833  K. Hailbronner and C. Carlitz, ‘European Synthesis Report  on the Implementation of Directive 
2001/51/EC on Carriers Liability,’ ODYSSEUS Study on the Conformity Checking of the Transposition 
by Member States of 10 EC Directives in the Sector of Asylum and Immigraiton, Commissioned by DG 
JLS (JLS/B4/2006/03) (on file with the authors), pp. 30-35.  
834  ECRE, Defending Refugees’ Access to Protection in Europe, December 2007, retrievable from: 
www.ecre.org and UK Refugee Council, Remote Controls: How UK Border Controls are Endangering 
the Lives of Refugees, December 2008, retrievable from: www.refugeecouncil.org.uk. 
835  International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (2001), UNGA A/56/49(Vol.I)/Corr.4. Article 5: ‘[t]he conduct of a person or an entity 
which is not an organ of the State […] but which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise 
elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under international 
law’. The ILC’s Commentary on article 5, as an example of attribution of State responsibility, refers 
precisely to those situations in which ‘[p]rivate or State-owned airlines [have been] delegated […] 
certain powers in relation to immigration control or quarantine’. 
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5.3. No remedies exist against carriers’ decisions to deny boarding 
 
PROBLEM: No remedies exist against carriers’ decisions to deny boarding. 
Article 6 Directive 2001/51 grants ‘effective rights of defence and appeal’ only to 
carriers. Neither specific procedures, nor remedies have been introduced for those 
affected by carriers’ decisions.  
 
The absence of any means to appeal for refugees and asylum seekers to challenge boarding 
rejections by carriers ‘arguably’ amounting to refoulement or preventing access to 
determination procedures may well constitute a breach of the right to an effective remedy 
and to judicial protection as disclosed above.  
 
SOLUTION: ‘Effective rights of defence and appeal’ for those affected by carriers’ 
decisions must be introduced to ensure compliance with EU and international law 
obligations of the EU Member States. 
 
Directive 2001/51 should include details on the procedures that carriers confronted with 
asylum seekers should precisely follow and make provision on clear appeal rights against 
their decisions in a manner compatible with the ‘effective remedy’ and the ‘judicial 
protection’ standards enshrined in article 47 EUCFR. Indeed, both non-refoulement and the 
right to leave to seek asylum should be fully guaranteed.  
5.4. Structural unsuitability of carriers to perform full (pre-)entry 
controls 
 
PROBLEM: Structural unsuitability of carriers to perform full (pre-)entry controls.  
- The private nature of carriers clashes with the public character of the functions they de 
facto carry out. When asked to check documents, they are in practice indirectly 
empowered to take full decisions on (pre-)entry. 
- According to current EU law such decisions should be taken by public officials only. 
Otherwise compliance with Member States’ international obligations cannot be properly 
assured.  
- Even if carriers would be de jure empowered to make full decisions on entry, it 
remains unclear how the exercise of effective remedies against their decisions and the 
right to judicial protection could be upheld in practice in a meaningful way. 
 
Current EU legislation on admission reserves the delivery of visas to Member States’ public 
authorities836 and entrusts checks on compliance with entry requirements exclusively to 
border officials837. Explicit exceptions should then be introduced to accommodate private 
carriers within this scheme, as they may de facto waive visa requirements and grant or 
deny (pre-)entry.  
 
                                                 
836  Article 4(1) CCV: ‘Applications shall be examined and decided only by consulates’ (our emphasis). In 
exceptional cases other public authorities are allowed to issue visas at the external borders, according 
to articles 35 and 36 CCV. Even where collaboration with private service providers is undertaken, 
article 43(4) CCV establishes that: ‘[…] the decision on applications and the printing and affixing of 
visa stickers shall be carried out only by the consulate’. 
837  Article 15(1) SBC establishes that ‘[t]he border control provided for by articles 6 to 13 shall be carried 
out by border guards in accordance with the provisions of this Regulation and with national law’. 
Article 7 SBC reiterates that ‘[c]ross-border movement at external borders shall be subject to checks 
by border guards’.  In turn, article 2(13) SBC defines border guard as ‘any public official assigned, in 
accordance with national law, to a border crossing point or along the border or the immediate vicinity 
of that border who carries out […] border control tasks’ (emphasis added). 
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However, even if the necessary legal amendments were introduced in this direction, it is 
hard to see how private entities, devoid of the competence and public authority necessary, 
could properly assume these tasks. Investing carriers with official power seems improbable 
and subjecting their decisions to the validation of EU Member States’ officials posted abroad 
may collide with the jurisdictional powers of the territorial State in which they act. Beyond 
legal technicalities, in practice, we do not see how the remedies that have to accompany 
entry refusals, according to article 13 SBC, and visa denials, pursuant to article 32(3) CCV, 
plus the concomitant judicial protection that has to be guaranteed, following article 47 
EUCFR, could be preserved if carrier sanctions are maintained. 
 
SOLUTION: Thorough discussions must be held with regard to the legal viability of 
maintaining the institution of carrier sanctions. The impossibility to introduce the 
necessary legal safeguards in their scheme should lead to the abandonment of the policy 
altogether. 
 
Once verified that it is impossible to incorporate the necessary legal safeguards to the 
carriers sanctions’ scheme and that refugee rights risk being neglected thereby, the entire 
institution should be considered incompatible not only with the international obligations to 
which the EU Member States have subscribed but also with the very EU acquis on entry 
carrier sanctions intend to implement.   
5.5. There is very little information available on the activities of 
ILOs 
 
PROBLEM: There is very little information available on the activities of ILOs. 
- Pursuant to article 6 ILOs Regulation, periodical reports on ILOs activities have to be 
drafted. Yet, their content is not made public. 
- Transparency and accountability would require declassification. 
 
Article 1 ILOs Regulation defines an ILO as a representative of a Member State posted 
abroad ‘in order to establish and maintain contacts with the authorities of the host country 
with a view to contributing to the prevention and combating of illegal immigration, the 
return of illegal immigrants and the management of legal immigration’. The bulk of their 
functions, according to article 2, relates prominently to the collection and exchange of 
information on illegal immigration. Article 4 provides for the legal framework of cooperation 
between the ILOs of different EU Member States operating in the same region through 
regular meetings, exchanges of information, the adoption of coordinate positions in regard 
of contacts with carriers, the organization and attendance at training courses, etc. 
Periodical reports on their activities are due at the end of each European Presidency, 
pursuant to article 6. However, the information contained therein remains ‘RESTRAINT 
EU’838. As a way to solve this conundrum, the Commission has proposed to amend the 
Regulation to give the Parliament access to these reports839. 
 
SOLUTION: The disclosure of existing periodical reports is necessary. The amendment 
proposed on this point by the Commission to article 6(1) of the ILOs Regulation should 
                                                 
838  Commission Decision 2005/687/EC of 29 September 2005 on the format for the report on the 
activities of immigration liaison officers networks and on the situation in the host country in matters 
relating to illegal immigration (notified under document number C (2005) 1508), OJ L 264/8 of 
08.10.2005, Annex. 
839  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation 
(EC) No 377/2004 on the creation of an immigration liaison officers network, COM(2009) 322 final, 
08.07.2009, article 1(3), [Commission Proposal to amend the ILOs Regulation hereinafter]. 
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be adopted. 
 
Without factual information it is impossible to judge on the impact that ILOs have on those 
seeking international protection. For reasons of transparency and accountability, as 
proposed by the European Commission and requested by the European Parliament, article 6 
reports should be declassified840. 
 
5.6. ILOs’ activities disregard the asylum dimension related to 
their action 
 
PROBLEM: ILOs’ activities disregard the asylum dimension related to their action. 
- Article 2 ILOs Regulation, defining the tasks of immigration liaison officers, neglects 
the possible impact of their activities on refugees’ and asylum seekers’ rights, omitting 
any allusion thereto. 
- No reference is made in the Regulation to human rights and general principles of EU 
law. 
- No specification of the procedures to be used in cases in which ILOs encounter 
refugees or asylum seekers or of any remedies available against their actions can be 
found in the ILOs Regulation. 
- The extent to which they interact with 3rd countries and commercial carriers is unclear 
too.  
- These issues remain unaddressed both in the Commission proposal to amend the ILOs 
Regulation and in the Commission proposal to amend the FRONTEX Regulation841. 
- Closer cooperation with FRONTEX alongside the enhancement of ILOs activities, as it is 
contemplated in both the Commission proposal to amend the ILOs Regulation and in the 
Commission proposal to amend the FRONTEX Regulation, should be established only 
when their powers have been clearly delimited, procedural guarantees put in place and 
remedial measures and judicial protection made available. 
 
The ‘appropriate qualifications of such liaison officers’, as referred to in the Preamble, are 
not specified in the body of the ILOs Regulation. The instrument defers the description of 
their responsibilities to each sending Member State, which shall ensure that its ILOs comply 
with national law and with the agreements concluded with the host country or the 
international organization with which they cooperate. References to EU law and human 
rights have been obviated. Such omissions are worrisome as it is difficult to conceive, for 
instance, of any ‘ways and means to assist the authorities in host countries in preventing 
illegal immigration flows originating from or transiting through their territories’, as 
stipulated in article 2(g), without effects on the right of everyone to leave his own country 
in search of asylum and on the principle of non-refoulement as characterised above. It 
remains unclear in which concrete ways ILOs are to carry out their responsibilities when 
confronted with refugees and asylum seekers and what remedies are offered for those 
cases in which human rights violations occur.  
 
                                                 
840  Projet Révisé de Rapport sur la proposition de règlement du Parlement européen et du Conseil 
modifiant le règlement (CE) n° 377/2004 du Conseil relative à la création d’une réseau d’officiers de 
liaison “Immigration”, 2009/98(COD), 29.04.2010.  
841  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council amending Council Regulation 
(EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation 
at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX), COM (2010) 61 final, 
24.02.2010, [Commission Proposal to amend the FRONTEX Regulation hereinafter]. 
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The Commission proposals are insufficient in this regard. The introduction of a recital in the 
preamble of the ILOs Regulation stating that the instrument ‘respects the fundamental 
rights and observes the principles recognised by article 6(2) [TEU] and reflected in the 
[ECHR] and the [EUCFR]’, although welcome, does not provide for adequate guarantees. 
Nor does the specification, in article 1(16) of the proposal to amend the FRONTEX 
Regulation, that ‘[t]he tasks of the liaison officers shall include, in compliance with 
European Union law and in accordance with fundamental rights, the establishment and 
maintaining of contacts with the competent authorities of the third country to which they 
are assigned to with a view to contribute to the prevention of and fight against illegal 
immigration and the return of illegal immigrants’. The concrete means by which this 
objective of compliance with EU fundamental rights can be achieved should be clearly 
spelled out in both Regulations. 
 
This is particularly relevant, especially when ILOs collaborate with commercial carriers in 
pre-boarding control and when they instruct third countries’ officials on how to manage 
migration flows. If the role of ILOs is limited to providing ‘[i]nformation sessions or training 
on the falsification/counterfeiting of travel documents, illegal migration or other relevant 
topics’842 the shortcomings noted previously with regard to carrier sanctions will only be 
perpetuated. Conversely, in the case in which ILOs are endowed with the power to make 
decisions on entry (by allowing or refusing boarding at departure), their actions must be 
subjected to strict compliance, in law and in practice, with all the conditions set out in the 
SBC, including the exceptions thereto in respect of international obligations binding upon 
the Member States. 
 
SOLUTION: better specification of ILOs’ tasks and powers, with an unequivocal 
submission to EU law, human rights and refugee law, and the introduction of appropriate 
safeguards and remedies is key. 
 
A clearer stipulation on ILOs functions, establishing their concrete powers vis-à-vis 
migrants and their relation to third countries and private carriers in the prevention of 
irregular migration is essential. The submission of ILOs’ activities to EU law, in general, and 
to the SBC and fundamental rights, in particular, should be unequivocal. ‘[E]nhanc[ing] the 
activities organised by the consular and other services of Member States in third countries 
and to support the reinforcement of the operational capacity of the immigration liaison 
officers’ networks […]’, as Recital 6 of the Commission Proposal to amend the ILOs 
Regulation suggests, without clearly delimiting their powers and responsibilities, raises 
legal uncertainty and increases the risk of obliteration of refugees’ and asylum seekers’ 
rights.  
 
Currently, the EU Draft Common Manual for Immigration Liaison Officers considers the 
Geneva Convention and the EU acquis on asylum as relevant legislation that ILOs have to 
take into account, but the text is too general and is not binding. Even if it was, it would still 
remain unclear in which specific way ILOs are to undertake their tasks in practice in 
accordance with fundamental rights and which (effective) remedies could be offered in the 
case violations occur843. Clear procedures and safeguards, matched with real opportunities 
                                                 
842  Draft Common Manual for Immigration Liaison Officers (ILOs) posted abroad by the Member States of 
the European Union, Council doc. 8418/06 of 25.04.2006, pp. 9 and 11 [EU Draft ILOs Manual 
hereinafter]. 
843  As an indication, but without legally binding effect, the IATA Code of Conduct for Immigration Liaison 
Officers establishes that when ILOs receive requests for international protection they should refer the 
person to the UNHCR, the appropriate diplomatic mission or a competent local NGO. See International 
Air Transport Association, A Code of Conduct for Immigration Liaison Officers, October 2002, § 2.3.  
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 394 
for effective judicial protection, should be set out for those situations in which ILOs are 
confronted with refugees and asylum seekers in the course of their activities. 
5.7. It is not certain that the legal safeguards and remedies 
against ILOs’ actions and/or decisions that could be 
introduced in the ILOs Regulation could be effective in 
practice 
 
PROBLEM: It is not certain that the legal safeguards and remedies against ILOs’ actions 
and/or decisions that could be introduced in the ILOs Regulation could be effective in 
practice. 
As with the carrier sanctions scheme, even if legal safeguards and judicial remedies 
were introduced in the ILOs Regulation, it remains unclear how the exercise of effective 
remedies against their actions and/or decisions and the right to judicial protection could 
be upheld in practice. 
 
As it will be expounded below, mechanisms of off-shore processing of claims of 
international protection are structurally unsuited to accommodate the requirements of non-
refoulement and the right to leave to seek asylum in a meaningful way. Refer to Part II for 
further details. 
 
SOLUTION: Thorough discussions must be held with regard to the legal viability of 
maintaining the institution of ILOs. The impossibility to introduce the necessary legal 
safeguards in their scheme should lead to the abandonment of the policy altogether. 
 
If verified that it is not possible to incorporate the necessary legal safeguards to the ILOs’ 
scheme and that refugees’ and asylum seekers’ rights risk being neglected as a result, the 
entire institution should be considered incompatible not only with the international 
obligations binding upon the EU Member States, but also with the very EU acquis on entry 
that ILOs intend to implement.   
6. JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS BY THE EU MEMBER 
STATES AND FRONTEX 
 
In the way towards the establishment of an integrated management system of the external 
borders of the EU Member States, the need was felt to set up a specialised Agency. Thus, 
preceding the enactment of the Schengen Borders Code, Regulation 2007/2004 established 
FRONTEX844. As stated in the Preamble and in article 1, the objective is to ‘improving the 
integrated management of the external borders of the Member States of the Union’, so as 
to ensure ‘a uniform and high level of control and surveillance’ and the ‘efficient 
implementation of common rules’ in the field, respecting fundamental rights and the 
principles enshrined in article 6 TEU and in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Regulation 863/2007 has supplemented the system, establishing the RABIT mechanism for 
exceptional and urgent situations of mass influx of third-country nationals attempting illegal 
crossings and regulating the powers of guest officers taking part in joint operations and 
pilot projects845. The amendment insists on compliance with fundamental rights, 
                                                 
844  Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing the European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union, OJ L 349/1 of 25.11.2004 [FRONTEX Regulation hereinafter]. 
845  Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 
establishing a mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and amending Council 
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mentioning that the Regulation should be carried out ‘in accordance with Member States’ 
obligations as regards international protection and non-refoulement’. Special emphasis is 
made in Recitals 16 to 18 on the need to respect the ‘obligations arising under the 
international law of the sea, in particular as regards search and rescue’.  
 
The submission of the Agency to the SBC is not made explicit in the FRONTEX Regulation, 
due to the Code being posterior. Yet, the Agency should be supposed in application of 
article 16 SBC, stating that ‘[o]perational cooperation between Member States in the field 
of management of external borders shall be coordinated by the European Agency […], 
established by Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004’. It is the RABIT Regulation that stipulates in 
Recital 16 that the instrument ‘contributes to the correct application of […] the Schengen 
Borders Code’. The amendment reinstates in article 2 the overarching principle of article 3 
SBC, according to which the control regime applies ‘without prejudice to the rights of 
refugees and persons requesting international protection, in particular as regards non-
refoulement’. The Commission proposal to amend the FRONTEX Regulation proposes to 
make explicit in article 1 that the Agency is required to observe the Schengen Borders 
Code, EU law, international law, ‘obligations related to access to international protection, 
and fundamental rights’. 
 
The Agency has been entrusted with several tasks. According to article 3 FRONTEX 
Regulation, joint operations and pilot projects can be launched at the initiative of the 
Member States or on the proposal of the Agency. If the Commission amendments are 
adopted, FRONTEX will be able to initiate border surveillance missions itself, ‘in cooperation 
with the Member States’. To date, FRONTEX has carried out a number of them since it 
started operations in 2006. For our purposes, HERA provides a good example. The declared 
purpose of the HERA operation, hosted by Spain, is to prevent illegal immigration by sea 
and to identify traffickers and smugglers, while increasing operational cooperation between 
participating Member States and third countries. HERA has been deployed in different 
phases, since July 2006. HERA I was concerned with the identification of irregular migrants 
arriving at the Canary Islands846. HERA II aimed at reinforcing maritime surveillance, 
dissuading pateras and cayucos from sailing off Senegal, Mauritania and Cape Verde. When 
the boats were already at sea, the goal was to intercept them while in the territorial waters 
of the country of embarkation, handing over the responsibility for returning them ashore to 
the authorities of the third country concerned847. HERA III brought together the two 
dimensions of HERA I and II, the explicit goal being ‘to stop migrants from leaving the 
shores on the long sea journey’848. In 2008, HERA became a permanent operation, to be 
launched according to the needs identified by FRONTEX. Running from February till 
                                                                                                                                                            
Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 as regards that mechanism and regulating the tasks and powers of 
guest officers OJ L 199/30 of 31.07.2007 [RABIT Regulation hereinafter]. 
846  FRONTEX, Press Releases, HERA II Operation to be Prolonged, 13.10.2006 and Longest FRONTEX 
coordinated operation – HERA, the Canary Islands, 19.12.2006. 
847  European Commission News, EU immigration: Frontex Operation, 12.09.2006, Ref: 48181: ‘Normally 
Senegalese boats escort the migrants inshore, start the legal procedure and try to arrest the people 
that were paid for organizing the journey.’ BBC News, Stemming the immigration wave, 10.09.2006, 
retrievable from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5331896.stm: The Spanish Commander in chief 
declared in this respect that ‘boats containing a total of 1,243 people ha[d] been intercepted and 
returned to shore’ and added that if they located ‘any illegal boat within 24 miles of the coast they 
[were] immediately returned.’ The boats were escorted to the Canary Islands when found outside that 
zone. 
848  FRONTEX, Press Releases, A sequel of operation HERA just starting, 15.02.2007 and Public Bull. 
February 2007, Ref. No. 5427/16.02.2007, p. 3. 
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December, it diverted 5,969 migrants back to Africa849. HERA 2009 run from March to 
December 2009, but official statistics are not available yet850.  
 
The NAUTILUS operation, first launched in 2006, has also become permanent afterwards. It 
covers the central Mediterranean for similar purposes. During the summer of 2009, the 
mission overlapped with a series of push-backs orchestrated by Italy. Although, according 
to UNHCR, ‘it [was] clear that a significant number from this group [was] in need of 
international protection’851, Italy returned at least 900 migrants to Libya between May and 
July ‘without proper assessment of their possible protection needs’852. The degree of 
FRONTEX’s involvement in these operations remains unclear853. 
6.1. Available evaluations ignore the impact of joint maritime 
operations on human rights and current monitoring 
mechanisms are insufficient to ensure compliance with the EU 
fundamental rights’ acquis 
 
PROBLEM: Available evaluations ignore the impact of joint maritime operations on 
human rights and current monitoring mechanisms are insufficient to ensure compliance 
with the EU fundamental rights’ acquis. 
Internal evaluations per operation are carried out by FRONTEX, but their content is 
classified. 
The Commission has conducted its own evaluation, but has shown uncritical with regard 
to possible flaws in the manner in which joint patrols have been performed.854 
The external independent evaluation carried out by COWI grants a general satisfecit to 
FRONTEX, without analyzing the impact on fundamental rights its activities have. 855   
The amendments proposed by the Commission to the FRONTEX Regulation will not 
substantially change the current state of affairs.  
 
As the other entry control measures already scrutinized, joint sea patrols may affect the 
rights of refugees and asylum seekers to non-refoulement and to access international 
protection in a significant way. Yet, none of the existing (accessible) evaluations embark on 
a legal analysis of such an impact.  
 
                                                 
849  Frontex Press Release, HERA 2008 and NAUTILUS 2008 Statistics, 17.02. 2009. 
850  Frontex Examples of Accomplished Operations, Hera 2009, available at: 
http://www.frontex.europa.eu/examples_of_accomplished_operati/art45.html.  
851  UNHCR Press Release, UNHCR interviews asylum seekers pushed back to Libya, 14.07.2009. 
852  UNHCR Press Release, UNHCR deeply concerned over returns from Italy to Libya, 07.05.2009. 
853  Human Rights Watch, Pushed Back, Pushed Around – Italy’s Forced Return of Boat Migrants and 
Asylum Seekers, Libya’s Mistreatment of Migrants and Asylum Seekers, Sept.2009, p. 37, retrievable 
from: http://www.hrw.org/en/node/85585; FRONTEX Press Release, Frontex not involved in diversion 
activities to Libya, 21 09. 2009. See also S Klepp, ‘A Contestated Asylum System: The European 
Union between Refugee Protection and Border Control inthe Meditarranean’, EJML (2010), pp. 1-20, 
explaining at p. 16 that she received contradictory information from the Maltese Ministry of the 
Interior,on the one hand, telling her that ‘700 irregular migrants were brought to Libya within the 
frame of the Frontex mission Nautilus II’, and from the Commanders of the Marine Squadron in 
charge of the operation, who denied it, on the other hand. 
854  Report on the evaluation and future development of the FRONTEX Agency, COM(2008) 67 final of 
13.02.2008. 
855  Article 33 of the FRONTEX Regulation provides for an independent external evaluation on its 
implementation after 3 years of activity. The COWI Report fulfils the goal: COWI, External Evaluation 
of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the 
Member States of the European Union, Final Report (Draft version), January 2009 [COWI Report 
hereinafter], retrievable from: http://www.frontex.europa.eu/specific_documents/other/.   
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Each joint patrols’ operation and pilot project is to be evaluated as it is completed, 
according to article 3(3) FRONTEX Regulation, but the evaluations per operation, the risk 
analysis and the operational plan upon which they are launched are not made public. The 
annual reports of activities drafted by the Management Board, according to article 20(2)(b) 
FRONTEX Regulation, furnish a very limited insight in this respect. The amended version of 
the Regulation, as proposed by the Commission, does not substantially change this state of 
affairs.  
 
The European Commission has conducted its own evaluation of FRONTEX, as it was 
requested by the Hague Programme. Although the European Council had explicitly asked 
for a ‘political evaluation’, the Commission seems to have taken the overall relevance of the 
Agency and its mandate for granted, focusing more on the enhancement of its powers and 
the enlargement of the scope of its responsibilities than on the assessment of  its results856. 
The outcome of FRONTEX’s activities is presented as ‘achievements 2005-2007’ 
beforehand. The Commission values as ‘impressive’ that ‘more than 53,000 persons, for 
2006 and 2007 together, have been apprehended or denied entry at the border during 
these operations’857. At the same time, it notes in passing that ‘experiences gained from 
joint operations show that border guards are frequently confronted with situations involving 
persons seeking international protection or crisis situations at sea’. The solution it 
proposes, on page 5, is simply to call on FRONTEX to offer specialized courses ‘on relevant 
provisions of European and international rules on asylum, the law of the sea and 
fundamental rights, in order to contribute to the full respect of these norms’. However, 
pursuant to article 1(2) of its Regulation, the Agency was supposed since its inception to 
‘facilitate and render more effective the application of existing and future Community 
measures relating to the management of external borders’, which should be understood as 
comprising at a minimum the Schengen Borders Code, the FRONTEX Regulation, and the 
RABIT instrument. One way in which this objective was to be achieved, according to article 
5 FRONTEX Regulation, is precisely through the provision of training and the development 
of a Common Core Curriculum for border guards. It thus ensues that FRONTEX was under 
an obligation to provide adequate training on the EU borders acquis since the beginning of 
its activities.  
 
From the little information available it appears that the 53,000 intercepted migrants have 
been ‘apprehended or denied entry at the border’ before an asylum application could be 
lodged or the opportunity to contest the refusal of entry was granted. This may entail very 
serious breaches of the right to asylum, the principle of non-refoulement and the right to 
an effective remedy and to judicial protection as elaborated above. Although, according to 
article 10(2) of the FRONTEX Regulation, the agents participating in joint operations ‘shall 
comply with Community law’ in full respect of ‘the rights of refugees and persons 
requesting international protection, in particular non-refoulement’858, the Commission fails 
to provide any details in this regard. 
 
                                                 
856  Together with the FRONTEX evaluation: Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, Examining the creation of a European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), COM(2008) 
68 final and Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Preparing the next 
steps in border management in the European Union, COM(2008) 69 final, both released on 
13.02.2008. 
857  The Commission staff working document SEC(2008)150 final provides the breakdown per mission of 
the statistical data.  
858  Article 3 SBC and its twin provision in Article 2 of the RABIT Regulation. See also the Preambles to all 
three Regulations.   
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Article 33 provides for an independent external evaluation on the implementation of the 
FRONTEX Regulation to be conducted three years after the Agency started its activities. The 
COWI Report fulfils the purpose. Although the Parliament had required the Commission ‘to 
fully evaluate FRONTEX’s activities with regard to their impact on fundamental freedoms 
and rights, including the “responsibility to protect”859, the COWI Report does not respond to 
this demand. The Report establishes that ‘[e]ffectiveness is assessed on the basis of the 
coherence between the objectives and goals listed in the Work Programs and the results 
reported in the General Reports’ provided by the Agency to itself, whereas ‘impacts are 
assessed on the basis of their fulfilment of articles 1 and 2 in the FRONTEX Regulation’ 
(§1.4.1). Against this background, the Report highlights some imbalances between the 
descriptions in Work Programs and the results in the General Reports, subject to 
improvement (§1.21.4, 1.22.3, 1.25.3). But, in general, it grants an overall satisfecit 
concerning the accomplishment of the objectives set out in the Regulation, without 
engaging in an extended legal analysis. Some of the recommendations at the end of the 
Report show, nonetheless, some criticism. Particularly, the Report invites FRONTEX to 
‘promote a uniform approach to asylum, migration and other human rights procedures to 
participating Member States at all joint operations, giving full consideration to international 
protection standards’ (§1.34).  
 
On the basis of the COWI Report, the Management Board has formulated some 
recommendations that the Commission has taken into account in its proposal to amend the 
FRONTEX Regulation860. The preoccupation to consider the human rights’ impact of joint 
operations transpires in the proposed amendment to article 33, requiring an external 
evaluation of the Agency’s activities every 5 years, which ‘shall include a specific analysis 
on the way the Charter of Fundamental Rights was respected pursuant to the application of 
the Regulation’. This provision, although making an important step in the right direction, is 
insufficient to guarantee that the fundamental rights of refugees and asylum seekers will be 
respected in each individual case.  
 
SOLUTION: The human rights dimension of FRONTEX operations must be well integrated 
in the Agency’s modus operandi. This shall be made clear in the amended version of the 
FRONTEX Regulation. In parallel, the development of a permanent monitoring system of 
FRONTEX activities, developed possibly in collaboration with the EASO861, is 
recommended, as it will enhance transparency and accountability, thereby contributing 
to ensure compliance with the EU fundamental rights’ acquis.  
 
The amendments proposed by the Commission to the FRONTEX Regulation, although 
explicitly submitting FRONTEX activities to the respect of ‘Union law, International law, 
obligations related to access to international protection, and fundamental rights’ in 
proposed article 1(1), do not make provision for the necessary means to achieve this 
objective in concreto. In the short run, in order for the Agency to fulfil its mission in 
accordance with its mandate, it would be highly recommendable that asylum seekers’ and 
refugees’ rights be integrated in risk analyses, feasibility studies, operational plans and 
evaluations per mission or pilot project coordinated by FRONTEX. The ‘description of the 
tasks and special instructions’, in proposed article 1(5), for officers participating in 
                                                 
859  European Parliament resolution of 18 December 2008 on the evaluation and future development of 
the FRONTEX Agency and of the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), 
P6_TA(2008)0633, § 23. 
860  Recommendations issued following the evaluation of the European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union 
(Frontex), available at: http://www.frontex.europa.eu/specific_documents/other/.  
861  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European 
Asylum Support Office, COM(2009) 66 final, 18.02.2009 [EASO hereinafter]. 
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FRONTEX missions should include clear orders on the procedures to be followed when 
confronted with refugees and asylum seekers. In this connection, as already requested by 
the European Parliament in its evaluation of the Agency’s activities, FRONTEX should also 
be required to ‘publish evaluation reports on joint operations and other coordinated 
missions, risk analyses, feasibility studies and statistics on migration trends’. This should be 
coupled with a reporting obligation on the EU Member States and FRONTEX to communicate 
the specific measures that they take when confronted with persons in need of international 
protection in the course of each joint operation they undertake862. The ‘incident reporting 
scheme’ proposed by the Commission could be used to this end. Independent monitoring of 
FRONTEX border surveillance operations by civil society organisations, in partnership with 
the EASO, should also be introduced. The ‘effective forced-return monitoring system’, 
proposed in article 1(12), could serve as a model. 
 
6.2. There appears to be an ambiguous understanding of maritime 
obligations 
 
PROBLEM: There appears to be an ambiguous understanding of maritime obligations.  
EU Member States participating in FRONTEX operations hold no uniform interpretation of 
their international maritime obligations, in particular with regard to search and rescue 
(SAR). Some appear to equate interception measures to SAR. However, both should be 
clearly distinguished.   
SAR obligations should not be disconnected from other international obligations ensuing 
from refugee law and human rights. This approach is not correct. 
Rescue requires disembarkation in a ‘place of safety’, in full respect of asylum seekers’ 
and refugees’ rights. Protection against refoulement, access to asylum and concomitant 
effective remedies and judicial protection have to be guaranteed. 
 
The HERA operations’ goal ‘to stop migrants from leaving the shores on the long sea 
journey and thus reducing the danger of losses of human lives’, as well as the Italian push-
backs carried out without any consideration of international protection obligations, appear 
to consider interception as equivalent to a SAR measure. This understanding seems to 
equate the binomial ‘interception + disembarkation in dry land’ to search and rescue and to 
disconnect SAR obligations from subsisting human rights responsibilities. However, these 
assumptions have no sound legal basis. Interception is not equivalent to search and rescue. 
It pertains to the category of police powers of the coastal State concerned863, which, as 
expounded below, are not unlimited. Moreover, interception does not overrule human rights 
obligations, which observance is implicitly required by the maritime Conventions 
themselves.  
 
SAR obligations have been defined in customary and treaty law. All major maritime 
conventions include a SAR obligation binding upon flag and coastal States alike, which 
                                                 
862  Standing Committee of Experts on international migration, refugees and criminal law, Views on the 
Commission report on the evaluation and future development of the FRONTEX Agency (COM(2008) 67 
final), Ref. CM08007 I, 04.04.2008. 
863  There is no internationally accepted legal definition of the notion of ‘interception’. But see UNHCR, 
Interception of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees: The International Framework and Recommendations 
for a Comprehensive Approach, UN Doc. EC/50/SC/CRP.17, p. 10: interception is understood as 
encompassing the ‘measures applied by a State, outside its national territory, in order to prevent, 
interrupt or stop the movement of persons without the required documentation crossing international 
borders by land, air or sea, and making their way to the country of prospective destination’. 
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benefits ‘any person’ anywhere ‘in distress at sea’864. Rescue has been defined in the Annex 
to the SAR Convention as an ‘operation to retrieve persons in distress, provide for their 
initial medical or other needs and to deliver them to a place of safety’. The place of safety 
has not been designated by default. Flexibility in the determination of the port of 
disembarkation is required to ensure that ‘the particular circumstances of the case’ are 
taken into account alongside ‘the guidelines developed by the [International Maritime] 
Organization’. The guidelines provide precisely that ‘[t]he need to avoid disembarkation in 
territories where the lives and freedoms of those alleging a well-founded fear of persecution 
is a consideration in the case of asylum-seekers and refugees recovered at sea’865. As a 
result, disregarding asylum seekers’ and refugees’ rights may not only amount to a breach 
of international protection obligations but also to a violation of maritime law itself. 
 
SOLUTION: The practice of stopping migrants from leaving or diverting them back to 
African ports without consideration of their particular situation must be discontinued. 
Specific procedures and remedies must be introduced in FRONTEX legislation to provide 
adequate legal safeguards to those in search of international protection. Both the 
FRONTEX Regulation and the guidelines for joint operations should be revised866. 
 
During the HERA operation ‘more than 1,000 migrants were diverted back to their points of 
departure at ports at the West African coast’867 and Italy has diverted at least 900 persons 
according to available reports, presumably before any asylum claims were considered. 
Diversion in these circumstances may amount to refoulement and breach the right of 
everyone to leave any country in search of international protection. Mechanical referrals to 
foreign authorities without a prior procedure to ensure the safety of the transfer collide with 
the procedural facet of the right to seek asylum and to protection against refoulement as 
characterized above. If the right to an effective remedy is to be respected, transfers to 
African countries should not ‘be executed before the [competent] national authorities [of 
the EU MS] have examined whether they are compatible with [fundamental rights]’ in each 
individual ‘arguable’ case868. Judicial protection has also to be guaranteed. Preliminary 
access to the territory of the intercepting Member State(s) may eventually have to be 
granted for this purpose. Neither the Commission proposal to amend the FRONTEX 
Regulation nor the draft guidelines for joint maritime operations introduce adequate 
procedures and remedial measures against interception and refoulement. Whereas the 
guidelines, as adopted by the Council, introduce a binding provision in Par I § 1.2 of the 
Annex concerning protection against refoulement, neither procedural safeguards nor 
remedies have been introduced to that end. Part II of the Annex proposes non-legally 
binding measures with regard to disembarkation in § 2, which are insufficient to guarantee 
the observance of the principle in accordance with EU and international legal obligations. 
6.3. Ambiguous reading of police powers in each maritime zone 
 
                                                 
864  Article 98, 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); Chap. V, 1974 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS); Annex, 1979 Search and Rescue 
Convention (SAR).  
865  Guidelines on the treatment of persons rescued at sea, IMO Resolution MSC.167(78), 20.05.2004, § 
6.17. 
866  Council Decision (2010/252/EU) of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as 
regards the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the operational cooperation 
coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders of the Member States of the European Union, OJ L 111/20 of 04.05.2010 [FRONTEX 
Guidelines hereinafter].  
867  FRONTEX Press Releases, HERA III Operation, 13.042007 and Public Bull. May 2007, Ref. No. 
7248/21.05.2007, p. 3. 
868  Mutatis mutandis, ECtHR, Conka v Belgium, Appl. No. 51564/99, 05.02.2002, § 79. 
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PROBLEM: Ambiguous reading of police powers in each maritime zone.  
Contrary to what seems to transpire from the Commission study on the law of the sea869 
and from the guidelines for FRONTEX operations, interception powers of the Member 
States concerned are not unlimited and are required to be exercised in compliance with 
their international obligations.  
 
Maritime law circumscribes interception powers of both coastal and flag States, so that they 
are not left free to act in any of the zones in which the sea has been divided. The UNCLOS 
delimits State sovereignty in each of the sea areas, so that police powers are exercised 
with due respect of the UNCLOS itself and of ‘other rules of international law’, as specified 
in articles 2(3) and 87(1), which includes refugee law and human rights.  
 
According to articles 92 and 87 UNCLOS, freedom of navigation reigns in the high seas, 
where ships are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their flag State. Only in limited 
instances may third States exercise jurisdiction. The case of ships of uncertain nationality 
and stateless ships in regard of which any State enjoys a right of visit is relevant for our 
purposes. Such a right of visit, according to the very wording of article 110 UNCLOS, 
appears to simply provide for a right to approach and board the ship to effect a vérification 
du pavillon, ‘which must be carried out with all possible consideration’. Such actions as 
blocking passage, arrest, escort to a port or tow the ship in question do not appear to be 
straightforwardly justified870.  
 
In the contiguous zone, coastal States enjoy ‘a limited right of police’871. Freedom of 
navigation continues to be the rule, but article 33(1) UNCLOS allows ‘the coastal State [to] 
exercise the control necessary to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or 
sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea’. Only such control as it is 
necessary is allowed. This requires a proportionality test to be carried out. It is unclear 
whether inspection and return are permitted actions at this level. In any case, States 
remain constrained to the observance of ‘other rules of international law’. 
 
Not even in their territorial sea can coastal States exert unlimited powers. The right of 
innocent passage, enshrined in article 18 UNCLOS, has to be observed. According to article 
19 UNCLOS, passage is rendered non-innocent if a vessel engages in the loading or 
unloading of persons contrary to the immigration rules of the coastal state. Where non-
innocent, the coastal State, pursuant to article 25 UNCLOS, may take all necessary steps to 
prevent passage. But again, always in accordance with ‘other rules of international law’, 
including non-refoulement and the right to leave to seek asylum with its concomitant 
procedural safeguards. Note, in addition, that the territorial sea has been assimilated to the 
national territory of the coastal State concerned872. Therefore, with regard to EU coastal 
States, the full asylum acquis applies at this level. 
 
SOLUTION: As required by articles 2(3) and 87(1) UNCLOS, it must be made abundantly 
clear in FRONTEX legislation that interception measures have to conform to ‘other rules 
of international law’, considering, in particular, refugees’ and asylum seekers’ rights 
under international and EU law. 
                                                 
869  Study on the international law instruments in relation to illegal immigration by sea, SEC(2007) 691 
final, 15.05.2007, p. 4. 
870  D. Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea, CUP, Cambridge, 2009, p. 17. 
871  D. P. O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea, Vol. II, OUP, Oxford, 1984, p. 1058. 
872  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on minimum standards on 
procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing international protection, COM (2009) 554 
final, 21.10.2009, article 3(1). 
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6.4. Inaccurate attribution of responsibility when FRONTEX and/or 
EU Member States collaborate with third countries 
 
PROBLEM: Inaccurate attribution of responsibility when FRONTEX and/or EU Member 
States collaborate with third countries. 
When interception is performed in the territorial waters of African countries, EU Member 
States and FRONTEX tend to consider that the responsibility for those 
intercepted/rescued belongs to them. However, under international law, this is not 
always the case.  
International cooperation does not relieve EU Member States from their international 
obligations. 
 
The HERA operations were based on bilateral agreements Spain had signed with Mauritania 
and Senegal, which content remains secret. FRONTEX has disclosed that the agreements 
allowed for ‘diverting […] would-be immigrants’ boats back to their points of departure from 
a certain distance of the African coast line’, making ‘Mauritanian or Senegalese law 
enforcement officer[s] […] present on board of deployed Member States’ assets […] always 
responsible for the diversion’873. In the case of the Italian push-backs no official information 
is available as for the formal acquiescence of Libya to allow the returns. In any event, the 
consent by Senegal, Mauritania and Libya does not make them ‘always responsible for the 
diversion’, as it seems to be assumed. Cooperation with third countries does not exonerate 
the EU Member States from their responsibilities under EU and international law.  
 
To determine responsibility in international law what counts is the attributability of the 
wrongful act in question to the State concerned874. Along these lines, the Strasbourg Court 
in Xhavara, as mentioned above, attributed exclusive responsibility to Italy for the acts it 
perpetrated in the territorial sea of its partner. It explicitly established that: ‘La Cour note 
d’emblée que le naufrage […] a été directement provoqué par le navire de guerre italien 
Sibilla. Par conséquent, toute doléance sur ce point doit être considérée comme étant 
dirigée exclusivement contre l’Italie’, making clear that: ‘Le fait que l’Albanie est partie à la 
Convention italo-albanaise ne saurait, à lui seul, engager la responsabilité de cet Etat au 
regard de la Convention pour toute mesure adoptée par les autorités italiennes en 
exécution de l’accord international en question’. Indeed, in the execution of international 
agreements Contracting Parties remain subject to their international obligations, without 
being capable of eschewing their responsibility for any resulting wrongful acts. ‘Where 
States establish […] international agreements to pursue co-operation in certain fields of 
activities, there may be implications for the protection of fundamental rights. It would be 
incompatible with the purpose and object of the [ECHR] if Contracting States were thereby 
absolved from their responsibility under the Convention in relation to the field of activity 
covered by such [agreements]’875. What is more, the Court considers that ‘[...] it is not 
open to a Contracting State to enter into an agreement with another State which conflicts 
with its obligations under the Convention’876. The fact that the African countries with which 
FRONTEX and the EU Member States collaborate are not Parties to the ECHR excludes their 
liability under this instrument877, highlighting the subsistence of the legal responsibility of 
each individual EU Member State participating in joint operations ‘where the person[s] in 
                                                 
873  FRONTEX, Press Releases, HERA 2008 and NAUTILUS 2008 Statistics, 17.02.2009. 
874  Articles 1 and 2, ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility for International Wrongful Acts. 
875  ECtHR, T.I. v UK (Dec.), Appl. No. 43844/98, 07.03.2000 and K.R.S. v UK (Dec.), Appl. No. 
32733/08, 02.12.2008, p. 15. 
876  Al-Saadoon v UK, Appl. No. 61498/08, 02.03.2010, § 138. 
877  ECtHR, Saadi v UK, 37201/06, 28.02.2008, § 126: ‘[i]n so far as any liability under the Convention is 
or may be incurred, it is liability incurred by the Contracting State […]’. 
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question had suffered or risk suffering a flagrant denial of the guarantees and rights 
secured to [them] under the Convention’878. 
 
SOLUTION: FRONTEX and the EU Member States must be made well aware of the fact 
that collaboration with third countries in border patrolling and entry control does not 
make away with the EU and its Member States’ protection obligations under 
international and EU law. Any such collaboration must be made compatible with the 
observance of these obligations or, this failing, be abandoned.  
7. THE EU JOINT RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMME: 
 
Already in 2000, the European Commission, concerned with the issue of ‘access to the 
territory’, suggested the possibility of ‘processing the request for protection in the region of 
origin and facilitating the arrival of refugees on the territory of the Member States by a 
resettlement scheme’, as a way ‘of offering rapid access to protection’879. The US two-tier 
asylum procedure was mentioned as a model, considering resettlement complementary to 
the reception of spontaneous arrivals. A feasibility study on the establishment of 
resettlement schemes in the EU Member States or at EU level was launched880. The 
Commission believed that ‘only a common approach [could] create the necessary political 
and operational basis that [would] produce beneficial effects on terms for access to 
European territory and allow resettlement to be used for strategic purposes both to assist 
the European Union and to attain the objectives of the [UNHCR] Agenda for Protection'881. 
 
In June 2003 the Thessaloniki European Council called on the Commission ‘to explore all 
parameters in order to ensure more orderly and managed entry in the EU of persons in 
need of international protection […] with a view to presenting to the Council before June 
2004, a comprehensive report suggesting measures to be taken, including legal 
implications’882. In October, the Italian EU Presidency held a seminar in Rome, in order to 
further progress in this direction. The resettlement feasibility study was examined by the 
participants and the seminar concluded that ‘resettlement [was] an indispensible and 
essential part of the international protection system, the use of which ha[d] saved many 
lives’. Among the advantages identified, it was mentioned that resettlement ‘offers an 
immediate access to durable solutions’, that it ‘allows for the identification of the most 
vulnerable and needy cases, contributes to more orderly and managed arrivals and enables 
States to carry out pre-arrival security and health checks’. In addition, resettlement 
‘enables better planning and management of resources and facilitates the early integration 
of refugees’. Finally, the seminar established that ‘resettlement has a positive impact on 
the integrity and credibility of the institution of asylum’, which could assist in preventing 
the abuse of the system883. 
 
                                                 
878  EComHR, WM v Denmark, Appl. No. 17392/90, 14.10.1992; Al-Saadoon v UK, Appl. No. 61498/08, 
02.03.2010. 
879  Towards a common asylum procedure and uniform status, valid throughout the Union, for persons 
granted asylum, COM(2000) 755 final, 22.11.2000, § 2.3.2. 
880  Study on the feasibility of setting up resettlement schemes in EU Member States or at EU level, 
against the background of the Common European Asylum System and the goal of a common asylum 
procedure, 2003, available at:  
 http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/asylum/studies/doc_asylum_studies_en.htm.  
881  On the common asylum policy and the Agenda for protection, COM(2003)152 final, 26.03.2003, p. 12.  
882  Presidency Conclusions, European Council 19-20 June 2003, Council doc. 11638/03, § 26. 
883  On the managed entry in the EU of persons in need of international protection and the enhancement 
of the protection capacity of the regions of origin, improving access to durable solutions, COM(2004) 
410 final, § 19 ff. 
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Keeping with the deadline, the Commission issued a communication on ‘improving access 
to durable solutions’ in June 2004, identifying the key elements of an EU Resettlement 
Scheme. However, a fully-fletched proposal has not been tabled until September 2009. 
Building upon the public consultations carried out in the framework of the Green Paper on 
the future of the Common European Asylum System in 2007884 and with the backing of the 
European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, the Commission has launched a Joint EU 
Resettlement Programme885. The Stockholm programme has welcome the initiative in § 
6.2.3, inviting the EU institutions to ‘encourage the voluntary participation of Member 
States in the […] scheme’. The Programme represents an important step for the Union, 
supported by a strong institutional consensus, which has to be applauded886. 
 
The Commission proposal is divided into 4 chapters. The first provides the background to 
the proposal; the second identifies the shortcomings of the current situation prevailing in 
the EU with regard to resettlement; the third section expounds the Joint EU Resettlement 
Programme proper, identifying the objectives and the guiding principles alongside the 
different components of the scheme; the fourth division refers to a separate and 
complementary proposal the Commission has presented to adapt the current Decision 
governing the European Refugee Fund (2008-2013)887.  
 
The Commission characterises resettlement, clearly differentiating it from internal EU-
relocation of refugees, as ‘one of three so-called “durable solutions” available to refugees’, 
‘generally carried out with the UNHCR’. The mechanism ‘targets those refugees whose 
protection needs have already been clearly established’. Being an ‘orderly procedure’, 
providing for safe and legal access to the EU, it is supposed to attenuate the necessity ‘to 
resort to different forms of illegal immigration’. An additional advantage attached to its 
predictability is ‘that reception and integration [of its beneficiaries] can be organized in 
advance’ (§1.2).  
 
The major shortcoming of the current situation is the low-profile engagement of EU 
Member States in resettlement. Only ten EU Member States have a regular annual scheme 
and their limited capacity ‘contrast[s] sharply with the numbers taken in by other countries 
in the industrialized world’ (§1.3)888. Therefore, the principal objective of the joint EU 
resettlement program is ‘to involve more Member States in resettlement activities’, so as 
‘to provide for an orderly and secure access to protection for those resettled’ and ‘to 
demonstrate greater solidarity with third countries receiving refugees’ (§2.1).  
                                                 
884  Green Paper on the future of the Common European Asylum System, COM(2007) 301 final, 
06.06.2007. 
885  On the establishment of a Joint EU Resettlement Programme, COM(2009) 447, 02.09.2009 [Joint EU 
Resettlement Programme hereinafter]. 
886  Report on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Decision No 573/2007/EC establishing the European Refugee Fund for the period 2008 to 2013 as part 
of the General Programme “Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows” and repealing Council 
Decision 2004/904/EC, A7-0125/2010, 29.04.2010; Report on the establishment of a joint EU 
resettlement programme, A7-0131/2010, 03.05.2010; Presidency compromise text, Council doc. 
7958/10, 26.03.2010. 
887  Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Decision No 
573/2007/EC establishing the European Refugee Fund for the period 2008 to 2013 as part of the 
General programme “Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows” and repealing Council Decision 
2004/904/EC, COM(2009) 456, 02.09.2009 [Proposal to Amend the ERF].  
888  Sweden, Denmark, Finland, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Portugal, France, Romania 
and the Czech Republic. For detailed statistics see the Commission Staff Working Document 
accompanying the Communication on the establishment of a Joint EU Resettlement Programme and 
the proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Decision No 
573/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 May 2007 establishing the 
European Refugee Fund for the period 2008 to 2013 as part of the General Programme “Solidarity and 
Management of Migration Flows” and repealing Council Decision 2004/904/EC, Impact Assessment, 
SEC(2009) 1127 final, 02.09.2009. 
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Additional flaws, at the practical level, include the lack of structures and procedures for the 
coordination of national initiatives between the Member States. At present, no exchange of 
information and no common planning or coordination mechanism of these activities exist. 
National resettlement schemes are negotiated bilaterally with the UNHCR. The Commission 
believes that the introduction of the EU programme has the potential to enable closer 
cooperation and to ensure coordination of the national schemes at EU level. Economies of 
scale could be fostered and the costs associated with resettlement eventually reduced. This 
way, the humanitarian impact of the EU could be exponentially increased, raising the 
Union’s profile in international affairs generally and allowing for a strategic use of 
resettlement. In addition, there is currently no means to identify priorities in a flexible and 
adaptive manner in the EU sphere. As a result, financial resources do not match real 
necessities well. The European Refugee Fund is considered to be too rigid to afford an 
adequate framework to the ever changing circumstances surrounding resettlement needs. 
According to the Commission, a mechanism is necessary for the common definition of 
priorities at EU level, with a corresponding financial instrument offering incentives to the 
Member States to resettle according to those priorities (§2.2 -2.3).  
 
In response to these inadequacies, the Joint EU Resettlement Programme pursues three 
major objectives: (1) an enlarged humanitarian impact of the EU, with ‘greater and better 
targeted support to the international protection of refugees’ world-wide; (2) the strategic 
use of resettlement, ‘ensuring that it is properly integrated into the Union’s external and 
humanitarian policies’; and (3) the cost-effectiveness of EU resettlement efforts (§3).  
 
Several principles underpin the Joint EU Resettlement Programme. First, involvement in the 
Programme is voluntary. It is expected that the creation of additional financial incentives in 
a revised version of the European Refugee Fund will attract participation by those EU 
Member States that currently conduct no resettlement or a very reduced scheme. Second, 
priorities are to be revised annually, so that evolving needs can be matched with tailored 
responses. Third, a multiplicity of non-State actors will be involved in the concrete 
development and implementation of the Programme, such as the UNHCR, IOM, 
international and local NGOs and local authorities dealing with reception and integration. 
Fourth, the approach of the Programme towards resettlement will be incremental, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. The number of Member States participating should be 
widened progressively, together with their capacity and the scope of their engagements 
(§3.1).  
 
The Joint EU Resettlement Programme, as designed, ‘will primarily consist of a mechanism 
which allows for the setting of common annual priorities on resettlement and more effective 
use of the financial assistance available through the [European Refugee Fund] […]’ (§3.2). 
A Resettlement Expert Group, will be established, composed of members from both 
resettlement and non-resettlement Member States and other stakeholders. It will meet on 
a regular basis to exchange information on targets and specific needs. On the basis of 
these discussions, the Commission will draft a Decision with the common resettlement 
priorities, taking account of the UNHCR yearly forecast of resettlement needs. The priorities 
will be reflected in the amended version of the European Refugee Fund (§3.2.1).  
 
Common needs and priorities defined, strengthened practical cooperation will supplement 
the scheme. The EASO is expected to provide the structural framework to practical 
cooperation initiatives undertaken with regard to resettlement. Selection and fact-finding 
missions, pre-departure orientation programmes, medical screenings, travel or visa 
arrangements, joint training, reception and integration tools, the identification of best 
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practices or the launch of pilot projects range among the conceivable activities. Close 
cooperation with the UNHCR is also deemed key to the success of the Programme.  
 
The Commission considers that an integrated approach between resettlement and other EU 
external policies would be desirable. ‘In particular, coherence with the EU Global Approach 
to Migration889 should be ensured’. It is proposed that resettlement priorities be established 
not only ‘on the basis of current needs’, but also ‘on the basis of other humanitarian and 
political considerations identified by the Member States and the Commission, taking into 
account the specific situation of the third countries concerned, as well as the overall EU 
relations with these countries’ (§3.2.3). 
 
Finally, to ensure progress and continuous relevance, as mandated by article 70 TFEU, the 
Joint EU Resettlement Programme will periodically be evaluated. The Commission, in close 
cooperation with the EASO, is to report every year on the resettlement efforts made in the 
EU, both to the Council and to the European Parliament. A mid-term evaluation will be 
carried out in 2012, upon consultation with all relevant stakeholders. In 2014, a full 
revision will be undertaken, so that the necessary improvements and further development 
of the Programme can be carried out (§3.3).  
7.1. The means devised for the identification of common priorities 
seem insufficient for a truly common approach to 
resettlement to emerge among the EU Member States 
 
PROBLEM: The means devised for the identification of common priorities seem 
insufficient for a truly common approach to resettlement to emerge among the EU 
Member States.  
For the identification of common priorities that truly translate a common approach to 
resettlement, more robust action seems required than periodic discussions at the 
Resettlement Expert Group.  
 
The low-profile commitment to resettlement the Member States have demonstrated so far 
reflects a persistent lack of political will across the EU to engage in these activities. To 
overcome this fundamental limitation, important incentives will have to be introduced for a 
significant commitment to resettlement to emerge that raises the humanitarian profile of 
the Union, involves ‘more Member States in resettlement’ (§2.1), and allows for the orderly 
management of refugee flows. 
 
SOLUTION: Additional policy tools should be introduced in a coherent framework that 
appropriately flanks the results achieved through meetings at the Resettlement Expert 
Group to ensure the development of a common approach to resettlement. 
 
To bring about a common approach to resettlement in the EU, besides discussions at the 
Resettlement Expert Group, there is a range of policy tools that could be introduced. EU-
wide information campaigns conducted in partnership with the UNHCR and the NGO sector 
may yield practical results. Some kind of twining programs between EU Member States and 
major resettlement countries may prove equally beneficial. Inviting officials from these 
                                                 
889  Priority actions for responding to the challenges of migration: First follow-up to Hampton Court, 
COM(2005) 621 final, 30.11.2005; The Global Approach to Migration one year on: Towards a 
comprehensive European migration policy, COM (2006) 735 final, 30.11.2006; Applying the Global 
Approach to Migration to the Eastern and South-Eastern Regions Neighbouring the European Union, 
COM (2007) 247 final, 16.05.2007; Strengthening the Global Approach to Migration: Increasing 
Coordination, Coherence and Synergies COM(2008) 611 final, 08.10.2008. 
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countries to the Resettlement Expert Group’s meetings could have a major impact on 
awareness-raising among European policy-makers. The establishment of private 
sponsorship mechanisms, allowing for the resettlement of refugees by private entities, may 
also help to build up public acceptance, while creating new opportunities for cooperation 
among governments, NGOs and the private sector890. More substantial financial assistance 
for those EU Member States engaging for the first time in resettlement activities, as the 
European Parliament has proposed, could provide an adequate incentive. In the short run, 
and to foster a solid common understanding among the EU Member States on resettlement, 
the introduction of an Open Method of Coordination-like scheme, based on the exchange of 
best practices and mutual-learning, may stimulate the approximation of national policies in 
this area891. 
7.2. Harmonised procedures and criteria for resettlement have not 
been envisaged 
 
PROBLEM: Harmonised procedures and criteria for resettlement have not been 
envisaged. 
The identification of common priorities, providing the programme with its main 
operational goal, is only a first step towards the development of a common EU approach 
to resettlement.  
However, this necessary premise is insufficient to achieve by itself the ultimate 
humanitarian and strategic aspirations of the programme. 
Beyond the identification of common priorities, the proposal should go into further legal 
detail. 
 
Together with the definition of common priorities at large, other elements have to be 
considered for a meaningful common approach to emerge. There are many points in which 
EU Member States’ practices and understandings differ with regard to resettlement. The 
Commission identifies some in its proposal ‘with respect to the numerical targets and 
specific caseloads […] to resettle, the legal criteria which are used for deciding who to 
resettle and the partners through which resettlement is carried out’ (§3.1).  
 
SOLUTION: If the humanitarian and strategic objectives of the programme are to be 
fulfilled, it is advisable to go beyond the mere identification of common priorities into 
significant policy approximation. To this end, more detailed and comprehensive rules 
should be adopted with regard to the criteria and procedures for EU resettlement. Full 
harmonisation will possibly have to be envisaged in the medium term. In the long run, 
permanent processes and structures should be set up at EU level to ensure the 
effectiveness and continuity of the policy. 
 
The Commission noted in its 2004 Communication on ‘improving access to durable 
solutions’ that, among the ‘key elements of an EU Resettlement Scheme’, a ‘general 
procedural framework’ and some minimum ‘criteria’ to identify its beneficiaries would have 
                                                 
890  UNHCR, Response to the Green Paper on the Common European Asylum System, September 2007, p. 
45; available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/46e159f82.pdf. 
891  For a similar proposal see: on the common asylum policy, introducing an open coordination method, 
COM(2001) 710 final, 28.11.2001. On the potentialities of using OMC-like mechanisms in the 
implementation of human rights see: O. De Schutter, The Implementation of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights through the Open Method of Coordination, Jean Monet Working Paper No. 07/04, 
available at: http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/04/040701.rtf and O. De Schutter and V. 
Moreno Lax (eds.), Human Rights in the Web of Governance: Towards a Learning-Based Fundamental 
Rights Policy for the European Union, Bruylant (2010).  
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to be formulated. This observation continues to be valid today and should be given 
particular attention if the programme is to produce significant effects. 
 
As noted by the European Parliament, follow-up measures in view of assuring the full 
integration of resettled refugees should also be included. The development of some sort of 
monitoring mechanism to guarantee the quality of resettlement in collaboration with the 
UNHCR and the NGO community would help achieving this aim892.  
 
In the longer run, it has been posited that ‘an EU-wide resettlement scheme should be 
expanded into a truly joint European resettlement programme based on common criteria 
and the commitment of European States to make a significant number of resettlement 
places available every year. Member States would have to commit to collectively resettling 
a certain number of refugees, who would be dispersed across Europe according to a fair 
and equitable system. […] [A] EU resettlement office could be established […] to take on a 
[fully] operational role, placing representatives in regions, planning allocations, 
coordinating missions with UNHCR, and setting levels and resettlement priorities’, in close 
cooperation with relevant NGOs893. The LIBE Committee has proposed to establish a 
Permanent Resettlement Unit within the EASO, which could coordinate and evaluate the 
policy by issuing annual reports and guidelines and liaise with the UNHCR and the NGO 
sector. Indeed, without permanent structures that prepare for and coordinate resettlement 
and follow up the subsequent integration of the refugees concerned ‘it will not be possible 
to increase the number of refugees in the EU’. Thus, the incremental dimension of the 
Programme, as conceived of by the Commission, risks being lost. Therefore, beyond the 
proposed reform of the ERF, an independent ‘resettlement fund’ could be created to 
financially underpin these permanent processes and structures in an adequate way. In 
these circumstances, an extension of the programme not only to protracted refugee 
situations but also to urgent humanitarian emergencies, as proposed by several actors, 
could be better accomplished894. 
7.3. Participation in the EU resettlement programme is conceived 
of as voluntary 
 
PROBLEM: Participation in the EU resettlement programme is conceived of as voluntary. 
In light of articles 78(2)(g) and 80 TFEU, serious doubts ultimately arise as for the 
voluntary nature of the participation in the resettlement scheme. 
 
On the basis of article 78(2)(g) TFEU, the Union ‘shall adopt measures for a common 
European asylum system comprising: […] partnership and cooperation with third countries 
for the purpose of managing the inflows of people applying for [international protection]’. 
In turn, pursuant to article 80 TFEU, such measures ‘shall be governed by the principle of 
solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the 
Member States’ and, ‘[w]henever necessary, the Union acts adopted [in this realm] shall 
contain appropriate measures to give effect to this principle’. If a choice is left to the 
Member States as for the means they can use, it appears that these provisions create an 
obligation of result. In this light, it is difficult to reconcile an obligation to adopt legal 
                                                 
892  Report on the establishment of a joint EU resettlement programme A7-0131/2010, 03.05.2010, § 16 
and 39-45. 
893  ECRE, Response to the Green Paper on the Common European Asylum System, September 2007, p. 
46; available at:  http://www.ecre.org/files/ECRE%20Green%20paper%20response%20final%20-
%20Read%20only.pdf.  
894  Amnesty International-EU Office, Response to the Green Paper on the Common European Asylum 
System, September 2007, p. 44, available at:  
 http://www.aieu.be/static/documents/2009/AIResponse_EASOProposalApr09.pdf.  
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measures for the management of refugee inflows in partnership with third countries, 
governed by the principle of solidarity among the Member States, with the voluntary 
character of the participation in the resettlement programme the Commission proposes. Of 
course, other measures than the EU Resettlement Programme could be envisaged, but 
some measures shall in any event be adopted.  
 
SOLUTION: Once the programme will be officially endorsed, participation therein should 
be considered compulsory, in light of articles 78(2)(g) and 80 TFEU. 
 
If the Member States have a choice as for the means to ‘managing inflows of people’ in 
need of international protection, an obligation of result appears to be inbuilt in these 
provisions. Once the choice with regard to the means has been made, participation in its 
implementation should be deemed obligatory. Should a Member State encounter difficulties 
in meeting its obligations under the resettlement or equivalent scheme, for instance, in the 
event of ‘an emergency situation characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third 
countries’, provisional measures may be adopted ‘for the benefit of the Member State(s) 
concerned’, according to article 78(3) TFEU. Eventually, the activation of the Temporary 
Protection Directive could be envisaged, if need be895. 
7.4. Resettlement shall remain complementary to pre-existing 
legal obligations 
 
PROBLEM: Resettlement shall remain complementary to pre-existing legal obligations. 
The complementary nature of resettlement to the reception of spontaneous arrivals and 
the provision of protection to those in need has not been mentioned in the proposal. 
There is hence a risk of obliteration of the legal obligations of the Member States in this 
context.  
 
Although it may be inferred from the general tenor of the proposal and from its drafting 
history, the Commission forgets to mention explicitly that resettlement must be a 
complement to – and not a substitute for – the provision of protection to spontaneous 
arrivals. The existence of a resettlement scheme cannot be used as an argument not to 
grant admission to spontaneous arrivals; nor should it produce a diminution of procedural 
guarantees for those who did not waited ‘their turn’ in their regions of origin to be orderly 
resettled in the EU. 
 
SOLUTION: The complementary character of resettlement to the reception of 
spontaneous arrivals should be clearly stated and the legal responsibilities of the EU 
Member States properly borne in mind. 
 
A recital should be introduced in any legal or policy instrument dealing with resettlement 
specifying that it remains ‘without prejudice to Member States’ obligations to determine 
asylum claims in fair procedures and to provide protection in their territory in accordance 
with international law’896. 
 
As an obligation to provide access to asylum or to avoid refoulement may arise 
extraterritorially, there is room to consider that legal responsibility may be engaged in the 
                                                 
895  Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection 
in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts 
between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, OJ L 
212/12, 07.08.2001. 
896  Improving access to durable solutions, § 25. 
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course of a resettlement operation beyond the terms originally intended. A resettlement 
scheme would not substitute for compliance with other obligations stemming from 
international or EU law vis-à-vis the persons concerned. This should be taken into account 
when designing concrete resettlement operations. Compliance with international obligations 
shall be ensured in these cases too. Engagement with the region/country of first asylum of 
those resettled will not diminish the legal obligations of the EU Member States concerned.  
7.5. The position of third countries and of other stakeholders 
should be reinforced 
 
PROBLEM: The position of third countries and of other stakeholders should be reinforced. 
Better results could be achieved if the position of third parties would be incorporated in 
the design and the implementation of the EU Resettlement Programme. 
Coherence with article 78(2)(g) TFEU would thereby be better achieved. 
 
It is asserted that the main objective of the programme is to provide ‘orderly and secured 
access to protection’ and ‘to demonstrate greater solidarity to third countries in receiving 
refugees’ (§2.1). To maximise its humanitarian impact, in line with article 78(2)(g) TFEU, a 
multilateral dialogue should be initiated with the countries hosting large numbers of 
refugees in the regions of origin and transit. This would facilitate cooperation and foster 
'the establishment of more commonality of visions, objectives and practices'897. In addition, 
as noted in the Stockholm Programme, ‘any development in this area needs to be pursued 
in close cooperation with the UNHCR and […] other relevant actors’ (§6.2.3). 
 
SOLUTION: The ultimate goals the programme pursues would be better served through 
the opening of a genuine dialogue with the countries hosting large refugee populations 
and with other relevant stakeholders. Some form of tripartite agreements, between the 
EU Member States, the third countries of first asylum concerned and the UNHCR could 
be envisaged to this end.  
 
Many actors have proposed multilateral approaches to address the problems of refugees. 
Lately, the Hague Conference on Private International Law has submitted 'Some Reflections 
on the Utility of Applying Certain Techniques for International Co-operation Developed by 
The Hague Conference on Private International Law to Issues of International Migration', 
pleading for the introduction of multilateral approaches that would promote international 
cooperation, fostering 'the establishment of more commonality of visions, objectives and 
practices in respect of international migration’898. On account of its passed experience, the 
institutional framework The Hague Conference of International Private Law provides could 
be used as a neutral forum for discussion. Further details on this proposal are elaborated in 
Part III of the study, regarding the long-term perspective of the external dimension of the 
CEAS. 
                                                 
897  'Some Reflections on the Utility of Applying Certain Techniques for International Co-operation 
Developed by The Hague Conference on Private International Law to Issues of International 
Migration’, Prel. Doc. No. 8, March 2006.  
898  Ibid. See also the 'Follow-Up Note’, Prel. Doc. No. 23, March 2007; 'Second Follow-Up Note’, Prel. 
Doc. No. 6, March 2008; 'Third Follow-Up Note’, Prel. Doc. No. 8, March 2009, available at: 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=progress.listing&cat=5 and H van Loon, 'Vers un nouveau 
modèle de gouvernance multilatérale de la migration internationale – Réflexions à partir de certaines 
techniques de coopération développées au sein de la Conférence de La Haye’, Liber Amicorum Hélène 
Gaudemet-Tallon, Dalloz (2008), pp. 439-434. 
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7.6. The Resettlement Programme follows a selective approach to 
policy coherence 
 
PROBLEM: The Resettlement Programme follows a selective approach to policy 
coherence. 
It is expected that resettlement coordinates with other EU external policies, in general, 
and with the Global Approach to Migration, in particular. 
Given the current focus of the Global Approach to Migration, this is problematic. 
As a matter of EU primary law, stronger emphasis should be put on cross-policy 
coherence between the EU resettlement programme and the internal asylum acquis. 
This, however, has been omitted in the Commission proposal. 
 
From the three aims the Global Approach pursues, as echoed in the Stockholm Programme 
(§6.1.1), the emphasis thus far has been on controlling irregular movement. Given the 
dissimilar goals each initiative seeks to achieve, it is possible to anticipate frictions when 
attempting to link the EU Resettlement Programme to the Global Approach to Migration. At 
the political level, the Commission has proposed that the identification of EU resettlement 
priorities takes account not only of protection needs but, as mentioned above, also of 
political considerations relating to ‘the specific situation of the third countries concerned, as 
well as the overall EU relations with these countries’. The adequacy of putting resettlement 
at the service of a broader migration management concern should be subject to debate. 
Factoring political considerations, alien to international protection needs, into the definition 
of resettlement targets risks detracting the programme from its primary humanitarian 
objective.  
 
The programmes define cross-policy coherence only in horizontal terms. The need to 
ensure that the external dimension of asylum is consistent with its internal counterpart has 
been neglected. However, it is established in article 7 TFEU that ‘the Union shall ensure 
consistency between its policies and activities, taking all of its objectives into account and 
in accordance with the principle of conferral of powers’. Consistency is one prime 
characteristic of Union law that the Court of Justice guarantees, pursuant to article 256 
TFEU. Therefore, according to article 13(1) TEU, ‘[t]he Union shall have an institutional 
framework which shall aim to promote its values, advance its objectives, serve its interests, 
those of its citizens and those of the Member States, and ensure the consistency, 
effectiveness and continuity of its policies and actions’. With regard to its external policies 
in particular, article 21(3) TEU establishes that ‘[t]he Union shall ensure consistency 
between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies 
[…]’. Flagrantly contradictory results between the external and the internal asylum acquis 
would have to be considered in breach of this legal obligation.  
 
SOLUTION: The adequacy of linking the programme to the Global Approach to Migration 
should be carefully reviewed. On the other hand, it would be highly advisable to recall 
that legal coherence between the internal and the external asylum acquis must be 
guaranteed as a matter of primary law. 
 
When common priorities will be discussed, any agreements reached within the 
Resettlement Expert Group in regard of selection criteria or resettlement procedures would 
need to take the relevant internal acquis into account. The fact that the Qualification 
Directive and the Procedures Directive are in place with regard to internal procedures may 
prevent the EU from engaging extraterritorially in the promotion of less protective 
standards. To be sure, this requirement of consistency does not extend per se the scope of 
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application of the asylum acquis abroad, but sets a minimum standard below which the 
procedures the Union may enact with regard to the extraterritorial initiatives it undertakes 
should not go. In any case, every EU external action will have to comply with the general 
principles of EU law, as disclosed in the ECHR and in the relevant provisions of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
8. REGIONAL PROTECTION PROGRAMMES (RPPS) 
 
Regional Protection Programs constitute the response of the European Commission to a 
debate on extraterritorial processing that sparked in the Union in 2003. At the time, the 
UK’s government commitment to cut by half the number of asylum applications lodged in 
the British islands led to a proposal to move asylum procedures outside the EU. ‘Transit 
Processing Centres’ and ‘Regional Protection Zones’ were the two main components of this 
strategy. Certain categories of irregularly arriving asylum seekers would immediately be 
transferred to the protected areas, have their claims assessed there and either be returned 
to their country of origin, if found not in need of international protection, or be offered a 
durable solution, in the EU or elsewhere. The affected case-load was to correspond to a 
selection of nationalities of countries considered to be generally safe and supposedly 
producing economic migrants abusing the asylum channel899. The UNHCR submitted a 
‘Three-Pronged Proposal’ in response, advancing the idea of placing the camps inside EU 
territory and pleading for the complementarity between the ‘EU prong’, which would deal 
with manifestly unfounded claims, and the ‘domestic prong’, which would process the rest 
of the applications900.  
 
Honouring the European Council’s invitation to establish the merits of these proposals901, 
the European Commission issued a Communication902. After careful analysis of the British 
and the UNHCR’s proposals, and taking the fears of the NGO sector into account903, 
Towards more accessible, equitable and managed asylum systems identified the ’basic 
premises of any new approach to the international protection regime’. The Commission 
enounced the overall principles that should underpin future proposals, but avoided the 
definition of any detailed policy instruments. For the Commission, the new approaches 
would have to fully comply with the international legal obligations ensuing from the Geneva 
                                                 
899  A first version of the UK Government’s plan was leaked to the press and is already referred to by The 
Guardian on 05.02.2003, available at:  
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2003/feb/05/asylum.immigrationasylumandrefugees. The draft 
New Vision for Refugees, is retrievable from: 
  http://www.proasyl.de/texte/europe/union/2003/UK_NewVision.pdf, in its version of 07.03.2003. A 
later version: New International Approaches to Asylum and Protection, was attached to a letter Tony 
Blair addressed to Costas Simitis for discussion in the European Council on 10.03.2003, available at: 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/apr/blair-simitis-asile.pdf.  
900  UNHCR, Three-Pronged Proposal, June 2003, available at:  
 http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3efc4b834.pdf.  
901  Presidency Conclusions, European Council 20-21 March 2003, Council doc. 8410/03, § 63: ‘The 
European Council noted the letter from the United Kingdom on new approaches to international 
protection and invited the Commission to explore these ideas further, in particular with UNHCR, and to 
report through the Council […] in June 2003’. 
902  Towards more accessible, equitable and managed asylum systems, COM(2003) 315 final, 06.03.2003. 
903  Amnesty International, Strengthening Fortress Europe in Times of War, March 2003, available at: 
http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/OneStopCMS/Core/CrawlerResourceServer.aspx?resource=1E1F952
4-B02D-4065-BEEE-BDC0FA9330F1&mode=link&guid=6cc9c32da2a74b3b9721e4889774fee1; ECRE-
US Committee for Refugees, Responding to the asylum access challenge, an agenda for 
comprehensive engagement in protracted refugee situations, April 2003, available at: 
http://www.ecre.org/resources/Policy_papers/357; UK Refugee Council, Unsafe havens, unworkable 
solutions, June 2003, available at: 
http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/policy/responses/2003/unsafe_havens.htm; Human Rights Watch, 
‘An Unjust “Vision” for Europe’s Refugees,’ June 2003, available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/eca/refugees0603/refugees061803.pdf.  
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Convention and the ECHR. Any extraterritorial initiative could only be considered 
complementary to the CEAS, without rendering in-country reception and protection of 
spontaneous arrivals obsolete. The Commission also considered that any new approach 
should be built upon a genuine burden-sharing system, in full partnership with third 
countries of first asylum hosting large refugee populations. Finally, the root causes of 
forced displacement would also have to be addressed. 
In June 2003, the European Council reiterated its invitation and asked the Commission ‘to 
explore all parameters’ of this new approach in ‘a comprehensive report suggesting 
measures to be taken, including legal implications’904. In its ensuing Communication, 
together with protected entry procedures and resettlement, the Commission proposed the 
establishment of EU Regional Protection Programmes as a specific means to enhance the 
protection capacity of regions of origin. It avoided any moves towards the 
extraterritorialisation of asylum procedures and the return of asylum seekers to supposedly 
safe areas abroad. The Commission conceived the initiative as a ‘tool box’ of different 
measures, ‘mainly protection oriented’ (§51), and including a resettlement component, that 
would serve to ‘addressing protracted refugee situations globally in a comprehensive and 
concerted approach’ (§57). The Hague Programme subsequently endorsed the proposal and 
invited the Commission to develop the initiative in practice, on the basis of the ‘experience 
gained in pilot protection programmes to be launched before the end of 2005’905.  
 
In September 2005, the Commission tabled its Communication on EU Regional Protection 
Programmes (RPPs)906. The text is divided into six parts. The first contains a general 
introduction to the concept. The second establishes the constituent activities of the 
Programmes. The Third discusses the factors that have been considered for the selection of 
the regions where the two pilot programmes have been launched. The fourth part deals 
concretely with the pilot programme initiated in the Newly Independent States (NIS) of 
Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, whereas the fifth section is reserved to the pilot project in 
Tanzania. The sixth chapter deals with the evaluation, sustainability and timing of the 
programmes, before the seventh section closes the document with general conclusions. 
RPPs, as framed in the Communication, are supposed to respond to the specific needs of 
the targeted countries in the regions of origin. Accordingly, the emphasis is placed on 
capacity building, in order to strengthen their ability to deliver adequate protection in 
protracted situations907. In regard of the countries and regions of transit, the focus is larger 
and also includes enabling ‘those countries better to manage migration’ (§2). In both 
cases, the overarching aim ‘should be to create the conditions for one of the three Durable 
Solutions to take place – repatriation, local integration or resettlement’ (§5).  
 
Among the conceivable activities, RPPs may include: ‘projects aimed at improving the 
general protection situation in the host country; projects which aim at the establishment of 
an effective Refugee Status Determination procedure which can help host countries better 
manage the migration implications of refugee situations […]; projects which give direct 
benefits to refugees […] by improving their reception conditions; projects which benefit the 
local community hosting the refugees […]; projects aimed at providing training in 
protection issues for those dealing with refugees and migrants; a registration component 
[…]; and a resettlement commitment, whereby EU Member States undertake, on a 
voluntary basis, to provide durable solutions for refugees by offering resettlement places in 
their countries’ (§6). These activities should be aimed at complementing the humanitarian 
                                                 
904  Presidency Conclusions, European Council 19-20 June 2003, Council doc. 11638/03, § 26. 
905  The Hague Programme, Council doc. 16054/04, 13.12.2004. 
906  On Regional Protection Programmes, COM(2005) 388 final, 01.09.2005. 
907  Protracted situations are those in which 25,000 or more refugees have been living in exile for at least 
five years: UNHCR Standing Committee, Protracted Refugee Situations, EC/54/SC/CRP.14, June 2004. 
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action and development programmes of the EU, ‘which are already taking place’. Indeed, 
‘[m]aximising the impact of RPPs can be done by assessing where potential protection gaps 
may exist and ensuring that additional measures complement and add value […]’ (§5). 
 
Concerning the financial means available, the Communication clarifies that ‘Regional 
Protection Programmes will be rooted in actions already existing, notably in the AENEAS908 
and TACIS909 financial programmes, and will not be based on a new financing framework’ 
(§4).  
 
Since 2007, two pilot Regional Protection Programmes have been in place in Tanzania – a 
region of origin hosting the largest refugee populations in Africa – and in three NIS 
countries – a major region of transit towards the EU. A number of factors were considered 
in the selection of these locations, ‘principally, the assessment of particular refugee 
situations in third countries; the financial opportunities available under existing Community 
funds; existing relationships and frameworks for cooperation between the Community and 
particular countries or regions; […][and] the necessity to assure added value […]’ (§9). 
‘Political considerations’ were also taken into account (§10). Some other possible 
emplacements were explored too. Placing a RPP in North Africa, Afghanistan or the Horn of 
Africa was assessed by the Commission in consultation with the Member States, but it was 
eventually discarded. In the particular case of North Africa it was established that ‘the more 
complex nature of the migration situation from North African countries [meant that] a 
wider approach may be required’ (§18). This does not mean, however, that future RPPs 
would exclude this region910. 
 
The Commission submitted in its RPP Communication that ‘an independent, external 
evaluation [was] to be carried out by 2007’, concerning ‘the effects and results of the 
programmes’ (§19). In this regard, the Commission mentions the existence of such 
external evaluation in its First Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum911. On this basis, 
and according to the Stockholm Programme call to ‘further develop and expand’ these 
programmes in light of the results achieved (§6.2.3), ‘[i]t has been decided to improve and 
expand them, in particular in the Horn of Africa (Kenya, Djibouti, Yemen) and north Africa 
(Libya, Egypt, Tunisia)’912. The evaluation, however, is not publicly available. 
8.1. RPPs pursue high ambitions with limited means 
 
PROBLEM: RPPs pursue high ambitions with limited means. 
RPPs draw on existing funds. 
There is no additional institutional set-up underpinning RPPs.  
Therefore, there is a real risk of excessive expectations with regard to RPPs.  
                                                 
908  Regulation (EC) No 491/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 
establishing a programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in the areas of 
migration and asylum (AENEAS), OJ L 80/1, 18.03.2004. AENEAS contained a multiannual programme 
for 2004-2006, which has been replaced by the Thematic Programme ‘Cooperation with Third 
Countries in the areas of Migration and Asylum’, based on article 16 of the Regulation (EC) No 
1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 establishing a 
financing instrument for development cooperation OJ L 378/41, 27.12.2006, within the framework of 
the 2007-2013 Financial Perspectives. 
909  TACIS is the acronym for the ‘Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States’ launched in 
1991. In the 2007-2013 EU Financial Perspective, the TACIS Programme has been replaced with the 
‘European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument’ for the countries covered by the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, which includes Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Nevertheless, TACIS projects 
programmed in 2006 will continue to operate until the end of the decade.  
910  On the establishment of a Joint EU Resettlement Programme, § 3.2.3. 
911  First Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum, COM(2010) 214 final, 06.05.2010. 
912  Ibid., p. 6. 
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Until the external evaluation report is disclosed, it is difficult to gauge the real value of 
RPPs. However, from the available information some conclusions can be drawn. First of all, 
it appears that RPPs pursue very high ambitions with rather limited means. Drawing on 
existing funds, the financial allocations available are insignificant in comparison to the scale 
of the needs to be addressed. This has led the UNHCR to warn of the risks of excessive 
expectations. Although ‘[a]n external evaluation of Regional Protection Programmes [has] 
concluded that they are a first and successful mechanism to provide more protection for 
refugees close to regions of origin’, there is also ground to consider that ‘their impact [is] 
limited due to limited flexibility, funding, visibility and coordination with other EU 
humanitarian and development policies, and insufficient engagement of third countries’913. 
 
SOLUTION: Given the limited material resources available, as advanced by numerous 
actors, it is crucial to ensure that the actions covered by RPPs are implemented in full 
coordination with other protection-oriented activities already undertaken by the EU 
within other external policies.  
 
The UNHCR has proposed that the comprehensive approach advanced by the Commission 
in its proposal be implemented, to ensure that the activities covered by the RRPs are 
carried out in coordination with other development and humanitarian initiatives already in 
place, avoiding the duplication of efforts and preventing the creation of additional obstacles 
to the realization of the protection goals to be achieved914. Other actors also maintain that 
better coordination of the existing protection-oriented initiatives in the EU development aid, 
humanitarian assistance and foreign affairs policy may deliver more tangible results than 
single RPPs operating alone915. Related areas ‘should be rooted in a common understanding 
of the scope and nature of the refugee problem in the regions of refugee origin’916. Inter-
agency cooperation seems particularly necessary in this context. Consistency could be 
achieved by coordinating existing working groups dealing with the external dimension of 
the CEAS. Amnesty International has submitted that the initiatives undertaken within the 
framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the EUROMED cooperation and the High 
Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration should be coordinated to ensure satisfactory 
results917.  
8.2. The position of third countries and of other stakeholders 
should be reinforced 
 
PROBLEM: The position of third countries and of other stakeholders should be reinforced. 
Better results could be achieved if the position of third parties would be incorporated in 
the design and the implementation of RPPs. 
Coherence with article 78(2)(g) TFEU would thereby be better guaranteed. 
The long-term impact of RPPs in the regions and countries hosting them should be borne 
in mind. 
 
                                                 
913  Ibid. 
914  UNHCR, Observations on the Communication on Regional Protection Programmes, October 2005, 
available at: 
http://www.refugeelawreader.org/inventory.d2?start=600&target=search&i_doctype%5B%5D=0.  
915  ECRE, Response to the Green Paper on the Common European Asylum System, p. 42. 
916  G Loescher and J Milner, ‘The Missing Link: The Need for Comprehensive Engagement in Regions of 
Refugee Origin,’ International Affairs (2003), p. 596. 
917  Amnesty International, Response to the Green Paper on the Common European Asylum System, p. 
43. 
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Enhanced efficiency may also be achieved through a genuine engagement with the regions 
of origin and transit hosting these projects. RPPs should take account of the interests and 
real capacities of the countries concerned, integrating them in the design and the 
implementation of their activities. As with the Joint Resettlement Programme, a multilateral 
framework of cooperation is required to this end. Only a full partnership with all relevant 
stakeholders will generate the ownership necessary for a maintained and sustainable 
dialogue with these regions. Only by engaging with the particular character of each refugee 
situation, and by considering the needs, concerns, and capacities of the countries 
concerned, along with the needs of the refugees themselves, will these situations be 
possibly resolved.  
 
SOLUTION: To ensure the feasibility of the programmes, the EU Member States should 
embark on a genuine partnership with the regions hosting the projects. Their needs 
should be given appropriate consideration, in a spirit of shared responsibility. An 
effective multilateral commitment, combining resettlement and regional protection is 
essential918.   
 
In considering the needs of its partners, the Union should also take account of the long 
term impact of these programmes. In fact, ‘the presence of a large community of refugees 
may have a detrimental effect on the political stability of the host societies’919. Assisting 
third countries in dealing with extensive refugee populations should not result into the 
further protraction of the situation920. It is important to bear in mind that durable solutions 
will not always be available in regions of origin or transit for all those who need it. This is 
why resettlement is key to the success of these initiatives. Resettlement, as part of a 
genuine burden-sharing endeavour, could reinforce efforts to establish viable asylum 
systems and to create opportunities for local integration. The experience gathered so far 
‘shows, however, that resettlement has remained a relatively underdeveloped 
component’921. Considerable efforts are required to make EU Member States engage in a 
true partnership with these countries in a spirit of shared responsibility.  
8.3. RPPs shall remain complementary to pre-existing legal 
obligations 
 
PROBLEM: RPPs shall remain complementary to pre-existing legal obligations. 
The complementary nature of RPPs to the reception of spontaneous arrivals and the 
provision of protection to those in need has not been mentioned in the proposal. 
There is hence a risk of obliteration of the pre-existing legal obligations of the Member 
States. 
 
The legitimacy of the actions of the Union in this realm, promoting capacity building for the 
protection of refugees in regions of origin and transit, as some commentators have 
observed, depends on maintaining the access to fair and affective asylum procedures in 
Europe. RPPs should unequivocally be considered complementary to the continued 
provision of protection in and by the EU Member States.  
                                                 
918  The international institutional framework provided by The Hague Conference of International Private 
Law could be used for this purpose, in cooperation with the UNHCR and other relevant stakeholders. 
See notes 159 and 160 above. 
919  Amnesty International, EU Regional Protection Programs : Enhancing protection in the region or 
barring access to the EU territory ?, September 2005, available at: 
http://refugeelaw.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/ai-eu-on-rpps-october-2005.pdf.  
920  UNHCR EXCOM, ‘Economic and social impact of refugee populations on host developing countries as 
well as other countries,’ Standing Committee, 26th Meeting, EC/53/SC/CRP.4, 10.02.2003. 
921  On the establishment of a Joint EU Resettlement Programme, § 3.2.3. 
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SOLUTION: The complementary character of RPPs to the reception of spontaneous 
arrivals should be clearly articulated and the legal responsibilities of the EU Member 
States properly taken into account. 
 
As already expounded above, in particular with regard to FRONTEX-led operations in 
cooperation with third countries in section 6.4, neither extraterritoriality nor cooperation 
with other countries or international organisations exempt the EU Member States from 
compliance with their previously contracted international engagements. Any initiative 
involving third countries or international organisations will not diminish their legal 
obligations as they arise from international and EU law. 
8.4. RPPs follow a selective approach to policy coherence 
 
PROBLEM: RPPs follow a selective approach to policy coherence.  
It is expected that RPPs are incorporated into the Global Approach to Migration. 
Given the current focus of the Global Approach to Migration, this is problematic. 
As a matter of EU primary law, stronger emphasis should be placed on cross-policy 
coherence between RPPs and the internal asylum acquis. 
In particular, regard should be had to the notion of ‘effective protection’ in the event of 
a link being established between the existence of RPPs in a particular area and the 
suitability of that area for the return of refugees and asylum seekers in the context of 
‘safe third country’ procedures. 
 
As with the EU Resettlement Programme, the migration management element of RPPs has 
raised profound concerns. The 2004 Communication improving access to durable solutions 
explicitly stated that the ‘tool box’ should include arrangements that ‘would focus on 
improving the response of third countries and countries of transit to mixed migratory flows, 
as well as at combating illegal immigration and organised crime’ (§51). Although the 2005 
RPPs proposal revises the language, and speaks instead of ‘[p]rojects […] which can help 
host countries better manage the migration implications of refugee situations […]’ (§6), the 
impetus seems to remain the same. The Stockholm Programme confirms that RPPs ‘should 
be incorporated into the Global Approach to Migration’ (§6.2.3). The inconveniences of 
linking protection projects to migration control initiatives, identified with respect to the EU 
Resettlement Programme above, remain relevant in this regard too. Regional Protection 
Programmes risk dwelling excessively on migration control priorities, at the expense of 
genuine humanitarian considerations. 
 
An additional risk some commentators have identified in this context is the question of 
whether the countries hosting RPPs could be deemed ‘safe’ for returns by the EU Member 
States922, which may then process the applications of asylum seekers originating from or 
having transited through these countries as manifestly unfounded. This would entail the 
extension of the ‘safe third country’ concept to countries in the targeted regions. Originally, 
the idea was indeed that RPPs would include an encouragement for these countries to 
accept the return of migrants. ‘[R]eturn could be aimed at the third country’s own 
nationals, as well as other third country nationals for whom the third country has been or 
could have been a country of first asylum […]’923. The condition was that the country 
concerned offered effective protection. The 2004 Proposal erases any explicit references to 
                                                 
922  K de Vries, ‘An Assessment of “Protection in Regions of Origin” in Relation to European Asylum Law,’ 
EJML (2007), pp. 83-103. 
923  Improving access to durable solutions, § 51. 
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return. However, the extension or not of the ‘safe third country’ concept to the countries 
covered by a RPP is ultimately a matter for each individual Member State to decide. It 
should be considered that the majority of asylum seekers reaching the EU flee not only 
unsafe countries of origin, but also unsafe regions of origin. The question, thus, arises as 
for what constitutes ‘effective protection’ under EU law. In this regard, a general reference 
to the analysis on ‘safe third country’ notions in Chapter 4 of this study is in order. 
 
SOLUTION: The adequacy of incorporating protection-oriented initiatives undertaken 
under the umbrella of RPPs into the Global Approach to Migration should be given 
thoughtful reflection, so that migration concerns do not detract them from their ultimate 
humanitarian aspirations. In general, consistency between RPPs and the internal asylum 
acquis should be ensured as a matter of primary law. In particular, returns to the 
countries hosting RPPs should not be performed, unless ‘effective protection’ is 
accessible there, both in law and in practice. 
 
Significant practical, political and legal obstacles prevent the subordination of asylum 
systems to migration management strategies. The central aspiration of RPPs should be to 
facilitate safe and legal access to international protection. The aim should clearly be the 
prevention of the root causes of forced displacement, not the containment of refugee flows 
in the regions of origin and transit.  
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KEY FINDINGS 
 
– A priori, there is no obligation to provide for international protection 
extraterritorially. Yet, when the EU and/or its Member States exert ‘effective control’ 
over an area in foreign territory or over persons abroad, for instance, through the 
extraterritorialisation of their migration and border policies, their human rights 
obligations, as ensuing from international and EU law, can be engaged. It should be 
noted, in addition, that international cooperation, be it with international 
organisations or with third countries, does not exonerate the Union or its Member 
States from their respective obligations.  
 
– From the foregoing it follows that, in order to preserve their effet utile, entry and 
pre-entry controls, in the form of Schengen visas, carrier sanctions, the intervention 
of ILOs, or the interdiction carried out in the course of a FRONTEX-led operation, 
shall be designed and implemented in a way that does not deprive refugees and 
asylum seekers of the protection that the prohibition of refoulement and the right to 
(leave to seek) asylum afford them in both its facets, substantive and procedural. 
 
– Accordingly, EU migration control and border surveillance legislation must be aligned 
with the fundamental rights’ acquis. To this end, action is required at three levels:  
 
1. The real impact that entry and pre-entry control measures have on the rights 
of asylum seekers and refugees should be properly identified. It is, hence, 
advisable that reporting obligations on the actors concerned, independent 
monitoring, evaluation mechanisms and the duty to collect specific statistical 
data relevant to the situation of asylum seekers and refugees in transit be 
introduced for that purpose. Once the real dimensions of the legal concerns 
posed by border and migration legislation with regard to refugees’ and 
asylum seekers’ rights become known, the streamlining of the existing 
legislation will be facilitated. 
2. The rights of refugees and asylum seekers must be duly incorporated in 
migration and border legislation. Specific procedures and adequate legal 
safeguards, as the vehicles of realization of those rights, must be 
contemplated therein. The instruments which alignment with the 
fundamental rights’ acquis reveals impossible will have to be abolished.  
3. The entire system of entry/pre-entry control has to be made subject to the 
democratic oversight of the European Parliament and the judicial control of 
national and European courts. Effective remedies, which are accessible both 
in law and in practice, have to be introduced for each individual case in which 
the person concerned has an ‘arguable claim’ that his rights have been 
violated.   
 
– Indeed, full compliance with the prohibition of refoulement and the right to (leave to 
seek) asylum requires access to adequate procedures and effective remedies. Where 
these procedures should be conducted is not without significance, since the exercise 
of rights conferred by EU law cannot be rendered practically impossible or 
exceedingly difficult and decisions at first instance shall not prejudice the right to 
effective judicial protection. In theory, therefore, a plethora of territorial and 
extraterritorial possibilities may seem available to the EU Member States, such as 
the screening of asylum candidates onboard intercepting vessels or in third countries 
supposedly safe. Bearing in mind that under EU law the effectiveness of rights must 
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be preserved, the merits of the extraterritorial initiatives adopted or proposed thus 
far shall be scrutinized thoroughly. 
 
– Under international law, neither the EU nor its Member States bear a legal duty to 
provide for the international protection of refugees abroad. From this perspective, 
there is no external dimension of asylum. 
 
– However, when the Union decides to extraterritorialise its migration policy and to 
carry it out beyond the national territories of its Member States, then, there ensues 
an extraterritorial responsibility vis-à-vis the refugees and asylum seekers that the 
EU and its Member States’ authorities encounter in the course of their 
extraterritorial activities. In this situation these persons are brought under the 
jurisdiction of the Union and/or its Member States in such a way that EU law, 
including fundamental rights, becomes applicable and must be duly observed.  
 
– This does not render extraterritorialisation impossible. Nonetheless, 
extraterritorialisation renders compliance with EU law significantly difficult. 
 
– In a context of prevailing extraterritorial entry controls, to ensure that the right to 
(leave to seek) asylum and to non-refoulement remain accessible in law and in 
practice, common measures should be codified to provide a safe and legal access to 
international protection in the EU. Article 78(2)(g) TFEU provides the Council and 
the European Parliament with the legal basis to adopt legislative acts ‘for the 
purpose of managing inflows of people applying for asylum or subsidiary or 
temporary protection’. It would further appear that such measures shall be adopted 
as an integral part of the CEAS that the Union has to develop. The proposed EU 
Resettlement Programme and Regional Protection Programmes, as analyzed above, 
give rise to some common findings:  
 
1. They pursue high ambitions with limited financial and material means. 
Therefore, to realize their humanitarian aspirations either their resources are 
increased in accordance with the needs to be addressed, or their coordination 
with other external humanitarian activities of the EU is assured in practice.  
2. Doubts arise as for the voluntary nature of the participation in these 
measures, as their proposers maintain. On the basis of article 78(2)(g) TFEU, 
the Union ‘shall adopt measures for a [CEAS] comprising: […] partnership 
and cooperation with third countries for the purpose of managing the inflows 
of people applying for [international protection]’. If a choice is left to the 
Member States as for the means they can adopt, it appears that this 
provision creates an obligation of result. In this light, it is difficult to reconcile 
an obligation to adopt legal measures for the management of refugee inflows 
in partnership with third countries, with the voluntary character of the 
participation in the measures which may be eventually adopted. Once the 
choice of the measures has been made, participation in their implementation 
should be considered compulsory. Otherwise, article 78(2)(g) TFEU would be 
rendered superfluous.   
3. To maximise their humanitarian impact, the measures adopted on the basis 
of article 78(2)(g) TFEU shall translate a multilateral partnership with the 
countries hosting large numbers of refugees in the regions of origin and 
transit. Their concerns and capacities shall be taken into account as part of a 
genuine burden-sharing endeavour. Following the Stockholm Programme, 
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‘any development in this area needs to be pursued in close cooperation with 
the UNHCR and […] other relevant actors’ (§ 6.2.3).  
4. In light of the duty to ensure consistency across the policies of the Union, 
enshrined in articles 7 TFEU and 21(3) TEU, flagrantly contradictory results 
between or within the external and the internal asylum acquis would have to 
be considered in breach of this legal obligation. When determining the group 
of addressees, the qualification criteria and the procedures for the 
implementation of article 78(2)(g) TFEU measures, account must be taken of 
the relevant internal acquis. The fact that the Qualification Directive and the 
Procedures Directive are in place for internal procedures may prevent the EU 
from engaging extraterritorially in the promotion of less protective standards. 
To be sure, this requirement of consistency does not per se extend the scope 
of application of those instruments abroad, but sets a minimum standard 
below which the EU legislator shall not go with regard to the extraterritorial 
measures it may enact. In any case, all EU action remains subject to the 
general principles of EU law, as disclosed in the ECHR and in the relevant 
provisions of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
5. On the other hand, linking article 78(2)(g) TFEU measures to the Global 
Approach to Migration, as promoted by the Stockholm Programme, is 
problematic. The adequacy of putting protection-oriented initiatives at the 
service of migration management concerns should be subject to debate. 
Factoring migration control considerations into the definition of resettlement 
targets or into the design of RPPs risks detracting these measures from their 
primary humanitarian objectives.  
6. The existence of such measures cannot be used as a pretext not to grant 
admission or not to provide protection in accordance with international and 
EU law to spontaneous arrivals. The complementary nature of these 
measures must be made straightforward. 
7. Bearing in mind that an obligation to provide access to asylum or to avoid 
refoulement may arise extraterritorially, there is room to consider that legal 
responsibility may be engaged in the course of a resettlement mission or the 
implementation of an RPP beyond the terms originally intended. The 
execution of these measures do not substitute for compliance with any 
obligations arising extraterritorially. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Schengen Borders Code 
– The introduction of a monitoring system to check compliance with refugees’ and 
asylum seekers’ rights when implementing entry and pre-entry controls is highly 
recommended. 
– Clear entry requirements for refugees and asylum seekers are lacking in EU law. 
Yet, according to article 77(2) TFEU, the EU legislator shall adopt the rules 
concerning ‘the checks to which persons crossing external borders are subject’. 
Thus, for the sake of uniformity and legal certainty, the ‘special provisions’ referred 
to in article 13 SBC with regard to the crossing of refugees and asylum seekers 
must be spelled out. For this purpose, it is recommended that the guidelines 
compiled in the Schengen Handbook without legally binding effect be upgraded to 
the Code itself. 
– Currently, entry refusals are not endowed with suspensive effect. However, on 
account of the special position of refugees and asylum seekers, the wording of 
article 13(3) SBC must be brought in line with the requirements of an ‘effective 
remedy’ ex article 13 ECHR and article 47 EUCFR. 
 
Visas 
– No analysis of the proportionality and the necessity of the EU visa policy has ever 
been undertaken. Yet, only an open and thorough evaluation will clarify its impact 
on refugees’ and asylum seekers’ rights, revealing the advantages and 
disadvantages of its furtherance as it stands today. 
– Considering that under exceptional circumstances human rights obligations may be 
engaged in embassy cases, in light of the Munaf and WM jurisprudence, it is 
advisable that visa lists be configured and periodically reviewed bearing in mind not 
only security and illegal immigration considerations, but also their possible human 
rights implications so as to enable the EU Member States to adequately fulfil their 
obligations. 
– To achieve the Treaty objective of a ‘common policy on visas’, the visa requirements 
for recognized refugees should be uniformized and the discretion accorded to the EU 
Member States eliminated. 
– Equally on account of the Munaf and WM jurisprudence, the conditions and the 
procedure to issue LTV visas to asylum seekers and refugees yet-to-be-recognized 
should be clarified in order to enable the Member States concerned to fulfil their 
international obligations as appropriate. 
– The linguistic inconsistencies between articles 19 and 25 CCV must be eliminated, so 
that refugee visa applicants do not see their applications truncated at the 
admissibility stage. This way, the appeal rights associated to formal visa refusals will 
unambiguously be made available to them too. 
– Where the Member States collaborate with private entities in the visa-issuing 
procedure, to avoid abuse by the host countries concerned or by the private entities 
themselves, direct access to the Member States’ representations abroad must be 
maintained for refugee visa applicants, not only in law, but also in practice. In this 
connection, the suggestion by the EDPS to locate the service provider in a place 
protected under diplomatic inviolability deserves further consideration. 
– Specific safeguards must be introduced where refugees’ and asylum seekers’ data 
are transferred to third countries, so that EU Member States’ protection obligations 
can be properly guaranteed. 
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– As visas are not always available in practice, as proposed bellow, the institution of 
carrier sanctions should be entirely re-thought, if not abandoned. 
 
Carrier sanctions 
– In order to understand the real implications of carrier sanctions for improperly 
documented refugees and asylum seekers, at a minimum, statistical data on the 
reasons for rejecting boarding as well as information on the handling of individual 
cases involving prospective passengers in search of international protection should 
be collected. In addition, a monitoring system by an independent body and/or an 
obligation on the Member States and the carriers themselves to report on the 
treatment accorded to refugees and asylum seekers at the boarding stage should be 
introduced. 
– If legally and materially possible, considering that visas are not always available for 
refugee applicants, carriers must be enabled to carry out full entry checks on the 
basis of all the relevant Schengen Borders Code requirements and the exceptions 
thereto, so that considerations beyond documental accuracy are properly taken into 
account. 
– Details on the procedures that carriers confronted with asylum seekers shall 
precisely follow coupled with effective rights of defence and appeal against their 
decisions must be introduced so that compliance with EU and international 
protection obligations can be guaranteed. 
– Thorough discussions should be held with regard to the legal viability of maintaining 
the institution of carrier sanctions. The impossibility to introduce the necessary legal 
safeguards in their scheme should lead to the abandonment of the policy altogether. 
 
ILOs 
– In a context of insufficient information on the concrete powers and activities of ILOs, 
the disclosure of the existing periodical reports is necessary. The amendment 
proposed on this point by the Commission to article 6(1) of the ILOs Regulation 
should be adopted. 
– A precise specification of ILOs’ tasks and powers, with an unequivocal submission to 
EU law and human rights, and the introduction of appropriate legal safeguards and 
judicial remedies for those confronted with their activities is compulsory. Enhancing 
their role without a prior delimitation of their responsibilities, as it has been 
proposed by the Commission, increases the risk of obliteration of refugees’ and 
asylum seekers’ rights, in breach of EU and international obligations.  
– As with carrier sanctions, thorough discussions should be held with regard to the 
legal viability of maintaining the institution of ILOs. The impossibility to introduce 
the necessary legal safeguards in their scheme should lead to the abandonment of 
the policy altogether. 
 
FRONTEX 
– Since available evaluations ignore the impact of joint maritime operations on human 
rights and current monitoring mechanisms are insufficient to ensure compliance with 
the EU fundamental rights’ acquis, the development of a permanent monitoring 
system of each one of FRONTEX activities, developed possibly in collaboration with 
the EASO, relevant NGOs and the UNHCR, is highly recommended. The proposed 
amendment to article 33 of the FRONTEX Regulation, introducing a periodic external 
evaluation of FRONTEX activities, including a specific analysis on the way the EUCFR 
was respected, is welcome. However, it might not be sufficient by itself to ensure 
the observance of  refugees’ and asylum seekers’ rights in each individual case. 
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– Given the ambiguous understanding by several EU Member States of their 
interdiction powers and their maritime obligations, it should be made abundantly 
clear that, as required inter alia by articles 2(3) and 87(1) UNCLOS, interception 
measures adopted in the course of a border control operation have to conform to 
‘other rules of international law’. This concerns not only search and rescue 
obligations but also human rights. The subsequent ‘delivery to a place of safety’ 
upon rescue or interception shall take account of the prohibition of refoulement and 
the right to (leave to seek) asylum that refugees and asylum seekers derive from 
international and EU law. Therefore, the practice of stopping migrants from leaving 
African shores or diverting them back without taking into consideration their 
particular situation must be discontinued. 
– To preserve the effet utile of the rights of refugees and asylum seekers found at 
sea, specific procedures and effective remedies must be introduced in Schengen 
legislation to provide them with adequate legal safeguards. Accordingly, the human 
rights dimension of FRONTEX operations must be well integrated, not only in the 
statement of FRONTEX’s mission in article 1 of its Regulation as the Commission has 
proposed, but also in the Agency’s concrete modus operandi. This should be made 
clear throughout the text of the amended version of the FRONTEX Regulation.  
– Where collaboration for the purposes of border patrolling or migration control is 
undertaken with third countries or international organisations, FRONTEX and the EU 
Member States must be made well aware of the fact that such collaboration does 
not make away with the EU and its Member States’ obligations under EU and 
international law. Any such collaboration must be made compatible with the 
observance of these obligations or, this failing, be abandoned. As ruled by the 
Strasbourg Court in § 138 of its judgment on Al-Saadoon, ‘it is not open to a 
Contracting State to enter into an agreement with another State which conflicts with 
its obligations under the [ECHR]’. 
 
EU Resettlement Programme 
– Provided that participation in the Programme can be considered voluntary, 
important incentives will have to be introduced for a significant commitment to 
resettlement to emerge among the EU Member States. The introduction of an OMC-
like scheme may serve the purpose. Multilateral collaboration with countries of first 
asylum hosting large refugee populations and with other relevant stakeholders 
should be undertaken. Tripartite agreements, between the EU Member States, the 
third countries in question and the UNHCR could be envisaged too.  
– In our view, in light of articles 78(2)(g) and 80 TFEU, once the programme will 
officially be adopted, participation therein should be deemed obligatory. If the 
Member States have a choice as for the means to ‘managing inflows of people’ in 
need of international protection, an obligation of result is inbuilt into these 
provisions. Once the choice with regard to the means has been made, participation 
in its implementation should be considered compulsory. 
– If the humanitarian and strategic objectives of the programme are to be fulfilled, it 
seems necessary to go beyond the mere identification of common priorities into 
significant policy approximation. To this end, full harmonization of selection criteria 
and resettlement procedures should be envisaged in the longer term. 
– The complementary character of resettlement to the reception of spontaneous 
arrivals should be clearly stated. A recital should be introduced in any legal 
instrument dealing with resettlement specifying that ‘it remains without prejudice to 
Member States’ obligations to determine asylum claims in fair procedures and to 
provide protection in their territory in accordance with international law’. 
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– The adequacy of linking the programme to the Global Approach to Migration should 
be carefully reviewed. It is worth recalling in this context that legal coherence 
between the internal and the external asylum acquis must be guaranteed as a 
matter of primary law.  
– Responsibility may be engaged extraterritorially, in the course of, or as a result of, a 
resettlement operation. Compliance with international obligations shall be assured in 
these cases too. The engagement with the region/country of origin of those to be 
resettled does not diminish the legal obligations of the EU Member States 
concerned. 
 
Regional Protection Programmes 
– Given the limited material resources available, it is crucial to ensure that the 
projects covered by Regional Protection Programmes are fully complementary to 
similar protection-oriented activities already undertaken by the EU within other 
external policies. 
– To ensure the feasibility of RPPs, the EU Member States should embark in a genuine 
partnership with the regions hosting the projects. Their needs should be given 
appropriate consideration in a spirit of shared responsibility. An effective multilateral 
commitment, combining resettlement and protection in the region is essential.  
– The complementary nature of Regional Protection Programmes to the protection to 
be granted to spontaneous arrivals by the EU Member States themselves should be 
clearly articulated. 
– The adequacy of incorporating protection-oriented initiatives into the Global 
Approach to Migration should be given thoughtful reflection, so that migration 
concerns do not detract the former from their humanitarian aspirations. 
– A clause should be introduced to remind that returns to the countries benefiting 
from RPPs should not be performed, unless ‘effective protection’ is accessible there. 
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PART 3: LONG TERM PROSPECTS FOR THE COMMON 
EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM  
 
The path on the evolution of the common asylum system must combine multiple 
parameters. It must be borne in mind that the linchpin of CEAS, the European Asylum 
Support Office (EASO), has just been adopted and we must address its potential 
developments on the basis of a text whose negotiation has only just been finalized. 
 
The first parameter to consider is temporal. The opportunities that one can imagine on the 
evolution of CEAS are mostly to the medium or long term. Indeed, the adoption of the "first 
generation" of EU legislation on asylum highlights only the distinctive features of CEAS. 
Only after a thorough evaluation of its implementation, monitoring, institutional 
development and daily supervision from the judge could the required additions and changes 
be made. Key elements are missing to provide a reliable overall assessment. In addition, 
determining elements for the final configuration of CEAS, whether adherence to the Geneva 
Convention or the prospect of CEAS as a judicial character, are now missing and lengthy 
procedures to achieve said configurations should not be underestimated. 
 
The second point is the legal context in which potential changes can be made to CEAS. The 
implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon, in that it subjects the entire common policy on 
asylum law to the common rule, is the single analysis reference. In the short and medium 
term, if not also in the long term, all prospective reasoning must be conducted in the 
current framework of the Treaties without pretending to imagine lines of evolution out of 
the ordinary. The European Union will sustainably submit to the current distribution of its 
powers with its member states and to a procedural system within which the common 
asylum policy must register. It is thus on this basis that the reasoning must be done, 
without advancing ideas put forward that would require a revolution in the order of things 
and therefore a revision of treaties, which would in turn doubtfully collect majority support 
of Member States. 
 
Much can be done however within this context, in the name of pragmatism and efficiency. 
The renewal of common asylum policy data is significant as much due to the Lisbon Treaty 
and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as to the planned accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Similarly, the rise of EU agencies, from the European Asylum 
Support Office to Frontex, hints of procedures and considerable developments in relation to 
those seeking protection. Long regarded as mere public policy of the Union led by the 
interests of management, the common asylum policy should now be conceived and 
developed in terms of fundamental rights, a finding which profoundly renews its 
apprehension.  
 
For all these reasons, six areas of work can be mentioned:  
 
– The legal perspective: CEAS can be more or less profoundly influenced by the entry 
into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and its Article 18 as by the 
possibility for the EU to accede to the Geneva Convention and the effect can operate 
a rebalancing of the common policy. Beyond that, we must also consider an 
eventual transition of the current period of approximation and harmonization of law 
in a phase where unifying regulation find its place.  
– The institutional perspective: the emergence of the European Asylum Support Office 
should profoundly alter the game of the common asylum policy, according to the 
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powers that may be assigned to it. The challenge of its growing power is major both 
in terms of CEAS’ consistency and effectiveness.  
– The jurisdictional perspective: increasing jurisdictional control of the common 
asylum is an inevitable consequence of an approach in terms of fundamental rights 
of the person which is now required, in terms of personal protection, as much as in 
terms of CEAS’ regulation. 
– The material perspective: Beyond the Geneva Convention and the international 
forms of protection, the modifications in protection applications, and notably the 
concern link to refugees called "climate refugees" will inevitably arise in the Union. 
Similarly, and from a pragmatic standpoint, it should find new avenues of work for 
the freedom of movement of protected persons.  
– The redistributive perspective: Dublin Regulation being not an instrument of 
solidarity between Member States, how ensuring a fairer distribution of asylum 
seekers and protected persons among the Member States of the European Union? 
– The external perspective: considering the difficulties of externalising the 
examination of asylum claims outside the European Union, how to ensure access of 
applicants to asylum procedures? 
 
SECTION 1: THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
The evolution of CEAS will be influenced by the degree of consideration of three parameters 
of varying importance. The first case is of immediate topicality: article 18 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, in relation to the right to asylum, implies a challenge for CEAS that 
must be clarified. The second element to consider is more problematic because it raises the 
question of accession of the Union to the Geneva Convention and its consequences. The 
third legal point that may be considered is more punctual and leads to consider the passage 
of CEAS in its current phase of legislative harmonization towards that of regulation. 
1. THE IMPACT OF ARTICLE 18 OF THE CHARTER OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 
The implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon and of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
therein, coincides with the adoption of the Stockholm Programme on AFSJ. This 
simultaneity poses a series of questions about the impact of these texts on the CEAS. 
Whether it concerns the inclusion of Article 18 of the Charter in the normative system that 
governs the right of asylum or the authority and scope to be given to this article from the 
point of view individuals or the judge, this issue is important. 
 
Regarding the authority of the Charter itself, its principle is in Declaration n°1 attached to 
the Treaty of Lisbon. The afore-mentioned stipulates in its paragraph 1 that “The provisions 
of this Charter are addressed to the institutions and bodies of the Union with due regard for 
the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing 
Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the 
application thereof in accordance with their respective powers ". Its second paragraph 
states that "This Charter does not establish any new power or task for the Community or 
the Union, or modify powers and tasks defined by the Treaties.” 
 
This specification does not address the specific issue of asylum as proclaimed by the 
Charter. The terms of this proclamation have raised questions and specific developments 
that can influence the evolution of CEAS. 
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1.1. The content of Article 18 of the Charter  
 
Article 18 of the Charter is entitled "Right to Asylum". It states that "The right to asylum 
shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 
1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees and in 
accordance with the Treaty establishing the European Community." Even if the 
“explanations of the Praesidium” claim to enlighten this article, the wording leads to a 
statement: that of the complexity of the overlapping of different texts guaranteeing asylum 
in the EU.  
 
Article 18 therefore requires a very precise legal analysis, given that it has been "much 
discussed" during the drafting of the Charter924, even in the opinion of the President of the 
Convention who adopted it. The compromise allowing for its final adoption left serious 
problems unresolved.  
 
Firstly, Article 18 does not conduct any substantive definition of "the right to asylum" which 
it obliges, however, to “guarantee”. In other words, it does "not specify any of the material 
conditions for the benefitting of the right of asylum"925, due to lack of consensus on this 
point. Article 18 is simply the choice of locking up the right to asylum in compliance with 
very different texts, one that is outside the EU, the Geneva Convention, and two others 
that found the Union, the TEU and the TFEU.  
 
In order to identify the right to asylum as provided by Article 18 of the Charter, we must 
thus refer to Article 78 §1 of the TFEU. This provision states that "the Union shall develop a 
common policy on asylum ... which “must be in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 
28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees, and 
other relevant treaties”. This technique of reference is not a new process for the Union. It 
establishes a compliance report doubly required by the Charter as well as the TFEU that is 
inspired by Article 63 §1 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. The latter formulated it in similar 
terms. 
 
In fact, Article 18 of the Charter is enriched by the Treaty of Lisbon, for the added value 
lies in the details it provides. On its basis, the Union shall develop a “common policy” of 
asylum that aims both “to provide an appropriate status to any third-country national 
requiring international protection” and "to ensure respect for the principle of non-
refoulement”. This advance made by the TFEU helps identify the merits of the right to 
asylum. It gives real substance to an obligation that was placed in an unspecified manner 
since the Treaty of Maastricht. Following the logic of Lisbon, the obligation to respect the 
right of asylum takes two distinct forms: that of an appropriate status and that of the 
prohibition of refoulement.  
 
Article 18 of the Charter can be read as: the right of asylum is now "guaranteed" by the 
formulation of two specific obligations imposed on the Union and its Member States. The 
first obligation is positive and the Union legislator must take charge: it is providing an 
"appropriate" status to the applicant for protection in the EU. The second obligation is 
negative: it prohibits the refoulement of a third-country national requiring international 
protection. This prohibition is now explicitly supported by EU primary law, following in this 
way the Geneva Convention.  
                                                 
924  G. Braibant, The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Le Seuil, Paris 2001 p. 148 
925  C. Ladenburger, "The contribution of the Charter on Civil and Political Rights" in JY Carlier and O. De 
Schutter, The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Bruylant 2002 p.115 
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One can conclude from these findings that the combination of Article 18 of the Charter and 
TFEU goes beyond a mere recognition of the existence of the right to asylum and of its 
respect. It now weights on the European Union and its Member States a true "positive 
obligation" implied by the need to "guarantee" the right to asylum. In the sense that this 
concept is familiar in the law of the ECHR, this "positive obligation" means an obligation to 
"ensure" which goes beyond an obligation "not to do", that of the classic prohibition of 
breaking the Geneva Convention. The obligations derived from Article 18 are not only 
satisfied by the principle of non-refoulement. They demand that everything be done to 
allow an effective benefit of that protection, including building an appropriate status.  
1.2. The interpretation of Article 18 of the Charter  
 
The authors of the Charter as well of the TFEU have seen fit to expressly rely on the 
Geneva Convention and the Protocol of 1967 as well as on the Union's founding treaties. 
This editorial choice must be analysed.  
 
Article 18 of the Charter is entitled "Right to Asylum". In doing so, it maintains a first 
deliberate confusion between the "right to asylum" in the original sense of the term and of 
refugee protection that the Geneva Convention regulates. Moreover, the authors of the 
Charter did not choose a second paragraph stating precisely the obligations of non-
refoulement, whether this refers to the application of the Geneva Convention or to the risk 
of torture or inhumane treatment covered by Article 3 of the ECHR. They preferred to refer 
the issue to Article 19 §2 of the Charter that covers the second hypothesis.  
 
An examination of the preparatory work of the Charter reveals that the amendments of the 
Convention’ members destined to reduce the right to asylum proclaimed in the Charter for 
the sole protection of refugees have been voluntarily dismissed by the authors926. These 
same authors intend then, of course, to go beyond the simple principle of non-refoulement 
and to provide a broader protection. Finally, the choice to build the asylum in a "right" in 
the Charter is not explicitly confirmed by the treaties to which Article 18 refers. There is 
some potential for regression as to the existence of a true "right" of asylum. This term is 
never mentioned by the TFEU who prefer to refer to a "common policy" on asylum and use 
the words "system" or "status" without once confirming the existence of a "right to 
asylum”927.  
 
These various findings have important implications. The substantive scope of the "right to 
asylum" in the EU is now less dependent of the Geneva Convention than the European 
treaties themselves. These treaties significantly broaden the scope of asylum through the 
content of the "common policy" they devote to asylum in Article 78 § 1 TFEU and "common 
European asylum system" in Article 78 §2 TFEU. If the Geneva Convention is effectively the 
incompressible threshold of the obligations on the Union and its Member States, nothing is 
prohibiting the Union to go beyond the simple requirement of non-refoulement, which 
weights on its member states under the Convention. In reality, that is exactly what 
happened and a reminder of the timeframe allows for awareness of this. When the authors 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
926  Cf in this sense C. Ladenburger, "The contribution of the Charter on Civil and Political Rights" in JY 
Carlier and O. De Schutter, The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Bruylant 2002 
p.114 
927  Protocol No. 24 is the same (except its title): it makes mention of asylum only as "an institution" Nor 
does it mention the Geneva Convention (see H. Battjes, European Asylum Law and International Law, 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2006 p. 113). 
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of the Charter agreed on the wording of Article 18, in the course of 2000, the common 
asylum system was still largely virtual. That was not the case when the Charter acquired 
the status of positive law with the Treaty of Lisbon, almost ten years later, as the whole law 
of asylum in the first generation had been adopted. This is no doubt not the result of a 
conscious desire from the authors of the treaty, but this fact changes the whole 
perspective.  
 
The literal interpretation of Article 18 implies that the reference made to the TEU and TFEU 
expands and “constitutionnalise” the material scope of the right to asylum in the EU. Since, 
under the terms of Article 78 §2 TFEU relative to the CEAS, subsidiary protection and 
temporary protection are integral parts of the CEAS, they can be considered as building 
blocks of the right to asylum that Article 18 claims to "guarantee"928. "In sum, the right to 
asylum applies to refugees and may apply to others in need of protection as well”929. 
Progress for persons seeking international protection is considerable.  
 
Finally, Article 18 of the Charter cannot be read without recourse to "explanations" that 
accompany the text of the Charter and guide its interpretation. They stress that "the text of 
the article was based on Article 63 EC Treaty, now replaced by Article 78 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union, which requires the Union to respect the Geneva 
Convention on Refugees.” They add that "it is appropriate to refer to the Protocols relating 
to the United Kingdom and Ireland, annexed to the Treaties, as well as to Denmark, to 
determine the extent to which Member States implement the Union’s right on the matter 
and to what extent this Article is applicable to them”. Finally, they specify that Article 18 
“respects the Protocol on Asylum annexed to treaties"930. From this set, we can infer that 
the authors of the Treaty of Lisbon have realised the potential of Article 18 and they 
wanted to set the rules of the game.  
1.3. The consequences for the Common European asylum system  
 
The explanations of the Convention on Article 18 of the Charter and its interpretation 
contain important information for the CEAS. Whether it’s the authority or the enforceability 
of Article 18 of the Charter, the implementation of the CEAS must necessarily take them 
into account. 
1.3.1. The authority of Article 18 of the Charter  
First, the right to asylum of Article 18 is "based" on Article 78 TFEU. It thus draws its 
authority from this article. This formulation is curious since one would be tempted to think 
that on the contrary, Article 18 was intended to found its own arrangements for its 
implementation. These are formed by the common asylum policy and the CEAS under 
article 78 TFEU. This choice results from the express will of the authors of the Treaty.  
 
From a hierarchical standpoint, this precision does not likely make article 18 of the Charter 
an independent reference standard that the treaty would then implement and develop. 
Subject to a further interpretation of the CJEU, the opposite approach must therefore be 
taken.  
 
Secondly, the reference in Article 18 to the Treaties establishing the broad sense (in that 
they also cover protocols) provides an important indication regarding the scope of territorial 
                                                 
928  Despite the inconsistency of the authors of the Treaty who define subsidiary protection as opposed to 
uniform status of asylum all the while integrating it into the CEAS ... 
929   H. Battjes, European Asylum Law and International Law, Nijhoff Publishers, 2006 p.113 
930  Protocol No. 24 annexed to TFEU 
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and material asylum. It is bounded on one hand by the situation defined by the protocols 
on the opt-out of certain States, on the other hand, by the scope of the Geneva Convention 
on refugees and, finally, the TFEU itself. Thus, the elements constituting the CEAS are 
intended to fall under the influence of Article 18.  
 
Thirdly, concerning the personal scope of the right to asylum, the authority attached to the 
Protocol on Asylum, known as the “Aznar Protocol" has been central to discussions of the 
treaty. Compliance with this protocol to the Geneva Convention had been raised931 at the 
conclusion of the Treaty of Amsterdam. The question was one of the main reasons for 
controversy in that it reduces the right to asylum to a right of third-country nationals and 
not to a right of nationals of the European Union, the latter not having the right to invoke it 
inside the EU932. It is placed here by the explanations accompanying the Charter as an 
established principle933. The Court of Justice, if it had to rule about this, would certainly be 
forced to take note of this explicit recall of primary law. However, if the issue of accession 
of the Union to the Geneva Convention were to materialise, the problem of compatibility of 
Protocol 24 to the Geneva Convention would be openly raised and should be decided, 
perhaps in a different sense.  
 
The authority of Article 18 of the Charter therefore appears to be already framed both by 
the treaty itself, the Charter and, finally, by the explanations that accompany it. However, 
as some doctrinal trends have rightly expressed, the right to asylum of Article 18 is not 
condemned to inaction, it is not limited to itself934. The use of the terms "with due respect" 
in the Geneva Convention states that developments are possible on the basis and in 
accordance with that provision and that ways to "guarantee" the right to asylum are not 
exclusively those in compliance with the Geneva Convention. A different situation would 
have involved the use by the authors of the words "by" respect, not "in" respect.  
 
In total, this clarification should not mask the essential: the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
is part of primary law and must be respected as well by EU itself as by the Member States 
when they implement it. This obviously applies to Article 18 in the two components that it 
highlights without question. On the one hand, Article 18 recognizes the existence of a 
"right" to asylum and, secondly, it requires that this right is "secured".  
1.3.2. The “invocability” of Article 18  
The proclamation of the right to asylum under Article 18 of the Charter of course also 
affects the views of individuals likely to invoke its protection. In other words, is it possible 
for an individual to directly invoke Article 18 of the Charter before the judge? Several 
readings are possible and will probably require an interpretation of the Court of Justice. 
 
One comment that is the most authoritative on the subject, that of Guy Braibant who 
chaired the drafting of the Charter, deserves quotation. From his point of view, Article 18 
constitutes "one of the few cases where the Charter is not sufficient in itself and where the 
reading should be combined with other texts”935, from the very will of its authors. The 
latter, as clearly linking asylum to its conventional application (like the Geneva and TFEU 
                                                 
931  See S.Peers, EU immigration and asylum law, Nijhoff Publishers, 2006, p. 515. 
932    Article 1 of Protocol 24: " Given the level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms by the 
Member States of the European Union, Member States shall be regarded as constituting safe countries 
of origin in respect of each other for all legal and practical purposes in relation to asylum matters..” 
933  This position is confirmed by Article 78 TFEU which links the right of asylum to nationals of third 
countries and realises, therefore, what the Convention had refused to establish. 
934  See J-Y. Carlier Asylum and Refugees. Protection law, Academy of International Law, The Hague, Vol. 
332 (2007), p.70. 
935  G. Braibant, The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Le Seuil, Paris 2001 p.147 
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TEU) would therefore reduce the direct applicability of Article 18. In other words, the right 
to asylum, a recognised subjective fundamental right, cannot be applied otherwise than 
through the texts which cement them. In this sense, the direct invocation of Article 18 
would have little practical implication for the potential beneficiary, without the aid of texts 
that apply it, starting with the Geneva Convention, which is the minimum of the protection.  
 
In contrast, another reading of Article 18 can reduce the expression "with due respect" to 
the intention of the authors of the Charter to ensure this article does not infringe on 
existing obligations in the matter and, especially, on the compromises between Member 
States at the Aznar Protocol. In this context, it would less be the direct nature of Article 18 
of the Charter than the scope of its application that would be covered by the formula. The 
authors' intention would have been, firstly, to establish compliance with existing texts and, 
secondly, to delineate its scope.  
 
We must not overestimate the meaning of this question. As the law stands, retaining a 
narrow or broad reading of Article 18 in terms of its possible “direct effect” does not change 
the issue that is truly essential from the perspective of individuals, that of its potential to 
directly invoke it. Article 18 of the Charter constitutes a "right" and not a principle within 
the meaning of the Charter. The subjective, individual right to seek asylum does not imply, 
however, a mechanically "direct effect" within the meaning of the jurisprudence of the ECJ. 
This requires the satisfaction of three conditions in order to recognise such an effect to a 
rule: it must be clear, unconditional and sufficiently precise. Clearly, the wording of Article 
18 does not meet these conditions and, because its wording is incomplete, it does not allow 
the right to asylum in the Charter to be self-sufficient. This does not mean that Article 18 
cannot be "invoked" before the judge precisely in the sense that the Court of Justice 
dissociates the concept of direct effect and that of the possibility of “invoking”, and cutting 
across the broader concept of justiciability. For it, direct effect is no longer a necessary 
condition to invoke a provision of EU law before national courts936. 
 
Any third-country national is entitled to invoke Article 18 to enforce the compulsory nature 
of right and guarantee that it implies. They can do so through by way of preliminary or by 
objection before the national judge. From this point of view, the enforceability of Article 18 
can both promote a consistent interpretation of EU legislation but also imply that contrary 
legislation or conduct can be shelved. Finally, Article 47 of the Charter concerning the right 
to an effective remedy as Article 41 on good administration also seeks to ensure its 
protection.  
 
A series of consequences follow.  
 
From a normative point of view, if Article 18 does not contain any material, the block of 
legality that secondary law of the European Union must comply with, is made of the treaty 
obligations of the Geneva Convention and Protocol of 1967 and of the requirements of the 
TFEU. The failure of Union legislator to establish an “appropriate status”, the refusal to 
provide a subsidiary or temporary protection as constitutive element of CEAS, can thus be 
sanctioned.  
 
From a jurisprudential point of view, Article 18 of the Charter also takes all its attention 
from the founding case law of the Court of Justice, previous to the entry into force of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, which wants that the legislation derived from Union be interpreted in 
                                                 
936  See R. Mehdi, Ordre juridique communautaire- effet direct, JCl. Europe, Issue 195, n°65. 
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light of the provisions of the Charter that the legislator referred to in the motivation of the 
legislation937. 
 
From an operational perspective, finally, it should be borne in mind that the right of asylum 
is not granted by the EU but by its member states, which are here reminded of their 
obligation to respect their Geneva commitment by the Charter. The essentially regulatory 
intervention of the European Union concerning asylum therefore makes Article 18 an 
element of law whose implementation requires the support of treaty obligations, without 
depriving the right to asylum of its subjective character. Basically and regarding the current 
state of law, Article 18 is essentially a right. Undoubtedly, follows a procedural right to seek 
asylum and thus have one’s application considered. Undoubtedly also, the result is a right 
to protection against refoulement which may imply a stay as long as the conditions of 
international protection are met.  
 
In total, the "neutrality" of Article 18 in terms of material content of asylum, in the sense 
that the proclamation of article 18 does not change the substance of the obligations on the 
Union, has nothing surprising. The general precautions taken by the authors of the Charter 
and heavily mentioned in the explanations of the Praesidium fully apply here.  
 
These precautions are primarily protective. They point out solemnly in Article 53 that 
nothing in the Charter shall be construed to limit or undermine human rights and 
fundamental freedoms recognised in their respective fields of application, by the law of the 
Union, international law and international conventions to which the Union or all the Member 
States adhere. Although not specifically mentioned in Article 53 of the Charter as is the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms or the constitutions of 
the Member States, the Geneva Convention is clearly part of these agreements as the 
primary law refers to it. It is therefore an incompressible foundation for protection.  
 
The concern of the authors of the Charter has also been to delineate the scope of rights and 
principles of the Charter in its Article 52. 
 
First, according to § 2, « Rights recognised by this Charter for which provision is made in 
the Treaties shall be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those 
Treaties ». This is precisely the case of the right to asylum, as aforementioned, and avoids 
the reduction of the latter to protection under the Convention of Geneva. Second, §4 also 
concerns asylum “In so far as this Charter recognises fundamental rights as they result 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, those rights shall be 
interpreted in harmony with those traditions». Again, the right of asylum may be affected. 
 
For all these reasons, the debate about the scope of Article 18 regarding the CEAS should 
probably not be overstated, as it is dependent on texts that implement it. Nevertheless, the 
potential that give its support on the founding treaties, should not be underrated. It is 
undeniable that it provides today an individual right to seek asylum and that it must be 
guaranteed, it protects against refoulement without it being possible today and in the 
current state of the construction of CEAS to decide definitively on the existence of a right to 
territorial asylum. 
 
                                                 
937  ECJ, 27 June 2006, European Parliament against the Council, C-540/03. 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 434 
2. THE ACCESSION OF THE UNION TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTION  
 
The Stockholm program suggests a new proposal. It had not been raised during the 
preparation of the program in question938: the Union might consider engaging in the 
process of ratification of the Geneva Convention and the Protocol of 1967. Some elements 
of context should be highlighted before making an inventory of the legal and political 
problems posed by this perspective at CEAS.  
 
On the political as well as on the symbolic level, it is hardly necessary to emphasise the 
benefits of such membership regarding the place it would make for the Union in 
international law on asylum as regarding the effective recognition of the responsibilities 
entrusted to it in this area. Clearly, establishing a link in this way between international 
protection guarantee on a regional level by the EU and the international protection 
established by the United Nations and the Geneva Convention can only be approved for a 
rational point of view to achieve better efficiency.  
 
Basically, without further ado, it must also be emphasized that there would be consistency 
in viewing the CEAS based on a tripartite Charter of Fundamental Rights / Geneva 
Convention / European Convention on Human Rights. We will focus here on technical 
issues, i.e. on the legal and practical consequences of such a perspective, if it came to be. 
2.1. Context  
 
Section 6.2.1 of the Stockholm program called "a common area of protection" is worded as 
follows: "...The development of a Common Asylum Policy should be based on a full and 
inclusive application of the Geneva Convention on the status of refugees and other relevant 
international treaties. Such a policy is necessary in order to maintain the long-term 
sustainability of the asylum system and to promote solidarity within the EU. Subject to a 
report from the Commission on the legal and practical consequences, the European Union 
should seek accession to the Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol.”  
 
Formally, the proposal of the joining of the Union at the 1951 convention is new but it is 
not completely surprising. It is due to several converging findings from a preliminary 
inventory.  
 
The Union's legal position in respect of the Geneva Convention is old but it must be 
clarified. In addition to the reminder of what the Geneva Convention applies only to 
"refugees" and not asylum which the European Union aims to guarantee under article 18 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, it is worth recalling that the EU decided on a purely 
unilateral level to comply with the requirements of the Geneva Convention, since the 
Maastricht Treaty (see further).  
 
This choice of the Union is easily explained: this reference is allowed to have a threshold for 
incompressible protection, indisputable as it binds all its member states at the moment of 
engagement in approximation of their national asylum policies939. However, this reference 
                                                 
938  The drafts of the Presidency circulated in early October still made no allusion to this question, no more 
than the communication from the Commission. 
 
939  One of the first initiatives in this area was thus the common position of 4 March 1996 defined by the 
Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union on the harmonized application of 
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to the authority of the 1951 Convention requires ruling out the possibility that, under the 
pretext that the Union would participate in the protection obligations of the Geneva 
Convention alongside its Member States, it would have been legally bound by this text. In 
this case, we cannot accept the idea of any "succession" of the EU's international 
obligations imposed on Member States under the 1951 text, as defined in the International 
Fruit case940.  
 
The Union does not replace its Member States regarding their obligations to individuals 
from the Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol in particular as regards the granting of 
protection and prohibition of refoulement of a protection seeker. Its current position, the 
voluntary compliance of this text, does not change the entire state responsibilities under 
the law of the Convention that remain whole. Any consideration of possible future 
membership of the Union to the Convention must continue to be conducted from this 
axiom, regardless of the situation of its member states, which remains unchanged and is 
not intended to be modified by a process of EU accession.  
 
Three points illuminate the reflection concerning the timeliness and necessity of the 
accession process concerning the CEAS.  
 
First, the attitude of the Union vis-à-vis the Geneva Convention has evolved over time with 
the progress in integrating its migration policy and its translation in the founding treaties. 
The weight of obligations derived from the 1951 Convention on the asylum policy of the 
Union is placed, from the outset, as a basic assumption by the Union. This awareness 
explains the statement of article K.2. of the Maastricht Treaty referring to the "respect for 
the Convention on the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951”. It is this condition that allows 
Member States to engage in the process of intergovernmental cooperation whose action 
begins, because they know that their international obligations are met.  
 
The obligation to respect the Geneva Convention is reiterated by the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
It does so in somewhat different terms in Article 63 TEC as the "measures" for asylum must 
be "consistent with the Convention on the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 and the 
Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to Status of Refugees and other relevant treaties”.  
 
Finally, the formula is even more precise in the treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) since it is now all the “common policy on asylum” to be “consistent” with 
those instruments. It is natural in this context that the question of the definitive legal 
position of the Union under the Geneva Convention is brought into the open today, even if 
only for purposes of clarification. This is the meaning of the proposal to settle the problem 
"from above" that is to say by using accession of the Union in good and due form.  
 
It is good then to realise that the main innovation of the Lisbon Treaty in terms of 
fundamental rights is constituted by the prospect of EU accession to the ECHR, without 
question. The principle of this membership is laid down in Article 6 §2 TEU. Its process is 
about to be committed to and its culmination will not be indifferent in terms of international 
protection of aliens. The treaty commitment of the European Union in respect of that other 
source of protection for third-country nationals in the EU941 is not neutral, even if it raises 
issues mildly different to the conventional right to asylum. The obvious interaction between 
                                                                                                                                                            
the definition of term "refugee" within the meaning of Article 1 of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 
1951 relating to the Status of Refugees, OJ L 63, p. 13 March 1996 6 
940  ECJ, December 12, 1972, International Fruit Company NV, C-21 and 24/72, Rec. P. 1219 
 
941  On the basis of Article 3 ECHR 
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different forms of protection within the CEAS, which is Article 3 of the ECHR strengthened 
by Article 19 of the Charter, requires strict alignment. This need explains that parallel 
thinking logically opens in adhering to a convention, the Geneva Convention, taking just as 
prominent a place in the protection of human rights of third-country nationals. 
 
Finally, the possibility of such a commitment already meets the consent of some Member 
States that seem in favour of it942. They expressed the latter in their stance on the 
Stockholm program. This attitude may explain the proposal ultimately made by the 
Stockholm program, which binds much caution since it is primarily talking about a process 
of exploration. Yet even this does not seem to raise the enthusiasm of the Commission: the 
deadline that the latter fixed in its Action Plan to establish a simple feasibility study on the 
issue is set for 2013943! The delivery to this date of this “Report on the legal and practical 
consequences of EU accession to the Geneva Convention" seemingly comes down to push 
any prospect of engaging discussion within a reasonable time, without it being explained 
why...  
2.2. The feasibility of accession  
 
Regardless of the outcome of the feasibility study for the Commission to come, the 
questions posed by the possible accession of the Union to the Geneva Convention are not 
minor. Its issues are in a sensitive legal and political context.  
 
A parallel analysis, one of the arrangements envisaged for the Union's accession to the 
European Convention of Human Rights, makes us aware of the unique nature and 
importance of the questions raised. Indeed, the 1951 Convention as the ECHR are not 
ordinary treaties, because their task is to protect human rights. If in the case of the ECHR 
the political position of Member States in terms of membership has now been clarified by 
specific provisions in treaties, this position remains to be clarified in the case of the Geneva 
Convention.  
 
Previously, it is worth recalling that under Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, accession to international conventions must be distinguished from its signature 
and ratification as a mean of expression of consent by a subject of international law to be 
bound by a treaty. Thus, in terms of relations with the ECHR and in accordance with Article 
59 §1, members of the Council of Europe become a party to the ECHR by signature, 
followed by ratification. However, existing treaties of the Council of Europe, when they are 
open to the participation of the European Community or Union or, generally provide the 
expression of consent to be bound through the membership formula. This process is 
envisaged for the ECHR by Article 6 § 2 TEU.  
 
On this basis, two major technical possibilities open primarily on the Union's accession to 
the Convention of 1951.  
 
The first is to act directly on the text of the Geneva Convention in order to amend 
provisions that would prevent the accession of the EU, especially due to the non-state 
situation of the Union, as discussed further. This is to use the revision procedure of Article 
45 of the Convention to help remove these barriers either by making changes to a text or 
by a specific adjunction to the European Union. The heaviness of such a revision procedure 
as much as the legal and political risks inherent in this type of manoeuvre is not negligible. 
                                                 
942  Such as for example the Benelux 
943  COM (2010) 171 p. 57 
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Initiating a review process always opens the opportunity, for those who want, to go from 
the procedural ground to substantive ground. There is a real possibility at this time to see 
review process, more or less underground, of the obligations presently undertaken by 
States, at the initiative of third countries willing to ask a price for the acceptance of the 
Union or even of the Member States concerned willing to get rid of certain constraints. 
 
The technique of an additional protocol to the Geneva Convention is probably preferable in 
this context, both for political and technical reasons. Such a protocol has the advantage of 
leaving the text of the convention itself intact and therefore to focus the discussion on the 
admission of the European Union and the details that must accompany it.  
2.3. The competence of the EU to accede to the Geneva 
Convention 
 
The granting of legal personality to the European Union by the Lisbon Treaty removes any 
obstacle in principle and the main issue is not about its capacity but about its competence. 
It concerns the legal possibility for the EU to accede to a text on human rights, as is the 
Geneva Convention.  
 
The issue arose in 1996 about the possible accession of the Community to the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Sought on the basis of Article 228 §6 TEC, the Court of 
Justice matched his refusal to important specification at the time. It remains relevant today 
in relation to joining the Geneva Convention: "In the current community law, the 
Community has no competence to accede to the European Convention on the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, because, first, nothing in the Treaty gives the 
Community institutions, in general, the power to enact rules on human rights or to 
conclude international agreements in this area and, secondly, such accession cannot occur 
through the use of Article 235 of the treaty”944.  
 
Hence the choice made later by the Treaty of Lisbon to provide the Union with a specific 
legal basis to enable it to accede to the ECHR. Article 6 §2 TEU now says that “The Union 
shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union's competences as defined 
in the Treaties”. In addition, Protocol n°8 annexed to the Treaty on the conditions of 
accession marks the limits of the operation, and in particular stressed the need to observe 
simultaneously the specificities of EU law and the distribution of competences as defined by 
the founding treaties.  
 
No specific provision of the Treaty of Lisbon concerns the question of possible accession of 
the European Union to the Geneva Convention. Without a legal basis comparable to that of 
Article 6 §2 TEU, it is necessary to use the reasoning conducted in 1996 by the ECJ, which 
provides a reading to assess the feasibility of such an accession.  
 
First, it is easy to validate the following observation: if the constituent treaties of the EU 
have provided a specific legal basis for managing the Union's accession to the ECHR, this 
choice does not mean they intended to exclude any possibility of further authorising the 
Union to accede to other international treaties on human rights, including the Geneva 
Convention.  
 
                                                 
944  ECJ, Opinion 2/94 of March 28th 2996, Community accession to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms European, Court Reports 1996 page I-1759 item 6 
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Therefore, title V of the TFEU in relation to "international agreements” can be applied. 
Article 216 §1 provides that "The Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third 
countries or international organisations where the Treaties so provide or where the 
conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the 
Union’s policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a 
legally binding Union act or is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope". 
 
An examination of the viability of the accession to the Geneva Convention does fit in this 
frame. This membership can be considered "necessary to achieve an objective set by this 
Treaty”, which is the protection of refugees under Article 18 of the Charter that has the 
same value as the Treaty. It falls "under the policies of the Union" which we have seen, and 
will come back to it, encompass the common asylum policy.   
 
The Union has, therefore, a "competence" in the sense of jurisprudence of the Court to 
intervene in matters of asylum, be it simply to make rules and/or to conclude agreements 
on the subject. A priori, the reading of the treaty indicates this since, under Article 78 §1 
TFEU, it is said that " The Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary 
protection and temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any third-
country national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the 
principle of non-refoulement. This policy must be in accordance with the Geneva 
Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of 
refugees, and other relevant treaties”.  
 
Hence the remarks made hereunder, of which legal impact is not negligible.  
 
The first is the hierarchical relationship of EU law to the Geneva Convention, which exists 
since the creation of the third pillar of Maastricht with article K.1., reaffirmed in Amsterdam 
with Article 63 TEC. This statement of compliance of Community law at that time with the 
Geneva law coexisted in the treaty with the affirmation of one the same subordination to 
the ECHR. The Court did not find a sufficient reason in 1996 to conclude the existence of a 
community "competence" on human rights. This compliance report appears therefore not 
sufficient by itself.  
 
The second remark is aimed at the very nature of the intervention of the European Union 
when it comes to asylum. As mentioned in the Tampere conclusions and now as stated by 
Article 78 §2 TFEU, the EU is developing a "common policy" on asylum. Undoubtedly, the 
positioning of the Union is now much more strongly marked than it once was, even under 
the Treaty of Amsterdam. The Union is developing a global approach around a "system" for 
which the components are carefully labelled: status, protection, procedures, common 
standards and partnership are common elements in accordance with Article 78 §2 sub a) b) 
c) d) e), f), g) TFEU. The intensity of the EU intervention is even deeper than it was before 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.  
 
It seems difficult in these conditions not to conclude to the existence of a competence 
expressly attributed to the Union on asylum by the Member States, masters of the treaties. 
Indeed, and this is the big difference with the problems posed by the accession to the ECHR 
without the Community having, at the time, a jurisdiction to intervene in the field of human 
rights. Here the EU has regulatory power exercised through the ordinary legislative 
procedure in order to establish a "common asylum system."  
 
Therefore, the external extension of the internal competence of the Union in the field of 
asylum is not debatable and enables it to commit itself internationally on issues relating to 
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asylum. It justifies the existence of its jurisdiction to accede to the Geneva Convention. It 
fits with the requirements of Article 4 § 2 d) TFEU which qualifies this competence of 
"shared" with regard to agreements relating to the area of freedom, security and justice. 
Therein lie the main concerns.  
 
The European Union shares its competence on asylum with its Member States, which is a 
fact. It occupies the normative field more or less efficiently, ventures into the operational 
field and leaves to states only the sovereign power to grant protection in respect of the 
common rules. The possible accession of the Union to the Geneva Convention should 
respect this reality, whether to adjust the commitment of the Union in function of its 
powers, or not to engage the competences that are, and remain, those of Member States, 
already parties to the Convention.  
 
In terms of competences held by the Union, the hypothesis of "sharing" is not the rule and 
one must also take into account the competences that Member States have reserved but 
that are treated in the Geneva Convention. In the current state of the division of powers 
between the Union and its Member States, a significant number of points remains strictly a 
matter of domestic law because the states have retained entire control. We think therefore 
of questions of education and freedom of religion (Article 4), the regime of property or 
intellectual rights (Articles 13 and 14), freedom of association (Article 15) or housing 
(Article 21), not to mention taxation (Article 29) or the granting of nationality. Membership 
of the Union will have to follow strictly this line of sharing, and articulate it clearly in the 
instrument of accession.  
 
Given this situation, two precautions could then be taken on the occasion of the accession 
negotiations. On the one hand, respect for commitments undertaken in the framework of 
their powers by the Member States could be ensured945 by excluding that the EU adheres to 
the entire convention. This accession would be only partial. On the other hand, one should 
make a systematic examination of reservations by Member States during their accession to 
the Convention946 in order both to ensure complete compatibility of national laws and the 
commitment of the Union within this shared competence and to check the maintenance of 
these reservations in case of jurisdiction retained by the Member States.  
 
None of this is insurmountable, but the technical feasibility of the accession of the Union 
does not empty the subject of debate. It does not prevent questions about the usefulness 
or even the practical benefits of such an accession to the Geneva Convention, as discussed 
further in Section 3.  
 
This debate has the merit of highlighting the increasing complexity of issues arising from 
the existence of shared competence between the EU and Member States on asylum. 
Caution or precision, the explicit reminder that the obligations of the Member States on 
asylum will remain unchanged in case of accession of the Union is essential. The nascent 
ambiguity attached to operational measures of the Union, through Frontex in particular, 
should not credit back at the occasion of a possible accession of the Union the idea that the 
Union is substituted in this case to Member States. They remain accountable to their 
international responsibilities and any procedure for membership must reaffirm this 
forcefully. In other words, the accession of the European Union to the Convention 
                                                 
945  Articles 4, 8, 9, 21, 22, 23, 29, 34 of the Convention 
946  The sensitive issue of reservations by member states at their own membership should be verified at 
that time as to their compatibility with these reserves the right to the European Union, which occurred 
later that commitment. Under section 351 TFEU, the obligations of States are clear: they must give 
precedence to their involvement in the European Union 
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complements the activity of international protection undertaken by Member States but it 
does not change anything with their obligations. 
2.4. The ability of the Geneva Convention to accept the accession 
of the European Union  
 
Things are not as simple as one might think, both due to the non-State character of the 
Union but also because of where it stands on the international stage. One major obstacle 
arises in the case of eventual membership: it concerns the nature of the parties to the 
Geneva Convention. Clearly, the Convention is currently open only to parties States as 
evidenced by its writing and organisation.  
 
The drafting of the 1951 Convention, if it uses the diplomatic term "high contracting 
parties" in the preamble, is focused exclusively on the use of "contracting States" (articles 
1,3,4,7, 8, 9,10 , 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 
33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39 , 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45). Again, the nature of obligations explains 
this focus: access to the territory and regulating the situation of foreigners are State 
prerogatives that the Geneva Convention intends to regulate.  
 
The organisation as the content of the convention confirms that the authors have chosen to 
reserve for States the opportunity to subscribe. Both the engagement mechanisms as well 
as the specific provisions highlight this option from the text’ drafters.  
 
Thus, the final provisions of the Convention highlight, clearly without ambiguity, that it is 
open only to the commitment of sovereign states, from the settlement of disputes under 
Article 39 and the territorial application clause of Article 40 to the explicit wording of Article 
39 § 2: "This Convention shall be open for signature on behalf of all States Members of the 
United Nations, and also on behalf of any other State invited to attend the Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons or to which an invitation 
to sign will have been addressed by the General Assembly. It shall be ratified and the 
instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations." This means that the case of accession of international organisations has not been 
envisaged by the drafters of the Convention.  
 
More interestingly, a "federal clause" in the agreement allows us to push the analysis 
further. The authors were indeed meant to regulate the issue of States called "federal" or 
"non unitary" in Article 41 of the text. Far from assimilating the European Union to a state 
model, the parallel is instructive, however, to conclude on the idea that the authors of the 
convention did not intend to open its ratification on non-state actors.  
Article 41 of the Convention regulates the scenario posed when a federal state accedes to 
the Convention and must meet its responsibilities in an internal system where the 
normative action is decentralised. When the latter falls within the Federal Government, the 
latter's obligations under the Convention are identical to those of " Parties which are not 
Federal States” (article 41 a). When the legislative authority stems from the components of 
the State and when the latter are not required on the basis of their constitutional system to 
"take legislative action, the Federal Government shall bring such articles with a favourable 
recommendation to the notice of the appropriate authorities of states, provinces or cantons 
at the earliest possible moment” (Article 41 b).  
 
Finally, additional indices confirm the feeling of an inability to see an International 
organisation accede to the Geneva Convention. Thus, models of instruments accession and 
succession to the Geneva Convention and Protocol of 1967 are listed in Appendix 1 of the 
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Handbook on international law on refugees of UNHCR in 2002 resulting from a cooperation 
between UNHCR, the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the World Organisation of Parliaments. 
They expressly only provide for the hypothesis of state accession. 
 
The outcome is clearly that the Convention expressly provides for membership of sovereign 
states only. This presents a significant obstacle to the EU. Reading the 1967 Protocol and in 
particular Article V of Accession abounds in this sense because this provision makes specific 
mention that the accession of States Parties to the Geneva Convention, Member States of 
the United Nations or one of its specialized agencies or "any other state which an invitation 
to sign will have been addressed by the General Assembly”.  
 
The obstacle is real but it is not impossible to overcome. For example, we can see that it 
arose already in exactly the same words about the European Convention on Human Rights 
which, in its earlier version to Protocol 14, only provided for the assumption of state 
membership. 
 
A second question raises in a more punctual manner, that of the disputes clause of Article 
38 of the Geneva Convention. It provides that "Any dispute between parties to this 
Convention relating to its interpretation or application, which cannot be settled by other 
means, shall be referred to the International Court of Justice at the request of any one of 
the parties to the dispute”. It implies that the EU accepts the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice that, under Article 34 § 1 of its statute, foresees that "only 
states may appear before the Court".  
 
This blockage from the international organization is coupled with another point of friction 
linked, itself, to the specific model of the Union. This requires indeed that the Court of 
Justice of the Union has exclusive jurisdiction for resolving disputes between its member 
states.  
 
For these two reasons, the issue of Article 38 of Geneva Convention must be addressed 
specifically during the negotiations, which should not be impossible given the low likelihood 
of disputes involving the Union. 
2.5. The accession process  
 
The previous findings indicate both the possibility for EU accession and in contrast the 
impossibility of the Geneva Convention to host a non-State party. Two sets of 
consequences follow. 
  
The first consequence concerns the Geneva Convention. The accession of the European 
Union to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 protocol requires either a change in these texts 
or the conclusion of an additional protocol.  
 
Hypothesis of the revision of the Convention, to be brief, is complex. It would entail 
focussing on the wording of the parties to the Convention, substituting as appropriate the 
term "High Contracting Parties" to that of state contractor. This simple amendment to the 
1951 Convention should be prior to the filing of the instrument of accession of the 
European Union. We can also design a language specifically authorizing such membership 
of the Union. For example, Protocol 14 to the ECHR, which recently entered into force, 
amended it in this direction with the addition of a paragraph 2 to Article 59 stating that "the 
European Union may accede to the Convention ".  
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The procedure for achieving this result is organised by Article 45 of the Geneva Convention. 
The latter provides in its paragraph 1 that any Contracting State may, at any time, request 
revision of the Convention by notifying the Secretary General of the United Nations. One or 
more Member States of the Union could make such notification. Given the importance of 
the issues raised by the prospect of accession, we can legitimately think that the UN 
General Assembly will be seized of the request to advise on measures to be taken under 
Article 45 § 2. It is also possible that all Contracting States will be asked to give their 
opinion on the matter. None of this guarantees neither the speed of the process, nor even 
the likelihood of completion. Some states may be tempted to use this opportunity to raise 
the stakes.  
 
Hence the preference could be given at the conclusion of a simple additional Protocol to the 
Geneva Convention, adding a new concentric circle around the core formed by the 
Convention of 1951: Geneva Convention, Protocol 1967, Protocol on membership of the 
European Union. This protocol would be brief, stating also the principle of membership of 
the European Union to the Convention, then defining the respective jurisdictions on the 
basis indicated above, finally solemnly reaffirming the full responsibilities of the contracting 
Member States concerning the text.  
 
The second consequence is of interest to the European Union and the procedure to be 
implemented in order to make accession to the Convention. Without having a specific legal 
basis in the TEU as is the case with the ECHR, the common rules applicable to international 
agreements of the European Union have to apply.  
 
Article 218 TFEU provides, in this respect, that the Council authorise the opening of 
negotiations on the recommendation of the Commission, adopt negotiating directives, 
authorise the signing and conclude the agreements while the Commission is conducting 
these negotiations that would be hypothetic regarding the Geneva Convention. Indeed, the 
hallmark of an accession treaty in this field is to reduce negotiations to a strict minimum.  
 
In this case, it is even possible to see the Council anticipate the entry into force of the 
legislation under §5 of article 218 and, on a proposal from the Commission, adopt a 
decision allowing for the provisional application before the entry into force itself. Then, the 
decision to conclude would be taken by the Council after approval by the European 
Parliament, the issue being resolved internally by the ordinary legislative procedure947.  
 
It is nevertheless difficult to see how the whole procedure of Article 218 could take place 
without implementing §11 of the same provision that provides a remedy for consultation at 
the Court of Justice. This precaution ensures the compatibility of a draft international 
agreement with European Union law. It provides that "A Member State, the European 
Parliament, the Council or the Commission may obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice as 
to whether an agreement envisaged is compatible with the Treaties. Where the opinion of 
the Court is adverse, the agreement envisaged may not be implemented unless it is 
amended or the Treaties are revised.” A major issue is likely to pose an insurmountable 
obstacle at that moment on the merits of the Union to accede to the Geneva Convention: 
the compatibility of Protocol n° 24 to the TFEU on asylum for nationals of European Union, 
called the "Aznar Protocol". 
 
                                                 
947  Article 218 §6 alinéa a, v 
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2.6. The consequences of the accession  
 
Assuming that the technical obstacles mentioned above are overcome, which is perfectly 
possible, the consequences of accession to the Geneva Convention for the European Union 
can be assessed summarily.  
2.6.1. The problem of the Aznar Protocol  
The adoption, on the occasion of the Amsterdam Treaty, of Protocol n° 24 said "Aznar 
Protocol" on the right to asylum for nationals of the EU, poses an obvious problem that 
could thwart a membership of Union to the Geneva Convention. A majority share of the 
doctrine948, in fact, puts into question its compatibility with the Convention. If supreme 
courts do not hesitate to use it to deny asylum to nationals of other Member States949, the 
problem is not as settled as it seems. 
 
The content of Protocol n° 24 is simple: on its basis, Member States undertake not to grant 
asylum to nationals of another Member State. Its single article explains why: "Given the 
level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms by the Member States of the 
European Union, Member States shall be regarded as constituting safe countries of origin in 
respect of each other for all legal and practical purposes in relation to asylum matters. 
Accordingly, any application for asylum made by a national of a Member State may not be 
taken into consideration or declared admissible for processing by another Member State", 
excluding specifically enumerated exceptions (notably under Article 15 ECHR or Article 7 
TEU). We also know that the point (d) of the protocol opens the possibility for a Member 
State to derogate from this principle, but on condition that the application "shall be dealt 
with on the basis of the presumption that it is manifestly unfounded without affecting in 
any way, whatever the cases may be, the decision making power of the Member State", the 
ambiguity of the wording being left open to interpretation950.  
 
The question of the compatibility of the principle of "safe countries of origin" presented 
under this angle with the requirements of the Geneva Convention remains open. Certainly, 
if, under certain conditions such compatibility may be considered because it does not 
automate the rejection of the application for protection made by a citizen of the Union, the 
fact remains that presuming this compatibility by assumption or principle as does the 
Protocol n°24 24, is difficult. This is true with respect, for example, to the principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality in Article 3 of the Geneva Convention951. 
Illustrative in this regard the criticism at the time by UNHCR952 against the protocol in 
question, apparently hostile to the idea that membership in the EU would be an objective 
and legitimate distinction of making the Member States’ situation incomparable to those of 
third States.  
 
The conditions under which the Charter of Fundamental Rights has been developed, 
emphasize the permanence of the commitment of some Member States to this option. Its 
                                                 
948  See F. Julien-Laferrière, "The compatibility of the asylum policy of the European Union and the 
Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the Status of Refugees" in The Geneva Convention of 
28 July 1951 relating to the Status of Refugees - 50 years after: Achievements and Prospects, 
Bruylant 2001, p. 257 
949  See CE, 20 December 2009 OFPRA v. Covaciu, Appl. 305 226, note E. Aubin AJDA 2010 p.796 
950  This has not prevented the Kingdom of Belgium to make a statement attached to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam stressing that freedom of appreciation. 
951  Not allowing any reservation. 
952  UNHCR, « Position on the proposal of the European Council concerning the treatment of asylum 
applications from citizens of European Union Member States », annexe à la lettre du Directeur de la 
Division de la protection  of internationale à M. Patijn, Ministre des Affaires étrangères des Pays Bas, 3 
février 1997 ; voir également UNHCR Press release 20 juin 1997 
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drafters did not ultimately choose the option to define the personal scope of Article 18 
concerning the right to asylum by targeting specifically "third-country nationals" (which 
allowed to exclude people from the Union) as had been envisaged at one moment. They 
nevertheless expressly reaffirmed their commitment to the Protocol n°24. The explanations 
attached to the Charter concerning Article 18 hence points out that this provision does 
respect the protocol related to asylum annexed to the treaty. 
 
We can consider this position as being an exclusion clause unforeseen by the Geneva 
Convention as the CEAS would not be open, hypothetically, to the citizens of the European 
Union. Two types of reaction can result from this.  
 
The first, a priori, might be legal in nature and come from the Court of Justice of the Union. 
By review of the accession proposal, it could highlight the legal difficulty of accession, due 
to the contradiction between a provision of primary law, Protocol 24, and the provisions of 
the Convention. The second reaction could, of course, be made by third counties opposing 
that the European Union assumes the right to deviate from the universality of international 
protection by unilaterally granting itself a certificate of compliance with fundamental rights. 
One avenue to explore might then be the opening of a specific procedure for application of 
protection open to citizens of the Union on the basis of the four cases laid down by Protocol 
n°24 which allow consideration of such a request.  
2.6.2. The impact on the principle of legality 
The compliance report existing today on the basis of Article 78 of the Treaty of Lisbon TFEU 
between the "common policy for asylum" and the Geneva Convention makes the latter a 
central element of the principle of legality. The Court does apply in this way. From this 
point of view, therefore, The Union’s adhesion would modify nothing of the current legal 
rules regarding compliance of the Geneva Convention by the secondary legislation of the 
Union and the action of its organs. Promoting the Convention by making real membership 
would increase significantly the place that the text of 1951 holds in the Union.  
 
The primary interest of the membership is the new status that the Convention could 
acquire at that time. It would become, first, an instrument directly available to the CJEU 
who would become a direct interpreter in the same way for the international agreements 
signed by the Union. Certainly, it does not hesitate already to refer to the Convention, for 
example on issues related to free movement of Turkish nationals, but has not yet had the 
opportunity to directly support itself on the treaty text, which should be done very soon 
concerning the cessation clause of directive 2004/83953. A membership of the Union would 
give it the direct opportunity954 to place itself as direct interpreter, an attitude that the 
European Court of Human Rights does not adopt. In the same spirit and in some states 
such as the candidates for enlargement, EU legislation on asylum would become in a 
certain sense and more clearly a "transposition" of the Geneva Convention.  
 
A second interest resulting from this approach would benefit the influence of the UNHCR. 
Without confusing its mission of monitoring the Geneva Convention with the one incumbent 
to the EU institutions and in particular the Court, its power of interpretation of the 1951 
convention would certainly be more easily taken into account. One can also imagine that 
the Court of Justice would rely on Article 35 of the Geneva Convention and the obligation of 
authorities to cooperate with the High Commissioner to relay the action of the latter in its 
                                                 
953  Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-179/08 
954  For a willingness to independently interpret the Community legislation on subsidiary protection, see 
ECJ, February 17, 2009, Meki and Noor Elgafaji Elgafaji, C-465/07 
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jurisprudence. In any case, the Court would find one more legal basis to further verify the 
implementation of their commitments by Member States.  
 
This inter-action from the CJEU and from an international convention is not unprecedented 
and that of the Aarhus Convention955 demonstrates that the judge may refer directly to 
international texts in the performance of its mission and see the latter to be influenced by 
it. The precedent to Aarhus is interesting insofar as we are also in the presence of an 
international convention that member states are also parties together with the Union956, 
overlapping articles of the Charter of Fundamental Rights957 and intervening in an area of 
shared jurisdiction. Membership of the Union was therefore obliged to modify some of its 
secondary legislation, but also to set an original contentious action organised by the Article 
12 of Regulation 1367/2007958 that allows an NGO to access to CJEU.  
 
In total, this strengthening of the role played by the Geneva Convention in the principle of 
legality that is imposed on the Union and Member States can only be welcomed, especially, 
as we noted above, it inscribes itself in parallel with the accession of the Union to the 
ECHR.  
2.6.3. The recognition of the international role of the Union  
One of the main benefits of accession of the EU lies in the greater involvement of the latter 
in the cooperation related to a proper application of the Geneva Convention, particularly at 
the level of the Commission. One must however notice that participation to the Executive 
Committee of HCR does not derive automatically from an accession to the Geneva 
Convention, but from a distinct procedure involving the Economic and Social Committee of 
the United Nations and based on three criteria: a clear interest for solving the problems of 
refugees; the largest geographical representation; the quality of membership of the United 
Nations or of its specialised institutions.  
 
The involvement of the Commission in the mechanisms to ensure proper implementation of 
the Convention is undoubtedly an excellent thing. The European Union is currently an 
observer member of the Executive Committee in charge of identifying the general principles 
of action of the High Commissioner and considering the use of funds and conduct of 
programs. While observers have no right to vote or to oppose the prevailing consensus on 
the conclusions and decisions adopted by the Executive Committee, the European Union 
has a right to speak.  
 
For the EU, moving from observer status to that of full member would obviously be 
desirable and would reflect the importance of asylum issues for the Union from a material 
point of view as well as a financial one. Clearly, the negotiations of accession of the EU 
should lift the difficulty linked to the last requirement referring to the quality of member of 
the United Nations or of its specialise institutions. Assuming that this is the case, the 
Member States of the Union should find no grounds for competition and potential conflict 
with their own views on the issue. This desire shows again that better integration of the 
                                                 
955  Council Decision 2005/370/EC of the European Union of 17 February 2005 on the conclusion, on 
behalf of the European Community, of the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, OJ L 124 of 17 May 2005 p.1. 
956  They therefore remain bound by their own obligations 
957  Sections 35 and 37 
958  Regulation 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 6th September 2006 concerning 
the enforcement agencies and bodies of the European Community to the provisions of the Aarhus 
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters, OJ L 264 of 25 September 2006, p. 13 
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Union in Geneva device can serve the coherence of the common asylum policy and the 
CEAS. 
 
In total, the prospect of membership of the Union to the Geneva Convention can be 
considered both from a political and legal perspective. Legally, comparing advantages and 
disadvantages is not a zero sum, despite the fact that the 1951 convention is already a 
source of law for the Union. The disadvantages arising from the removal of technical 
barriers are likely outweighed by the real added value of strengthening the principle of 
legality and improving its judicial review. Moreover, in this founding period of the CEAS 
consolidated by the accession to the ECHR and the entry into force of the Charter 
consolidates, it is not indifferent to conduct a comprehensive upgrading of the sources of 
international protection via membership. In other words, the Union's accession to the 
Geneva Convention will have not only have symbolic effects. Politically, it is undeniable that 
membership will allow more visibility and a stronger voice of the Union at international 
level, particularly in the eyes of third countries of origin or transit. It is not indifferent 
either, that it becomes a full partner for these third countries in this way, without passing 
through its member States also party to the Convention. However, one should probably be 
careful about the terms following which the international negotiations on the accession can 
begin and the dynamics that can then thus be revealed. Scaling down dynamic of 
commitments made in 1951, denigration of asylum policy in the event of failure or blockage 
of the negotiations are risks that must be weighed before proceeding further. 
3. THE PASSAGE FROM HARMONISATION TO REGULAT-
ION IN VIEW OF A EUROPEAN CODE OF ASYLUM 
 
The search for greater coherence in moving towards a genuine common European asylum 
system often overlooks a simple way of progress towards this goal: the adoption of 
regulations instead of directives.  
 
The “acquis” on asylum is composed, if we stick to the basics, from three directives 
(reception conditions, qualification, procedures for asylum) and a regulation on the “Dublin” 
system for determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum, 
excluding the new regulation on the European Asylum Support Office that will be discussed 
in the next section. Using directives was consistent with the spirit of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam where Article 63, §1 TEC limited the jurisdiction of the European Community 
to, unless exceptions, the adoption of "minimum standards" excluding obviously the 
adoption of regulations. This limitation has disappeared with the Lisbon Treaty, which now 
permits the adoption of any standard considered adequate in accordance with the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality. The advantage of regulations compared to guidelines 
deserves attention.  
 
While the directive is an instrument of indirect legislation suitable for harmonisation of 
legislation of Member States which maintain a certain diversity, regulation is an instrument 
that has a direct effect resulting in unification of national standards which completely 
disappears and give way to a single rule on the entire territory of the EU (subject only to 
the three Member States benefiting from opting outs). The advantages of flexible directives 
can become disadvantages. A simple example is the Qualification Directive 2004/38 
defining the persons eligible for international protection in the European Union and whose 
Article 15 c) concerns subsidiary protection. This standard that contains an internal 
contradiction in requiring the proof of an individual threat in case of indiscriminate violence, 
has been transposed in the opposite way by the Member States. Some, like Belgium have 
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removed the requirement of individualisation, while others like France have insisted on it, 
by requiring the applicant to demonstrate that one is directly concerned. We observe that 
the transposition by Member States extends rather than approximates differences in 
domestic law of Member States in relation to the text of the Directive.  
 
The adoption of regulations instead of directives would be more appropriate for part of the 
“acquis” on asylum. Besides the delineation of protected persons and the definition of their 
rights, we think with regard to asylum procedures of procedural guarantees for asylum 
seekers. Since they largely correspond to legal obligations for Member States deriving from 
human rights or general principles of law and they obviously concern essential elements for 
the rights of asylum seekers, we do not see why they would not be the object of a 
regulation that would give greater clarity and legal certainty to those concerned. The 
question of types of asylum procedure seems more appropriate for directives with Member 
States retaining some flexibility. Asylum procedures are still extremely diverse due to the 
extremely low harmonising effect of the "asylum procedures" directive of 1st December 
2005. Since exactly the same procedural guarantees would be offered to asylum seekers, 
some diversity of procedures according to the wishes of Member States would not pose 
problems. In other words, the common asylum procedures would stem from the fact that 
they rely on identical procedural guarantees whilst remaining diverse in terms of their type 
within the member states.  
 
It appears, however, that the area of reception conditions continue to lend itself to a 
directive rather than a regulation since it is difficult to align the level of the rights of asylum 
seekers on a single standard because of the diversity of the situations encountered in 
Member States that host highly variable numbers of asylum seekers in very different 
contexts relating to their living standards and to their degree of experience in this field.  
 
The Commission has opted, for political reasons relating to the political calendar, to submit 
its proposals on the basis of the Amsterdam Treaty that prevented, as was already 
mentioned, the use of regulation except where the Dublin system is concerned. Since this 
decision cannot be questioned because of the monopoly of the initiative that the 
Commission disposes of, the question of adopting regulations arises only for the future.  
 
It seems reasonable to settle it when the second phase of the common European asylum 
system will be in place. It is likely that the second generation of standards will still be 
marked by a number of technical or political inconsistencies more or less important due to 
the fact they have been adopted separately, even despite the efforts of coordination we can 
expect from the European institutions to draw parallels between the various texts adopted 
simultaneously in the same area. The idea of a codification of texts that was addressed by 
the Commission in its contribution to the preparation of the Stockholm programme 
regarding immigration should logically be imposed regarding asylum. This could provide the 
opportunity to adopt for the aspects of the common asylum mentioned above regulations 
rather than guidelines for the benefit of asylum seekers as well as Member States.  
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SECTION 2: THE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE  
1. THE GRADUAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE NEED FOR CO-
OPERATION BETWEEN MEMBER STATES 
  
The common asylum policy started to develop with the adoption from 2003 of the 
legislative instruments analysed in this study. The Commission, however, from the outset 
stressed the need to accompany the legal harmonisation process through coordination of 
national asylum policies of Member States to ensure a coherent implementation of the 
European instruments. It even proposed in 2001 to apply to the model of the European 
employment policy the open method of coordination to the common asylum policy959 by 
considering the adoption by the Council of Ministers of multiannual guidelines. These 
guidelines would have been implemented through annual action plans of Member States 
that the Commission itself would have been responsible for evaluating the results through 
summary reports.  
 
This proposal having received no response from the Member States whom implicitly but 
certainly opposed themselves to it concerning asylum as well as immigration, the issue has 
been left aside until the European Council invited into The Hague programme setting out 
the priorities in Justice and Home Affairs for the period 2005-2009, "the Council and 
Commission to establish in 2005 appropriate structures involving the national asylum 
services to promote a fruitful practical cooperation960". If the vocabulary has changed from 
coordinating to cooperation, the problem remains the same even if it is considered in a less 
formal setting than the one imagined in 2001. The Commission proposed, on this basis, to 
reinforce – the term is curious in view of the lack of any earlier progress - the practical 
cooperation in a communication dated 17 February 2006 entitled "New structures, new 
approaches: improving the quality of decision making in the Common European Asylum 
System"961.  
 
Underlining the need to harmonise the practices of Member States beyond the legislation 
and to promote greater convergence for the future European common asylum system to be 
based on mutual trust between Member States, the Commission then proposed the creation 
of networks with a clear mandate for cooperation in each of the three priority areas 
identified in the Hague Programme:  
 
– Single procedure for applications for recognition of refugee status and subsidiary 
protection;  
 
– Information on countries of origin;  
 
– Specific pressures weighing on the reception capacities of certain Member States 
due to their geographical location.  
 
It added, fourthly in this list, the training of personnel of the asylum offices of the Member 
States.  
                                                 
959  Communication from the Commission on November 28th, 2001, COM (2001) 710 
960  OJEU C 53 of March 3rd, 2005, p.53 
961  COM(2006)67 
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2. THE DELAY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRACTICAL 
COOPERATION AT INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL  
 
Member states are, up to present, almost the only bodies involved in implementing the 
European asylum policy at the national level. It is not only about the transposition of EU 
directives into national law which is naturally a competence of the Member States under 
the supervision of the Commission, but in particular about the implementation of European 
and national standards to individual cases, especially by refusing or granting asylum to 
applicants.  
 
The practical cooperation envisaged by the Commission in its Communication of 2006 did 
not result in the establishment of the envisaged networks, even if projects developed on an 
ad hoc basis with the financial support of European Community Refugees Fund in the fields 
of action envisaged by the Hague Programme (one thinks particularly of the European 
Asylum Curriculum (EAC) that trained staff of Member States employed in the field of 
asylum).  
 
Institutionally, the only development has involved the replacement in 2002 of the Cirea 
(Centre for Information, Reflection and Exchange on Asylum) by Eurasil. While the 
succession of Eurasil chaired by the Commission to Cirea who was a working group of the 
Council, logically marks the passage of the EU asylum policy of the intergovernmental era 
to community era, the new structure bringing together Member States practitioners did not 
become a structured network and did not provide for the practical cooperation between 
Member States the institutional framework it needs to get out of the embryonic stage at 
which it is still limited today. 
3. THE PROSPECTS RELATED TO THE CREATION OF THE 
EUROPEAN ASYLUM SUPPORT OFFICE (EASO) 
 
Noting that "there are still considerable differences between the decisions made in the 
matter (even in similar cases) due, firstly, to the timidity of harmonising rules laid down by 
legislation and secondly to the divergent practices of national authorities”, the Commission 
again emphasized in its action plan on asylum of 17 June 2008 the need to accompany the 
legal harmonisation of effective practical cooperation. 
 
A step was taken by the European Council when it agreed, in line with the Hague 
Programme, to set up a European Asylum Support Office in the European Pact on 
Immigration and Asylum concluded in 2008. This office just recently became the object of 
regulation 439/2010 of 19th May 2010 and is expected to begin effectively functioning in 
late 2010. 
 
Under this regulation, the duties of this office will be very diverse. They cover support for 
practical cooperation between Member States, support of Member States under particular 
pressure and the implementation of the Common European Asylum System. Concerning the 
office tasks directly related to the issues addressed in this report, it is worth noting:  
 
– the gathering of relevant, reliable, accurate and up-to date information on countries 
of origin of persons applying for international protection (Article 4);  
– the exchange of information between the Member States' asylum authorities and 
between the Commission and the Member States' asylum authorities concerning the 
implementation of all relevant instruments of the asylum acquis of the Union. The 
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Office may create factual, legal and case-law databases on national, Union and 
international asylum instruments. (Article 11);  
– Support the relocation within the Union of beneficiaries of international protection 
(Article 5);  
– Support for external dimensions of the Common European Asylum System (Article 
7).  
 
The possibility for the European Asylum Support Office to adopt under Article 12 § 2 
"technical documents related to the implementation of asylum instruments of the Union" 
like “guidelines” or “operating manuals” is particularly interesting. This refers particularly to 
the guidelines that the Board might adopt on the basis of Article 29, §1, e), to assist 
Member States in assessing the situation in countries of origin of asylum seekers on the 
basis of reports prepared by the Director under Article 31, §6, d). Such instruments, if 
properly used under the supervision of the Court of Justice as we propose (see below), 
could help the practical cooperation in the field of asylum to increase convergence and 
ensure continuous quality decision-making by Member States in the field within a 
framework of European law in accordance with the aspirations expressed in paragraph 5 of 
the preamble of the organic regulation of the EASO. The political will to act in this direction 
has already been expressed in the Stockholm program by the European Council that 
"whichever the Member State where people submit their applications for asylum, it's 
important that they benefit from an equivalent level of treatment for the conditions of 
reception, and the same level as to the procedural rules and the determination of their 
status. The aim should be that similar cases are treated equally and that this process will 
produce the same result.”  
 
The creation of the European Asylum Support Office will enable the practical cooperation to 
solve the issue of the backlog that has accumulated and becomes clear if one recalls that 
its equivalent in the field of external borders (Frontex) has been created already nearly six 
years ago by a regulation of 26th October 2004. Regrettably, however, as we insist in the 
next section on the legal perspective (see below), the European legislator has decided to 
curb immediately the Action Office, alleging that it « should have no direct or indirect 
powers in relation to the taking of decisions by Member States' asylum authorities on 
individual applications for international protection » (paragraph 14 of the preamble of the 
Regulation). Besides being unnecessary, such details do not fit into a vision for the future 
of the European Support Office designed like a minimum instrument of first generation as if 
it had been adopted on the basis of the Treaty of Amsterdam. While it will have to prepare 
and accompany the implementation of the second generation of instruments, the adoption 
of which is scheduled for 2012. The fact that the European Parliament itself has sustained 
such a restrictive view of the mission of the European Asylum Support Office in its 
legislative resolution of 7 May 2009 shows that the spirits have not yet realised the 
changes that are needed in the coming years in order to implement the very ambitious 
project of setting up a common European asylum among the objectives of the Treaty of 
Lisbon. Let us hope that the discussion on the revision of the mandate of the Office, which 
should happen on the basis of the external assessment that it will order no later than 19 
June 2014 under article 46 of the Regulation, will provide the opportunity to better align its 
work with the particularly high claims that the EU feeds with regard to asylum.  
 
SECTION 3: THE JURISDICTIONAL PERSPECTIVE  
 
The culmination of the setting up of CEAS requires a full recognition of the judge at the 
heart of this system. Developing the role of a “European judge of asylum” would have the 
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merit to place the issue in terms of protection of a fundamental right and not only of the 
simple management of a common policy of the Union. The presence of the judge seems 
natural to organise within the framework of the EU, irrespectively of the powers that must 
remain those of national judges.  
 
Referring the task of issuing a harmonised reading on asylum in the EU to the European 
judge, facilitating the exercise of this right must therefore be a reasonable goal to attain. 
This ambition should be put in its political and legal context and it should be framed in 
terms of the existing treaties.  
 
The obstacles to overcome in order to achieve this are considerable. The reluctance of 
Member States to see their prerogatives framed regarding asylum is obviously even 
stronger with the idea to submit to a European court in this area. Furthermore, recognising 
the presence of a European judge of asylum, whatever the form and scope, cannot ignore 
the existence of an already complete contentious system in the Union as well as the 
presence of mechanisms of legal protection in domestic law. If a jurisdictional response 
must be given to the current shortcomings of the protection of asylum, this response must, 
first, fit into the existing architecture and, secondly, be adapted for this area by meeting 
the special challenges that now need to be resolved.  
 
This means how much, at this stage, the reflection can be seen as premature. It must be 
here merely to clarify issues and identify key goals. Giving a jurisdictional dimension to the 
asylum policy at the level of the Union covers a wide range of varied assumptions. It may 
simply require adjustments of what exist as well as going as far as the creation of a specific 
court susceptible to guarantee compliance with the rules of the European asylum system. 
 
The reflection is therefore a broad perspective. It can only be conceived from the CEAS’ 
dysfunctions and in light of the contentious system of the European Union that has been 
radically altered by the Treaty of Lisbon and the prospects of accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In any event, the accession of the Union will allow a 
judge, the European Court of Human Rights, to ensure in a more direct manner, the 
compliance with Article 3 of the ECHR, source of the subsidiary protection. This new order 
underlines, in a caricature fashion, the paradox it would be to reject in principle any 
intervention by the EU judge in ordinary asylum, where the rise in power of the judge of 
subsidiary protection is set. 
1. RECENT SUGGESTIONS 
 
The prospect of a judicial character of the common asylum policy has been raised twice in 
recent months. It was done first by the Commission itself in its evaluation of an "integrated 
approach to protection" at the level of the Union962. It was then raised by a Member State, 
Sweden, just before taking up chairmanship of the European Union.  
 
The point of view of the Commission is expressed with caution in paragraph 4.5 of the 
above assessment. This refers to the "creation of a European Authority on asylum", which 
would be responsible for managing and coordinating the common European asylum policy. 
Probably taking the form of an agency, it mission could be, according to the Commission, to 
replace "the national judicial and administrative bodies that make decisions on applications 
for asylum”. Centralising all decisions on asylum, it would thus constitute the comm. 
                                                 
962  Action Plan on Asylum: An integrated approach to protection across the EU, SEC (200*) 2030 of June 
17th 2008 
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European instance for asylum and, of course, would likely include a Board of Appeal 
inserted into the general contentious device of the Union. The aim of this long-term vision 
clashes with reality, but obviously it has the essential merit of opening a debate provoked 
by the inadequacies of the current arrangements. 
 
In somewhat different terms, the Swedish Minister for Immigration has raised a similar idea 
at the JHA Council in February 2009, although this suggestion has neither been a proposal 
in good and due form, nor even been integrated in the development of the Programme of 
Stockholm which says nothing about it. It can be summarized in the words of the minister 
to journalists: "if you get an asylum application, you need a body that says that this 
decision should apply to all similar applications. Hence the Ministerial conclusion that the 
Court of Justice should play this determining role.  
 
To all this, it is possible to add the tempered reaction from NGOs and the UNHCR regarding 
a rise in institutional power, the latter, it seems, particularly preferring the enhancement of 
the action of national authorities963. 
In perspective  
 
Considering the possibility of a full jurisdictional dimension for the European asylum system 
is part of a scenario now largely theoretical, if not completely illusory. This forward thinking 
has however several merits.  
2. THE ELEMENTS OF THE PROBLEM  
 
The primary interest of the approach is to ask the question in the only legal perspective 
that it’s worth: it is to guarantee the exercise of an individual right of the person by the 
judge before any other consideration, notably of an administrative or policy type. The 
second merit is likely to force to rethink the relationship between national and European 
level regarding the scope of judicial protection provided to asylum seekers. It is now 
necessary to respond to the too many different solutions that persist in the legal 
framework, even though the latter is harmonised. Finally, on the eve of the accession of 
the Union to the ECHR, seeking to streamline and systematise the legal protection of 
people is simply an objective of common sense.  
 
This approach highlights the benefits of greater involvement of the European judge in 
asylum: it is both to address current problems and to ensure a common understanding of 
the legal standards applicable to asylum. But it is probably insufficient to remain at that 
point.  
 
Any progress of the CEAS on the path of mutual recognition of national asylum decisions 
depends today, in fact, on further harmonisation of protection. If this approximation is well 
advanced in terms of legislation, it remains very insufficient in terms of national decisions, 
each State continuing to retain its discretionary ability to assess situations without the 
normal mechanisms that ensure the uniform application of law in the European Union be 
sufficient to remedy the problem. This results in unequal treatment of applicants for 
protection that is not permissible.  
 
The recent intervention of the Court of Justice in the Elgafaji964 Case on the situation in Iraq 
illustrates the limits on what the CJEU can presently bring. If the Court has certainly 
                                                 
963  SEC (2009) 1376 part. II, annex 2 p. 8 
964  CJEU, C-465/07 of 17th February 2009 
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clarified the concept of subsidiary protection under Article 15, c) of Directive 2004/83, and 
solved the internal contradiction that this provision involves by stating that should prevail, 
in exceptional cases, the collective inherent nature of the situation of indiscriminate 
violence to the detriment of the requirement for individualisation of serious threats, this 
legal interpretation of the CJEU is not sufficient. As useful and even fundamental as it is, it 
still leaves to the national authorities the discretion of deciding the level of "blind violence" 
required to consider whether a civilian being sent back to the country concerned may face, 
merely due to his presence on the territory, a real risk of serious threat. The Court has 
certainly reduced the power of interpretation in law of the Member States, but the risk of 
diverging interpretations of the competent national authorities in fact still exists. The Dutch 
Council of State has considered the Elgafaji case on the basis of the foregoing 
interpretation of the Court of Justice that there is not an exceptional situation in Iraq posing 
serious threats to any civil due to a situation of indiscriminate violence...  
2.1. The difficulty of the approach  
 
It is therefore necessary for the Union to reinforce the building of another notch. It could be 
a further judicial intervention for control of national conducts. This intervention would thus 
allow the emergence of new European standards to arise in a concrete and operational 
manner. Referring the task of validating and enforcing them to a court is an interesting line 
of work, excluding political treatment. The issue is both complex and sensitive.  
 
The problem is complex in that it is not feasible or likely that an entirely new contentious 
device can be built specifically for asylum, at the precise moment that the Lisbon Treaty 
has come to reunite the treatment of European jurisdictional issues, turning their backs on 
the multiple derogatory solutions from Amsterdam. Any creation of a judicial body as with 
any procedural innovation must be thought out without excessive individualisation outside 
of the traditional patterns of control of the European public policy, in order to be credible. 
This reduces the range of possibilities. 
 
The issue is particularly sensitive because it must also respect the traditional dividing lines 
between the powers of national judges and the justice of the Union. Nothing, in the present 
state of law, allows in general or specifically for the jurisdiction of the Union to deal with 
administrative decisions taken at national level to nullify them and, a fortiori, of national 
judicial decisions. The preliminary ruling of article 267 TFEU as well as the infringement 
procedure of article 260, simply remain in the framework of a declaratory contentious and 
not in a contentious of cancellation. The judge of the European Union can therefore neither 
reform, nor destroy nationals norms. Again, the reasoning must be brought to completion, 
at least, without changing the treaties and any solution undermining this division of 
responsibilities is not possible in the state of the Union's integration.  
 
To this we must add one final element. The planned accession of the Union to the European 
Convention on Human Rights will probably have little effect to resolve dysfunctions. The 
judge of the ECHR has only in its power subsidiary protection provided by Article 3 ECHR, it 
is not the judge of the Geneva Convention. Also, despite the progress to come that we can 
expect from its presence, there is every reason to believe that the essence of the problem 
remains unchanged.  
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3. THE CENTRAL PLACE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE  
 
Any analysis of the role of the judge in the CEAS must take into consideration the existing 
contentious modalities, both technically and functionally.  
 
The role of the Court of Justice in control of asylum policy of the European Union has 
fuelled an old debate. It justified in the eyes of the Member States the restrictions 
established by the Treaty of Amsterdam in the area of preliminary ruling, at the time of its 
negotiations. The reasons advanced at the time were essentially the risk of clogging of the 
Court because of the number of potential applications, which had deterred from going 
further and founded the organisation of a derogatory preliminary procedure in Title IV TEC.  
 
These restrictions have now disappeared since the Treaty of Lisbon restores full 
competence to the Court of Justice. In this context, already, the Court shall conduct 
preliminary rulings to exercise its jurisdiction for interpretation as well as for appreciation of 
the validity of the legislation of the Union, which it has done, again, very recently965. 
Moreover, the recent introduction of an urgent preliminary question966 and obligation to 
respond "as soon as possible" when a person is detained under Article 267 §4 TFEU, 
assigns an important role to the Court concerning asylum.  
 
This role is mechanically intended to fully function since the directives establishing the 
European asylum system have been implemented in Member States and raise questions of 
the national courts regarding their interpretation and compatibility of national law. It 
follows that the Court of Justice now plays a central role, almost impossible to circumvent, 
concerning asylum in the European Union, a role that the justiciability of Article 18 of the 
Charter will strengthen. Any proposal to increase the place of the judge in the European 
asylum system must consider this reality. 
4. THE WORK HYPOTHESES: REFORM OR ADAPTATION?  
 
From the judge’s viewpoint, the rise of the common asylum policy has predictable 
consequences: the need for judicial intervention to reduce areas of misunderstanding or of 
conflict with secondary legislation will naturally grow while the risk of a glut of requests 
related to the number of contentions is real967, even if it deserves to be specifically 
checked.  
 
If one logically concludes that the contentious system of the Union must be adapted to deal 
with the latter, two options are plausible: breaking away with the establishment of a 
specific court or that of evolution with expansion of functions of the Court of Justice or of 
the Tribunal.  
                                                 
965  See for example ECJ, Case Joined Salahadin Abdulla of 2 March 2010, C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 
and C-179/08 
966  This procedure is governed by articles 23 bis of the Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (OJEU 2008, C 115, p. 210) and 104b of the Rules of Procedure of the 
Court 
967  See Ex. ECRA, Submission from the European Council on Refugees and Exiles in response to the 
Commission’s Green Paper on teh Future Common European Asylum System in COM (2007) 301, p 
AD5/9/2007/Ext/RW 6 
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4.1. The reform: a specialised court  
 
The problem of the increasing power of the judge in the Union, and therefore the 
jurisdictional control of it, is present and these questions are not new. They have mobilised 
the attention of observers for several decades968, both in response to a "crisis" of the 
jurisdiction of the Union but also in response to a growing social demand. It is clear that 
despite the proven public needs and solutions outlined by the Treaty of Nice, little has 
changed, notably with regards to the level of "speciality" of the Union’s judicial 
architecture...  
4.1.1. The tracks of specialisation  
The attractiveness of a specialised judge has not just arisen only regarding asylum in the 
EU. Thus, in the related area of data protection, the European Parliament has expressed a 
similar concern and specifically contemplates a similar process969. In its resolution of 25 
November 2009 on the Stockholm Programme, the Parliament evoked all at once the need 
to consolidate into one agency the various actors responsible for the management of large 
information systems that exist in this area,970 but also the urgency of creating a “European 
Tribunal for Cyber-crime affairs"971, for reasons that could easily translate to the issue of 
asylum. The Parliament justified this particular position because of the "significant increase 
in recent years" of cyber crime cases and "the testing of capacity of national courts”.  
 
These two factors, volume of cases involved and the failure of national courts to deal 
effectively with the problem,972 are also at the heart of questions relating to European 
judicial control concerning asylum. They also justify a specific judicial intervention of the 
Union, on behalf of a reasonable application of the principle of subsidiarity. Two routes can 
then unfold.  
 
The first goes to the end of the process undertaken and leads to the creation of a European 
Court of asylum, concentrating in its hands the final decision to grant protection. This Court 
can either intervene in appeal of national decisions of refusal, or in the case of the creation 
of a single Authority, be judge of that authority's decisions. Objectively and for the reasons 
explained further, this option is not feasible in the medium term.  
 
The second line of work is to try to exploit the technical possibilities made available to the 
Union by the Treaty of Lisbon. If we want to move towards the specialisation of the 
European court, the “Copernican”973 revolution started in Nice, has not been interrupted by 
the Treaty of Lisbon, and one can think in this context towards the creation of a new 
authority.  
 
Under article 257 TFEU, the European Parliament and the Council may establish "special 
tribunals' by regulation in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure. This process 
is initiated either on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Court of 
Justice or, more originally, by proposal from the Court of Justice itself, and after consulting 
the Commission. These specialised courts are added to the Tribunal and they can be 
responsible for dealing at first instance with certain categories of appeals in specific areas. 
                                                 
968  See The Future of the Union court, Editions de l'ULB, Brussels, 2002 
969  This could allow a hint of regret for the fact that the same type has not been made about the security 
of asylum 
970  Item 147 Resolution 
971  A Point of Resolution 
972  Failure to have all the elements to decide 
973  K. Lenaerts, "The reorganization of the judicial structure of the Union: what angle of approach to 
take?" in the Future of the Court ... op. cit. P. 49 
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The rules governing the composition and powers of such courts are established by the 
regulation that establishes them. Their decisions may be appealed on points of law or, 
when the regulation establishing a specialised court provides it, a right of appeal also on 
matters of fact, before the Tribunal.  
 
The idea of establishing a "specialised court for asylum" can be seen within this legal and 
contentious context, the feasibility of the operation not posing any insurmountable 
technical issues. To consider that asylum constitutes a "specific matter" would allow 
exploring of this avenue but that is where difficulties arise. 
4.1.2. The obstacles to a specialised court 
Technically, things are complicated, to the likely point of driving to a cul de sac. The duties 
that may be assigned to a specialised court constitute indeed the main obstacle. If the 
primary interest of specialisation lies in the unification within a single jurisdiction for 
responses to the contentious of asylum, important barriers immediately arise in the current 
state of law given the prerogatives of the Court of justice itself.  
 
It is difficult to unify the treatment of all matters relating to asylum within the same judicial 
body other than the Court of Justice, namely both a judge responsible for authentic 
interpretation of EU law relating to asylum and a judge in charge of its conform application. 
Indeed, if one opts for the creation of a specialised court, it cannot interfere with the rules 
governing the powers that the treaty reserves to the Court of itself, namely for annulment 
and especially that of preliminary collaboration with national court’s. The Court, moreover, 
has always been very careful in keeping its essential contact with the national courts and 
has consistently opposed any reform to decentralise this function. 
 
While the treaty, from the Treaty of Nice, opened the possibility included in Article 256, §3 
TFEU to entrust the Trinunal to hear and determine questions referred for a preliminary 
ruling under Article 267, in specific areas laid down by the Statute. In this case, the 
Tribunal solves the case unless it considers that it requires a decision of principle likely to 
affect the unity or consistency of Union law and decided to refer the matter to the Court of 
Justice for a ruling. Moreover, decisions made by the Tribunal on prejudicial questions may 
exceptionally be subject to review by the Court of Justice, under the conditions and limits 
set by statute, in case of serious risk to the unity or consistency of Union law. That said, 
the lack of enthusiasm for the EU to engage in this way should be noticed, since, to date, 
things have not changed one step in that direction.  
 
Major difficulty, the Lisbon Treaty does not provide the opportunity to share this with the 
specialised courts that it allows creating. It is doubtful that the Court of Justice will also be 
supportive in an area as sensitive and specific in terms of fundamental rights that may be 
the one of asylum.  
 
Assuming that we consider establishing a specialised court for asylum matters, it is hard to 
see within the current state of the Union’s contentious organisation, how it might break the 
two lines on which it rests: on the one hand, the EU judge cannot determine the internal 
law to invalidate it and, secondly, the Court intends to retain the monopoly of the 
preliminary collaboration.  
 
Therefore, the road of a court specialised in the field seems difficult to follow. To increase 
the judicial character of the European asylum system is then assumed to eventually take 
the path of adaptation. The device must be structured around the Court of Justice, the 
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hypothesis of the judicial character of the future European asylum office seeming remote 
from reality like the one of specialising a judge encounters obstacles.  
4.2. Adaptation: expanding the role of CJEU  
 
The Court of Justice974 is already competent in asylum both in preliminary ruling and in the 
infringement procedure against Member States that don’t fulfil their obligations, in addition 
to the contentious of annulment of secondary legislation exclusively reserved to this Court. 
This raises the question of the possible complementary role that could be given to it. To 
evaluate this possibility, the issues should be clarified before exploring the possible 
answers. 
4.2.1. The purpose of the intervention of the judge: to regulate the CEAS 
The current mismatch between the legal parameters set by EU law and the facts which 
Member States apply, explains many of the current difficulties with the European asylum 
system. Wide disparities persist in the assessment of facts by the Member States that no 
one denies. These differences lead to serious distortions in the granting of protection to 
asylum seekers, without being remedied and in violation of the principle of equal 
treatment. Reading in the same way, the commitments made in secondary legislation and 
making sure to apply them to the different international situations in a converging manner, 
must therefore be a central objective for the Union. The creation of the European asylum 
office is a first response, of an administrative type, but still remains insufficient.  
 
The functions entrusted to this office and especially the Member States’ insistence in 
retaining their full discretion975, allow believing that this step is not sufficient to fulfil the 
assigned objective. In other words, the primacy of political reading on law enforcement has 
every chance to continue. For this reason, support from the judge must be considered in 
order to facilitate the administrative control of the device. It clearly implies that states are 
willing to give the judge a place as an expert both within the European Asylum Support 
Office, as well as in considering the organisation of a genuine collaboration in its business 
by taking fully into account its judicial dimension. This means that the judge's influence 
may be exercised in different ways.  
 
A first indicator of the judicial character of the European asylum policy, as a minimum, will 
be provided by the composition of the European Asylum Support Office. This will set the 
tone posed by the Union on issues of asylum and its political, administrative or legal 
priorities. From this point of view, even if the focus is clearly in the regulation on the 
operational approach and on the role of national administrations of Member States 
competent in asylum, there is a possibility to develop room for specialised national judges 
in asylum. The regulation does not exclude it, far from it, since the “working groups" 
referred to in Article 32 can be constituted of national judges, as experts delegated by 
Member States authorities. This possibility is interesting because it is very likely that the 
analysis of the factual situation by a judge or a representative of the Ministry of Interior will 
not lead to exactly the same conclusion as the angle of view may differ. It would 
necessarily result in a more balanced reading of situations, assuming that states follow 
through with it.  
 
                                                 
974  In the strict sense and not according to Article 19 § 1 TEU hence the name Court of Justice of the 
European Union covers both the Court of Justice, Tribunal and specialised tribunals. 
975  See recital 14: The Office should have no direct or indirect powers in relation to the taking of decisions 
by Member States' asylum authorities on individual applications for international protection. 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 458 
A second important indicator of the evolution of the CEAS will reside in the modes of 
regulation of the European asylum policy. One of the priorities of the future European 
Asylum Office is that of increasing convergence and ensure ongoing quality of Member 
States decision-making procedures and this convergence need explains the regulatory 
function that is given to the office. This feature is exclusively administrative in the current 
state of the law but there is no reason to imagine that the Judge of the Union provides 
assistance, if only to ensure the factual of the conditions of factual application of a 
fundamental right guaranteed by the Treaty.  
 
The success of the European Office will reside in its ability to lead the Member States to 
subscribe the exercise of their right to grant asylum in a common framework in which legal 
considerations outweigh political assessments. The contribution of the Support Office is 
therefore to organise, coordinate and promote exchange of information on asylum, 
including, and in particular, regarding the processing of applications for protection by 
national authorities and the responses of national law. On this basis, the Board may adopt 
"technical documents related to the implementation of EU instruments on asylum"976 as 
"guidelines and operational manuals”.  
 
The function of such instruments is essential for the development and improvement of the 
European asylum system. We can estimate that the Office's task here is to gradually 
establish a true "administrative doctrine" whose effect will guarantee individuals the unity 
of application of the European asylum system. Their compatibility with the right of asylum 
is crucial and it cannot be satisfactory that they do not oblige the member states.  
 
Such an “administrative doctrine” on asylum raises the question of authority regarding the 
States, especially as this is the only legislative power entrusted to the Office. In the current 
state of the law in the EU, the legal acts of composing such a doctrine is clear: they are not 
binding because of lack of a decisive character. They are therefore likely to remain a dead 
letter and take on no other effect than incentive for the Member States, thereby depriving 
individuals of relying on the benefit of their interpretation. Either it is simple indications, in 
no way altering the discretionary power of states to decide, or it's a genuine guidance in 
the sense that Union law already recognises from other areas, such as the competition law 
for example. In the first case, the assumption of access to court must be rejected while in 
the second, things can change and their contentious status is a crucial issue.  
 
The precedent of "guidelines" adopted by the Commission which have nourished a rich 
contention before the courts of the EU competition law977, provides useful guidance. It 
allows instructive parallels.  
 
It is accepted that these “atypical” actions do not constitute legal acts in the full sense of 
the term but they are nevertheless likely to involve the institutions in a particular 
constraint. The Court summarised its case against them in a leading case: "the Court has 
held, acting on internal measures adopted by the administration, that, if they cannot be 
regarded as rules of right on observation for which the administration, in any case, will be 
bound, they dictate nevertheless a rule of conduct indicative of the practice from which the 
administration may not depart in an individual case without giving reasons that are 
compatible with the principle of equal treatment"978 The Court explains the reasons very 
                                                 
976  Article 12 §1 
977  C. Vincent, "The normative force of communications and guidelines in European Competition Law, in: 
C. Thibierge et al. The normative force - Birth of a concept, LGDJ, Bruylant, 2009, pp. 691-703. 
978  ECJ, June 28, 2005, Dansk Rørindustri Others v Commission, Case. C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-
205/02 P, C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P, ECR. P. I-5425, paragraph 209 
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clearly: "In adopting such rules of conduct and announcing their release they will 
henceforth apply to cases covered by them, the institution in question limits itself in its 
power of discretion and cannot depart from those rules under penalty of being found, if 
any, in respect of a breach of general principles of law such as equal treatment or the 
protection of legitimate confidence . It cannot therefore be excluded that under certain 
conditions and according to their content, such rules of conduct having a general 
application may produce legal effect979". 
 
This reasoning must be transposed to the acts of the European Office, which would 
establish a link between the action of the European Office and the court of the Union and 
contribute to a better regulation. In their current design guidelines are nothing more than 
the expression of how the administration of the Union exercises its discretionary power. 
Here, in asylum, they are destined to play the same role, except that it is Member States 
who exercise their own power, and not the Union, but within the application of Union law 
which is imposed upon them.  
 
It would be logical to require Member States to justify their decisions with regard to the 
national Office documents, particularly when national decisions diverge, which is a 
minimum. These documents are, remember, "related to the implementation of EU 
instruments on asylum" which are binding on States. Such a procedural requirement is 
nothing but the expression of the obligation of loyal cooperation that weighs on those 
States under Article 4 §3 TEU. This obligation complies with the textual prohibition that is 
done in the Office "to give instructions to member states for granting or rejecting 
applications for international protection"980. It merely asks them to explain the reasons 
leading them to singularise themselves in their application of the common asylum policy, 
possibly in violation of a fundamental right guaranteed by the Charter and treaties. Thus, 
the obligation of states to explicitly position themselves in relation to acts of the Office 
shows the interest in allowing access to the judge.  
4.2.2. Pathways to judicial regulation  
The Lisbon Treaty opens a new and important trail in contentiousness. Article 263 § 5 TFEU 
provides that " Acts setting up bodies, offices and agencies of the Union may lay down 
specific conditions and arrangements concerning actions brought by natural or legal 
persons against acts of these bodies, offices or agencies intended to produce legal effects in 
relation to them.”. There is an opportunity here to explore in order to submit to the Court 
of Justice acts by which the European Office specifically contributes to the implementation 
of the CEAS.  
 
Negatively, first of all, it should indeed be able to check the consistency of such an 
"administrative doctrine" to the principle of legality and especially of course the respect of 
EU rules governing the right to asylum. The hypothesis that the Office would, under 
pressure from a majority of Member States, adopt a position contrary to the requirements 
of European law on asylum should not be dismissed by principle. It would thus be remedied 
and that judicial review could also contribute largely to legitimising the actions of officers 
both in terms of certain Member States and public opinion, NGOs and third States. With 
regard to verification of the legality of the Office, the precedent of "atypical acts" shows 
precisely the limits of the exercise. Its main merit of enabling individuals concerned to 
partially open, even in exceptional cases, the judge's door by means of an action for 
annulment.  
                                                 
979   id. paragraph 211Article 12 paragraph 2 
980  Article 12 paragraph 2 
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In positive terms, then the conditions under which member states comply with the 
guidelines of such a doctrine981 should also be checked, lest persist in the Union divergent 
behaviour in the application of European law on asylum. The Stockholm Programme refers 
to this need when it says that " regardless of the Member State in which their application 
for asylum is lodged, are offered an equivalent level of treatment as regards reception 
conditions, and the same level as regards procedural arrangements and status 
determination. The objective should be that similar cases should be treated alike and result 
in the same outcome”982. In terms of control imposed on states, the motivation for their 
decision to depart from the guidelines should clearly justify a review by the judge, not to 
mention the interest that the national court of asylum will find in its motivation for control 
over national decisions. 
 
All this is then assumed to have a particular path of law. We can estimate it to be open in a 
systematic manner, i.e. for individuals, or choose to reserve it for privileged operators or 
national judges, in function of the role intended for this contentious path.   
 
The precedent of the Treaty of Amsterdam provides evidence that the construction of a 
specific law on asylum and immigration open to privileged operators is not inconceivable. 
Article 68 § 3 TEC, forecast that “The Council, the Commission or a Member State may 
request the Court of Justice to give a ruling on a question of interpretation of this title or of 
acts of the institutions of the Community based on this title. The ruling given by the Court 
of Justice in response to such a request shall not apply to judgments of courts or tribunals 
of the Member States which have become res judicata "Even though this possibility has 
never been used under the influence of the earlier treaty, and it offers a valid working 
hypothesis that doesn’t prevent further digging.  
 
One solution would be to virtually replicate this pattern under cover of the potential 
conceivable appeals of Article 263 §5 TFEU. It would imply to revive the idea of “such 
appeals in the interest of the law”. Lighter than the infringement action, faster than the 
reference, such an action would serve as a palliative, and could achieve comparable results. 
In response to a Member State which would voluntarily depart, and in a reasoned way, 
from the evidence-based analysis of the European Office, it should be possible to ask the 
Court to clarify the requirements of Union law under the Office’s analysis, validating or 
invalidating the latter. On this basis, the follow-up by European institutions or national 
judges would be simple to discern: to consider if the interpretation of the state in question 
constitutes or not a breach of its obligations for the former and to censor national decisions 
based on a misinterpretation of EU law for the latter.  
 
The real question then would be on the list of beneficiaries of the right to operate such an 
action. A preferred approach would be of "institutional" type, as required by expanding the 
list of potential beneficiaries of such an application, for example to the Parliament, the 
European Office (or even the mediator), the target of regulation by the judge could thus be 
reached. This choice excludes a right of individual petition.  
 
To do this, Article 263 § 5 TFEU presents a problem: currently, it reserves the possibility of 
a specific appeal against acts of organs of the Union to "physical or moral persons", which 
the EU institutions or member states are not.  
 
                                                 
981  Knowing that "these documents are not intended to give instructions to member states for granting or 
rejecting applications for international protection" (Article 12 § 2) 
982  Point 6.2 
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If they want to use this medium to create a legal access to the court, with it being 
recognised that acts of the Office produces "legal effects" as defined in the jurisprudence of 
the Court of Justice, the scope of such action in interpretation or in the discretion of validity 
of acts of the European Office would be open to private individuals.  
In order not to duplicate other remedies such as prejudicial reference, the remedy should 
then have a simple and rigorous character to safeguard against the risk of clogging of the 
Court. One can imagine this:  
 
– Quick access to the judge, based on urgent procedure need for preliminary rulings, 
once a national decision is motivated in contradiction with the guidelines of the 
Office is stopped. Far from being a "direct or indirect instruction", the guideline 
should be confirmed or denied by the judge in an extremely short timeframe.  
– A strictly defined purpose, that of compatibility between the actions of officers who 
supervise the discretion of states and the positive law of asylum, which 
consequently allows deducing the compatibility of national deviant behaviour.  
– An effect erga omnes, i.e. to allow other national systems to draw from the latter 
consequences, as soon as the question is identified.  
 
In this way, the guarantee by the judge of a uniform application of asylum appears more as 
its contribution to the regulation of the system as a disruption of the existing law. It may 
be envisaged without real disruption neither of treaties nor the existing legalities and would 
contribute, no doubt decisively, to the balance of CEAS.  
 
SECTION 4: THE SUBSTANTIVE PERSPECTIVE  
 
Two questions arise regarding the substance of the right to international protection. Firstly, 
one regards the definition of protected persons, the issue of "environmental refugees". 
Then, as regards the status of protected persons, the question of their freedom of 
movement within the European Union.  
1. THE ISSUE OF "ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES"  
 
The concept of "environmental refugees" or "climate" has emerged in the discussions on 
international protection, but international law of refugees is still characterised by a legal 
vacuum for most people fleeing their home country due to climatic or environmental 
reasons. The UNHCR opposed itself for this reason, to the use of the term "refugee" 
relating to the environment or climate.  
 
It is only in certain circumstances that people fleeing their home country due to climatic or 
environmental reasons may fall within the scope of the Geneva Convention, for example 
when a government would not attend the victims of natural disasters for one of the five 
causes stated under the Geneva Convention. Regarding the EU, one can imagine that these 
people fall under the subsidiary protection in cases where the depletion of natural resources 
or water supplies due to climate change lead to an armed conflict covered by Article 15, c) 
of the Qualification Directive. The return to a country gravely affected by climate change to 
the point where the situation would become unbearable, may also fall within the concept of 
inhuman or degrading treatments within the meaning of Article 15, b) of the Directive. 
Finally, Directive 2001/55 of 20 July 2001 on temporary protection could be applied in 
cases of mass influx of displaced persons due to climatic or environmental reasons, as the 
cases of people fleeing "areas of armed conflict or endemic violence " or " systematic or 
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generalised violations of human rights" referred to in Article 2, c) of this Directive are only 
examples in a non-exhaustive list983, despite the fact that the legislator did not, during the 
course of preparing this Directive, accept a proposal to include natural disasters in this 
list984.  
 
People fleeing their home country due to climatic or environmental protection can also be 
fall under domestic law or practices of certain Member States of the European Union. 
Finland and Sweden are currently the only examples where people can receive temporary 
protection because of an environmental disaster under a specific provision in the legislation 
on foreigners. Regarding the practice, it is worth noting that the United Kingdom has 
granted residence permits to people because of the volcanic eruption in Montserrat in 1995, 
and such situations can lead to the delivery of residence permits on humanitarian grounds 
in Denmark.  
 
Knowing that the criteria for entitlement to subsidiary protection should be defined "on the 
basis of international obligations under instruments of human rights and practices already 
existing in the Member States" following point 25 of the preamble of the Qualification 
directive, there is a legal basis, albeit limited, to consider the integration of persons fleeing 
their country of origin for reasons of climate or environmental in the latter mentioned 
Directive. It may be recalled here that the European Parliament proposed in 2002, during 
the discussion of the current qualification directive, that this matter be discussed at the 
second stage of the construction of a common European asylum system.  
 
The European Council agreed in the Stockholm Programme to further explore the linkages 
between climate change, migration and development and invited the Commission to 
present an analysis of the effects of climate change on international migration, including 
potential effects on immigration in the European Union. The Commission announced in its 
Action Plan on the implementation of the Stockholm program a communication on this 
point during the year 2011. The items should be quickly assembled so that the issue of 
environmental or climate "refugees" be taken into account in the common European asylum 
system at its inception in 2012. If the recast of the Qualification directive is the appropriate 
legislative instrument to do so, the idea, in line with the strengthening of the global 
approach to migration envisaged by the Commission, to use regional protection 
programmes to assist third countries to strengthen their reception capacities should also be 
considered due to the fact that most persons could remain in their home region. 
2. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF PROTECTED PERSONS  
 
The issue of freedom of movement of protected persons, that is to say, those who have 
already obtained either refugee status or subsidiary protection, comes up in a rather 
specific manner in the European Union. It is indeed discussed as much as a question of 
individual rights of the protected persons as a way to contribute to a better sharing of the 
burden of asylum between Member States of the European Union. This is particularly the 
case since solidarity between Member States on asylum is discussed in terms of relocation 
of protected persons, that is to say, the internal relocation in the EU of persons protected in 
a Member State experiencing particular pressures on asylum to other Member States better 
disposed to host a certain number (a pilot project for the benefit of Malta is implemented 
during the year 2010). Although it is difficult to assess the potential impact of the 
recognition of freedom of movement for persons protected due to the fact that mobility 
                                                 
983  Article 2, c) does indeed use the term “particularly” before listing the above two cases  
984  Council document 6128/01, p.4 
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would be left to the individuals concerned, it is reasonable to think that it would relieve to 
some extent the states undergoing particular pressure. Moreover, one can also understand 
the granting of such freedom to protected persons as a form of compensation for the 
inability to choose their first asylum country within the European Union because of the 
Dublin system for determining the responsible State. In this context, it is necessary to 
devise a mechanism that is as effective as possible for the people and for the Member 
States concerned.  
 
The Commission has already proposed on 6 June 2007 to extend the scope of directive 
2003/109 concerning the status of long-term residents, to beneficiaries of international 
protection. This proposal was apparently blocked for the reason that some Member States 
most affected, considered it an insufficient answer to the problem of burden sharing 
mentioned above. It is arguable that the length of the period of residence required to 
acquire the status of long-term resident of five years, is actually quite long, despite the fact 
that the duration of the asylum procedure would be included in the calculation of the 
number of years required. Moreover, another crucial factor must be taken into account in 
assessing this proposal.  
 
It is because the relationship between the status of long-term residents issued by a 
Member State and freedom of movement within the European Union is organised in too 
loose a manner by directive 2003/109. Article 14 § 2 of chapter of this directive on the 
residence in other member states actually allows them to examine the situation of their 
labour market and apply their national procedures regarding the requirements on filling a 
position, plus they can also apply the priority rules in favour of European citizens and third 
country nationals legally residing and receiving unemployment benefits. Thus, freedom of 
movement for long-term residents may be reduced to students and people moving for 
reasons other than work. As Member States, in transposing the directive 2003/109, widely 
used the possibility to limit the movement of long-term residents as workers, the above 
proposal of the Commission may therefore be considered inadequate due to the limited 
effects it would have if it were to be adopted. Rather, the granting of a genuine free 
movement985 of protected persons must be considered as much from a legal point as from 
the political viewpoint.  
 
This well-known goal of European law can be achieved in two somewhat complex ways. The 
first is to provide in the qualification directive or in another text, the provisions granting to 
persons protected the right to reside in other Member States of the European Union by 
requesting from the Member State where they intend to settle the recognition of the 
decision to grant refugee status or subsidiary protection. The second would be to define the 
rights of persons protected as privileged third-country nationals to reside in other Member 
States of the European Union and to enable them to obtain from their new asylum country 
the recognition of their status once they have established their residence. The first method 
seems more consistent with the wording of Article 79, §2, a) TFEU providing that the 
common European asylum system has a "uniform status of asylum” (in reality that of 
refugee) "valid throughout the Union” (such accuracy is not provided in point b) in respect 
of subsidiary protection). The second seems to be favoured in the Stockholm program 
providing for the creation of "a framework for the transfer of the protection of beneficiaries 
of international protection when exercising their rights of residence acquired under the 
legislation of the EU." 
                                                 
985  We thus question the reasons why the Directive 2009/50 dated 25th May 2009 establishing the 
conditions for entry and residence of third country nationals for the purpose of highly qualified 
employment (directive called “blue card”) including provisions relating to mobility between member 
states of interest to beneficiaries of international protection excludes them from its scope 
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Both methods achieve in reality about the same result in linking mutual recognition and 
freedom of movement, knowing that the most of the discussions will focus, in both cases, 
on the conditions the protected person must meet to obtain, in one or another order, the 
mutual recognition of their status as protected persons or their right to stay. The second 
seems preferable for the reason that it gives individuals a right to stay as third-country 
national which should avoid them, provided they are extended the opportunity to get the 
long-term resident status986, to lose their right to stay in the event of application of the 
cessation clauses, which would be the case if it arose from their status as protected 
persons.  
 
Based on the idea that granting freedom of stay is, whatever the manner of achieving this, 
mandatory under Article 79, §2, a) of the Treaty of Lisbon to make the status of refugee 
(as well as subsidiary protection as this seems desirable and even necessary under the 
principle of non-discrimination) valid throughout the European Union, it is proposed to 
extend to protected persons freedom of stay in other Member States to work as an 
employee or as an independent. This proposal should also help achieve the second 
objective (above) to alleviate the Member States for whom the asylum system implies 
particular pressures.  
 
The conditions provided for exercising this freedom would be those of directive 2004/38 of 
29 April 2004 on the free movement of EU citizens, upon production of the proof of a 
promise of employment, proof of employment or of exercise of independent activity. 
However, a period of residence in the Member State of first asylum would be provided 
before allowing the exercise of freedom of residence in order, on the one hand, to limit the 
temptation to abuse the international protection status, on the other, to build confidence 
between Member States before they are forced to accept on their territory a person 
benefitting from international protection in another Member State. This period corresponds 
to the period set by the Commission in its proposal for a recast of the qualification directive 
for renewal of residence permit, or three years. A protected person would acquire the 
freedom of movement as a worker with the first renewal of his residence. Besides the fact 
that the prescribed period is shorter than the one for acquiring the status of long-term 
residents, even if it does not include the duration of the asylum procedure, this system 
differs from the above proposal of the Commission in that it creates in the chief of 
protected persons a genuine uniform individual right to free movement as workers in all 
Member States of the EU (subject to opt-out of certain Member States). Some limitations 
compared to free movement of EU citizens could be provided if found necessary, such as a 
salary equivalent to at least the minimum wage to ensure that the people have adequate 
resources.  
 
The Commission announced in its Action Plan for implementing the Stockholm program, a 
communication on "A framework for the transfer of international protection and the mutual 
recognition of decisions on asylum" for 2014. Such a time limit for a single communication 
which will then have to be followed by a legislative initiative, which itself will require some 
time before being adopted, may seem unusually long when taking into account the 
objective is not only to grant additional rights to protected persons, but also to relieve the 
Member States facing particular pressures. The argument that we must first achieve a 
sufficient level of harmonisation and therefore await before the adoption of the second 
generation of standards for asylum, is hardly convincing when one considers the fact that 
                                                 
986  The above proposal of the commission therefore retains its meaning, except as regards the provisions 
of the Directive 2003/109 relating to residence in other member States.  
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Member States did not hesitate to adopt a system for determining the state responsible for 
examination of an asylum claim such as Dublin based on an implicit form of mutual 
recognition of negative decisions 30 years ago (the Dublin Convention of 1990) before any 
form of harmonisation of asylum was even considered in Europe. 
 
SECTION 5: THE DISTRIBUTIVE DIMENSION 
1. A DISTRIBUTIVE SYSTEM FOR THE CEAS: OBJECT-
IVES AND APPROACHES FOR REFORM 
 
Assuming that all pending legislative proposals are adopted, the “second phase” CEAS will 
not differ significantly from the “first phase” CEAS in its distributional elements. Protection 
seekers will still be distributed according to the Dublin system – an improved Dublin 
system, to be sure, but essentially the same system as today (see Dublin Recast Proposal, 
recital 7). As for protected persons, their relocation within the Union will still be ad hoc and 
subject to “double voluntarism” (see below, para. 3.2) – although carried out in some cases 
with the support of the EASO (see art. 5 EASO Regulation). In light of the profound 
deficiencies observed today, this “improved status quo” approach is unsustainable in the 
longer term, and a fundamental reconsideration of existing arrangements will be necessary 
(see EP 2009c:21 and 27; EP 2009b, amendment 39; COM (2009)5.2.2). 
 
At this stage, suggesting detailed mechanisms for the distribution of protection seekers and 
protected persons would of course be premature. Nothing forbids by contrast, to sketch out 
some broad orientations for future reform. Before doing so, it is useful to recall some basic 
parameters.  
 
To begin with, the Treaties lay down a number of principles and objectives that are 
particularly relevant for distributive arrangements. 
– First and foremost, the CEAS will have to be based on full respect for 
fundamental rights (art. 67 TFEU) including e.g. the right to family life and 
physical integrity.  
– More specifically, it will have to concretise the right of asylum under article 18 
CFR, and so guarantee the examination of applications for protection in one 
Member State at least, ensure respect for the prohibition of refoulement, and 
offer adequate status to the persons requiring it (see above, Section 1; see also, 
in this light, art. 78(1) and (2e) TFEU).  
– Beyond these fundamental guarantees, the CEAS will have to be “fair” towards 
third-country nationals (art. 67(2) TFEU) and promote integration once they 
obtain protection987. 
– Finally, the CEAS will have to be governed by “the principle of solidarity and fair 
sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member 
States” (art. 80 TFEU). 
 
In addition to these Treaty-based principles, the Stockholm Programme has stressed that 
distributive mechanisms under the CEAS will also have to prevent abuse of the asylum 
system (paras. 6.2 and 6.2.2.). 
 
                                                 
987  Although not mentioned in the context of art. 78, but rather in art. 79 (4) TFEU, there can be little 
doubt that integration constitutes a relevant objective of the common policy on asylum (see 
Qualification Directive, art. 33; ERF Decision, art. 4; EP 2009c:30 ff ; COM 2009:27). 
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Finally, and self-evidently, any distributive mechanism will have to be capable of achieving 
its objectives in an efficient and cost-effective manner. 
 
This is the broad policy framework within which the distributive elements of the CEAS will 
have to be developed. Before proceeding further, it is worth pointing out one last 
methodological consideration: distributive mechanisms cannot be devised in isolation. 
There are at least three key interdependences that will have to be taken into account: 
 
– First, the features (and chances of success) of distributive mechanisms will 
necessarily depend on the general development of the CEAS in its key regulatory 
components, and particularly on the level of harmonization and/or centralization 
in adjudicating claims. Based on the foregoing analysis (see Section 1, para. 3, 
and Sections 2 and 3), we will proceed on the assumption that the CEAS will be 
strengthened in all its aspects (e.g. through further harmonization and practical 
cooperation under the aegis of the EASO), but not revolutionised (e.g. through a 
full centralisation in the hands of the EU of first instance adjudication – see 
art. 78 (2e) TFEU – or through the establishment of a European Asylum Court 
competent to review and annul first instance decision). 
– Second, as it emerges from the Treaty itself, the distribution of protection 
seekers and protected persons is not only a matter of burden sharing. Still, it is 
closely interconnected to the broader issue of burden sharing. In this regard, we 
make reference to the study submitted in January 2010 to the European 
Parliament by the Matrix Team (Matrix 2010), and stress the conclusion that 
financial burden-sharing must be substantially scaled up in the context of a 
holistic approach to the issue. 
– Third, the distribution of respectively protection seekers and protected persons 
raises different questions (e.g. in terms of cost, or human rights implications) and 
accordingly requires differentiated solutions. At the same time, the two aspects 
cannot be addressed in isolation from each other since they are closely 
interdependent. 
2. TOWARDS A NEW MECHANISM FOR THE DISTRIBU-
TION OF PROTECTION SEEKERS 
2.1. The Dublin system: a dead end 
 
The Stockholm Programme includes the following statement: “[t]he Dublin System remains 
a cornerstone in building the CEAS, as it clearly allocates responsibility for the examination 
of asylum application”. We respectfully disagree. Experience has abundantly shown that the 
Dublin system is an unfair, wasteful, and inefficient system for the distribution of protection 
seekers. In Part II of the present Report, we have described in detail its shortcomings, and 
there is no need to enter into any details here. A few reminders are nonetheless useful. 
 
– The treatment of protection seekers under the Dublin Regulation is deeply 
unsatisfactory. The Regulation: (a) offers insufficient safeguards against 
refoulement and introduces a striking inequality of treatment deriving from the 
inconsistency of asylum practices across the Union; (b) it has an adverse impact 
on family unity and, more generally, on the well-being and integration prospects 
of protection seekers; (c) it includes insufficient safeguards for vulnerable 
persons, including ill persons and children. If approved, the Recast Proposal 
would solve some of the most pressing human rights problems included in this 
Setting up a Common European Asylum System:  
Report on the application of existing instruments and proposals for the new system 
 467 
short summary. Yet, it would fall well short of delivering a satisfactory system. 
Even under the new Regulation, and unless decisive advances are made in the 
harmonisation of asylum law and practice, Dublin would remain an “asylum 
lottery” for protection seekers. Furthermore, the new Regulation would do little to 
alleviate the anti-integrative effects of the system, since it would not be premised 
on an allocation of responsibilities based on the real links between protection 
seekers and Member States. This particular problem is compounded, in the 
present state of EU Law, by the absence of mechanisms allowing for the mobility 
or relocation of protected persons between the Member States. In short, and 
without losing sight of the human rights improvements to be expected from the 
new Regulation, the “fairness” of the system to protection seekers would remain 
highly questionable. 
 
– In a “fair sharing perspective”, the system places additional burdens on States 
that are already overburdened due, in particular, to their geographical position. 
The new Regulation would provide the tools to avoid specific burden-
concentrating effects through the “suspension mechanism”, but it would still fall 
short of ensuring an equitable (“fair”) distribution of protection seekers among 
the Member States. 
 
– Finally, the Dublin system suffers from serious deficits in terms of efficiency and 
cost effectiveness. To recall: Dublin requests are launched for roughly 12% of all 
asylum requests. While acceptances are frequent, most of the agreed transfers 
are ultimately not carried out: roughly half of agreed “take backs”, and two thirds 
of agreed “take charges”, do not take place. Finally, the application of the criteria 
has practically no incidence on the distribution of responsibilities: the 
overwhelming majority of asylum applications (more than 96%) are examined in 
the State where they are first lodged988. The financial costs at which such meagre 
results are bought are not known to this date – and this is certainly a point on 
which a thorough enquiry is called for. However, the little evidence that is 
available suggests that they are quite substantial (see ECRE 2008:4; see also 
SEC (2007)15). 
 
Let us note that there is an obvious connection between the unfairness of the system to 
protection seekers and to States, on the one hand, and its dismal performance in terms of 
effectiveness, on the other hand. The Evaluation Report suggests that border States fail to 
systematically fingerprint illegal entrants, thus reducing the effectiveness of EURODAC as a 
tool for the implementation of the Dublin criteria (COM (2007a)9). As for protection 
seekers, evidence suggests that they are engaged in a constant struggle to evade the 
system through absconding, destroying evidence, and litigation. To an extent, this struggle 
is successful: uncooperative behaviour accounts among the key factors in the 
ineffectiveness of the system. However, this “success” comes at a heavy price – for 
protection seekers themselves, who risk undermining their protection chances, for the 
integrity of the CEAS, and for the orderly management of migration.  
2.2. What needs changing, what is to be kept 
 
On the basis of the preceding observations, there should be no doubt on the fact that the 
Dublin system is inherently flawed, and that no measure of tinkering can remedy its 
                                                 
988  For details on these figures, see Part II, Chapter I, Section V.2. 
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shortcomings. A distinction must nonetheless be made, in this regard, between the various 
goals of the system, since some are realistically attainable and others are not. 
 
The system is certainly apt to ensure access to an asylum procedure in the responsible 
State, especially if amended in the transition between Dublin II and Dublin III. Its 
shortcoming in this respect is that it is slow and bureaucratic. Furthermore, the system is 
theoretically apt to fulfil – and fulfils to some extent – its goal of neutralising multiple 
applications through the “one chance only” principle and take back transfers. 
 
These two functions are linked to the key principles enshrined in article 3 DR: guaranteed 
access to one procedure, and the “once-chance-only” principle. It is fair to assume, and we 
will proceed on the assumption, that whatever the distribution system chosen for the third 
phase of the CEAS, these two key principles will be maintained. For one thing, the idea of 
abolishing them has not been advanced in the intense debate on the Dublin system. Quite 
apart from this, article 78(2e) TFEU explicitly calls for a system allocating responsibility for 
examining protection claims among the Member States. It is hard to see what 
“responsibility” could mean in this context, if it did not entail that the claim must be 
examined by the responsible State, and cannot (normally) be pursued with another 
Member State. 
 
While these central elements of the system are presumably destined to stay, the 
distributive concept embodied in the criteria could and (in our view) should be reformed 
entirely since it is unworkable and ineffective. Let us reiterate: in the vast majority of 
cases, asylum applications become the responsibility of the State where they are first 
lodged. If that is so, nothing justifies running a complex, bureaucratic, time-consuming, 
and at times arbitrary system of “objective” responsibility criteria. 
 
As noted above, the chance for an in-depth reconsideration of this aspect was lost in the 
passage from the first to the second phase of the CEAS. Yet, the Commission has taken the 
commitment to “evaluat[e] the application of the Dublin Regulation at regular intervals 
and, once the second phase of the CEAS is in place, of the principles on which it is based” 
(COM (2008a)7-8). In this perspective, it is useful to consider possible alternative models 
for the distribution of protection seekers in the CEAS. 
2.3. Alternative models for the distribution of protection seekers 
2.3.1. The direction for reform: taking protection seekers’ preferences seriously 
If the analysis set out above is correct, then it would appear that the Dublin distributive 
concept suffers from a distinct lack of “user-friendliness”. It exposes them to an asylum 
lottery, and it disregards to a large extent the preferences of protection seekers, relying 
instead on a responsibility principle that the latter may with reason regard as arbitrary 
(“responsibility for entry and stay”). A significantly higher level of convergence in the 
protection and reception standards throughout the EU would reduce some of the incentives 
to evade the system, thus solving part of the problem. Still, it would not eliminate 
protection seekers’ preferences based, e.g., on social networks and previous abode, which 
the literature suggests are extremely relevant “pull-factors”. 
 
As noted above, disregard for protection seekers’ preferences has considerable costs in 
terms of welfare and integration, and a strong impact on the system’s legitimacy and 
effectiveness. It is the reason why the Dublin system so often needs the backing of costly 
and disruptive coercive measures, such as detention and escorted transfers. From a legal 
point of view, the importance of this last point cannot be overstated. There is a profound 
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difference between the coercive removal to a country where the applicant risks onward 
refoulement, or ill-treatment, and a voluntary transfer to that same country: only in the 
first case can the transfer amount to refoulement. The same goes for family issues: the 
right to family unity can only be violated if the separation from family members is imposed 
(through removal, or refused admission) by the State. 
 
As a general orientation, therefore, we fully support the proposition that the distribution 
system for the third phase of the CEAS should give greater relevance to the preferences of 
protection seekers (see EP 2009c:30 ff ; ESC Opinion on the Dublin III Proposal, 16 July 
2009, 3.2; UNHCR 2001:5; ECRE 2008:25 ff). This would reflect the view, which we also 
fully endorse, that was expressed by UNHCR in 2001: “[…] arrangements on transfer of 
responsibility should not be utilized as instruments of migration control, but rather should 
be aimed at ensuring that the most appropriate solution is identified in respect of those 
applicants who, after consideration of their claim, are found to be in need of protection as 
refugees” (UNHCR 2001:2; emphasis provided).  
2.3.2. The UNHCR model 
ExCom conclusion No. 15 provides the blueprint for the allocation model that UNHCR has 
consistently proposed (UNHCR 2001:5, 2007:38), and that the Commission regarded in 
2001 as the most credible alternative to the Dublin criteria (COM (2001)4).  
In this model, responsibility would lie, as a general rule and as it is currently the case 
under art. 13 DR, with the State where the application is first lodged. Exceptions would be 
made only if the protection seeker has a close link with another Member State. In this 
respect, and drawing on recommendations from UNHCR itself (UNHCR 2001:5), the 
following links would form the basis for responsibility criteria: 
– Family ties (broader that what is proposed in the Recast Proposal), subject to the 
consent of the persons involved, and 
– Possession of a residence permit, also subject to the protection seekers’ consent. 
Other links (e.g. previous abode, presence of persons or communities, other than family 
members and relatives, willing to provide support) would also need to be considered as 
basis for further criteria, as pointed out in the EP Resolution on the future of the Common 
European Asylum System (EP 2009a:30-31). At the very least, they should be included in 
an expanded humanitarian clause, as grounds to derogate from the “default” rule that 
responsibility lies where the claim is first lodged. 
 
To be sure, such a system would not solve all the problems posed by the existing system, 
still less ensure the achievement of all the relevant policy goals. 
 
First, and quite clearly, such a system would not necessarily ensure a “fair” distribution of 
asylum claims, as these would not be allocated according to a predetermined key. It could 
even be objected that such a system would shift the burden back from the traditional 
“transit” States at the EU borders to the traditional “destination” States. Such an argument 
would of course need to be empirically proved. We would in any event observe that: 
 
– At present, more than 96% of the applications are already examined by the State 
where they are first lodged.  
– It is by no means clear that this works to the disadvantage of traditional 
“destination” States. To the contrary, the majority of take backs are directed to 
States located at the EU borders (hence the need for the “close links” corrective 
criteria in the perspective of fair allocation). 
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– Whatever the case, it is not clear that burden-shifting on traditional “destination” 
States would be worse than the present situation, in which the Dublin system has 
the effect of shifting the burden to less resourced border States.  
 
From the standpoint of the protection seeker, the system would also fail to guarantee 
optimal integration conditions in every case. Protection seekers could still be compelled to 
lodge their asylum claim in a State other than their preferred one to avoid immediate 
removal, as it frequently happens today, and not qualify under the “integration-friendly” 
criteria derogating to the basic default rule. 
 
There is no denying, however, that such a system would considerably improve on the 
Dublin system. The effectiveness gains, and the cost reductions, would be conspicuous: 
 
– The basic working mechanisms of the existing system would be maintained, thus 
facilitating the transition – only the criteria listed in art. 9(2) and 10-12 DR would 
be eliminated, and the others would be suitably amended. 
 
– Responsibility determination would be enormously simplified, inter alia because 
the asylum applicant would actually have an incentive to provide all the relevant 
documentation and information. 
 
– Accordingly, “take charge” transfers would always be voluntary and would require 
the mobilisation of the resources that are devoted, today, to coercive transfers. 
 
The advantages would also be considerable in terms of integration, notwithstanding our 
preceding observations. The criteria based on illegal entry or on the delivery of a visa that 
do not reflect real links between the protection seeker and the State concerned (UNHCR 
2001:5), would be dropped. All the criteria derogating from the “default” rule, which would 
consist of an expanded version of the family and humanitarian criteria currently in place, 
would by contrast be conducive to the welfare and integration of the protection seeker. 
As a final point, legal challenges to “take charge” transfers would be practically excluded, 
due to the element of voluntarism involved. 
 
In short, in spite of some limitations, such a system would have the merit of simplicity, 
would eliminate the legal problems surrounding the process of responsibility determination, 
and it would advance the twin goals of being more cost-effective and more integration-
friendly. 
2.3.3. The ECRE model 
Although supporting a reform on the lines of the UNHCR model, ECRE has proposed a more 
radical departure from the Dublin system. Instead of basing responsibility allocation on 
predefined criteria, which could only ever constitute an approximation of the protection 
seekers’ preferences, ECRE advocates giving directly to the protection seeker the choice of 
the responsible State (ECRE 2009:29 ff).  
 
Such a system would be attractive for several reasons. It would, in fact, maximize the 
advantages to be expected under the UNHCR model: formalities would be reduced to a 
minimum, full cooperation could be expected from the protection seekers – while 
maintaining the “one chance only” principle to guard against abusive behaviour –, and 
chances of integration through self-determination would be maximised.  
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But while this would be the optimal system from the perspective of protection seekers, 
there are reasons to doubt that it would be acceptable for the Member States. 
 
First and foremost, multiple applications are not the only of kind of “abuse” that Member 
States intend to prevent through the Dublin system. Misuse of asylum procedures to secure 
admission in a particular State for reasons of personal convenience are also targeted. And 
arguably, a free choice system could presumably work as an incentive to lodge unfounded 
applications, since the ECRE system could be used as a “ride” to the preferred 
destination989. Whether the considerable advantages of the ECRE model would offset this 
potential disadvantage – bearing in mind Dublin’s failure to actually steer the distribution of 
asylum applications – would of course be a wholly political question. 
 
Secondly, and contrary to what empirical evidence suggests concerning the UNHCR model, 
the system would probably have palpable burden-shifting effects to the detriment of some 
Member States – the traditional destination States. ECRE itself has acknowledged this 
(ECRE 2008:30-31). The issue would be, then, whether these States would regard 
compensation through other burden-sharing mechanisms – financial solidarity, and 
administrative centralization/cooperation – as a sufficient “insurance”. 
2.3.4. Mechanisms based on distributive keys 
The models we have examined so far share one basic feature with the Dublin system. They 
are “responsibility-allocation” mechanisms, rather than schemes aiming at a pre-
determined distribution of protection seekers. Of course, in a perspective of fair 
responsibility sharing, such a scheme could also come into consideration. In particular, a 
“distributive key” could be agreed at EU level, whereby – as it happens in some federal 
States – quotas of protection seekers are allotted to the Member States in function of 
indicators such as population and GDP. 
It must be noted that past attempts at establishing such quotas have failed to attract 
sufficient support among the Member States (see Thielemann 2003:8). But quite apart 
from political feasibility, the merits of a key-based distribution mechanism would clearly 
depend on its detailed features, and great variations are conceivable on this point. 
 
First of all, distributive keys indicate the aggregate number of asylum applicants to be 
assigned to a Member State yearly, but they do not per se determine which Member State 
is responsible for each individual applicant. Two possibilities could be envisaged. 
 
– First, defining predetermined criteria to be applied by the competent national 
authorities or by the EASO – although this would mean overstepping a sensitive 
red line, by giving an EU body the power to impose the admission of an individual 
on a Member State. Be that as it may, the debate on the responsibility criteria 
would not be avoided: Dublin, real links, or the choice of the protection seeker? 
In this regard, we would maintain our position that the criteria would have to be 
devised along the lines identified by UNHCR, or along the “free choice” model 
suggested by ECRE. Indeed, available studies on national “dispersal” mechanisms 
convincingly point out that rigid mechanisms, giving no say to protection seekers 
and disregarding the protection seekers’ preferences, would undercut integration 
and invite evasion, much as it is the case today with Dublin (see BOSWELL 2003). 
– Second, entrusting the decision to the discretion of the EASO. This could lead to 
an optimal use of the reception capacities of the Member States. However, apart 
from representing an even more radical departure from the principle that Member 
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 472 
States decide on the admission of individuals, a number of difficulties would have 
to be resolved: how would the EASO take into account “protection differentials” 
among the Member States? And how would it take into account the preferences 
and interests of protection seekers? 
 
In addition to defining individual allocation rules, another issue would have to be settled: 
the nature of the quotas. There is a vast spectrum of possibilities here, and in order to 
advance reflection we would point out the two extreme models. 
 
“Rigid” quotas would place an absolute ceiling on the number of protection seekers allotted 
to each Member State. Under such a scheme, protection seekers could not be transferred 
(or kept) in a State having exhausted its yearly quota, whatever their personal situation 
and preferences. This solution would, of course, ensure strict abidance by the agreed 
distribution of responsibilities. However, it would reproduce the problems that exist under 
the Dublin system: some protection seekers would be absolutely barred from their 
preferred destination without their having a say, and without their real ties and/or 
preferences being taken into account. Indeed, unless “family unity” and “humanitarian” 
exceptions were provided for, the system would exacerbate the problems – including the 
legal problems – existing under Dublin. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, a merely indicative key could be devised. Under such a 
system, protection seeker would still be allocated under the normal responsibility criteria, 
even to States having exhausted their quota. However, quotas would indicate whether the 
“capacity” of a Member State is over- or under-utilized at any given moment, and thus 
allow for activating (and targeting) complementary burden-sharing mechanisms. In such a 
scenario, strict abidance by the agreed distribution would not necessarily be guaranteed, 
but the system would still respond to the need of respecting the real links and/or 
preferences of protection seekers. 
2.3.5. A combination of models  
All the models that we have discussed above would likely raise political difficulties. The 
UNHCR and the ECRE models would probably be met with stiff resistance from several 
Member States. “Distribution keys”, as experience makes clear, would be very difficult to 
agree. It is not our role to pre-empt or to speculate upon the political debates to come. 
 
We would only suggest that, to make any of the above solutions acceptable, they could be 
combined together and/or coupled with other mechanisms. 
 
There would be value, for instance, in making a gradual passage from Dublin to the UNHCR 
or ECRE models of responsibility allocation, allowing for experience to be gained and 
potential problems to be tested empirically before a definitive step forward is taken. In this 
perspective, the Dublin criteria could be maintained as a “dormant” system (mécanisme de 
veille) and be reactivated on a temporary basis – if at all necessary – through a procedure 
following by and large the model of art. 31 of the Dublin Recast Proposal. The 
disadvantage, here, would be to use as a remedy a system whose drawbacks are by now 
widely documented. 
 
As an alternative, and in order to address the shortcoming of the UNHCR and ECRE 
proposals, namely that they provide no guarantees as to an “equitable” distribution of 
protection seekers, these could be complemented through an indicative distribution key, 
setting out “fair share” indicators. Agreeing on an indicative key might be less prohibitive 
than agreeing on an actual distribution key. And far from being useless, an indicative key 
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could serve the purposes that have been sketched out above. Should a Member State 
receive more applications than its fair share, the following measures could (or would 
mandatorily) be taken: 
 
– Increased financial assistance from (scaled up) EU funds and operational 
assistance for reception and processing of asylum applications through the EASO 
– something that would also prevent “overburdening” crises from turning into 
“protection” crises, since scaled-up assistance would help maintaining or raising 
protection and reception standards. 
– The activation of EU funded “transfer programmes” to under-burdened States, to 
be managed by the EASO. In such a scheme, the selected under-burdened State 
would have an obligation to accept responsibility for transferred protection 
seekers (see, for a purely voluntary precedent, ERF Decision, art. 1(e), 2(6) and 
6(c)). Let us stress that in this model, relocation would however not be 
compulsory for the protection seeker, as this would recreate the problems that 
characterize the Dublin system. Rather, the “transfer programmes” should 
provide protection seekers with incentives and facilities for their voluntary 
transfer to another Member State (see also: Matrix 2010:146).  
 
Such a composite system could be conducive – at any rate, much more conducive than the 
Dublin system – to a cost-effective, humane and productive allocation of responsibilities, 
while providing for robust mechanisms of burden sharing. 
2.4. Distribution systems and protection guarantee: on the need to 
retain the sovereignty clause 
 
Having discussed possible distribution systems for protection seekers, one point must be 
stressed. As noted above, we assume that the “one-chance only principle” will remain a 
centrepiece of the future CEAS. The implication is that coercive “take back” transfers will 
also remain a lasting element of the future CEAS. In our view, this will make it necessary to 
retain, whatever the “post-Dublin” instrument chosen, the sovereignty clause and all 
attendant guarantees (e.g. effective remedies) as a safeguard against direct or indirect 
refoulement. 
 
To explain our position, it is sufficient to recall three legal elements that have been 
examined at length elsewhere in this Report (see above, Part II, Chapter I, Section I): (a) 
it is the individual responsibility of each Member State, under the Geneva Convention and 
ECHR, to ensure that transfers to another State do not result in onward refoulement or 
inhuman or degrading treatment in the responsible State; (b) such responsibility cannot be 
circumvented through the application of absolute presumptions of safety; (c) Member 
States are expected to remain in charge of adjudicating protection claims and providing 
reception conditions, which means that the possibility of diverging standards of protection 
and reception will persist.  
 
No doubt, significant progress in the convergence of Member States’ laws and practices 
would greatly reduce the practical significance of the sovereignty clause. Strict common 
standards, commanding universal compliance and adequately reflecting international 
standards, would make it practically impossible to successfully challenge Dublin transfers 
on protection-related grounds. Doing away entirely with the sovereignty clause, i.e. with 
the possibility to challenge a transfer on protection-related grounds, would however be 
incompatible with the Member States’ international obligations.  
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3. STRENGTHENING DISTRIBUTION MECHANISMS FOR 
BENEFICIARIES OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 
3.1. An alternative to a better allocation of protection seekers? 
 
In devising the alternatives to Dublin, one should also take into account the possible 
introduction of new rules on the distribution of beneficiaries of international protection. We 
are referring to the introduction of free movement rights and to the strengthening of 
internal relocation programmes. We see the value of both initiatives, and we believe that 
both would be useful elements of the future CEAS.  
 
Before addressing them briefly, however, we would stress that we do not regard them as 
alternative to reforming the Dublin system. First of all, we see a more productive pre-status 
determination allocation, and post-status determination mobility, as both desirable in their 
own right. The needs and aspirations of the concerned persons evolve over time. Allowing 
for mobility once status is determined would provide an additional chance of continually 
maximizing the integration, self-reliance and well-being of protected persons. This would 
be, of course, also to the benefit of the host societies. 
 
Secondly, no hasty assumptions should be made as to whether, and to what extent, the 
mobility of protected persons would solve the problems raised by the Dublin system.  
 
In this regard, it bears recalling again that, for the time being, the failures of the Dublin 
system are largely due to the disparities in protection and reception standards that still 
exist among the Member States. Forms of mobility for protected persons would do nothing 
to alleviate this problem. Dublin would still be as unfair – a “protection lottery” – and 
inefficient as it is today. 
 
Assuming that the objective set by the Stockholm Programme would be achieved – namely, 
“that similar cases [are] treated alike and result in the same outcome [throughout the EU]” 
– part of the problem would of course disappear. In this scenario, the chief obstacle to a 
satisfactory functioning of the Dublin system would be its disregard for preferences based 
on different reception conditions and, crucially, on different integration prospects. In 
theory, the promise of a chance to relocate to the preferred destination, once recognised as 
persons in need of protection, could render the whole Dublin concept more acceptable to 
bona fide protection seekers. Just how much, however, would depend on the credibility of 
the promise, on the length of the “waiting period” imposed, and on the conditions attached 
to it. If for instance free movement was extended only to workers, as proposed above 
(Section 4), free movement would of course constitute a solution only for a fraction of the 
persons allocated (and potentially mis-allocated) under Dublin. 
3.2. A system based on voluntary relocation 
 
The two concepts that are being discussed are, as noted above, free movement rights and 
relocation programmes. The possibilities and advantages linked to free movement, as well 
as its possible forms, have already been discussed in Section 4. In the following lines, we 
will focus on internal relocation, which comes closer to a concept of (planned) distribution.  
An EU concept of internal relocation of protected persons is slowly taking form. The two key 
elements of the acquis in this regard are: (a) ERF funding for initiatives undertaken by the 
Member States (see ERF Decision, recital 19, art. 1(e), 2(6) and 6), as well as (b) the 
competences of the EASO to “promote, facilitate and coordinate” such initiatives in favour 
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of Member States which are faced with “specific and disproportionate pressure” (see EASO 
Regulation, recital 6 and art. 5). The European Council, for its part, has provided political 
impetus for the establishment of relocation programmes to the benefit of overburdened 
States, and a pilot project for Malta has been launched (see Pact on Immigration and 
Asylum, IVc). 
 
The central tenet of this emerging re-allocation acquis is double voluntarism, i.e. the 
agreement of the States and of the individuals concerned. Double voluntarism is, in itself, a 
valuable principle, ensuring acceptance from all the parties concerned. However, it reduces 
the chances that significant programmes are implemented. 
 
As was perhaps to be expected, the initiatives taken so far have not yielded significant 
results: “ad hoc examples have been more symbolic than anything else, as they have had a 
negligible impact on costs and overall pressures on the country in question” (Matrix 
2010:16). 
 
The European Parliament, while expressing support for voluntary relocation mechanisms 
(EP 2009c:37 and 40), has called for decisive steps forward, such as “the prompt 
formalisation of the principle of solidarity and fair sharing […] involv[ing] a system of 
‘compulsory and irrevocable solidarity’” (EP Resolution on the Stockholm Programme, 
para. 56), as well as the establishment of “[b]inding responsibility sharing instruments” (EP 
2009a, amendment 39). 
 
In the Stockholm Programme, the European Council has refrained from endorsing such 
ambitious goals. It has only referred to the “voluntary and coordinated sharing of 
responsibility”, emphasizing administrative assistance and capacity building in all Member 
States, rather than re-allocation mechanisms (Stockholm Programme, paras. 6.2.1 and 
6.2.2).  
The Matrix study submitted to Parliament in January 2010 suggests that considerable 
benefits could be obtained, in terms of an equitable distribution of responsibilities and 
burdens, from more ambitious schemes of internal resettlement, including from schemes 
breaking away from double voluntarism. In other words, introducing compulsory burden 
sharing, as requested by the European Parliament, would seem to be a sensible and 
desirable policy option in a burden-sharing perspective. 
  
We would however wish to highlight a key recommendation made in the very same study: 
“Only physical relocation of protection seekers will make a significant contribution to a 
more equitable distribution of asylum costs across Member States. If this is to avoid 
generating significant human costs and additional costs to the Member States, it is crucial 
that this is based on a voluntary relocation of the protection seeker” (MATRIX 2010:146). 
This recommendation should also apply, in our view, to the relocation of protected persons. 
Indeed, in legal terms it applies a fortiori to protected persons. The compulsory transfer 
(i.e. the expulsion) of a legally residing person would raise serious human rights issues. In 
the case of refugees, it would be in direct violation of article 32 of the Geneva Convention, 
which prohibits the expulsion of “refugees lawfully in [the] territory [of State parties] save 
on grounds of national security or public order”.   
 
In short: taking reallocation initiatives from a symbolic to a significant scale would be a 
promising avenue for reform. Abandoning double voluntarism might be necessary in order 
to achieve this, although it would no doubt prove extremely difficult. Abandoning the 
element of voluntarism on the part of protection seekers would, for its part, be a serious 
mistake and a source of considerable legal problems.  
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SECTION 6: THE EXTERNAL PERSPECTIVE 
Attempting to strike the right balance between border control, migration management and 
access to protection, so that ‘the necessary strengthening of European border controls 
[does] not prevent access to protection systems by those people entitled to benefit under 
them’990, several proposals have been formulated engaging directly with the individual 
refugee and his physical access to the territory of the EU Member States in a safe and 
orderly way. Two of these solutions have been quite comprehensively formulated and 
reappear periodically on the table for negotiation at EU level. They, thus, deserve particular 
attention. Building upon them, and on account of the findings arrived at in Chapter 5 of the 
study, we present our own proposal for a ‘comprehensive approach’ to access to 
international protection at the end. Reflecting this selection, the coming sections deal with 
(2) offshore processing; (3) protected-entry procedures; and (4) our proposal for a 
comprehensive approach. The methodology applied responds to the following scheme: (1) 
the background of the mechanism under consideration is introduced; (2) the newest 
proposal at EU level is presented; (3) legal and practical shortcomings as for its 
implementation are identified; and (4) recommendations are made, as appropriate.  
1. OFF-SHORE PROCESSING: NATIONAL OR AD HOC 
PROTECTION PROGRAMMES 
1.1. Background 
1.1.1. Unilateral Initiatives 
Two major resettlement countries, the US and Australia, have conducted, and eventually 
abandoned, extraterritorial processing schemes. The US Caribbean interdiction programme 
began as a response to a surged in the number of irregular arrivals from Haiti, immersed in 
a civil war at the relevant time. A 1981 bilateral readmission agreement with Haiti 
authorised the US to intercept Haitian asylum seekers in the high seas. Subject to a 
rudimentary screening procedure onboard US Coast Guards cutters, those determined to 
have a ‘credible fear’ were given access to the mainland for full processing; the remainder 
were directly repatriated to Haiti. Out of the some 1,800 Haitians intercepted from 1981 to 
1986, none was reported to had submitted a bona fide asylum claim. All were returned to 
Haiti without any opportunity to seek judicial review. During the early 1990s, intercepted 
Haitians were taken to the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay for screening by the US 
Immigration and Naturalization Service. In 1992, however, President Bush-father allowed 
for direct repatriation to Haiti. The no-screening policy continued until 1994. It was under 
the Clinton Administration that the Government succeeded in arguing before the US 
Supreme Court that non-refoulement did not apply beyond US territorial waters, in the Sale 
case. In response, Haiti’s President-in-exile Aristide threatened the US with the suspension 
of the 1981 agreement. Consequently, President Clinton resumed the pre-screening policy 
in May 1994, entering into agreements with Jamaica and the Government of the Turks and 
Caicos Islands to use their territory for extraterritorial processing. No prior screening was 
undertaken before the transfers to these countries were carried out. Eventually, Aristide 
returned to office and the outflow of Haitian boat people decreased. Yet, in February 2004, 
violence broke out again, resulting in a further exodus. On 25 February 2005 President 
Bush-son announced that any refugee attempting to reach US shores would be turned 
back. The ‘shout test’ was, then, introduced. Upon interdiction, only those able to attract 
                                                 
990 European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, Council doc. 13440/08, 24.09.2008, p. 11. 
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the attention of the crew would be given a pre-screening interview. Then, only those 
successful in convincing the crew that they had a well-founded fear of persecution would be 
brought to the US for full processing. The rest would be returned without further 
inquisition. To our knowledge, the Obama Administration continues the interdiction 
program991. 
 
The Australian ‘Pacific Solution’ was instated after the MV Tampa incident992. A Norwegian 
registered container ship had rescued 433 asylum seekers in the waters off Australia in 
August 2001. At the time, Indonesia was the main transit country for those en route to 
Australia. Australia was assisting Indonesia with the costs of processing asylum seekers in 
its territory. They were in the process of signing an agreement on the prevention of 
people’s smuggling and trafficking. When the MV Tampa sought permission to disembark, 
Australia considered it to be Indonesia’s responsibility. At the end, having entered into 
agreements with Nauru and Papua New Guinea, Australia took the rescuees to these 
countries. The incident led to the adoption of new domestic legislation on immigration and 
asylum. Australia excised certain of its islands from its ‘migration zone’. No valid asylum 
claims could be made in those territories thereafter. And it provided that asylum seekers 
could directly be taken to a ‘declared country’ for processing. Both in Nauru and Papua New 
Guinea Australia funded closed reception centres, which were managed by the IOM. Status 
determination was conducted by Australian immigration officials, initially with the support 
of the UNHCR, and without any judicial control. Recognised refugees were resettled in 
neighbouring countries. In February 2008, Australia’s new government announced the 
abandonment of the policy and the closure of the centres in Nauru and Papua New Guinea, 
however, without excluding the idea of maintaining some sort of off-shore processing for 
unauthorised arrivals in Australia’s excised Christmas Island993. 
1.1.2. Multilateral Initiatives 
Without concerning directly the issue of off-shore processing, there are two historical 
examples of multilateral initiatives initiated to resolve a regionally focused exodus with a 
multi-stage approach. The International Conference on Central American Refugees 
(CIREFCA – 1987/1994) was incepted to deal with forced displacement in the Central 
American region ensuing from armed conflict in Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador. The 
Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees (CPA – 1988/1996) tackled the 
issue of persistent mixed flows from Vietnam to other countries in the South Eastern Asian 
region. Both entailed the collaboration between countries of origin, facilitating orderly 
departure and the return of non-refugees; countries in the region, providing first asylum 
and dealing with the determination of refugee status; and resettlement states, providing for 
durable solutions extra-regionally to those found in need of international protection. From 
the international relations perspective, both experiences have been portrayed as examples 
of successful collective action, illustrating that 'significant global burden- and responsibility-
sharing is possible and can lead to durable solutions'994. On the other hand, serious 
                                                 
991  D. Evans, ‘Florida advocates: Stop deporting Haitian immigrants!’, Facing South, 14.05.2009, 
available at: http://www.southernstudies.org/2009/05/the-debate-over-floridas-haitian-immigrants-
heats-up.html#  
992  Federal Court of Australia, Ruddock and Others v. Vadarlis and Others, 18.09. 2001, [2001] FCA 
1329. 
993  ‘Last refugees in Nauru,’ Ministry for Immigration and Citizenship, Press Release, 08.02.2008: ‘The 
asylum claims of future unauthorised boat arrivals will be processed on Christmas Island. Christmas 
Island will soon have an increased capacity for offshore processing of unauthorised arrivals with the 
opening of the new immigration detention centre built by the former Government. The new centre on 
Christmas Island will have the capacity to house 400 people with a surge capacity of a further 400 
people.’  Available at: http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/media-releases/2008/ce08014.htm. 
994  A. Betts, Comprehensive Plans of Action: Insights from CIREFCA and the Indochinese CPA, New Issues 
in Refugee Research, UNHCR Working Paper No. 120, January 2006, p. 5.  
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procedural flaws have prompted significant disapproval in legal quarters. Particularly in the 
case of the CPA, the status determination procedures, run by countries that were not 
parties neither to the Geneva Convention nor to other major human rights instruments, 
have been severely criticised995. Accordingly, from the legal point of view, any attempt at 
replicating these experiences should be subject to careful consideration. 
 
Although without subsequent implementation, plans to extraterritorialise asylum 
procedures have been reiterated in recent times. Denmark submitted in 1986 a proposal for 
a Resolution to the UN General Assembly, suggesting the establishment of regional 
processing centres administered by the UN. According to the draft, asylum claims would be 
processed in these centres and durable solutions would be granted to those found to be in 
need thereof. Voluntary repatriation would be privileged over ‘regional integration’, and 
‘resettlement outside the region’ would intervene as a measure of last resort996. However, 
the draft failed to attract sufficient support and was eventually discarded. 
 
In 1993, The Netherlands placed ‘reception in the region of origin’ on the agenda of the 
Inter-Governmental Consultations (IGC). The ‘Dutch Proposal’ was ‘distinct from most 
traditional schemes by referring to the possibility of processing exclusively in the region, 
and consequently returning asylum-seekers from the territory or borders of participating 
states to facilities in the region of origin […]997". Not only processing centres were 
envisaged, but also camps for the accommodation of applicants, which would be run 
multilaterally. The proposal was studied in depth, but a series of legal and practical 
concerns led to the abandonment of the idea. The IGC explicitly stated that ‘the “exclusive” 
option [was] not feasible and as, such, [did] not deserve further elaboration’998. A 
comprehensive account of ‘a pro-refugee but anti-asylum strategy’ was put forward by the 
British ‘New Vision for Refugees’999. It consisted of four components: (1) ‘Regional 
Protection Areas’, conceived of as ‘artificially created internationally controlled areas’, 
providing for protection and assistance to those accommodated in source regions; (2) the 
return to those areas of certain categories of asylum seekers, immediately upon the 
submission of a claim; (3) coercive intervention, sanctions and military action, as means to 
‘stop the protection need occurring’; and (4) the ‘assumption that the main way in which 
refugees would move to a third country would be through Regional Protection Areas’. 
Recognised refugees would either be accepted for resettlement or required to integrate 
locally, whereas those found not to be in need of international protection would be 
repatriated to their home countries. A later version of the plan, submitted for discussion at 
the European Council in March 2003, projected that ‘Transit Processing Centres’ would be 
introduced alongside ‘Regional Protection Areas’1000. The ambition was ‘to deter those who 
enter the EU illegally and make unfounded asylum applications’. To guarantee the deterrent 
effect, it was proposed that these centres ‘be placed on transit routes into the EU’. 
According to the draft, asylum seekers arriving in the participating Member States would be 
transferred to a transit processing centre directly to have their applications assessed there. 
                                                 
995  For an example see S. Bari, 'Refugee Status Determination under the Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(CPA): A Personal Assessment,' IJRL (1992), pp. 487-513. 
996  UNGA, International procedures for the protection of refugee : draft resolution, UN Doc 
A/C.3/41/L.51, 12.11.1986, available at: 
 http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N86/299/46/img/N8629946.pdf?OpenElement.  
997  IGC Secretariat, Working Paper on Reception in the Region of Origin, September 1994, p. 6-7 
(emphasis added). 
998  IGC Secretariat, Reception in the Region of Origin: Draft Follow-Up to the 1994 Working Paper, August 
1995, p. 7. 
999 New Vision for Refugees, 07.03.2003, available at: 
http://www.proasyl.de/texte/europe/union/2003/UK_NewVision.pdf, 
1000  New International Approaches to Asylum and Protection, 10.03.2003, attached to a letter Tony Blair 
addressed to President of the European Council, available at: 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/apr/blair-simitis-asile.pdf.  
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The centres would be located outside EU territory, possibly managed by the IOM, and 
financed jointly by the participating Member States. The answer to whether the centres 
would also host ‘illegal migrants intercepted en route to the EU before they had lodged an 
asylum claim but where they had a clear intention of doing so’ was deferred to further 
discussion. The key question was ‘to consider whether such a process should apply to all, or 
only certain categories of unfounded asylum applicants’. 
 
In response to the British initiative, the UNHCR launched a ‘Three-Pronged Proposal’1001, a 
comprehensive model aimed at improving global access to durable solutions both in regions 
of origin and in destination countries. The ‘Regional Prong’ addressed the necessity to 
strengthen protection capacities in source regions, whereas the ‘Domestic Prong’ proposed 
measures to rationalize procedures in industrialized states. Bridging them both, the ‘EU 
Prong’ engaged in a re-modelling of Blair’s ‘Transit Processing Centres’. ‘Upon arrival 
anywhere within the territory of EU Member States or at their borders, all asylum seekers 
from designated countries of origin would be transferred immediately to the centres, except 
from persons […] medically unfit to travel or stay in closed reception centres, as well as 
unaccompanied and separated children’. These closed centres would be located in the 
territory of the EU Member States, would be funded with EU resources, and would offer 
rapid and fair processing, according to EU standards. Persons found in need of asylum 
‘would be distributed fairly amongst Member States, according to a pre-determined key’, 
whereas unfounded applicants would be jointly returned to their countries of origin. In 
regard of the target group, the UNHCR established that, ‘consistent with the objective of 
tackling the abuse of asylum systems, the main focus would be on populations who consist 
primarily of economic migrants, that is, persons from specific countries of origin whose 
asylum applications are likely to be manifestly unfounded’. In December 2003, the Office 
reviewed its proposal on the ‘EU Prong’, pleading for the progressive establishment of a 
comprehensive EU system. The system would, then, comprise EU Reception Centres, an EU 
Asylum Agency to take charge, in time, of first instance decisions, and an EU Asylum 
Review Board for appeals. Reception Centres in the revised version were to be open and 
decision-making was to be undertaken under regular rather than accelerated 
arrangements1002. 
 
Along these lines, the German Interior Minister at the time insisted in the creation of ‘safe 
zones’, ‘camps’ or, as referred to in later submissions, ‘reception facilities’ in North Africa 
with the financial assistance of the EU. A proposal was submitted informally to the Brussels 
JHA Council in July 2004. The premises would lodge those intercepted en route to the 
Union, who would otherwise embark on unseaworthy boats to reach European shores. A 
screening would be undertaken inland to identify prospective refugees. No appeal 
procedures were envisaged. Those found to be irregular migrants would be returned on the 
basis of readmission agreements. For those found to be refugees, EU Member States could 
offer durable solutions, on a voluntary basis.1003 In the aftermath of the Cap Anamur 
upheaval,1004 the idea was further elaborated and eventually emerged in a public 
                                                 
1001 UNHCR, Three-Pronged Proposal, June 2003, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3efc4b834.pdf. 
1002  UNHCR, A Revised ‘EU Prong’ Proposal, December 2003, at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/400e85b84.pdf.  
1003  Deutsche Presse Agentur, 19.07.2004 and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19.07.2004. 
1004  In the summer of 2004, a German NGO vessel, the Cap Anamur rescued some 40 asylum 
seekers/migrants in the Mediterranean. The Italian authorities requested the flag State to take charge 
of the rescuees. Germany opposed and Italy eventually allowed disembarkation. However, most of the 
asylum seekers/migrants were directly returned, seemingly without a proper assessment of their 
asylum claims. Criminal proceedings were brought against the captain and the president of the NGO 
for abetting illegal immigration. Both have been absolved by the Agrigento Court on 07.10.2009: 
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document. In his ‘Effective Protection for Refugees, Effective Measures against Illegal 
Migration’,1005 Otto Schily submitted that the scheme would be based on joint interception 
in the high seas and return to extraterritorial processing centres in North Africa. The 
centres would not provide full status determination, but only a form of simplified review, 
whereby those deemed to be refugees would either be transferred to “safe countries in the 
region of origin” or to the EU. Following the US Supreme Court’s understanding in Sale, the 
proposal rested on the assumption that the prohibition of non-refoulement ‘has no 
application on the high seas’.  
 
The Hague Programme, adopted in November 2004, did not contain any official 
endorsement of any of these proposals. Instead, it invited the Commission to present a 
‘study, to be conducted in close consultation with the UNHCR, [to] look into the merits, 
appropriateness and feasibility of joint processing of asylum applications outside the EU 
territory, in complementarity with the Common European Asylum System and in 
compliance with the relevant international standards’ (§1.3). The Commission plans to 
launch the study at the beginning of 2010. 
1.2. Presentation 
 
The Stockholm Programme, in a rather cryptic language, urges ‘the Commission to explore 
[…] new approaches concerning access to asylum procedures targeting main transit 
countries, such as protection programmes for particular groups or certain procedures for 
examination of applications for asylum, in which Member States could participate on a 
voluntary basis’ (§6.2.3.). It omits, however, the invitation to ‘the Council and the 
Commission to develop methods to identify those who are in need of international 
protection in “mixed flows”’ and the reference to ‘taking forward the analysis of the 
feasibility and legal and practical implications of joint processing of asylum applications 
inside and outside the Union’ earlier drafts of the Programme contained1006. 
 
Meanwhile, in the aftermath of the Italian push-backs in the summer of 20091007, former 
JLS Commissioner Barrot mentioned in an interview that he would suggest to Libya that it 
opens ‘reception points’ for asylum seekers in its territory1008. Elaborating on this idea, the 
French delegation has tabled a proposal to resolve the ‘migration situation in the 
Mediterranean’, through the establishment of ‘a partnership with migrants’ countries of 
                                                                                                                                                            
http://cerca.unita.it/data/PDF0114/PDF0114/text42/fork/ref/09281jrs.HTM?key=cap+anamur&first=1
&orderby=1.  
1005  ‘Effektiver Schutz für Flüchtlinge, wirkungsvolle Bekämpfung illegaler Migration. Überlegungen des 
Bundesministers des Innern zur Errichtung einer EU-Aufnahmeeinrichtung in Nordafrika,’ 09.09.2005, 
available at: 
http://www.proasyl.de/fileadmin/proasyl/fm_redakteure/Archiv/presseerl/Schily_ueberlegungen.pdf.  
1006  Draft Stockholm Programme, version of 16.10.2009, § 5.2.3. and version of 06.10.2009, § 5.2.2., 
available at: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/oct/stockholm-draft-presidency-programme.pdf.  
1007  UNHCR, ‘Official: Italy to continue returning would-be immigrants to Libya,’ 23.09.2009, available at: 
http://unhcr-eu.se/official-italy-to-continue-returning-would-be-immigrants-to-libya/; ‘Follow-up from 
UNHCR on Italy's push-backs,’ 12.05.2009, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/4a0966936.html.; 
‘UNHCR interviews asylum seekers pushed back to Libya’, 14.07.2009, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/4a5c638b6.html. An application has been lodged with the ECtHR by some of 
the migrants affected: Hirsi v Italy, Appl. No. 27765/09. See also UNHCR, 'Hirsi and Others v. Italy – 
Submission by the Office of the UNHCR' February 2010, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/type,AMICUS,,,4b97778d2,0.html. 
1008  ‘Barrot veut des points d’accueil pour les migrants,’ Europe1, 12.07.2009, available at : 
http://www.europe1.fr/Info/Actualite-France/Politique/Barrot-veut-des-points-d-accueil-pour-les-
migrants/; ‘Les dernières propositions de Jacques Barrot ne sont pas convenables,’ France Terre 
d’Asile, 13.07.2009, available at:  
 http://www.france-terre-asile.org/index.php/component/content/article/1166; ‘Barrot wants reception 
points in Libya for asylum seekers,’ ECRE Weekly Bulletin, 17.07.2009, available at : 
http://www.ecre.org/files/ECRE_Weekly_Bulletin_17_July_2009.pdf. 
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origin and of transit, enhancing Member States’ joint maritime operations and finding 
innovative solutions for access to asylum procedures’1009.  
 
The proposal is three-folded. In the first place, ‘a partnership with third countries of transit 
and of origin based on reciprocal requirements and operation support’ is to be concluded. It 
is proposed that ‘a strong political dialogue’ be maintained with both Libya and Turkey, in 
particular, ‘on existing migration routes’. Within this framework, ‘the European Union must 
issue a firm reminder of its requirements while offering its support to those countries’ 
operational capacities’. It is envisaged that practical cooperation be reinforced in the fields 
of external borders monitoring and the fight against illegal immigration and organised 
crime. To that effect, the French delegation proposes that readmission agreements be 
concluded by the EU with these countries that Libya be led to the definition of its Search 
and Rescue Area and that European immigration liaison officers be stationed in their 
territories. In exchange, ‘their efforts may be accorded appropriate support via the various 
Community resources’. 
 
The second prong of the initiative aims at ‘enhancing joint maritime operations at the EU’s 
external borders’. In this regard, ‘FRONTEX’s modus operandi in the Mediterranean should 
be reviewed’, so that the Agency can duly intervene at all three levels of action deemed 
fundamental ‘to cope with crisis situations at the maritime borders’. Maritime intervention 
by the coastal State of departure is considered ‘the most relevant’, as it happens the 
‘closest to the illegal immigrants’ place of embarkation’. Conversely, high sea intervention 
is deemed with the potential to create a pull factor and attract migrants ‘in order to 
“provoke” their rescue’. It is, therefore, proposed that air surveillance patrols take over 
maritime operations at this level. Maritime interception in European waters would 
complement the other two levels of intervention, being considered ‘an effective means of 
preventing illegal disembarkations and subjecting the intercepted persons to the standard 
legal procedures’. For these purposes, FRONTEX should be allocated appropriate resources 
that it could use ‘to help finance the whole of this chain of intervention’. This part of the 
strategy would be supported by a comprehensive return policy, in which FRONTEX and EU 
funds would play a key role.  
 
The final leg of the French initiative deals with ‘innovative solutions concerning asylum’. It 
is stated that ‘[e]very care must be taken to ensure that persons apprehended during 
interceptions or rescues at sea are not exposed either directly or indirectly, in the country 
to which they are to be repatriated, to the risk of any punishment or treatment which 
violates the provisions of the [ECHR]. Such persons must be given a genuine opportunity to 
request and – if a need is established – to obtain international protection’. Two alternatives 
are proposed. Either an ‘ad hoc protection programme’ is started in Libya with the 
participation of the UNHCR and the IOM and the financial support of the EU, or the 
possibility is offered to lodge asylum applications at the EU Member States’ embassies in 
that country. 
 
The ad hoc protection programme would suppose that persons intercepted at sea under the 
second prong of the proposal be returned to Libya for processing. UNHCR would be in 
charge of establishing protection needs. ‘[S]pecial consideration would have to be given to 
the situation of such persons and to the guarantees which would be accorded to them in 
the first country of refuge while their applications were being examined, supported if 
                                                 
 1009 Migration situation in the Mediterranean: establishing a partnership with migrants’ countries of 
origin and of transit, enhancing Member States’ joint maritime operations and finding innovative 
solutions for access to asylum procedures, Council doc. 13205/09, 11.09.2009 [Migration situation in 
the Mediterranean hereinafter]. 
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necessary by the IOM’. The EU, ‘in accordance with procedures yet to be determined and 
within the framework of resettlement operations, would undertake to receive persons 
recognised as refugees and requiring resettlement on a long-term basis’.  
 
Thereafter, Italy has joined France in this initiative and the proposal was formally 
submitted to the President of the European Council for further discussion in view of the 
adoption of the Stockholm Programme1010. The Brussels European Council of October 2009 
echoes the proposal, calling for a reinforcement of FRONTEX and the intensification of 'the 
dialogue with Libya on managing migration and responding to illegal immigration, including 
cooperation at sea, border control and readmission'. Nonetheless, the Presidency also 
reminds that interceptions should be carried out 'with due regard to ensuring protection for 
those in need who travel in mixed flows, in accordance with international law'1011. In 
February 2010, the Council conclusions on ‘29 measures for reinforcing the protection of 
the external borders and combating illegal immigration’ have provided renewed support to 
this initiative1012.  
 
The Commission, in response, has issued two proposals, one to amend the FRONTEX 
Regulation, enhancing the powers of the Agency (at note 111 above), and another one for 
a Council Decision supplementing the SBC as regards the surveillance of the sea external 
borders, containing guidelines for FRONTEX-coordinated operations. The second proposal 
has been adopted by the Council on 26 April 2010 (at note 124 above). According to article 
1 of the Decision, joint maritime surveillance is governed by the rules laid down in Part I to 
the Annex. ‘Those rules and the non-binding guidelines laid down in Part II to the Annex 
shall form part of the operational plan drawn up for each operation coordinated by the 
Agency’. The Annex, in turn, makes clear that ‘[t]he especial needs of […] persons in need 
of international protection […] shall be considered throughout all the operation’ (§1.3). In 
particular, the principle of non-refoulement should be observed every time (§ 1.2). The 
Annex then proceeds to describe when and how interception powers should be used in its 
legally-binding Part I. As SAR situations may arise in the course of surveillance operations, 
Part II of the Annex, ‘reproduc[ing] and clarify[ing] international and Community rules that 
already exist’ in this regard1013, attempts at establishing a system to determine the port of 
disembarkation, but without legally-binding effect. 
1.3. Assessment 
1.3.1. Practical Obstacles 
Both the Caribbean interdiction programme and the Pacific Solution have proven 
prohibitively costly. The safe haven in Guantanamo Bay was closed down less than a year 
after inception. ‘Regarding costs, the US found [the] scheme […] to be very expensive’1014. 
The Australian experience shows that any savings from reduced processing upon arrival 
have to be relocated into the off-shore scheme together with considerable additional 
disbursement. ‘The Department of Immigration and Citizenship expended $289 million 
between September 2001 and June 2007 to run the Nauru and Manus [Off-shore 
                                                 
1010  Letter of S. Berlusconi and N. Sarkozy to F. Reinfeldt of 23.10.2009 (on file with the authors). 
1011  Presidency Conclusions, European Council 29-30 October 2009, Council Doc. 15265/09, 30.10.2009, § 
40. 
1012  29 measures for reinforcing the protection of the external borders and combating illegal immigration, 
Council conclusions, Brussels 25-26 February 2010. 
1013  Explanatory Memorandum, Commission proposal for FRONTEX Guidelines, COM (2009) 658 final, 
27.11.2009, § 5.2. 
1014  IGC Secretariat, Reception in the Region of Origin: Draft Follow-Up to the 1994 Working Paper, August 
1995, p. 27. 
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Processing Centres]’1015. From fiscal year 2002/3 to fiscal year 2005/6, the Pacific Solution 
represented a net loss of $900 million for the Australian taxpayer1016.  
 
Alongside expenses, the ‘New Vision for Refugees’ paper identified other major obstacles 
the feasibility of off-shore processing schemes similar to the Italian-French proposal would 
encounter. Any such initiatives would ‘require considerably more international co-operation 
on refugees than has been witnessed in recent decades and an international confidence in 
collectively managing problems’. Yet, Several refugee-hosting countries have already 
opposed similar proposals when they were consulted in 2003 in the framework of the 
UNHCR Convention Plus initiative1017. In a meeting with UNHCR in September 2004, North 
African states showed clear resistance to collaborate in the development of off-shore 
processing schemes1018. In July 2009, Libya was offered to start a dialogue with the 
European Commission on cooperation to jointly manage mixed migration flows, which it has 
not yet accepted1019. If, in addition,  Europe is to ‘receive persons recognised as refugees 
and requiring resettlement on a long-term basis’, the concrete ‘framework of resettlement 
operations’ has first to be established. The development of an intra-EU burden-sharing 
mechanism seems to be a precondition for any such program to succeed. As referred to 
above, experience shows, however, that resettlement has remained an underdeveloped 
component of the EU asylum policy so far. Be it as it may, ultimately, ‘[t]he main risk is 
that it will not be possible to provide [abroad] a level of protection that is sufficient for the 
courts in Europe to recognise the protection as sufficient to safeguard human rights’1020. 
Material difficulties are aggravated in the French case by Libya’s poor human rights record. 
The fact that the country is not a party to the Geneva Convention, nor to the ECHR, that it 
conducts no refugee determination procedures itself, and that, although UNHCR’s presence 
in the country is tolerated, it entertains no official co-operation with the Office, magnifies 
practical concerns. 
1.3.2. Legal Concerns 
It is not clear from the Italian-French proposal who would be considered responsible for 
those intercepted and repatriated to Libya. Under international law1021, ‘no State can avoid 
responsibility by outsourcing or contracting out its obligations, either to another State, or to 
an international organisation’1022. Cooperation with Libya would not exonerate EU Member 
States from their duties under the principle of non-refoulement or the right to leave any 
country in order to seek asylum. ‘Where States establish […] international agreements to 
pursue co-operation in certain fields of activities, there may be implications for the 
protection of fundamental rights. It would be incompatible with the purpose and object of 
the [ECHR] if Contracting States were thereby absolved from their responsibility under the 
Convention in relation to the field of activity covered by such [agreements]’1023. In addition, 
‘[i]n so far as any liability under the Convention is or may be incurred, it is liability incurred 
                                                 
1015  ‘Last refugees in Nauru,’ Ministry for Immigration and Citizenship, Press Release, 08.02.2008. 
1016  M. Kingston, ‘Terror, boat people and getting old,’ The Sidney Morning Herald, 15.05.2002, available 
at: http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/05/15/1021415009323.html. 
1017  UNHCR, Convention Plus/Forum Briefing, 07.03.2003, internal summary by the Department of 
International Protection, quoted by G. Loescher and J. Milner, op. cit., p. 604. 
1018  A. Betts, 'Towards a Mediterranean Solution? Implications for the Region of Origin,' IJRL (2006), p. 
661. 
1019  Commission Working Paper, First Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum, SEC(2010) 535 final, 
06.05.2010, p. 31. 
1020  New Vision for Refugees, p. 4. 
1021  ILC, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001, UNGA 
A/56/49(Vol.I)/Corr.4. 
1022  G. S. Goodwin-Gill, ‘The Extraterritorial Processing of Claims to Asylum or Protection : The Legal 
Responsibilities of States and International Organisations,’ U.T.S. Law Review (2007), p. 34. 
1023  ECtHR, T.I. v UK (Dec.), Appl. No. 43844/98, 07.03.2000 and K.R.S. v UK (Dec.), Appl. No. 
32733/08, 02.12.2008, p. 15. 
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by the Contracting State […]’1024. The fact that Libya, with which FRONTEX and EU Member 
States would collaborate, is not a Party to the ECHR precludes its liability under that 
instrument. Independent responsibility of each EU Member State participating in the 
scheme would subsist, ‘where the person[s] in question had suffered or risk suffering a 
flagrant denial of the guarantees and rights secured to [them] under the Convention’1025. 
Nor would the EU Member States participating in the French proposal be able to eschew 
responsibility under the ECHR by transferring functions to the UNHCR, the IOM or 
FRONTEX. ‘Absolving Contracting States completely from their Convention responsibility in 
the areas covered by such a transfer would be incompatible with the purpose and object of 
the Convention: the guarantees of the Convention could be limited or excluded at will 
thereby depriving it of its peremptory character and undermining the practical and effective 
nature of its safeguards’1026. 
 
Also uncertain is the group addressed by the Italian-French proposal. The impression is that 
all persons intercepted by the Member States, in the high seas or in territorial waters of the 
participating States, presumably with the intervention of FRONTEX, would be repatriated to 
Libya, where ‘the UNHCR would be responsible for identifying persons in need of 
protection’.1027 However, with regard to those who manage to enter the territorial waters 
of an EU Member State, selecting asylum seekers on the basis of their migration route for 
off-shore processing may amount to a penalty prohibited under article 31 GC. Recognising 
that the absence of travel documents or authorization are unrelated to protection needs, 
article 31(1) GC exonerates refugees from penalties related to their irregular entry. In 
general, such selection may also contravene article 3 GC, establishing that ‘the Contracting 
Parties shall apply the provisions of [the Geneva] Convention to refugees without 
discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin’. 
 
It is not specified in the proposal where those intercepted and repatriated to Libya would be 
accommodated. But as the ultimate aim of the program is to prevent irregular movement, 
it is conceivable that its drafters envisaged reception centres in Libya to be closed. This 
entails large-scale detention. The extraterritorial applicability of the ECHR having being 
recognised1028, the impossibility to observe article 5 ECHR’s requirements in practice should 
prompt the abandonment of the initiative. The ECHR applies in international waters 
too1029.Retention of boat people at sea, transfer to official vessels of the intercepting State 
or escort to the point of departure against free will, as the FRONTEX Guidelines suggest, 
constitutes a restriction on physical freedom that may well amount to unlawful detention, 
unless effective legal safeguards and prompt judicial review can be introduced1030. 
 
It is not known whether the French proposal envisages transfers to Libya to be automatic. 
Should that be the idea, EU Member States would risk incurring in direct and indirect 
breaches of the principle of non-refoulement with regard to those claiming a ‘well-founded 
fear’ of persecution or a ‘real risk’ of ill treatment in Libya or caused by the onwards 
deportation from Libya to ‘the frontiers of territories where [their] life or freedom would be 
threatened’. According to the legally-binding part of the guidelines for FRONTEX-led 
operations, ‘[t]he persons intercepted or rescued shall be informed in an appropriate way 
so that they can express any reasons for believing that disembarkation in the proposed 
                                                 
1024  ECtHR, Saadi v UK, 37201/06, 28.02.2008, § 126. 
1025  EComHR, WM v Denmark, Appl. No. 17392/90, 14.10.1992. 
1026  ECtHR, Bosphorus v Ireland, Appl. No. 45036/98, 30.06.2005, § 154. 
1027  Migration situation in the Mediterranean, p. 6. 
1028  ECtHR, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v UK, Appl. No. 61498/08, 02.03.2010. 
1029  ECtHR, Women on Waves, Appl. No. 31276/05, 03.02.2009. 
1030  ECtHR, Rigopoulous v Spain, Appl. No. 37388/97, 12.01.1999; Medvedyev v France, Appl. No. 
3394/03, 10.07.2008. 
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place would be in breach of the principle of non-refoulement’ (§1.2 Part I). As established 
in the non-binding Part of the Annex, the coordination centre would be informed of the 
presence of such persons and would then convey that information to the competent 
authorities of the Member State hosting the operation (§2.2 Part II). No further safeguards 
or procedural arrangements have been introduced therein. However, according to article 3  
ECHR, read in conjunction with article 13 ECHR, an ‘arguable claim’ that the transfer to 
Libya would entail such risks requires access to an ‘effective remedy1031" Inter alia, ‘the 
notion of an effective remedy […] requires that the remedy may prevent the execution of 
measures that are contrary to the Convention and whose effects are potentially irreversible 
[…]. Consequently, it is inconsistent with article 13 for such measures to be executed 
before the national authorities have examined whether they are compatible with the 
Convention’1032. In these cases, appeals have to be endowed ‘with automatic suspensive 
effect’1033. Because onboard screening would not satisfy these requirements1034, the 
claimants would have to be taken before the competent courts in Europe before any 
transfer to Libya takes place. This would translate in a considerable duplication of efforts, 
rendering the management of such a scheme overly complex. Two procedures would need 
to be run, one in Europe to decide on the appropriateness of the transfer to Libya and one 
in Libya to decide on the protection needs of the claimants. 
Automatism of the transfers to Libya may breach the notion of an effective remedy on a 
different account too. The Strasbourg Court has indicated that expulsion orders have to be 
served in writing, after an individual examination of the case, following a legal procedure 
previously established by law, stating the reasons and indicating the means and conditions 
to appeal, before deportation occurs1035. The opposite would amount to an arbitrary use of 
force, and, for our purposes, also to the collective expulsion of the migrants concerned in 
violation of the Convention1036.  
 
These reasons should induce to the refusal of the Italian-French proposal. Member States 
should not embark on a system that would hinder the fulfilment of their legal obligations 
under EU and international law. Some observers have suggested that ‘if centres are to be 
established, they should first of all be established within the European Union and 
transported only as a model if shown to work satisfactorily’1037. In the design of such a 
model, the experience Romania is gathering through its Emergency Transit Centre, 
providing for temporary evacuation to Romania of persons in urgent need of international 
protection and their onward resettlement1038, could be adapted and extended. But all the 
legal and practical preconditions for the system to deliver should be put in place first. We 
believe, however, that reinforced and improved systems of territorial processing would be a 
better investment. It should be understood that most EU Member States’ asylum systems, 
if properly managed and resourced, could deal effectively with the caseloads they face.  
                                                 
1031  Inter alia, ECtHR, Jabari v Turkey, Appl. No. 40035/98, 11.07.2000, § 48. 
1032  ECtHR, Conka v Belgium, Appl. No. 51564/99, 05.02.2002, § 79. 
1033  ECtHR, Gebremedhin v France, Appl. No. 25389/05, 26.04.2007, § 66. 
1034  On the scepticism of the UNHCR towards onboard processing see: S. Blay, J. Burn and P. Keyzer, 
‘Interception and Off-shore Processing of Asylum Seekers : The International Law Dimensions,’ U.T.S. 
Law Review (2007), p. 17. 
1035  ECtHR, Abdolkhani and Karimnia v Turkey, Appl. No. 30471/08, 22.09.2009. 
1036  ECtHR, Conka v Belgium, Appl. No. 51564/99, 05.02.2002. 
1037  PACE, Assessment of transit and processing centres as a response to mixed flows of migrants and 
asylum seekers, C Jonker Rapporteur, 13.06.2007, Doc. 11304, § 61. 
1038  UNHCR, IOM and the Government of Romania, ‘Emergency Transit Center (ETC) officially opened in 
Timisoara, Romania,’ Joint press release, 12.03.2009, available at: http://www.unhcr-
budapest.org/index.php/news/107-emergency-transit-center-etc-officially-opened-in-timisoara-
romania; Agreement between the Government of Romania and the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration Regarding Temporary 
Evacuation to Romania of Persons in Urgent Need of International Protection and their Onward 
Resettlement, 08.05.2008,  available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4a7c221c2.pdf.  
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1.4. Recommendations 
 
The selection of addresses shall neither be discriminatory nor amount to a penalty, as 
articles 3 and 31 GC have to be observed. Detention must comply with article 5 ECHR 
levels, both at sea and upon arrival to Libya. Transfers to that country cannot be 
automatic, since the procedural guarantees attached to protection against refoulement, 
as established in the ECHR and the EUCFR, must be fulfilled. In this light, considering 
the overly complex system that would have to be developed, it is highly uncertain that 
the initiative can be pursued in practice. 
 
On one hand, ‘the creation of centres outside Europe would […] appear highly 
problematic’1039,  as many doubts exist concerning the ability of national protection 
programmes to comply with international and EU legal standards. On the other hand, 
EU Member States should not create situations in which the fulfilment of their 
obligations under international and EU law cannot be guaranteed. On this account, the 
initiative, as currently conceived of, shall be abandoned. 
The preferred line of action is the investment in better managed and better resourced 
asylum domestic systems in Europe.  
2. PROTECTED-ENTRY PROCEDURES 
2.1. Background 
 
In conformity with Tampere’s call to ‘offer guarantees to those who seek protection in or 
access to the European Union’ (§3), the Commission launched a Study on the feasibility of 
processing asylum claims outside the EU against the background of the common European 
asylum system and the goal of a common asylum procedure1040. The study engaged in the 
scrutiny of the various protected-entry procedures employed by the EU Member States at 
the time and identified different avenues for policy approximation, ranging from the 
maintenance of individual initiatives to the creation of Schengen Asylum Visas. 
Subsequently, the EC Thessaloniki conclusions invited the Commission to examine 'all 
parameters in order to ensure more orderly and managed entry in the EU of persons in 
need of international protection’ (§26). The Italian Presidency organised a seminar in 
October 2003, where the feasibility study was submitted to discussion. ‘[I]t became clear 
from the Rome Seminar and from Member States’ relevant legislative practice that with 
regard to the potential of Protected-Entry Procedures, there is not the same level of 
common perspective and confidence among Member States as exists vis-à-vis 
resettlement’. The Commission announced, accordingly, that it did not ‘plan to suggest the 
setting up […] of an EU Protected Entry Procedure mechanism as a self standing policy 
proposal’. It noted, however, that ‘in certain circumstances, a protected entry in the EU of 
                                                 
1039  PACE, Assessment of transit and processing centres as a response to mixed flows of migrants and 
asylum seekers, C Jonker Rapporteur, 13.06.2007, Doc. 11304, § 61; PACE, Resolution 1569 (2007), 
Assessment of transit and processing centres as a response to mixed flows of migrants and asylum 
seekers. 
1040  Study on the feasibility of processing asylum claims outside the EU against the background of the 
common European asylum system and the goal of a common asylum procedure, 2003 [PEP Feasibility 
Study hereinafter], available at:  
 http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/asylum/studies/doc_asylum_studies_en.htm.  
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persons with immediate and urgent protection needs could nevertheless be procedurally 
facilitated […], though at the full discretion of individual Member States […]’1041. 
 
After wide consultations of the relevant stakeholders in the 2007 Green Paper process, the 
question of how to address mixed flows and ‘to establish effective protection-sensitive entry 
management systems’ has resurfaced. In this connection, the Commission has promised to 
‘examine ways and mechanisms capable of allowing for the differentiation between persons 
in need of protection and other categories of migrants before they reach the border of 
potential host States, such as Protected Entry Procedures and a more flexible use of the 
visa regime, based on protection considerations’1042. 
2.2. Presentation 
 
Within the new approaches for the Commission to explore concerning access to asylum 
procedures, The Stockholm Programme calls for ‘certain procedures for examination of 
applications for asylum’ to be introduced in ‘main transit countries […], in which Member 
States could participate on a voluntary basis’ (§6.2.3). A previous draft invited ‘the Council 
and the Commission to develop methods to identify those who are in need of international 
protection in “mixed flows” […]’1043, and a still earlier version expressly called on the EU 
institutions ‘to examining the scope for new forms of responsibility for protection such as 
procedures for protected entry and the issuing of humanitarian visas’1044. 
 
The French delegation, in its proposal to ‘establishing a partnership with migrants’ countries 
of origin and of transit, enhancing Member States’ joint maritime operations and finding 
innovative solutions for access to asylum procedures’, as an alternative to setting up an ad 
hoc protection programme in Libya, has suggested the introduction of a protected-entry 
procedure from that country. The French delegation has invited the Commission to consider 
‘the possibility of introducing, in Member States’ diplomatic representations in Libya, and 
with the logistical support of the European Asylum Support Office […] a specific procedure 
for the examination of applications for asylum’1045. The procedure ‘would aim to identify 
applications which […] did not appear to be manifestly unfounded. […] Persons whose 
applications were not considered to be manifestly unfounded would be authorised to enter 
EU territory […] in order to submit an application for asylum there’. 
2.3. Assessment 
 
to the feasibility study, a protected-entry procedure allows ‘a third-country national [either] 
to approach the potential host State outside its territory with a claim for asylum or other 
form of international protection, [or] to be granted an entry permit in case of a positive 
response to that claim, be it preliminary or final’. The French proposal appears to be a 
hybrid between these two possibilities. It foresees the introduction at EU Member States’ 
embassies in Libya of a screening procedure to detect ‘manifestly founded’ claims or else 
applications which ‘did not appear to be manifestly unfounded’. This may pose problems of 
correlation with regard to the concept of ‘arguable claims’ under the ECHR. The term 
‘arguable’ is not readily identifiable with the claim not being ‘manifestly ill-founded’, since 
at times the Strasbourg Court has sustained the arguability of a claim rejecting its 
foundedness only afterwards. In T.I., for instance, the Court considered the claim arguable, 
                                                 
1041  Improving access to durable solutions, § 35. 
1042  Policy Plan on Asylum, § 5.2.3. (emphasis in original). 
1043  Draft Stockholm Programme, 16.10.2009, § 5.2.3. 
1044  Draft Stockholm Programme, 06.10.2009, § 5.2.2. 
1045  Migration situation in the Mediterranean, p. 7. 
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because the case raised concerns about the risks faced upon expulsion, although it was 
declared inadmissible in the end.1046   
 
The study also suggests that these procedures, which have been running under different 
forms in the majority of the Member States of the EU-15, can be offered ‘either as an 
exclusive channel to protection in a host State, as a complementary channel, or as an 
exceptional practice to be activated ad hoc’. It ensues from the text of the proposal that 
the French delegation envisages the procedure as an exclusive channel to access the EU. 
Otherwise, it would detract from the deterrent effect it pursues. Yet, it appears that 
exclusivity ‘would shift rather than solve any problem of abuse’. ‘[P]ersons arriving as 
asylum applicants today could also chose to simply go underground tomorrow, and bypass 
any form of system whatsoever’. The development of this mechanism ‘can only be brought 
about if protection seekers find it favourable to select protected-entry procedures over the 
smuggling option’. It may be worthy to remember that spontaneous asylum seekers could 
not be penalized on account of their illegal entry in accordance with article 31 GC.1047 
 
The first thing to decide is the definition of the beneficiaries under this scheme. The French 
proposal addresses the ‘examination of applications for asylum’. Under article 2(b) of the 
current Procedures Directive, ‘[a]ny application for international protection is presumed to 
be an application for asylum, unless the person concerned explicitly requests another kind 
of protection that can be applied for separately’. Thus, subsidiary protection, unless claimed 
for explicitly and separately, should be understood as being covered by the definition. In 
addition, it should be taken into account that the Qualification Directive establishes, in 
articles 13 and 18 that Member States shall grant refugee status or subsidiary protection 
status to a third country national or a stateless person, who qualifies for it in accordance 
with the Directive. For the sake of legal consistency, the introduction of additional 
qualification criteria for the purposes of protected-entry procedures, based on family ties, 
linguistic abilities or previous visits to the country concerned, should be excluded.1048  
 
The ‘procedures yet to be defined’1049, according to which entry from the EU Member States’ 
embassies in Libya would be allowed, as they translate rights individuals directly derive 
from EU law, would have to be established in a way that does not ‘render practically 
impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of [the] rights [concerned]’1050. Such 
legislation would also have to make possible the related ‘right to effective judicial 
protection’ that article 47 EUCFR guarantees1051. Several options could be explored.  
 
(1) Full assessments of asylum claims should not be conducted at embassies. The 
difficulties of providing access to an effective remedy abroad have already been addressed 
in the framework of off-shore processing schemes above. If the procedural requirements of 
EU Law are to be guaranteed, access to information in the adequate language, legal aid, 
counselling, representation and access to an appeal, have to be ensured.  
(2) A better option would, thus, be to grant LTV visas, according to the relevant provisions 
of the CCV, to those alleging a right to seek asylum, a ‘real risk’ of ill treatment or a ‘well 
founded fear’ of persecution. A valuable alternative to smuggling would be introduced in 
this case.  
                                                 
1046  ECtHR, T.I. v UK, Appl. No. 43844/98, 07.03.2000. 
1047  PEP Feasibility Study, p. 61-63. 
1048  This is what most countries have done in their protected entry procedures in the past ; see PEP 
Feasibility Study, p. 73 ff. 
1049  Migration situation in the Mediterranean, p. 7. 
1050  ECJ, Rewe, 158/80, 1981 ECR 1805, § 5; Peterbroeck, C-312/93, 1995 ECR I-4599, § 12. 
1051  ECJ, Verholen and Others, C-87/90 and C-89/90, 1991 ECR I-3757, § 24. 
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(3) Otherwise, if pre-screening proceedings were to be devised in order to establish the 
arguability of a claim prior to the delivery of a visa for entry, further resources would have 
to be mobilised. Recourse could be had to NGOs, the UNHCR and the EASO for the purpose 
of providing legal counselling, translation and representation in situ. Claims could be lodged 
in person or by post. Interviews should be held by the ‘competent national authorities’ for 
the guarantees of effective remedies to be ensured. This could entail the secondment to 
embassies and consulates of personnel from national asylum authorities1052 or be 
undertaken by consulate officials themselves, if sufficient prior training is provided. ‘[T]he 
guarantees accorded to such persons in the country concerned while their applications 
[are] examined’1053 would have to reach the level of ‘effective protection’ discussed earlier. 
To avoid imbalances that may amount to discrimination between asylum applicants abroad 
and spontaneous arrivals to Europe the level of proof could be adapted. In any event, 
appeals of negative decisions would remain a major concern1054. Compliance with article 13 
ECHR and 47 EUCFR require that real access, in law and in practice, to effective remedies 
be made available in every individual case. This may ultimately entail that entry has to be 
allowed with a LTV visa for the purpose of judicial review, if no other meaningful option 
remains.  
 
(4) An intermediate possibility would be to grant entry on LTV visas on the basis of a 
differentiated presumption. For those still in their country of origin claiming a right to seek 
asylum or a threat of refoulement, a LTV visa could be delivered on the assumption that 
they run such a risk. It would be for the asylum authorities of the Member States 
concerned to disprove the allegation. On the contrary, those claiming a right to (leave to 
seek) asylum from third countries would have to prove, prior to a LTV visa being delivered, 
that their life or physical integrity are in peril. 
 
Since international and EU law obligations can be engaged from abroad, in a context of 
prevailing extraterritorial controls, to ensure that the right to seek asylum and to non-
refoulement remain accessible in law and in practice, a common European system of 
protected-entry procedures should be codified to provide a safe alternative to illegal entry. 
Article 78(2)(g) TFEU provides the Council and the European Parliament with the legal basis 
to adopt legislative acts ‘for the purpose of managing inflows of people applying for asylum 
or subsidiary or temporary protection’. It would further appear that such measures shall be 
adopted as an integral part of the CEAS that the Union has to develop. In any event, such 
procedures would offer a complementary means of access to asylum that would not 
substitute for the provision of adequate protection to spontaneous arrivals. 
2.4. Recommendations 
 
From Article 78(2)(g) TFEU, it appears that some sort of mechanism shall be introduced 
‘for the purpose of managing inflows of people applying for asylum or subsidiary or 
temporary protection’. Because international and EU law obligations in regard of 
refugees and asylum seekers can be engaged extraterritorially, in an environment of 
pervading pre-border controls, the codification of a system of protected-entry 
procedures to ensure access to protection in a safe and legal manner is advisable.  
                                                 
1052  The Swiss model provided an example of the secondment of asylum decision-makers abroad; see PEP 
Feasibility Study, p. 129 ff. Yet, the model is currently under discussion ; see: Rapport relatif à la 
modification de la loi sur l’asile et de la loi fédérale sur les étrangers, 19.12.2009., ‘Suppression de la 
possibilité de présenter une demande d’asile à l’étranger,’ § 1.3.3. (we thank F. Maiani for this 
information).  
1053  Migration situation in the Mediterranean, p. 7. 
1054  The Swiss Refugee Council has argued that the possibility to appeal from abroad is not effective, in: 
PEP Feasibility Study, p. 135. 
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Several arrangements could be envisaged:  
Full assessments of asylum claims should be excluded. The difficulties of full off-shore 
processing have already been highlighted with regard to national protection 
programmes. 
LTV visas could be delivered to those alleging a ‘real risk’ of ill treatment or a ‘well 
founded fear’ of persecution. This option would best accommodate protection concerns, 
but may render pre-border migration controls redundant. 
LTV visas could be granted to arguable claims. Pre-screening proceedings would have to 
be introduced in conformity with relevant procedural standards under international and 
EU law, including effective remedies. As with the first option, practical and legal 
difficulties to ensure effective remedies may lead to the consideration of the fourth 
alternative. 
LTV visas could be issued on the basis of a differentiated presumption. Claims submitted 
from the country of origin would be presumed arguable, unless the asylum authorities of 
the Member State concerned disprove it. Claims submitted from third countries would be 
presumed unfounded, unless the applicant produces proof of the contrary. 
 In any event, these procedures must remain complementary to spontaneous arrivals.  
3. A PROPOSAL FOR A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO 
ACCESS: PROTECTION-SENSITIVE ENTRY MANAGE-
MENT SYSTEMS AT ALL STAGES OF THE REFUGEE 
FLOW 
 
Several actors have advocated for the introduction of protection-sensitive components in 
border management protocols. The UNHCR’s ‘10-Point Plan of Action’, addressing mixed 
migration flows, provides valuable guidance on this point1055.  In some countries, NGOs 
work in tandem with the UNHCR arranging with border guards for the independent 
monitoring of border controls, at the external border and in its immediate vicinity1056. 
Nonetheless, the international protection implications of extraterritorial actions remain 
largely unchecked. In the 16 October 2009 draft, The Stockholm Programme invited ‘the 
Council and the Commission to develop methods to identify those who are in need of 
international protection in “mixed flows”’ as part of the external dimension of asylum 
(§5.2.3). The final version, however, relays on the EASO for that task, and solely in the 
context of joint maritime patrols, requesting it ‘to cooperate with FRONTEX wherever 
possible’(§5.1). Considering the wording and the extension of article 78(2)(g) TFEU, the 
fact that the Asylum Agency will be endowed with no power to pass legally binding 
measures for this purpose and that it has only been entrusted with the task of developing 
techniques to differentiate asylum seekers travelling in mix flows when they find 
                                                 
1055  UNHCR, Refugee Protection and Mixed Migration: A 10-Point Plan of Action, (revision) January 2007, 
available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/45b0c09b2.pdf; Implementing the Ten-Point Plan 
of Action in Southern Europe: Activities Undertaken by UNHCR to Address Mixed Migration in the 
Context of the Mediterranean/Atlantic Arrivals, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/452b6f764.pdf 
1056  Tripartite Memorandum of Understanding on Modalities of Mutual Co-operation and Coordination to 
Support the Access of Asylum Seekers to the Territory of, and the Asylum Procedures of the Republic 
of Hungary, 28.12.2006, available at : 
 http://www.unhcr-
budapest.org/hungary/images/stories/news/docs/03_Access%20to%20territory/3_2_tripartite%20agr
eement_HUN/HUNtripartiteENG.pdf. The 2007 report: Asylum Seekers’ Access to Territory and to the 
Asylum Procedure in the Republic of Hungary is accessible on:  
 http://helsinki.webdialog.hu/dokumentum/Border_Monitoring_Report_2007_ENG_FINAL.pdf.   
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themselves already ‘at’ the external border of the EU Member States constitute serious 
limitations1057.  
 
There is a pressing need for a comprehensive approach to the issue of access to 
international protection in the EU, which requires the prior acknowledgment by the EU 
Member States of the mix character of the migratory flows to which they are confronted 
and the recognition of extraterritorial protection-related obligations that may be engaged 
by the actions or omissions of their agents when they operate abroad. The rights of 
refugees and asylum seekers travelling in mix flows should not be compromised by the 
extraterritorial intervention of the EU Member States. Those rights should be taken into 
account at all the stages in which EU migration and/or border controls are carried out.  
 
Comprehensiveness should be understood in two complementary ways. On the one hand, 
several layers of action should be contemplated so that the different levels in which EU 
intervention occurs are appropriately covered. At the same time, the management of 
refugee inflows should be carried out multilaterally, in ‘partnership and cooperation with 
third countries’. The role other stakeholders could play should also be considered. Only a 
multilateral approach may lead to practical results. All relevant actors should thus be 
incorporated as partners to the process of border surveillance and migration control. Their 
contribution, especially in terms of monitoring and counselling, is essential.  
 
Action should be deployed at three different fronts: 
 
Engagement with the regions of origin and transit: A meaningful engagement with the 
regions of origin and transit may diminish the urge for displacement, if the root causes of 
forced migration are adequately addressed. In the design of Regional Protection Programs 
and, in particular, of the resettlement component it includes, the needs and capacities of 
the countries hosting large refugee populations should be fully taken into account in a spirit 
of shared responsibility. Only multilateral collaboration, incorporating an inter-agency 
factor, in close and continuous cooperation with the UNHCR and other relevant stakeholder 
organisations, may yield satisfactory results at this level.  
 
The institutional framework The Hague Conference of International Private Law provides 
could be used to this end1058. This proposal is consistent with the call in The Stockholm 
Programme to the EU institutions to furthering cooperation in civil matters within the 
framework of the Conference. The European Council urges, indeed, ‘[t]he Union [to] 
continue to support the Conference and [to] encourage its partners to ratify the 
conventions where the EU is or will become a Party or where all Member States are Parties’ 
(§7.6). The European Council considers this to be ‘very important with a view to interacting 
with third countries in a secure and legal environment’ (§3.5.1). On this account, the EU 
could rely on the Hague Conference for the ‘adopt[ion] [of] measures for a common 
European asylum system comprising: […] partnership and cooperation with third countries 
for the purpose of managing the inflows of people applying for [international protection]’, 
as mandated by article 78(2)(g) TFEU. The experience the Conference has earned through 
the years, assembling the EU and its Member States along with other countries in the 
South and achieving consensus in delicate matters affecting the rights of migrants, comes 
to its credit. The 1993 Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of 
                                                 
1057  Position of the Council at first reading with a view to the adoption of the Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Asylum Support Office, Council doc. 16626/09, 
16.02.2010. 
1058  See note 157 above. 
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Inter-country Adoption constitutes a case in point1059. The Convention was negotiated and 
ratified both by western countries and developing States through the intermediary of The 
Hague Conference. In addition, pursuant to its articles 6 to 11, it comprises a series of 
equitable arrangements with regard to its implementation, which is entrusted to duly 
accredited Central Authorities in each Signatory Party, appropriately staffed by qualified 
personnel, and fully competent to carry out the tasks required by the Convention in a 
proper way. Central Authorities are supposed, moreover, to co-operate among themselves 
for the purposes of the Convention. In view of the results achieved, and ‘at regular 
intervals’ in any case, ‘[t]he Secretary General of the Hague Conference […] shall […] 
convene a Special Commission in order to review the practical operation of the 
Convention’1060, arbitrating among the Parties in case of conflicting positions. Entrusting the 
conduct of the negotiations and supervision of multilateral arrangements for the 
management of refugee inflows to a neutral actor seems a good way to ensuring parity 
among the several States involved.   
 
Action at the external borders and beyond: The reinforcement of domestic asylum systems 
should prove the best option to manage mixed migration flows, providing effective access 
to international protection to those requiring it, while fairly dealing with non-refugee 
arrivals. The incorporation of protection-sensitive elements into the system of border and 
migration control is crucial. Training, monitoring and reporting of actions undertaken to 
ensure compliance with refugee law and human rights should be factored in the design of 
the Integrated Border Management System and the Global Approach to Migration the EU is 
progressively developing. All actors susceptible of encountering refugees in the course of 
their migration or border control activities should receive specific training in refugee law 
and human rights and work on clear instructions on how to handle asylum claims so that 
the EU Member States properly fulfil their obligations. In this respect, visas, carrier 
sanctions, ILOs, FRONTEX and RABIT legislation should be clearly streamlined. All the 
actors concerned should incorporate in their modus operandi clear instructions and legally-
binding protocols with regard to the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers providing 
them with sufficient procedural guarantees. An obligation should be introduced for the EU 
Member States and it agents to report periodically on the concrete initiatives they 
undertake to ensure compliance with their international and EU protection obligations. As 
identified in the first part of the study, transparency and accountability in this area need to 
be reinforced to guarantee legal and democratic oversight. Referral to asylum authorities 
upon embarkation or disembarkation should be swift and adequate. Information 
arrangements and reception conditions should be appropriate to deal with the caseload 
concerned. The EASO, in close cooperation with the UNHCR and the relevant NGOs, should 
provide independent monitoring and legal and material assistance throughout the migration 
journey, not only at points of entry, but at every stage in which EU border or migration 
controls are conducted. The Asylum Agency, in addition, will provide a forum for exchanges 
among the actors involved, ensuring the coordination of the scheme. Against this 
background, Asylum Support Teams should be deployed not only where particular 
pressures are involved, but at any time joint patrols are launched. Where ILOs would be 
stationed, EU asylum experts should be seconded too. This will guarantee a harmonious 
approach to asylum seekers and the uniform application of the EU acquis. 
 
Engagement with single asylum seekers: As an alternative to irregular arrivals, a system of 
protected-entry procedures could be established to ensure safe and legal access to refugee 
                                                 
1059  Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption of 29 May 
1993 [International Adoption Convention hereinafter], available at: 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=69.  
1060  Article 42 International Adoption Convention. 
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processing. Several alternatives have been outlined above. A balanced option would be to 
provide entry on the basis of a differentiated presumption that could always be reversed. 
For those in the country of origin, claiming a 'real risk' of ill treatment or a threat of 
refoulement, a visa should be delivered for the purpose of accessing asylum procedures in 
Europe, unless proof on the contrary is provided by the asylum authorities concerned. From 
those present in a third country, prior to a visa being delivered, the submission of sufficient 
proof of persecution or of a 'real risk' of ill treatment would be required. The system could 
be based on LTV visas in the short run and then turn into a system of Schengen asylum 
visas. Beneficiaries would have to be distributed evenly in Europe in accordance to a 
predetermined key ensuring fair responsibility-sharing. Family ties, cultural links and 
personal preference could also be taken into account to guarantee the humane treatment 
of applicants and good integration prospects.  
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4. KEY FINDINGS 
 
– The proposed Protected-Entry Procedures give rise to findings that are common 
to those arrived at with regard to the EU Resettlement Programme and Regional 
Protection Programmes. We refer back to them as presented above.  
– As far as off-shore processing initiatives are concerned, such as the ad hoc 
protection programme in Libya that the French delegation has suggested, it is 
highly uncertain that the programme can be pursued in practice in accordance 
with international and EU law standards. Considering the overly complex system 
that would have to be developed for that purpose, the initiative should be 
abandoned. 
– In the medium term, the preferred option is to develop a comprehensive 
approach to access to international protection in the EU, which incorporates 
protection-sensitive components into the system of border management and 
entry control at all its stages, recognising the mix character of migration flows 
and the extraterritorial applicability of human rights’ obligations. Such an 
approach requires a multilateral management to be effective, conducted in 
partnership with the regions and countries of first asylum, the UNHCR and other 
relevant stakeholders. 
5. RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1. Protected entry procedures 
 
– From Article 78(2)(g) TFEU, it appears that some sort of mechanism shall be 
introduced ‘for the purpose of managing inflows of people applying for asylum or 
subsidiary or temporary protection’. Because international and EU law obligations 
in regard of refugees and asylum seekers can be engaged extraterritorially, in an 
environment of pervading pre-border controls, the codification of a system of 
protected-entry procedures to ensure access to protection in a safe and legal 
manner is advisable.  
 
– Several arrangements could be envisaged:  
 
1. Full assessments of asylum claims should be excluded. The difficulties 
of full off-shore processing have already been highlighted with regard 
to national protection programmes. 
2. LTV visas could be delivered to those alleging a ‘real risk’ of ill 
treatment or a ‘well founded fear’ of persecution. This option would 
best accommodate protection concerns, but may render pre-border 
migration controls redundant. 
3. LTV visas could be granted to arguable claims. Pre-screening 
proceedings would have to be introduced in conformity with relevant 
procedural standards under international and EU law, including 
effective remedies. As with the first option, practical and legal 
difficulties to ensure effective remedies may lead to the consideration 
of the fourth alternative. 
4. LTV visas could be issued on the basis of a differentiated presumption. 
Claims submitted from the country of origin would be presumed 
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arguable, unless the asylum authorities of the Member State 
concerned disprove it. Claims submitted from third countries would be 
presumed unfounded, unless the applicant produces proof of the 
contrary. 
– In any event, these procedures must remain complementary to spontaneous 
arrivals. 
5.2. National or ad hoc protection programmes 
 
– The selection of addresses shall neither be discriminatory nor amount to a 
penalty, as articles 3 and 31 GC have to be observed. Detention must comply 
with article 5 ECHR levels, both at sea and upon arrival to Libya. Transfers to that 
country cannot be automatic, since the procedural guarantees attached to 
protection against refoulement, as established in the ECHR and the EUCFR, must 
be fulfilled.  
– On this account, it is very uncertain that the idea of ad hoc protection 
programmes can be pursued in practice in compliance with international and EU 
law standards. 
– The preferred line of action is the investment in better managed and better 
resourced asylum domestic systems in Europe. 
5.3. Protection-Sensitive Entry Management systems 
 
– In the medium term, the preferred option is to develop a comprehensive 
approach to access to international protection in the EU, which incorporates 
protection-sensitive components into the system of border management and 
entry control at all its stages, recognising the mixed character of migration flows 
and the extraterritorial applicability of human rights’ obligations. Such an 
approach requires a multilateral management to be effective, conducted in 
partnership with the regions and countries of first asylum, the UNHCR and other 
relevant stakeholders. 
– Action should be deployed at three levels: 
 
1. Engagement with the regions of origin and transit, possibly in a 
neutral forum. 
2. Action at the external borders and beyond, at all the stages of the 
refugee flow. 
3. Extraterritorial engagement with single asylum seekers. 
 

